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Zol.tun Kanyo 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Our ti'.wi in S'z«':yed which has now been widened to in-
clude col lrriyues work j iki in Budapest, Debrecen and Pecs 
has ory.iru zed s<'ve ira 1 International conferences, some of 
which wen.' hel.il in Ihmya try, others abroad, the language of 
some confidences was Hungarian, in other cases we used 
English, German and French. W^ have published the material 
of these conferences i n St mlia pootica in Hungarian (vols. 
1 and 6.), however we w.mted to publish the important es-
says presented at our conferences in a volume published in 
abroad. We sent the: whole material of our international 
conferences to Professor Margolis in the USA, who, with 
Professor J. flint ikka, was trying to organize a new aes-
thetic series. I gave my editorial remarks to Professor 
Margolis, but he did not reply to our questions, and so 
we asked him to send back the studies, unable to achieve 
anything. Therefore we had to take things into our own 
hands. We have aLready published E. Lang's paper "Die 
Sprache Edgar Wibeaus" in Studia poetica 3, pp. 183-241. 
Z. Kanyo's, G. I.. Permjakov's and L, Tarnay's paper on 
simple forms in Studia poetica 4, pp. 7-47, 49-75, 09-167. 
liowever, the majority of the studies were still waiting 
for publication. At last our aim has been achieved: in vol-
ume 5 of Studia poetica we present the material of our 
working group in Vienna 1979, and an important part of our 
conference in Szeged 1980 and,, in the last part, we pub-
lish some new material on fictionality. 
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Certainly it is rather late to publish the studies of 
the 1979 and 1980 conferences, and some authors have al-
ready published their studies in well-known literary peri-
odicals; e.g. Woods's paper, a critical reaction to the 
critical remarks on his fietiona1ity-book - was published 
in the second special issue of Poetics on fictional lty and 
II.H. Lieb has published his excellent study in an enlarged 
form in Poetics. (1981) We understand the Intention of these 
scholars, however, we are here publishing the studies which 
have already appeared else here as well as papers, which 
have been waiting for publication. From our conference 
"Reference and Fj.ct.iona 1 11y" we have to admit that we lost 
a paper during our correspondance with Professor Margolis, 
It was written by U. Niklas, a young assistant professor 
at Warsaw University, but in has proved impossible to get 
her manuscript back. Another loss is the essential part or 
professor Pole's rather long and interesting paper: he has 
changed his original opinion on several questions of fic-
tionality and asked us only to publish the introduction, 
as the terminology had to be changed as well. Professor 
Pe1c is working on a book on fictiona1ity, this lecture in 
its abbreviated form should be considered its first ver-
sion. It is a pity that M. Biervisch did not write his 
valuable contribution, as his linguistic and poetic studies 
are very highly appreciated in our circle; I have omitted 
the discussion of his ideas in my Introduction. This In-
troduction was a paper consecrated to the main problems of 
fictionality nowadays giving the possibility to speak about 
reference and fictionality seen in philosophy, linguistics 
and in theory of literature. Certainly the majority of the 
authors would probably change some details in their origi-
nal text, but they are publish.ed here - with the exception 
of Prof. Pelc's paper-in their original form. 
The second chapter of our volume contains some stud-
ies from our conference in Szeged 1980. This conference 
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was not uniquely consecrated to fictionality, Its title 
was "The Structure of Narrative". 
As we have already mentioned some papers from this confer-
ence were published in Studia poetica 3 and 4 most of the 
papers to be published in this volume under the title 
"Fictionality and Narratology". However some papers could 
not be published in this section, it is to be hoped that 
they will appear soon in another volume of Studia poetica. 
It was at our conference that Prof. H. H. Lieb read his 
valuable study - a very successful nominalistic summary of 
the use of fictionality. It appears here in its original 
form, i.e. without the enlargement in Poetics X (1981): 
541-559. A. Steube tried to apply the results of her lin-
guistic analyses to fictionality, our colleagues in Sze-
ged - K. Csuri and A. Bernath - wished to explicate the 
role of fictionality in the analysis of literary works and 
to deal with some classical theoretical questions on fic-
tionality that appeared in the German theory of literature, 
our friend from Pecs, A. Bokay, has formulated his ideas in 
a hermeneutical language. M. Bierwisch has not formulated 
his manuscript, so we cannot publish it. At the end of this 
chapter you may read Professor L. Dolezel's valuable con-
tribution on narratology and fictionality. 
The last chapter in our volume "Studies on Fiction-
ality" publishes some new material from our group on fic-
tionality. I formulated a rather long essay on "Russell's 
View on Fictionality" for the second Fictionality-lssue 
of Poetics XI. (because of its length it was not accepted 
then Russell's semantic conception can be considered the 
representative of a nominalistic tendency in semantics 
(for the distinction between nominalistic and realistic 
tendencies in semantics cf. my essay "The Main Views on 
Fictionality in the Logico-Semantic Tradition" Studia po-
etica 3, pp. 115-124. and the study on Meinongian seman-
tics "Semantik fUr heimatlose Gegenstjnde" Ibid. pp. 3-114J 
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Our present volume is brought to a close with L. Tarnay's 
study introducing a dialogical point of view in the expli-
cation of fictionality. 
REFERENCE AND FICTIONALITY 
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REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS 
Introduction 
Zoltan Kanyo 
A. Jozsef University, Szeged 
Let us begin with a terminological question: Is the 
title of our working group correctly formulated at all? Do 
not the terms "reference" and "fictional text" stand in 
such opposition that any efforts to reconcile them are nec-
essarily nullified? Certainly I do not hold this opinion: 
on the contrary, I am convinced that it is perfectly legi-
timate to speak about reference in fictional texts, but I 
would not be surprised if, e.g., a literary critic found 
this formulation strange or even inadmissible. Terminolo-
gical disagreements are as a rule nothing but the materi-
alisation of conceptual divergencies and as a matter of fact 
we should take into consideration right from the beginning 
the fact that there are different conceptions about fic— 
tionality and possibility of reference in fictional texts in 
accordance with the scientific paradigm which one assumes to 
be right. Our discussion would benefit considerably from the 
systematization of these special paradigms, this task can-
not, however, be accomplished here in an extensive form, as 
it implies a minute and thorough historical treatment of at 
least three branches of science which all have a respectable 
tradition of some thousand years. What I can offer instead 
is to throw light on some main problems which I consider 
from the point of view of our present discussion rather de-
cisive in connection with a theory or conception which can 
be held to be representative of the development of the 
branch of science or even - if this word can be allowed in 
this context - to be an archetype. 
- 14 -
Several arguments can be advanced In favour of ordering 
our short overall view so that poetics should be treated 
first: as everybody knows the first theoretical conceptions 
about literature were inseparable from the perception of its 
fictional character. Man became aware of the theoretical 
problem of fictionality in poetics, and even today fiction-
ality and literature are so closely associated that they are 
sometimes confused, i.e. it is thought that everything which 
is literature, is fictional, and everything which is fic-
tional is literature, or the one is taken as a subclass of 
the other. These views are certainly erroneous as fiction 
can be used in any field of research and even in everyday 
communication without any poetic goal or effect. Literature 
offers nonetheless the most impressive examples of fictional 
texts and literary theory does not cease from producing 
newer and newer explanations for this peculiar phenomenon. 
We would have a veritable embarras de richesse if we were to 
report all the conceptions which have been elaborated in 
literary study under the heading of fictionality, realism, 
etc. Instead of that I shall confine my remarks to a clas-
sical work which determined the development in this fiel'd in 
a rather elementary way and is - curious as it may sound -
in most respects superior to its followers. I mean Aristot-
le's Poetics, a work which is nowadays seen in quite a dif-
ferent light from some decades ago thanks to the philologi-
cal-research of recent years and to the theoretical inves-
tigations of modern poetics although these are based on 
methods and principles other than those on which Aristote-
lian Poetics rested, albeit appearing as a true analogon of 
the Aristotelian teohne. What I am aiming at in connection 
with this classical work of theoretical poetics is a rather 
sacrilegious attempt at translating the main theses and 
presuppositions of this work concerning fictionality into 
the metalanguage of modern poetics and at scrutinizing the 
consequences which follow from them in order to make them 
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more understandable in a way which does not contradict the 
original Aristotelian spirit. The main arguments of Aristo-
telian Poetics as concerns our topic can be summed up as 
follows: 
.1; There is a class of human activities determined by spe-
cial features which can be accounted for by general human 
abilities in imitation, rhythm and melody. This class of 
activities will be named poetic activities. 
2; The original manifestations of poetic activities are spe-
cial forms of oral communication. 
3; Poetic activity imitates human actions In well structured 
stories. 
4; The actions narrated in poetic works represent, according 
to the nature of poetic activity, possible or necessary 
actions. 
5; Poetic activities as a class of human actions are gov-
erned by general, partly metaphysical, rules. 
These theses need some elucidation and comment however, 
we can touch here only upon the most important connections. 
The first mentioned thesis expresses the assumption 
that the predicates "poetic", "literature", "poeticality" 
"literariness", "estheticity" etc. can be applied to a well-
defined class of activities or to the results of these ac-
tivities. Although supported both by the widespread naive 
conception about literature and by the main schools of mod-
ern „poetics from the Russian Formalists to Generative Po-
etics, this assumption seems rather dubious, since neither 
traditional nor modern poetics have succeeded in setting up 
a full list of features by means of which the class of po-
etic phenomena could be unambigously determined and any such 
attempt proves necessarily hopeless in an intensive examina-
tion. We do not wish to deny that there are human abilities 
which establish some features recurrent in some or even all 
poetic activities or texts, but this is only half of the 
truth, because there are also different abilities which can-
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not be explained on the basis of a static anthropological 
structure. There is a possible solution of this problem if 
we raise the second thesis out of the rather subordinate 
position it occupies in Aristotelian Poetics and declare 
it as central. In this way poetic activity appears as a 
special form of communication which rests upon convention. 
It will certainly presuppose some human abilities, but in 
addition- to this it will take into account some other fac-
tors as well, e.g. the special interests and goals of the 
community, whether the convention determining the special 
poetic activity is commonly accepted, institutionalized or 
is known only by a minority or even is persecuted, etc. In 
this view poetic activity and consequently literature have 
reality only in the context of a historically, sociological-
ly and culturally, determined community disposing of a com-
mon convention or conventions and the comprehensive notion 
of literature or poetic activity can at the very best be 
conceived of as a family notion, in the sense of the late 
Wittgenstein, comprising a series of various literary lan-
guage games. In full agreement with similar statements made 
by Searle^" and others I would insists upon the fact that, 
there is no convention embracing all the factual and pos-
sible poetic activities, and consequently there being no 
well definable poetic activity or literature as such, it 
cannot also be postulated as the starting-point of the the-
ory. Aristotle's approach has for this reason some funda-
mental difficulties, namely, it is not possible to define 
the subject of poetics according to his proposal. 
Among the distinctive features of poetic activities he 
mentions first mimesis. This much discussed notion expres-
ses an inborn human ability and at the same time it points 
to the special semantic significance of such activities or 
of their results as a rule4 As we are here interested in 
semantic questions this notion deserves some examination. 
If anybody thinks that "imitation" is too narrow a concept 
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tion for literary semantics, he should be reminded that 
this term should not be taken literally but as a special 
sort of understanding or knowledge dependent on factual re-
lations - the fact of this dependance will certainly be -
admitted generally, although its scope will be variously 
determined. As to the Aristotelian position according to 
the 3rd thesis we have to take into consideration the fact 
that mimesis, i.e. the correspondence between events and 
narration, rests upon the same structure of action in both 
cases, or, to put it in another way, narration imitates ac-
tual events in so far as the structures of real events are 
mirrored in the fundamental linguistic and narrative set-
tings serving as essential components in narration. Narra-
tion itself is labelled "mythos", a word that had the same 
connotation as the term fiction has nowadays and is defined 
as follows: "by 'mithos' X mean the arrangement of the 
2 
events" . This means that at the level of narration there 
is no question of direct imitation, since narration is con-
sidered as constructed or invented according to the re-
quirements of beauty by the poet, this maker of mythos and 
verses. The question of imitation and of reference can how-
ever be raised in a more general connection: If the poet 
invents a story then it has no referents which could be 
pointed out as such in the actual world, but it still ap-
plies to life as it represents an action structure which is 
bound to be analogous to a real action structure. Therefore 
if it proves to be consistent and ifulfills all the social 
and cultural requirements for which Aristotle has the la-
conic expression beauty, this action will be conceived of 
as a possible or a necessary action, i.e. something that 
can or must happen. In this sense narration acquires gener-
ality by.transcending the linkage to the actual world and 
to a series of concrete actions which at a primitive stage 
can be characteristic of certain poetic activities (e.g. 
iambic poetryl and this transcendence that poetry achieves 
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according to its very nature Beans seaantically a shift 
from actual reference to Modality. It should be emphasized 
that Aristotle assumes, just like modern modal logic* that 
the actual wo&ld is a possible state of affairs, therefore 
he does not see any problem in the embedding of reports of 
actual events or persons in poetic narration. As he writes 
"there is nothing to prevent acme actual events being the 
kind that might probably happen, i.e. are capable of hap-
pening""*. 
I cannot at present treat in full the Aristotelian con-
ception about reference and generality in poetic narration. . 
This theme, however, deserves thorough attention, since the 
sense of the conception outlined before has been profoundly 
misunderstood in literary theory and the consequences of 
this misunderstanding exert .even today a negative: influence 
on theoretic research in literary study. The basis of this • 
misinterpretation was the inability to comprehend the broad 
and deep logical foundations of this poetics, the original 
logical notions having been mutilated and the modality prob-
lem taken into parenthesis. Everything had to be valued in 
accordance with actuality, and this constraint and its • 
frustration gave birth to several peculiar ideas in poetics 
such a sociological types as referents, the opposition be-
tween naive imitation and free creation as archetypal poetic 
forms of self-expression, the explication of truth in lit-
erature by means of a category of particularity that should 
unify in itself generality and individuality in a dialecti-
cal way, etc. I do not wish to maintain that the history of 
literary theory has been a mere decline since Aristotle's 
death. The last mentioned thesis points to the fact that his 
Poetics followed a different scientific paradigm that the 
one modern scientists profess and I do believe that in me~ 
thodological respect there is not only a difference, but an 
effective development, made possible by empirical research 
and by repressing mere speculation. But speculation has its 
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merits as well and a real theoretical revival of poetics 
can only be expected if poetics again acquires the theore--
tical knowledge it had as a basis in Aristotle's time. 
Modern logic was for a long time not very favorable to 
theoretic research in fiction or generally to literary se-
mantics; this rather negative appreciation can be maintained 
even if we acknowledge the importance of the aesthetic or 
poetic conceptions of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and other 
classics of modern logic. What literary semantics theoreti-
cally needs is the formulation of adequate truth conven-
tions for literary texts, I mean the explication of naive 
intuition by means of which the members of a community may 
know, what states of affairs prevail in a narrative work be-
lpnging to a certain tradition. The truth of literature is 
an intricate notion, but we certainly need it if we want to 
make certain statements and inferences about literary texts. 
In connection with Aristotelian Poetics I have tried to ex-
plain that there is no literature and literariness but only 
concrete literary language games, and consequently there is 
no truth in literature in general, but according to the con-
vention underlying the special communication forms - an • 
extremely transitional relation determined by pragmatic 
factors. The claim to formulate truth conditions for fic-
tional texts did not meet with understanding in classical 
extensional logic, there was even doubt cast on it by the 
program for the ideal language that should not contain any 
fictitious terms. Modern logics was interested first of ali 
in truth conditions according to the actual world, there-
fore a different truth-relation is taken into consideration 
here than the relation I consider central for literary se-
mantics: in that case we were concerned with the inner se-
mantic constitution of texts according to the underlying 
convention, here we have to compare the states of affairs 
presented in the texts with the actual states of affairs; in 
the first case we try to explicate the understanding of the 
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text, in the second the stress is laid upon ontological 
considerations. I do not intend to deny the importance of 
this ontological question for the theory of fiction, how-
ever, I consider it secondary as compared to the semantic 
one, and the fact that modern logic raised it first con-
tributed mainly to the confusion in the application of log-
ical methods to fictional texts. In principle there are 
three possible answers to the question of what the truth-
value of sentences containing fictional terms is, each of 
which determines a type of conception in modern logic. The 
three answers are the following: sentences containing fic-
tional terms are per definitionem true - the Meinongian 
type, they are per definitionem false - the Russellian 
type, or they cannot have truth-values - the Frege - Straw-
son line. These different solutions appear at face value to 
be equals side by side, but they have rather different pres-
tige and one may wonder if the Meinongian type belongs to 
modern logic at all as some of its theses contradict clas-
sical symholic logic in such a way that this approach was 
for a long time totally discredited in modern logic. Due to 
the essential change that took place recently in logic the 
Meinongian views are considered much more favorably today, 
but this does not lessen the difference between the Fregean 
and the Meinongian ontological presuppositions, I.e. the 
Meinongian type.remains a special class some of the repré-
sentants of which are to be found among poetic and aesthe-
tic conceptions, e.g. the well known concept of the Tartu-
school of the secondary modelling system.bears unmistakably 
Meinongian traits. 
The Russellian type was influential for a certain time, 
but it has not many supporters nowadays, even if certain of 
its principles are henceforward acknowleged. The main prob-
lem of this approach from our point of view is its total 
insensitivity tov/ards the semantic question of literary 
works. In his "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" Rus-
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sell writes: "... to maintain that Hamlet, for example, 
exists in his own world, namely, in the world of Shakes-
peare's imagination just as truly as (say) Napoleon ex-
isted in the ordinary world, is to say something deliber-
ately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is 
scarcely credible. There is only one world, the 'real' 
world: Shakespeare's imagination is a part of it, and the 
thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the 
thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the 
very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, 
etc. in Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there 
is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet."'' Russell's 
argument can be summed up as follows: fictitious names are 
concealed existential descriptions which do not denote any 
entity, consequently the sentences containing them must be 
false, if something were said about fiction or literature in 
a well-founded way, then this phenomenon had to be trans-
lated into a physicalistic or behavouristic language - a 
program very impressively solved by Reichenbach in his Ele-
ments of Symbolic logic . Apart from the well-known prob-
lems of the description theory this approach implies that 
there is no inner logical solution for the fundamental se-
mantical problem of fictional texts, this statement is 
theoretically as unacceptable as the proposed physicalistic 
reduction. 
- Beyond dispute the Frege-Strawson line can be consid-
ered as the most respected in logic and in certain schools 
of literary study as well. It is sufficient if we mention 
that logicians such as Frege, Strawson, Ryle, E.G. Moore 
and a scholar who began a new period in literary theory, R, 
Ingarden, are party to this line . In spite of many deep 
insights into the structure of fictional texts which cannot 
even be tentatively enumerated here I should like to empha-
size that as far as a possible solution of the central 
question of literary semantics is concerned it does not make 
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any tangible difference if the sentences containing fic-
tional names are considered false or having no truth value 
and, in this respect, I agree with Mr. Bernath's and Mr. 
Csuri's position concerning Frege's conception abput lit-
erature . 
All these models based on extensional logic belong to 
the prehistory of the logic of fiction and its formulation 
is the task of today. As Professor Woods is going to give a 
systematic overview of the recent discussions it is need-
less for me to recapitulate the main tendencies, instead of 
which I wish to point to some questions to which I attach 
importance. The main problem is to formulate the truth-con-
dition for fictional texts in such a way that these special 
conditions should not contradict the general truth-condi-
tions, i.e. the validity of these conditions should be lim-
ited to the semantic constitution of the relevant communica-, 
tion forms and relatedness of these connections to actuality 
should be taken into account in quite different terms. Sev-
eral proposals have been outlined of which I shall mention 
three. The first is the introduction of a story operator 
most Impressively represented in John Wood's The Logic of 
Fiction which is certainly one of the most important con-
tributions to this question in the last years7. I must say, 
however, that I do not sympathize with this solution be-
cause there is no linguistic evidence on which such an op-
erator could be based, the same text could be - as Castaiie-
da has very convincingly pointed out - without the slightest 
change a fiction and a non-fiction, and if the story opera-
tor does not refer to the linguistic structure, but to the 
fact that the text is being uttered in a special literary 
communication form, then the story operator reflects a prag-
matic feature of the text which cannot be conceived of as 
generally valid special logic or semantics but as dependant 
on the convention underlying the text. I presume therefore 
that Wood's olim operator should be reinterpretated in a 
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pragmatic sense. But this operation can be spared if we fol-
low Routley's proposition to base the logic of fiction on 
context logic. The main thesis of his approach, that "there 
is no general uniform logic of fiction ... each work will Q 
have its own internal logic" corresponds to the ideas I am 
trying to explain here. I certainly consider Routley's ap-
proach as a whole very promising, even if context logic it-
self is contested by some logicians. The third solution is 
the application of the central notion of modal logic "pos-
sible world" to fictional texts. It has the advantage that 
by means of the model theoretic apparatus a lot of problems, 
can be technically solved unambigously. The main question 
is, however, whether fiction can be considered at all as a 
possible world in the sense of intensional logic. Certainly 
we have no longer a comprehensive notion of fiction and an 
argument pointing out that there are narrative worlds rep-
resenting logically impossible connections does not disturb 
us. We do know about conventions of building up nonsensical 
texts, but their existence is not a proof against the ap-
plicability of this notion to any fictional texts whatso-
ever. I mean there are classes of tests to which this notion 
can be applied, but not without certain essential changes. 
In this respect Mr. Bernath and Mr. Csuri will present an 
interesting experiment, whereas I should like to emphasize 
that the truth-conditions determined by pragmatical conven-
tions can only be stated empirically in connection with the 
community making use of the relevant communication form. In 
this respect I should like to touch upon one of the most 
discussed questions of the logic of fiction, namely what 
kind of entities are referred to in fictional texts. Profes-
sor Pavel's study and Professor Pelc's paper are devoted to 
this topic. I should like, however, to formulate briefly a 
somewhat different position. The majority of the theoreti-
cians of literature and even a great number of logicians are 
inclined to take fictional characters such as Hamlet, Anna 
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Karenina, Sherlock Holmes, etc. for non-actual but well-
individuated objects, a view supported either by pure anal-
ogies or by Meinongian ontology or by the fallacy that the 
possible world-semantics commits one to choose the possible 
contants and to give them extensional interpretations, etc. 
I do not wish to accept this rather doubtful ontology and 1 o 
think the analyst having in view such well-known fictional 
characters is considerably misled, if he tries to determine 
the properties of fictional characters according to these 
most representative figures. Whoever has analysed folk-
tales - a genre in which fiction appears in all likelihood 
historically for the first time - knows that there is no 
need for names, a singular indefinite description ("an old 
man"l or a definite description (."the king") do the same. 
For convenience one can - as Aristotle mentioned - "tack on Q 
names afterward" , but by this dubbing nothing has ontolo-
gically changed, there is no new entity coming into being, 
the name not being any more than a textual device of 
crossreference. As to the fictional character itself, it 
should not be conceived of as a constant but rather a vari-
able which is at the same time determined by a number of 
properties prescribed by the game that involves it. If X 
say, let us imagine a game of chess, White applying strategy 
A, Black adopting strategy B, then White and Black are not 
two entities, but two roles of players defined by the game, 
logically explicated as two variables having the correspond-
ing predicates in the scope of existential quantifiers. This 
is too simple an example to overcome all the difficulties in 
the semantics of fiction, nevertheless it points to what my 
deep conviction is: if there is a solution to this discus-
sion, it is not to be found in ontological speculations but 
in empirical investigations revealing the inner structure of 
fictional narratives. 
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As fas as linguistics is concerned I was complied in 
the course of my explanation to take sides in one of the 
main linguistic discussions going on between defenders of an 
abstract language system of a Saussurian type and-the par-
tisans of a primarily conventionally determined language 
concept. For the sake of order X should like to make it 
clear that I belong to the last mentioned group, i.e. I con-
sider that theoretical problems of literature, fiction and 
even reference can only be satisfactorily solved if we con-
sider the use of the texts as basic. Only in so far as the 
contextual background is systematically taken into account 
can the problem of deictic particles, articles, pronouns 
- so differently treated in different grammatics, but in its 
importance generally underestimated - be settled in an ade-
quate way. Nowadays there are two main approaches to this 
problem, the one I would label the extension of logic to 
natural language the other the recurrence of self-deter-
mining linguistic principles. Let us begin with the last 
one. This conception could hardly be illustrated better 
than by the following extracts of Mr, Bierwisch's classical, 
and anything but outdated, study "On classifying Semantit 
Features": "... an interpretation of reference indices and 
corresponding arguments along the lines (of usual logical 
analysis - Z.K.I must be given up. Instead of this I pro-
pose to consider, an argument X^ as a variable to be sub-
stituted by the representation of a fraction of the (real 
or fictious) universe talked about. This fraction is made 
up from one or more equivalent objects or individuals which 
are singled out for separate predication only under specific 
conditions. These conditions are either part of the predi-
cate to be applied or expressed by particular specifiers and . 
quantifiers such as 'every', 'all', 'two', 'many', etc. ... 
I suspect however that the proposed concept of 'global ref^ 
erence' cannot be explained in terms of more basic notions 
of a semantic theory, but must be taken as a primitive no-
/ 
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tion itself. I presume, in other words that in this respect 
the quantification theory and the linguistic semantic theo-
ry are radically different in that they take opposing di-
rections: whereas quantification theory takes individuals 
as the starting point from which exhaustive and partial sets 
are constructed by means of universal and existential quan-
tification, linguistic semantics probably has to start with 
sets as primitive terms which may further be specified with 
respect to the participation to their elements in particular 
states of affairs"10. Though Mr. Bierwisch is one of the 
linguists from whom X personally have learned the most, I 
cannot follow him in this respect. More exactly I agree with 
him in the detils, not however in the conclusions he seems 
to be compelled to draw. Since I have not enough time to 
propound my opinion let me formulate the hypothesis under-
lying my studies in this direction to the effect that logi-
cal and linguistic relations should not be opposed to each 
other and that logical relations reflect as a rule the ab-
stract correspondences in the structure of natural language. 
However, in order to get an adequate picture of this last we 
need to take into account over and above the logical connec-
tions the features of the context the text is embedded in, 
as the consideration of context-relations may considerably 
transform the logical pattern. This principle was by the 
way very convincingly adapted by E. Lang, who unfortunately 
could not accept our invitation to participate in our dis-
cussion, in his excellent text-theoretic book "Semantik der 
koordinativen Verkniifung". According to this principle my 
starting-point would not be a primitive notion "global ref-
erence" presupposing sets as primitive terms, but the usual 
distinctions by means of the appertinance of individuals to 
sets and of quantification.In accordance with the proposals 
of Bellert, van Dijk and others, certain features of the 
reference indices should be connected with the referential 
or the pragmatic context, classes of reference indices seem 
to be specialised in order to indicate a certain type of 
determination of the objects they refer to. It is not pos-
sible and not even necessary to explain the theoretical 
basis of this conception, as I have done it elsewhere12. 
What I have to do for illustrations's sake is to show that 
it is possible to give a consistent explication of the 
examples that led Mr. Bierwisch to the contested conclu-
sions within the scope of the proposed theory. Mr. Bier-
wisch' s examples refer to the use of the definite article 
"the" determining nouns in plural such as 
1; The boys hit the girls. 
2; The piicemen rounded up the demonstration. 
3; The whites oppress the negroes. 
4; The Chinese of the seventh century knew porcelain. 
The definite article is as a matter of fact a homonymic 
morphological unit for at least the following three differ-
ent types of reference: 
1; the generic one corresponding to the universal quanti-
fier, 
2; the referential one defining the speaker's reference to 
an object or a set of objects, 
3; the existential one corresponding to the existential 
quantifier, this use being determined by syntactic con-
structions and the semantic features of the nouns and 
the verbs taking part in them. 
Although Mr. Bierwisch's examples can certainly be differ-
ently interpreted, the problem Mr, Bierwisch pointed to is 
obviously joined to the referential use. Mr. Bierwisch is 
certainly right in pointing out that it is impossible to 
give a correct account of our first example by means of 
quantificational logic, since a quantification based on sets 
consisting of individuals compels us to take sides, viz, if 
every boy hit every girl or some boys hit some girls, etc. 
All possible variants do not seem to correspond with the 
original sentence. He is also right when in connection with 
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the third example he states: "Rather the groups referred 
to are understood as a plurality whose individuals are not 
singled out with respect to participation or nonparticipa-
tion in the states and processes in question. .It is claimed 
only that the group as a whole is concerned"13. This how-
ever is not the consequence of the indeterminacy of refer-
ence in natural language, but is a rather normal effect of 
plurality. The definite article with a singular noun in its 
scope introduces an individual, that with a plural noun, 
however, a set the power of which is greater than one. By 
the use of the definite article and plural in general the 
speaker is not committed to anything more than the fact 
there is a set consisting of more than one element to which 
the speaker intends to refer. If he wishes to be more ex-
plicit, he has several numerical quantifiers at his disposal 
and he can very well explain how many individuals are con-
cerned, since natural language has this possibility as well 
and it seems not at all a subordinated special case. In a 
word, it seems to me to be possible to preserve the essen-
tial insights of Mr. Bierwisch's analysis without being • 
compelled to give up the inclusion of logical and set-theo-
retical relations in linguistics. 
A last remark about narrative research: after the dec-
line of the structuralistic approaches of the sixties the 
interest in empirical research - I do not mean interpreta-
tion - has perceptibly diminshed. Dr. Rauh's paper resuming 
the main results of her doctoral dissertation makes an ex-
ception that we are very glad to include in our program. 
The general scene is, however, not very reassuring: on the 
one hand theoretic experiments amounting to the mere appli-
cation of theories originally devoted to the explication of 
quite different connections, on the other hand empirical 
research and interpretations with insufficient theoretical 
foundations while the decisive questions, e.g. the question 
of a narrative syntax, are not even raised. Though the pres-
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ent conditions are perhaps not very propitious for -the 
undertaking of such an enterprise, scientific development 
gives important impulses. I have to mention first of all, 
action theory and game theory which promise to outline a 
Structure, not static or linear as the structuralists have 
been thinking, but dynamic and dialectical, consisting in 
the strategic moves of opponent agents. Action theory and 
game theory have a deep influence on linguistics today and 
there are even some experiments on narrative topics as well. 
However, in this field, a rather old work remains the most 
instructive - Aristotle's Poetics, 
Thus arriving at .the starting point of my exposition, 
I put an end to my introductory remarks. If the listener is 
a bit disappointed that here X have raised so many questions 
without giving detailed answers, he should be reminded that 
nothing other could be my aim but to put the questions and 
to formulate them in a provocative way. The questions will 
be answered by our participants who are all distinguished 
specialists in their fields and should the listener be 
dissatisfied with one" answer or another, he is kindly re-
quested to look for an adequate solution and to work with 
us in the discussion. 
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ANIMADVERSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS; 
REFERENCE, INFERENCE AND TRUTH IN FICTION 
John Woods 
The University of Calgery 
1. I have long helieved that a primary datum for the se-
manticist of fiction is the syntactic (rather than lexical) 
ambiguity of fictional sentences. After all, it is true is 
it not, that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street, yet also 
true that he did no such thing? That we seem ready to ac-
quiesce without embarrassment in such apparent contradic-
tions suggests to me that they are indeed only apparent and 
that the appearance can be despatched by postulating ambi-
guity. So, then, though possessed of important pragmatic 
peculiarities, fictional discourse lays strong claim to a 
non-negligible semantic status; and the accommodating theo-
ries could be expected to articulate appropriate doctrines 
of reference, inference and truth. 
2. The surface "contradiction" that "Sherlock Holmes lived 
in Baker Street" is both true and not true requires clari-
fication and eventual disposal_in the theory of truth. If 
this is to be achieved by way of syntactic ambiguity, then 
the theory of truth needs to expound and regiment the ambi-
guity, of course; but it can also be expected to clarify 
the respects in which, if any, fictional pronouncements re-
fer, and the manner in which fictional surface contradic-
tions avoid authorization of the inference of everything 
whatever. So we may suppose that the theory of truth would 
give the lead to the theory of reference and the theory of 
inference. Truth theory would seem to be basic. 
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3. In some of my earlier work1, I attempted to find a se-
mantic framework for fictional discourse that answers to 
these various tasks. It is clear to me now, as it was in 
1974, that The Logic of Fiction did not give all the an-
swers and that it was far from perfect, even as far as it 
went and goes. It may now be timely to quickly review this 
theoretical sketch, with three main purposes in mind: 
(1) To take account of whatever virtues it may still 
possess. 
(2) To expose and develop its evident deficiencies. 
(3) To use it as a benchmark (though manifestly an imper-
fect onel against which rival theoretical perspectives 
may be compared and assessed. 
4. The theoretical sketch of The Logic of Fiction may be 
set out as follows: 
A basic semantic datum, I have said, is that fictional 
sentences give rise to apparent contradictions by which are, 
except in deliberately theoretical moments, not in the 
least disturbed. We say that "Sherlock Holmes lived in Ba-
ker Street" is both true and not true, yet we do not blush. 
There is an ambiguity somewhere that annuls the contradic-
tion and fully justifies our confident casualness. One way 
of representing the ambiguity is by assigning to "Sherlock 
Holmes lived in Baker Street", a pair of canonical repre-
sentatives S and ^O(S)1 in an appropriate semantic meta-
language in which S can be declared not true and rO(S)l 
true. '0' is a (kind of) modal operator on sentence repre-
sentations in the theory, the semantics of which should 
capture the truth theoretical peculiarities of fictional 
sentences. Ordinarily the operator '0' does not appear in 
the surface structure, in order that fictional sentences 
may achieve and preserve effective verlsimiltude. 
The truth theory for fictional sentences (or, more 
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precisely, for their canonical representations in the se-
mantic metalanguage) defines a satisfaction relation for 
sentences, from which, in turn, a truth definition can be 
got. Initially we say that a sentence 'o^) 1 meets the 
elementary sayso condition iff 
(S"l)[ r0 (.4,)1 represents a sentence that occurs in a work of 
fiction. And let us say that a sentence r0 (<J>} meets the 
author's sayso condition iff (S2) rO(if)1 meets the ele-
mentary sayso condition or 
IS31 <j> is a logical consequence of ip, \j/ is consistent,, 
and r0(*)1 meets the author's sayso condition. 
The basis of the definition of satisfaction of sen-
tence, 4> by a sequence, s, can now be given. 
•1. If <j> is r01^)1 meets the sayso condition, s satis-
fies ij>. The recursion clauses are as follows: Given that i)> 
does not meet 1, then 
2. Negation. If <J> is "of-i^l1 then s satisfies cf> iff 
there is a sentence r0(x)1 that is satisfied by S and 
no sequence satisfying x* fails to satisfy r i//*1 , where 
any sentence F * is exactly like the sentence P save 'for 
showing a free variable wherever P * displays a fictional 
name. 
3. Negation. If 4> is '-lOiif/)1, then 4 is satisfied by 
s iff r0 ( ) is not satisfied by s. 
4. -Conjunction. If ({i is r0(x1)1 and is r0 ( j)1 
then s satisfies '"iji&ij'1 iff s satisfies both <j> and iJj . 
5. Conjunction. If <j> is rO(Wx)" then s satisfies $ 
iff s satisfies r 0 U ) 1 and r0(x)"'. 
6. Implication. If 4> is г0(x1)', and iji is r0(x2)1 • 
then r<j>->i|)1 is satisfied by s iff s satisfies i|i or 
does not satisfy $. 
7. Implication. If $ is r0 (<j. '-*<|>)1 then s satisfies $ 
iff s satisfies some sentence r0(x11 and no sequence 
that satisfies x fails to satisfy r<t> '-»V . 
- 36 -
8. Quantification. If ^ is r3 v.Ort)1 then $ is 
satisfied by s at least one of these conditions is 
met: 
(.il r0OH 1 contains free occurrences of the variable v. 
and v denotes the i-th element of some sequence s' dif-
fering from s in at most the i-th place, a is the name 
of that element and x is a substitution instance of 
r0 X1 with 
respect to a, and x meets the say so condition. 
tii). If 0 (.!(/) is rOtx (v. ,a) )"• , then v. denotes the I? "V 
i-th element of some sequence s' differing from s in at 
most i-th place; that element knows r o 9 (.v̂ . = a)1 to 
be true; the predicate x is such that in general 
fX ( v ., v,)1 is semantically equivalent to rv . believes ^ r- 1 ^ r 
that ^(.v^.jv^) is semantically equivalent to v. be-
lieves that rx lv Vj-)1? and • the element denoted by v. J n 1 
believes that rx(v^j a)1. 
9. Quantification. If $ is r0(3v(\|>))1 then 4> is sat-
isfied by s iff for some name or singular term a, free 
for a free variable in i|i, rO(S^(iJi) J1 is satisfied by s. 
A truth-definition now easily drops out. Truth is sat-
isfaction by every sequence. And truth, it should be noted, 
is governed by a single condition of material adequacy: 
(T) x is true iff y 
where x is the name of a sentence and y is the sentence 
.named or a translation of it in our theory's semantic meta-
language. In particular, "0 (Holmes lived in London)" is 
true if 0 (Holmes lived in London). 
Now, though it would be dreadfully cumbersome here to 
set forth the details, it can be seen that this semantic 
sketch has, or seems to have a number of advantages, 
ta) Condition 9 provides that "Moriarity discovered that 
Holmes really existed" is unsatisfiable, whereas "0 (Mori-
arity discovered that Holmes really existed)" is allowed 
to be satisfiable. 
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(.hi Conditions 8 and 9 allow for the representation of 
"Holmes had tea with Gladstone" by the harmless 
rO(T(h, gl)1, and of "Someone psychoanalyzed Grandiva" and 
"Someone loves Molly Jeavens" by the also harmless 
"3 vO0H v» 0 n the other hand, the theory will reject 
such sentences as "Pierre Trudeau waltzed with Molly 
Jeavens," as it righly should. 
(cl Conditions 2 and 3 concerning negation proyide that 
"OUI 1 and 0("1<j> 1 are neither contradictories nor con-
traries, which gives us a respectable method of represent-
ing the indeterminacy of fictional beings, if it were our 
wish to do so, without doing violence to the Law of Ex-
cluded Middle. What is more, a canonical representation in 
the form r0(.iji&lijil"1 is satisfiable, as is its implicandum 
r0(,t(i 1 & OCtyl1 . Since, r0(*)1 does not contradict 
rOCW>r , It is impossible to derive from r0(\|>&-)^)T, any 
sentence whatever; and an all-important contradiction prob 
lem is disposed of. 
(.dl There are methodological virtues, as well. The system 
of The Logic of Fiction. 
requires only the classical truth values, the 
semantic rudiments of first order systems, both 
referential and substitutional, - such items as 
sets, functions, substitution instances, and the 
like, a primitive alethic modality, possibility, 
and another primitive, 0, which is a very weak 
modal. Negatively speaking, for a theory of fic-
tion we do not need to depart the classical laws 
of Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle; we do 
not need to postulate the multivocality of 'true' 
or of 'exists' or of 'is in the world'; we do not 
need to abandon classical negation for some many-
valued interloper; we do not need many-valued 
composition logics; we do not need the neutral 
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quantifiers ' £ ' and • ir •. We can still win and lose 
bets concerning the whereabouts of Holmes: "0 (Holmes 
lived in Baker Street)" wins; "0 (Holmes lived in 
2 
Berczy Street)" loses . 
(e) And, finally, here is a theory of truth that does direct 
a certain amount of traffic in the theories of reference 
and inference. 
(i) Reference. That we refer in fiction to fictional ob-
jects could be accounted for by the legions of sentences in 
the form ""ot̂ v).1 and in the form r03 y î  vi that are 
assigned the truth-value T. That reference does not in such 
cases imply existence is conveyed by the unsatisfiability 
of such sentences as "3x(Sherlock Holmes = x)". 
(ii) Inference. Getting the truth conditions right goes 
quite some way, of course, in charting the course of what, 
in fiction, follows from what and what does not. Certainly 
one of the largest claims of the truth theory of The Logic 
of Fiction is that it shows convincingly not only how "con-
tradictions' can be true but also how they do not sanction 
that classical nuisance, the inference ex falso quodlibet. 
5. It is pleasant to have one's critics speak well one's 
work and to take it seriously. But an altogether more bene-
ficial outcome of criticism is the disclosure of problems 
and perplexities. Here are some that have been unearthed by 
critics of The Logic of Fiction. 
(a) Robert Howell The semantic theory of The Logic -of Fic-
tion does in fact, and contrary to my intentions, allow 
that "inconsistent fiction, contrary to fact, does narrate 
everything". Proof. To show that if r0 ).1 is in a 
given story, then so is r0 (1 (~li|i) )1 , for arbitrary . Let 
r0 C4>& I<f>)"" be in the story; hence it meets the elementary 
eayso condition and is satisfied by s. To show that 
•OPD-H) 1 is also satisfied by s, we use Negation rule 
2 as follows. There is a sentence r0(t}.«"!.}.)1 that is sat-
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isfied by s, and (vacuously) no sequence satisfying 
r(.<t>&"ty) falls to satisfy r~IOi|i), for any So ro'n(Hi))1 
is satisfied by s. 
4 
tb) Richard Routley Consider an authored self-contradiction 
represented as r0(.<|>&_l$)1 . Then the story containing such a 
sentence yields O(iji), for arbitrary Proof. Since 
r C4>). 3 ( a - X i s a classical tautology, we have it by 
the modality of 'O' that r0(.$&~)$)1 iff r0(,i|>«Tty). Thus we 
also have r0 t<P&~1<I>I1 , hence by «-distribution, r0 CV)1 # where 
f is any sentence you please. 
(cX Terence Parsons^ Formulas r3 (ip^ ,a)1 are taken to 
represent such fictional-real world truths as that "Someone 
psychoanalyzed Gradiva." The semantical rules of The Logic 
of Fiction provide that such a formula is (in the particular 
case before us), satisfied iff 
(i) v knows that 0 someone, w, is Gradiva. 
Cii). v believes that v psychoanalyzed Gradiva. 
(iiiX for all w and u, that w psychoanalyzed u is 
equivalent to w believes that w psychoanalyzed 
u. 
But it is not true, in particular, that "a psychoanalyzed b" 
is equivalent to "a believes that a psychoanalyzed b". It 
co'uld have happened that Freud psychoanalyzed Gradiva and 
yet was immediately thereafter struck down with irreversible 
amnesia; or he might have died. 
^ More importantly however, the rules utterly fail to ac-̂  
count for such sentences as "A certain fictional detective 
is more famous than any real detective". Here is a bet-sen-
sitive, indeed winning, asseveration, but it contains noth-
ing even resembling an intensional verb, as required By rule 
8 UiJL. 
6,' Trouble indeed for the semantic account of The Logic of 
fiction, perhaps even trouble enough to show that that en-
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terprise was Fundamentally misconceived and that we should 
pursue the semantics of fiction in very different theories, 
or even that we should abandon the semantic pretense al-
together and content ourselves with pragmatics- Let us see. 
A. Possible Worlds Semanticsi Pavel® Mature theories exist 
which give the semantics of possible worlds. True, some 
thinkers despair of a completely satisfying account of that 
powerful metaphor. Maximal sets of propositions have been 
put to the explicational test, and some still find it want-
ing, what with the notion of a proposition being no clearer 
than that of apossible world, or what with propositions be-
ing explicable only in terms of possible worlds. On the 
other hand, possible worlds semantics are certainly theoret-
ically better-behaved than the theory of The Logic of Fic-
tion; so would it not be preferable, if far from ideal, to 
look there? 
No, I think not. For I take it that the predicate, "is 
fictional", which. Holmes satisfies (.e.g., "OS-r(x •= Holmes 
& x is fictional)"X is governed by the following condi-
tion: 
'x is fictional' entails, for some possibly fx 
and Î j:. That is, a fictional object, x, satisfies some 
such modalized inconsistent predicate by virtue of this 
circumstance that had the author so chosen, x would have 
behaved inconsistently, and the author could have so chosen. 
Moreover, if we allow for some standard reduction postu-
lates for iterated modalities, we could obtain from rPos-
sibly "" ""Necessarily (Possibly ip)1, from which, in the 
particular instance, we would have, essentially as it were, 
the necessary possible self-contradictoriness of fictional 
beings. Fictional beings would be impossibilia, and not 
intuitively plausible candidates for residency in any pos-
sible world.7 
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Now, it is quite true that a major thrust of The Logic 
of Fiction was to show that such fictional contradictions 
were only apparent. But, Howell and Routley have rather con-
vincingly a.erred that the attempt failed. Therefore, show 
how the contradictoriness of fictional objects was "only" 
apparent, and how the derivation of everything whatever 
could be avoided. What is more, they would need to show that 
their solutions of such contradiction problems could be ab-
sorbed without theoretical violence into their possible 
world semantics. And finally, in order to show the advan-
tages of their theory over ray own, it would be required of 
them to show that their solutions of the contradiction prob-
lems could not, without theoretical violence, be absorbed 
into a theory of The Logic of Fiction sort. Tu quoque. g 
B. Meinongean Semantics: Parsons The best treatment of 
Meinongean semantics is that of Terence Parsons. One of its 
most useful features is that it has been very deliberately 
developed so as to provide an adequate theoretical home for 
fictional objects. However, for me there is an uncertainty 
about its analysis of fictional objects. Part of it has to 
do with the general notion of a Meinongean object. Parsons' 
account provides that corresponding to each different non-
empty set of properties there is a different specific ob-
ject. Some might find this an over-generous criterion of 
objecthood and others, might wonder whether, say, unit sets 
of ^properties are ever property-rich enough adequately to 
individuate. It depends I suppose on how close a connection 
there is between uniqueness and indiyiduatedness. For exam-
ple, there is no particular reason to think that there is 
just one object that is red and has no other (nuclear) prop-
erties; but corresponding to the set {being red} ¡.here is 
one object at most. So we have a problem with uniqueness. 
Moreover, regardless of whether the-red-only-thing is unique, 
it is dubious that redness alone ever makes a substantive 
enough contribution to its bearer so as to confer genuine 
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individuality upon it. My own complaint, however, is some-
what different. All objects, fictional or otherwise, are 
by virtue of their corresponding sets. Thus fictional ob-
jects "were objects before they were written about: they 
were so to speak only identified by the author, and writing 
about them did not confer objecthood upon them." So, then, 
the requirement that fictional objects be run-of-the-mill 
Meinongean objects as such denies us the intuition that in 
a rather deep, and somewhat literal sense, fictional objects 
have a literary paternity; i.e., that they are created by 
their authors. 
There is also something unsettling about the require-
ment that fictional objects should be incomplete in the man-
ner of Parsons' treatment'of this notion, that is, that 
they be indeterminate with respect to an enormous range of 
properties that one would have supposed them capable of 
exemplifying. On the face of it, it is not credible to say 
that Sherlock Holmes neither lacked nor possessed a kidney, 
ten toes, two elbows, or a mother; than he went to school 
or not, that he did not comport himself with Watson and the 
world in ways not chronicled by Doyle. Mind you, there are 
ever so many things about Holmes that we shall never know. 
But it is an over-reaction to elevate these insolubilia to 
ontological heights; it is a confusion of the ovdo essendi 
with the ordo oognosaendi. Perhaps it might be thought that 
I am wrong to suppose that on the Meinongean analysis Hol-
mes' incompleteness (epistemologically or ontologically 
rendered—it doesn't matter here) involve those properties 
of a few lines back. Nevertheless Holmes is a man. I would 
think that it would follow this, relative to elementary zo-
ology, that Holmes had a mother, and that relative to human 
anatomy, he had two elbows, a kidney and a certain number 
of toes. I would also think that having shoulders and back, 
that either he was be-moled or not. It may be a deficiency 
of sorts that Parsons' Meinongean preoccupation is with 
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ontology and not with logic. Parsons says that he does not 
seek for a logic of fiction. But if I am not to know what, 
follows about Holmes from what, I wonder whether the ontolo-
gical project can satisfactorily proceed. Let A be any pror 
position ascribing to Holmes any property not in his repre-
senting set. Parsons elects to assign to A. and to not-A 
as well, the intermediate truth value "indeterminate" or i. 
This leaves us with the need to make up our minds about 
A or not-A . Are we to assign it i or do we attach the 
classical truth-value T? If we make the former choice, we . 
abandon the law of excluded middle for fictional objects. 
If we go with the second option we tamper with the conven-
tional truth-functionality of the law. Either way, we invest 
our decision and the theory which it advances with a logical 
significance that needs to be explained and justified. 
Q 
3. PragmaticsPurtill Some authors have been tempted by 
the notion that the sentences actually constitutive of a 
piece of fiction (as opposed to those that are about fic-
tion, those that a literary critic might use, for example) 
are spared all but the limits of semantic significance, 
they are not true and they are not false, and that is about 
all there is to their semantic "theory"; the deeper truths 
lie elsewhere—in pragmatics. Purtill is one who has yielded 
to such a temptation, but not with wholly convincing re-
sults10. As I have said, Purtill holds that the sentences 
literally constitutive of a piece of fiction are neither 
true nor false, that they do not make assertions, that 
(.therefore) they do not make assertions about what they 
would appear to be about. Such sentences in fact tell tales, 
and in such non-assertive uses, they escape the burdens of 
all but the limits of semantic significance. That is, they 
are not true and they are not false. Purtill holds that if 
I tale-tell by means of a sentence, S, then S neither as-
serts nor denies anything,.and that it cannot be inferred 
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either that S is true or that S is false. Purtill makes two 
claims which it is useful to distinguish: 
(A) In fiction sentences are forwarded non-assertively. 
(B) Any sentence forwarded non-assertively is non-
It is, of course, open to us to accept (A) without accept-
ing (B). Proposition (B) is not obviously true, and some 
philosophers (Frege, for example, in "The Thought") have 
held that it is false. In particular, if a statement could 
be used unassertively, then tale-telling could perfectly 
well be the non-assertive presentation of statements; and I 
do not see why such statements couldn't be truth-valued, 
and why in such non-assertive uses we can't be said to be 
forgiven the obligation of staying on the semantics tracks. 
But what of what we ourselves say about fictional 
g; «.ngs-on, by way for example of literary criticism? Pur-
till thinks that, unlike the sentences constitutive of the 
fiction in question, these sentences do have some positive 
semantic significance, for they are true of false, and quite 
genuinely about something, of. which something quite genu-
inely is asserted. They have syntactic significance as well, 
for they are "ellipses" for sentences that are more faith-
fully rendered in the form: 
r (Doyle, his readers, "Holmes solved the case of 
the Speckled Band"), 
author, the author's audience or readership, and the non-
truth-valued, semantically bereft sentences with which the 
author makes his magic. 
In this particular example, we have more or less ob-
vious facts to take into account. 
1. In this fashion, Doyle has tale-told us that Holmes 
solved the case of the Speckled Band. 
2. Statement 1 is true ("straightforwardly true" as Profes-
sor Purtill might say). 
truth-valued. 
where with, as arguments, and 
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3. The sentence "Holmes solved the case of the Speckled 
Band" makes a false assertion. 
4. What was tale-told would make a false assertion; *-.hat 
is, what Doyle tale-tells, but does not assert, would make 
a false assertion. 
Consider now the following inconsistent set: 
(•£) What Doyle tale-told, is X. 
(ii) What Woods (say) non-elliptically asserted is 
Y. 
(Hi) What Doyle tale-told is neither true nor false. 
(iv) What Woods non-elliptically asserted is false. 
(v) 'X' = 'i". 
I think that we can quickly agree that Purtill is committed 
to the rejection of (v), for he would appear expressly to 
hold (i)-(iv). Suppose then that (v) is rejected. Then, 
though 1X* and 'Y' are the same sentence, 'X' was put to 
non-assertive, non-truth-valued purposes, and 'Y' to asser-
tive, truth-valued purposes. The similarity is syntactic 
only. But, if so, it is unsurpassingly unclear (to me at 
least) whether the predicate in "X! and ' Y' predicates the 
same thing, and unclear, as well, whether their common sub-
ject term has any, never mind whether it be the same, se-
mantic role (e.g., does it refer to Holmes?). What, then, 
accounts for the urge in us all to think that the author's 
"Holmes scolded Watson" and the critic's "Holmes scolded 
Watson" show a common concern for Watson? 
Purtill's views, perhaps like my own in The Logic of 
Fiction, rather quickly prove unconvincing. I do not, how-
ever, for a moment suppose that the difficulties with 
Purtill's pragmatic reconstruction indicate that the prag-
matic approach is wrong in principle1'''. But I do think that 
the possible world and Mainongean approaches are wrong in 
principle; and about the approach of The Logic of Fiction 
I remain, for the time being at least, undecided and more 
baffled than I care to admit. 
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF NON-EXISTING ENTITIES 
/ISSUES IN THE ONTOLOGY OF FICTION/ 
Thomas G. Pavel 
University of Ottawa 
0. Current work in the semantics of fiction usually starts 
from post-Russellian ontologies in which, according to 
Quine's formula, "to exist is to be the value of a variable". 
The domain where these values are chosen is supposed to be 
the actual universe and its modal counterparts. In order to 
account for the semantics of fiction, some authors are ready 
to accept an extension of this domain, while others appear to 
think that the only real thing about fiction is fictional 
discourse: hence, the speech-act theory of fiction. In this 
paper I will criticize the attempt to ground the theory of 
fiction in a theory of fictional discourse and I will suggest 
an ontological expansion to account for fictional construc-
tions. 
1. A mime enters an empty stage. He greets an invisible per-
son by taking off an invisible hat and putting it back on 
again. Offering a broad smile, he shakes an invisible hand 
and utters a few inaudible words. He then takes the arm of 
his /invisible/ partner and the two companions walk a few 
steps. It is by now clear that the invisible person is a 
woman. The mime smiles gallantly, puts his arm around her 
waist, carasses her hair, whispers a few words of love in her 
ear. His hand becomes more daring but the invisible woman soon 
puts things back in order. They stop and sit on a /visible/ 
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lively. As his partner does not appear to believe him, the 
mime insists, argues, swears, falls to his knees. Still 
timid, she rejects his advances. But soon they embrace. 
Black out. 
There is little doubt that a competent public correct-
ly grasps at least two kinds of facts about the mime's per-
formance: first, that the mime is only pretending to meet, 
talk to or embrace someone, second, that the mime's activi-
ty on the stage can be described as pretending something. 
A naive or unperceptive spectator who believes that the mime 
actually speaks to and kisses shadows is certainly wrong. By 
the same token, a person who, while realizing that the per-
former is only acting,' does not understand what all this com-
ing and going on the stage means, is said to have missed the 
point of the performance. 
Consider now two theorists who want to account for the 
mime's performance. One of them would argue that it is use-
less to look into what exactly the mime pretended to be do-
ing. Did he meet a woman? Did he kiss her? Pointless ques-
tions, since it would be equally awkward to answer "Yes, l)e 
did" or "No, he didn't'.' In this theorist's views, what is 
essential about the mime's show would be precisely the fact 
that is is a piece of acting. 
The second theorist would claim that despite the act-
ing, in order to understand what the show is about, one has 
to correctly interpret each detail of it. For the second the-
orist, the answer to questions like "Did the mime meet a wom-
an?" must be affirmative or negative. Indeed, would argue the 
second theorist, the meaning and the course of the act would 
change completely if at the beginning of the show the mime 
did not meet a woman but a mad dog. 
In answering this, the first theorist may bring into the 
discussion conditions and rules which govern our relations 
with the external world and other minds. Suppose that he es-
tablishes a few rules of appropriateness, asking people to 
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use certain types of behaviour /e.g. talking, kissing/ only 
when interacting with other people, to make certain gestures 
only when handling the appropriate objects,, etc. When checked 
against these rules of "appropriateness", the mime's behav-
iour is clearly spurious. The mime talks to and kisses non-
existing entities, handles non-objects, etc. Therefore, the 
first theorist may argue that the mime's gestures lack the 
appropriateness of their counterparts in acutal life. True, 
the moving of lips and smiling occurs in communicative situa-
tions, but the mimé is not involved in such a situation. Whom 
does he kiss and talk to? No-one, the first theorist would 
answer. It is all a pretense. There is no need to worry a-
bout the woman: she is nothing but the result of "special 
effects" used by the mime. 
But this argument need not convince the second theorist. 
For, it is clear that as the appearance of the woman is the 
result of the mime's industry, it is no less clear that in 
the actj the woman does play a role. 
The first theorist may then add that he does not deny 
the woman's role in the act. All he is trying to show is that 
there are two types of acts: actual actes and pretenses and 
that some entities involved in pretenses do not exist, even 
if we can be brought to a certain kind of perceptual aware-
ness of them. Although we may well believe that a woman is 
kissed by the mime, or rather we may suspend our disbelief 
that-.no woman is there to be kissed by the mime, it remains 
clear that there is no woman there on the stage. The first 
theorist would conclude-by sketching a theory of the public: 
the audience may be said to have internalized a system of 
codes to be used in different.situations. In order to cor-
rectly assess the mime's behaviour all the spectator has to 
do is to switch his system to, say, the code of "pretense" 
or of "artistic fiction". This triggers a modification in 
the spectator's perceptual framework allowing him to see what 
is not there, to hear what is not said, and to correctly in-
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fer what is not the case from what is not genuine. Moreover, 
although the system has been switched to "pretense", there 
remain perceptual outlets which work on the "actuality" 
switch. Thus, the spectator knows all along that he is sitt-
ing in a theatre, that "in fact" the woman is not there, 
' that he is more ¿r less willingly suspending his disbelief, 
etc. 
How many positions are on the switch-board? asks the 
second theorist. 
At least two, answers his opponent, but not necessarily 
only two. Systems with more options can be thought of, with 
the important qualification that in each of these systems to 
exist would mean to exist in the basic "actual" option. In 
all the other options existence is a mere illusion. 
Consider, however, another performance by the same mime, 
the second theorist would say. At some point in this perform-
ance, the mime is pretending to be a priest who blesses the 
audience. Is the blessing genuine? Certainly not, as both the 
actor and the audience correctly interpret the setting of the 
act. But think of a few variations on this theme. Consider, 
for example, the case of an unbeliever who attends a mass 
and sees the priest blessing the crowd. The unbeliever as-
sumes that what he sees is either collective delusion or 
plain imposture. In the first alternative the priest is him-
self the victim of an unwarranted belief, in the second, he 
takes advantage of the popular faith. Suppose, moreover, 
that the ritual observed by the priest is assumed to compel 
a certain holy being to descend invisibly upon the heads of 
the attendants. Does this being exist? Not for the unbeliever, 
of course, who disdainfully scorns the popular piety. Nor 
does the holy being exist for a sceptic priest, who vacu-
ously performs che sacred gestures. The crowd nonetheless, 
as well as a sincere minister, knows that the holy being is 
there. But let us consider the impostor priest. He "pre-
tends" to inyoke the holy spirit, while believing that there 
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is no such being. Suppose, in addition, that the ritual in-
volves some manifestation, of deeply felt belief, such as . 
closing the eyes, trembling, sweating, etc. Suppose also that 
the attendants are trained to carefully scrutinize the minis-
ter in order to detect and punish superficial /and hence in-
effectual/ enactments of the rite. The perjured performer of 
the rite has to perform it as "sincerely" as possible, while 
knowing perfectly well that his rapture is fake. But in order 
for his performance to appear genuine, he has to keep his own 
knowledge of the imposture as marginal as possible. In fact, 
he may be said to willingly suspend his disbelief in the epi-
phany of the holy spirit, and enter the performance of the 
rite with his system "switched" to some non-actual option. 
For more common situations similar to the invocation rite, 
think of the innumerable cases of false lovers who willingly 
and perversely suspend their disbelief in the presence of lo-
ve, and simulate all the symptoms of this feeling: palor, 
shyness, blushes, tears, raptures, etc. Some get caught, as 
the simulation of love can sometimes conjure up the feeling 
itself. After repeatedly having lied "I love you," these 
lovers succumb to their own fantasy. To ask whether their 
love exists or not does not make.sense. They would say yes, 
but they also did so when they were only lying. Soon they 
will forget that there was a time when they were not deeply 
in love, just as after their love passes, some will claim 
that it was never there. 
The first theorist would certainly argue that love is 
as elusive as can be and that even if it is not impossible 
to grant love some sort of existence, it would be mistaken 
to give it the status of entity. Hence, the simile between 
the holy being and love does not work: one should not com-
pare entities and states. 
To this the second theorist can reply that in many cul-
tures love has been thought of as an /invisible/ entity which 
takes possession of the body and soul. Contemporary biology 
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and psychology do not subscribe to"a dybbuk-theory of love, 
but neither does modern science approve of invisible holy 
beings. And in any case, we are not talking about science, 
but about pretense. Now, as the previous examples suggest, 
pretense sometimes carries more reality than reality can it-
self provide. To see this better, let us examine again the 
mime's impersonation of a priest. Let us assume that the act 
takes place in a country where, against the general wishes 
of the people, religion has been entirely forbidden by a 
cruel, unscrupulous tyrant. Churches have been closed, 
priests imprisoned and true believers martyred. A well-or-
chestrated campaign against the old faith is launched; among 
other things, every artistic event is preceded by or in-
cludes some anti-religious act. The cultural leaders of the 
country force our mime to include in his repertoire a parody 
of priestly gestures. But suppose that, like the large ma-
jority of the inhabitants, the mime is a deeply religious 
man. Unable to refuse the performing of the blasphemeous act, 
he decides to subtly transform it into an unobtrusive re-
membrance of the mass. Do not forget that the audience has 
been deprived of any sacred ceremony for a long time, so- that 
even an imitation of the precious forbidden gestures can e-
lectrify the public. Moreover, the image of a minister has 
become so venerable in this society without ministers, that 
the spectators instinctively do not pay much attention to the 
parodic sequences of the anti-religious act. But then, in the 
midst of the performance, the mime turns towards the public 
and letting a saintly expression invade his face, he slowly 
and solemnly blesses the crowd. A stream of grace goes through 
the hall. No one present doubts the genuineness of the bless-
ing. Neither do the few censors who supervise the performance; 
indeed, the next day the mime is arrested and executed.1 
Was the blessing a true one? or was it nothing but the 
delusion of a deprived crowd bewitched by a.poor tumbler? If 
the situation is seen as an emergency, then it may be judged 
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according to rules applicable in other similar emergencies. 
The Christian Church, which traditionally concedes baptism 
an essential role in the individual path towards salvation, 
and which jealously keeps for itself the privilege of dis-
tributing it, allows the layman to administer baptism in 
well-defined crisis situations. If new regulations concern-
ing sacraments and blessings were ever made which would take 
into account the social conditions of modern tyrannies, they 
could carefully consider situations in which some rites ac-
quire full force even if the usual conditions for their ef-
fectiveness are not met. Thus, not only could a layman va-
lidly baptize a still-born, in the absence of an ordained 
minister, but he would be equally enabled to felicitously 
pronounce a couple husband and wife in cases when, say, the 
two must depart for concentration camps. 
2. The preceding examples all involve cases where the exist-
ence of some entity of state is not well established. The 
entities or states in question appear to exist according to 
some criteria, while they do not exist according to other 
criteria. Thus, it is not easy to decide whether the invis-
ible woman in the mime's act exists or not, whether a holy 
being descends or not upon a crowd of believers, whether or 
not someone really is in love with someone else. Some of the 
examples equally involve situations where the opposition 
between genuine acts and competences and faked ones' starts 
to blur. On the one hand, the blessing of the crowd by an 2 
impostor priest is not a genuine blessing. On the other 
hand, a juggler can sometimes acquire the competence of a 
priest. There appear thus to be situations in which the pre-
tense of an action becomes the very action. Wouldn't the 
second theorist be justified in surmising that supposedly 
nonexlsting beings, states or properties do posses after all 
some kind of existence? Shouldn't one refrain from too dras-
tic a use of Occam's famous razor in situations where beards 
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should grow? Wouldn't a bit of trimming largely suffice in 
such situations? 
But notice first that the mime's act is not a text made 
up of words and sentences.3 The choice of this type of exam-
ple is deliberate. It is only natural when examining a fic-
tional text to be led to believe that what makes it fiction 
lies somewhere in its linguistic wrapping. Our first the-
orist, who supports the speech-act theory of fiction, would 
claim that fictional discourse embodies a special type of 
speech-act, characterized notably by the /deliberate/ fail-
ure to follow the rules of assertion. Thus, fictional dis-
course would transgress the following usual regulations for 
assertions. Notably the speaker must believe that his utter-
ance is true /the rule of sincerity/. Some theoreticians add 
that the speaker must be prepared to defend the truth of his 
utterance /the rule of argumentation/; the speaker must be 
prepared to accept the consequences of his utterance /the 
4 
rule of consequences/. Since, in a sense, it may appear that 
a story-teller and more generally the originator of a fic-
tional discourse does not believe in the truth of his utter-
ance, nor is he prepared to defend it or to accept its con-
sequences, the speech-act theorist may well claim that for 
fictional discourse the above rules are out of place. 
But is this claim defensible? The second theorist, with 
whom we will side from now on, may find at least three ways 
of attacking it:, by arguing that the above rules cover only 
a minor part of assertive utterances, by casting doubts on 
the notion of speaker or originator in the case of fictional 
discourse, finally by showing that linguistic meaning is on-
ly a subclass of a much wider category. 
To begin with, the above rules for assertion cover only 
a small section of actual assertive utterances. They de-
scribe the behaviour of an ideal speaker whose capabilities 
far exceed those of human being. Thus, in order to follow the 
rule of sincerity a speaker has to be transparent to himself 
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with respect to his beliefs. But since his linguistic compe— 
tence enables a speaker to utter an astronomically large 
number of/new/ assertions, in order to follow the rule of 
sincerity the speaker must possess at least two things: a-
set B of propositions he believes in and a machinery able 
to quickly pick up for each assertive utterance of the 
speaker the corresponding proposition belonging to the set B 
of sentences the speaker believes to be true. When the speak-
er utters a sentence, this machine is automatically trigger-
ed:. if the result of its scanning the set B ends success-
fully, the speaker may be said to have been sincere, while 
if the machine fails to find the corresponding sentence in 
B, the speaker has been insincere. 
However, when confronted with real speakers, this mo-
del of sincerity involves serious problems. First,.it is 
highly improbable that real speakers possess anything like 
a set B of propositions that they believe to be true. The 
picture we get from actual situations appears rather to sug-
gest that we more or less believe a limited number of propo-
sitions, while for a large number of propositions we simply 
do not know /in any serious sence of the word/, whether we 
believe them to be true or not. In many cases people assert 
sentences they think they believe, when in fact they adhere 
to these sentences for other reasons than belief. For in-
stance, they may only strongly admire the person whom they 
heard assert these sentences. A speaker A, for example, will 
utter with conviction sentences like: 
/1/ In our riding X is the best candidate. 
in situations where A does not know anything about X, but 
has a friend B who asserted /1/ several times in the most 
convincing tone of voice. Equally often," speaker A may utter 
sentences like: 
/2/ The best vacation spot in Germany is 
Baden-Baden, 
/3/ Under Mao Tze Tung the Chinese people lived 
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a free and happy life. 
despite the fact that he has never visited Germany and knows 
nothing about contemporary China. Again, these are his 
friend B's professed opinions and he feels that he has the 
right /and the duty/ to use them as his own. When uttering 
/1/ to /3/, is speaker A sincere? That is, does he believe 
in what he is saying? But what exactly do we mean by "A be-
lieves that utterance a is true?" Do we refer to rational 
belief? To irrational belief? Do we ask the speaker to be-
lieve deeply in the truth of a, or are we prepared to allow 
for a perfunctory assent of the speaker to his own sayings? 
Is the belief supposed to last for a long time, or are we 
satisfied with a belief equal in duration to the utterance 
believed to be true? And if the last alternative is chosen, 
should the belief be simultaneous with the utterance, or may 
it precede and/or follow the assertion? 
These are not spurious questions. Witness the difficul-
ty, in which we so often find ourselves, of discerning 
whether or not we in fact believe in the truth of some of our 
incautious statements. Does speaker A believe sentence /3/ 
to be true? If his life depended on his rejecting /3/, would 
he hesitate a single moment to /sincerely/ retract is? Are 
we not justified in claiming that, rather than believing that 
/3/ is true, A prefers to play with the idea that he believes 
/3/ to be true? Or take the case of a domestic quarrel, dur-
ing -which one of the partners asserts that the other is the 
basest human being ever to have lived on earth. Does the ut-
terer believe this to be true? Probably yes, at least at the 
time of the argument. Or perhaps he believed it a few moments 
before saying it, but when the words were on the tip of his 
tongue, he suddenly realized that the statement sounded 
greatly exaggerated, without, however, his being able to stop 
the already triggered utterance. Or it could be that the 
speaker did not fully believe the words until later in the 
verbal exchange when he saw how right he had been. And so on. 
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Thus far we have examined only examples of evaluative 
assertions. When factual assertions are considered, the 
sincerity requirement appears even more out of place. Sup-
pose that speaker A says: 
/4/ President Kennedy's murder was by 
Castro's orders. 
/5/ The chemical composition of water is 
/4/ is a controversial statement which A has probably read 
in some newspaper or heard in a conversation with, say, his 
vocal friend B. The sincerity of A in uttering /4/ depends 
less on his own genuine belief that /4/ is the case than on 
his tuning in to. the circulation of statements around him. 
Confronted with the pressing question "Do you really believe 
this?", A may well answer "I dont't know. Many people say 
that" or "It's in the papers" or "They said so on T.V." 
Such sincerity by participation in a group is even 
clearer in the case of the uncontroversial statement /5/. As 
has been pointed out by Putnam, a given community collec-
tively masters its own language and its relation with real-
ity. It may well be that as an individual a member of the 
community is not well acquainted with the full meaning of 
terms like elm, gnosis, or werewolf. One can employ such 
terms, however, by virtue of the social division of linguis-
tic labour. An ignoramous may refer to elm, gnosis or were-
wolves on the assumption that in the community there are 
specialists in elms, gnosis and werewolves who could provide 
all the information necessary should the need arise for a 
closer scrutinizing of the statements about elms, gnosis or 
werewolves. Similarly, speaker A can utter /5/ as carelessly 
as he wishes, without ever bothering to check whether he be-
lieves it to be true or not, since in uttering /5/, he can 
count on the testimony of innumerable chemists who know /5/ 
to be true. And more important, perhaps, he can rest on the 
firm support of an entire educational and academic apparatus 
strongly sanctioned by his society. To assert that the chem-
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ical composition of wather is 1^0 has less need of sincere 
belief in the truth of the statement than epistemological 
adherence to a given society. 
What has been said about sincerity applies all the 
more to the rules of argumentation and consequence. As the 
imago of a speaker capable of finding out whether or not he 
believes what he says appears to be rather unrealistic, how 
can one ask such unreliable speakers to defend the truth of 
their utterances or to accept their consequences? Speakers 
who are ninoere by participation should not be expected to 
defend the truth of their utterances other than by reference 
to the community /"I don't know; my friends told me that," 
"It's in the newspapers," etc./, nor to readily accept the 
consequences of what they say /"How should I have known that 
saying 'X is a good leader' entails endorsing concentration 
camps?"/. Accordingly we have to reject the claim that fic-
tional discourse differs from assertive discourse by the sus-
pension in the former of rules of assertion in force in the 
latter. It appears, indeed, that in many cases the rules of 
assertion are far from being in force in assertive discourse 
itself. The application of these rules can be construed ei-
ther as a normative idealization /corresponding probably to 
a more or loss circumscribed attitude towards the ethics of 
language/, or as applying only to a few marginal cases, such 
as the assertions of people such as geniuses or saints who 
control exceptionally well the beliefs they share. 
The above considerations suggest that qualities such as 
sincerity, ability to argue about assertions, and readiness 
to accept their consequences are far from being individually 
possessed by speakers. In many cases the individual speakers 
behave as if their personal linguistic duties had somehow 
waivered. They need not scrupulously perform these duties, 
since at every failure to do so the community is there to 
cover for them. But if this is so, the very notion of the 
speaker as the originator and master of his own utterances 
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becomes suspect. When our speaker A irresponsibly carries 
over the assertions of his friend B, may he be said to be' 
the speaker? Or, if we still want to qualify him as a speak-
er, should we not defuse some of the connotations of the 
term? 
The contemporary notion of an ideal speaker in total 
command of his linguistic competence, knowing the syntax, the 
meaning of words, the speech-act rules, controlling his be-
liefs and his expectations, seems to be a modern offshoot 
of the cartesian subject, that motionless master of an inner 
space entirely under his own control. But when seen as a 
member of a social group that largely covers for his utter-
ances, the individual speaker appears to be much less dis-
tinctively in charge of his discourse than the cartesian 
tradition maintains. 
In any case, there are few areas where the cartesian 
notion of sueject-speaker is more out of place than in rela-
tion to literary fiction. For, indeed, who is the speaker 
uttering a folk-tale? The raconteur narrating a token of the 
tale? But is the raconteur more than an occasional speaker 
who happens to utter the tale on this particular time? Aren't 
his chances of success increased as he smoothly enters the 
more formalized role of a tale-teller, as he so to speak lets 
the tale speak itself through his mouth? While dealing with 
speech-acts we are tempted to neglect the persistent testi-
mony of story-tellers, bards, poets and writers, who so often 
mention a vicarious speech experience as one of the central 
aspects of poetic acts. The muse may have become a worn-out 
symbol, more often ridiculed than actually used. Reference 
to the muse is, nonetheless, far from spurious. Like the 
prophet's reference to his god, the poet's reliance on the 
muse, on inspiration, on the dictation of the sub-conscious, 
etc., is precisely a way of mentioning this particular type 
of speech experience, in which the speaker is "spoken 
through," as it were, by a voice which is not exactly his 
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own. Who is the originator of the literary utterance? Does 
it make sense at all to look for a "speaker"? 
3. The absence of an individuated speaker does not mean that 
no speech-act can ever be performed. Take promises, for in-
stance. There can be anonymous promises, or unclear promises, 
or promises implicit in the behaviour of a group of persons. 
Thus, the group of young ladies met by the narrator of "Re-
membrance of things past" on the Balbec beach did not perform 
an explicit speech-act when promising Marcel happiness. This 
was an implicit promise, deducible from the care-free ap-
perance of the band, from their youth, from myriad details 
out of which the narrator gathers the resulting message: 
promise of happiness. The same thing can be said about warn-
ings, denouncing, even assertion. For every speech-act with 
a well individuated originator, it is possible to find its 
"vague" equivalent, consisting of fuzzy communication con-
veyed by imperfect means, sometimes without any use of natu-
ral language, often without a clear originator. Let us call 
these "vague" equivalents of speech-acts messages. In the 
acceptation used here, natural events can carry messages as 
well. Dark clouds may be interpreted as a warning, a fresh 
morning as an exhortation, etc. That these are only anthro-
pocentric interpretations of events which lack meaning is not 
important here. The fact is that the human species sees mes-
sages in many natural events and that linguistic and para-
linguistic behaviour is only a narrow, specialized type of 
message-carrying activity. Speech-acts are only the tip of a 
huge non-linguistic iceberg: linguistic promises, warnings, 
assertions, etc. are but a subset of the mass of messages 
that surround us. 
Now, if instead of speech-acts, we direct our attention 
towards messages, we can see that fictional discourse in-
cludes a large number of the latter. More generally all types 
of fiction, literary or non-literary, are replete with mes-
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sages. 
An interesting aspect of seeing speech-acts as a subset 
of the more general class of messages is that in this way we 
can dispense with the so—called principle of expressibility. 
While it may be strategically important for the theoretician 
of linguistic acts to postulate that any content is linguis-
tically expressible, once the notion of message has been ex-
tended to include non-linguistic sings and signals, the prin-
ciple of linguistic expressibility is no longer needed. In-
deed, why should we assume that the class of messages is ex-
pressible in one of its sub-classes, namely the set of lin-
guistic messages? Think of physiognomic expressions. Are all 
of them translatable in linguistic terms? The mixed feelings 
which can be instantly grasped on a face like Chaplin's in 
the last frames of City Lights are not necessarily expres-
sible in our everyday language. The same point can be made 
about musical moods. Are the moods of any Beethoven piano 
sonatas or Mahler's symphonies translatable into words? 
Nonetheless, each section of these sonatas or symphonies can 
be said to convey a certain message. But arent's music lovers 
correct in reacting inpatiently when pedestrian critics 
translate these messages into trivial statements about, say, 
suffering, hope, heroism, and so on? Such statements essen-
tially miss the linguistic inexpressibility of musical mes-
sages . 
- To recapitulate, we have seen that genuine speech-acts 
are only a minority of linguistic utterances, that conse-
quently the notion of speaker or originator implied by 
speech-act theory should not be accepted as such, and that 
linguistic meaning is only a sub-class of a much wider cate-
gory, which we called messages. All this points towards a 
rejection of the so-called 'speech-act' theory of fictional 
discourse. But this means that in order to understand how 
fiction /and perhaps literature/ works, one should not shun 
models involving nonexisting entities, states or properties. 
- 64 -
4. Let us turn back to our mine. How does he manage 
to attract our attention? How does he lead us to interpret 
his gestures correctly and to posit next to him the imagi-
nary presence of a woman? 
The public's attention is directed towards the mime by 
a score of conventional elements. An artistic production is 
a special happening carefully isolated from other activities, 
usually taking place in a hall reserved for artistic events, 
on a stage situated in such a way as to constitute the focal 
point of the hall. The beginning of the show is marked by a 
gong, by music, by the dimming of lights, by the raising of 
the curtain, etc. But more fundamental than these conven-
tional ways of channeling attention is the /trivial/ fact 
that events which potentially carry messages recommend them-
selves to the attention in a natural fashion. One stops to 
see a car accident, one turns his head to better see two 
people arguing in the street, or an interesting physiognomy, 
or an elegant dress. Much of our daily activity /trivially/ 
consists of message detecting and decoding. 
Now, a general characteristic of messages is their in-
completeness. It suffices to notice a slowdown of highway 
traffic and the distant flashing of police car lights in or-
der to understand the message: "car accident." A spark of 
hostility in a colleague's eye is enough to warn us that he 
/she doesn't agree with our ideas. The expression on the face 
of avpassing woman may be all we need in order to feel that 
she is the only human being capable of loving us /Baudelaire, 
A une passanteI. In no situation are we offered complete in-
formation on the state of affairs taking place. All we have 
access to are a few factual clues, from which we are "pro-
grammed to infer a general message. The programming may be 
biological or cultural. In deriving configurations and mes-
sages from clues we have a bias towards an anthropological 
or at least animistic interpretation. Cultural specifications 
may be added at will, as well as individual idiosyncrasies. 
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Accordingly, a basic fact of our understanding of the 
environment in which we live, is that an individual belong-
ing to the human species, born and raised in a given culture, 
must be capable of integrating the incomplete perceptual 
clues with which he is constantly faced into coherent pic-
tures of states of affairs. In order to represent this capa-
bility, a theoretical model is needed, a model which shows 
how the individual constructs configurations out of facts. 
Whatever form the model takes, it will include some ability 
of hypothetically positing worlds in which the factual 
clues are included. Constructing worlds obeys different sets 
of rules which are both biologically and culturally deter-
mined. But basically all world positing involves the posit-
ing of individuals whose presence may be only an indirect 
result of the processing of factual clues. In other words, 
a model of our understanding of the environment must contain 
some device for positing individuals whose actual existence 
is unwarranted. The same reasoning applies to states, prop-
erties, acts, and so on. Not unlike the familiar Popperian 
scheme, tested /as opposed to unwarranted/ existence is ob-
tained by checking the posited individuals, states, proper-
ties, etc. against some accepted battery of criteria, such 
as. authority, personal experience or intersubjective obser-
vation. 
Notice that the process described above is independent 
of the philosophical dispute between realism and antireal-
ism. An Anti-realist can take the positing-checking scheme 
as involving unwarranted versus Warranted assertibility 
/Dewey/, while a realist may see the scheme relating hy-
potheses and their partial confirmation, as a way of indefi-
nitely approaching an actual world. 
Now, if clue-processing and positing unwarranted 
worlds, individuals, states, and properties is a fundamental 
way of taking our environment into account, to posit the 
existence of an invisible woman next to our mime has nothing 
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special about it. Her Meinongian existence simply fails to 
result in actual existence after further checking is com-
pleted. But such was already the case with all Greek gods, 
with phlogiston and with ether. 
5. From what has been said, it appears that in order to 
function epistemologically, human beings and presumably human 
communities as well, have to develop at least two abilities. 
On the one hand they should be capable of positing various 
worlds, individuals, states, etc. On the other, they should 
develop techniques for controlling these worlds and checking 
them in actuality. In order for the barber who handles 
Occam's razor to be able to make a living there must be a 
great deal of beard-growing. Or, to put it otherwise, actual 
ontology is but a particular case of Meinongian und ultra-
Meinongian ontologies. 
However, if there is nothing special about the mime's 
girl friend, how can the difference between fiction and non-
fiction be captured? We saw that this difference is not be 
found at the level of discourse. In what follows we will ex-
amine the possibility of explaining the difference between 
fiction and non-fiction and non^fiction at the level of ontol-
ogies. We will contrast mono-level and multi-level ontol-
ogies, plain and special ontologies, and ludic and non-ludic 
uses of ontologies. 
Consider the following model. An ontology 0 is defined 
as an ordered pair /K,F/ made up of a cosmos K and an ontic 
foundation F. The definition of the cosmos closely follows 
that of model structures. A cosmos K is an ordered triple 
containing a non-null set C of worlds, a world W belonging 
to C and given as the actual world and a binary relation A 
on C, the relation of accessibility. A world I belonging to 
C is defined as a pair /D^T /, constituted of a domain Dx 
of entities which exist in I and of a set Tj of sentences 
true in the world I. Depending on the constraints on D_ and 
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Tj, we can include in the description of the world I such 
elements as properties, stages, events, acts, sensations,-
perceptions, values, etc. The ontic foundation F of an on-
tology 0 contains a set N of elements and a set M of func-
tions, the ontic functions, which take as their domain mem-
bers or ordered n-tuples of members of UD^. where I eC, and 
as their values members or ordered rc-tuples of members of N. 
According to this definition, it is possible to match a giv-
en ontic foundation with more than one cosmos and vice-versa. 
It is possible as well that a cosmos K belonging to a given 
ontology serves as the ontic foundation of another ontol-
ogy 0 2, in the sense that the set UD^ of entities to be 
found in the worlds of the cosmos K, or some subset of UD^, 
serves as the set N of elements of the ontic foundation of 
the second ontology 0 2. 
An example will show what is meant by this construction. 
Let us consider a fragment of a cosmos K^ belonging to the 
ontology made up of two worlds W^ and W2. W^ is the ac-
tual world of this cosmos. We concentrate upon a sub-domain 
of W^, consisting of three individuals a, b, and a as well 
as upon some of the true sentences about these individuals. 
Assume that among these sentences one can find statements 
which characterize a, b, and a human beings, assign them 
proper names, a gender, a national and social status, etc. 
Suppose moreover that b and a are respectively the mother 
and '-father of a in W^ as well as in all worlds of the cosmos 
Kp. In most of these worlds and particularly in W^ and W 2, 
a is a religious prophet who preaches the near coming of the 
end. The difference between W^ and W 2 consists in that while 
in Wj^ the actual world of Kp, a becomes a martyr, in W 2 he 
dies of sickness shortly after being tried and acquitted. 
Suppose now that these elements of K^ serve as the ontic 
foundation of a second ontology 0 2 - /Kg, Fs/. The ontic 
foundation F is made up of a set of elements, among which s 
a, b and a are included, and of a set of relations. One of 
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these is the identification relation which associates some 
or all entities belonging to the new cosmos K s with one and 
only one element of the set F^. Let us suppose that among 
the entities of Ks, there are the elements g, d, e, f. Among 
the true sentences in the world W which is actual in K , s s 
there are sentences asserting that g is God, d is his son, 
e is the mother of d and f is the husband of e and protector 
of d. The identification relation contains the pairs /a,d/, 
/h,e/, /e,//. This amounts to saying that he who in is a 
religious prophet, in.Kg is the son of God, his mother, in 
K is his mother in K as well, while his father in K be-
P s p 
comes in Kg his protector. The ontic foundation should also 
contain a relation of correspondence, which matches rela-
tions in Kp. For instance, to the relation father of /o,a/ 
in W^ eKp, the correspondence relation associates father of 
/g,d/ in W s e Ks. 
It should be clear that this two-level ontological con-
struction is designed to represent the contrast most soci-
I 
eties make between the sacred and the profane. Indeed, ac-
cording to the classical analyses of Mircea Eliade, the 
religious mind divides the universe into two regions quali-
tatively different. Space, time, and more generally the whole 
ontology divides along the sacred-profane distinction. The 
religious mind needs two different frames of reference, in-
dependent of one another, yet intimately interconnected. The 
KwaKiutl neophyte who shouts "I am in the Center of the 
World!" while being in the cult house next to the sacred pole, 
does not deny the profane reality of the pole; he only as-
serts the establishing of a sacred ontology, in which the 
pole becomes the Center of the World. Similarly, the Chris-
tian who asserts the divine nature of the Cris-t is using a 
sacred ontology having as its ontic foundation the profane 
ontology containing Jesus as a human being. 
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Multi-level ontologies are not in principle restricted 
to the sacred/profane opposition, nor to having at most two 
levels. Philosophers of science who oppose reductionism and 
believe in such notions as level-independence and emergence 
/Bunge, Polanyi/, may need a larger number of ontological 
levels. The point I wish to make here is that, besides their 
use by the religious mind, two-level ontologies typically 
serve artistic fiction. The mime's body and movements as they 
exist in the actual world serve as part of the ontic founda-
tion in a second ontology in which he is the timid lover 
courting the /invisible in the first ontology/ woman. If so, 
we are prepared to understand why it is false to claim that 
"in Little Red Riding Hood both ... 'red' means red and yet 
... the rules correlating 'red' with red are not in force" 
/Searle/. What happens in fact is that the rules correlating 
"red"-in-the-second-ontology with red-in-the-first-ontology 
are a bit more complex than the rules relating "red" with 
red in the first ontology. Indeed, as the first ontology 
serves as the ontic foundation of the fictional ontology, 
"red"-in-02 is matched with red-in-O^ via the ontic relations. 
It is clear, however, from the way we define these relations, 
that nothing forces us to relate "red"-in-02 to red-in-O^. 
The writer of fiction can always fabricate a story about a 
land where red was in fact green. But he will choose to do 
so only rarely, probably because in order to be manageable, 
secondary ontologies have to respect as much as possible the 
inner structure of the primary ontologies they use as their 
ontic foundation. 
A further distinction of some interest for our topic is 
that between plain and special ontologies. This distinction 
is meant to account for the contrast between plain existence 
and special kinds of existence. Again, this contrast is best 
seen in the ontology of the sacred, where the absolute 
reality of the sacred is crucially opposed to the plain ex-
istence oi the profane. Sacred beings not only obey other 
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laws than sublunar creatures, but their way of being is 
fundamentally different /according to R. Otto's formula/-. 
Christian theology, which reflected at length on this aspect 
of sacred ontology, arrived at the theory of the analogy of 
being„ according to which most or all predications, espe-
cially those involving the verbs to be or to exist, are only 
analogically asserted of God and of his creatures. God's 
existence and being belong to a special ontology. Fictional 
constructions may be said to involve special ontologies as 
well, ontologies in which being and existence are only ana-
logically similar to the same notions in plain ontologies. 
Without entering into the details of this hypothesis, it may 
well be that the main difference between plain and special 
ontologies lie in the status of existence; while in plain 
ontologies the Russellian explanation of the notion of ex-
istence in terms of variables and their values is in force, 
in special ontologies existence could still be a predicate, 
probably a predicate the content of which greatly varies from 
one special ontology to another. 
Finally, if both sacred and fictional beings belong to 
special ontologies, what distinguishes them? For despite the 
frequent identification of myth with fiction, it must be point-
ed out that for their users, nothing could be farther apart 
than myth which have "absolute authority" /Eliade/, and mere 
fictions. Like any other element of the accepted ontology, 
myths can be employed in fiction for as long as the public 
believes in them. When they are no longer in force, myths 
globally become fiction, or rather they start to be used as 
fiction. What seems to distinguish myth from its fictional 
uses is the ludic character of fiction. Theoreticians of lu-
dic activities agree to a few common characteristics to be 
found in most of these: the free character of games, their 
separation from the rest of time and space, the uncertainty 
of their outcome, their unproductivity , their being governed 
by rules, their fictional character.6 Clearly, as opposed to 
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belief in the myths of the community, which is in most cases 
compulsory, assent to fiction is free and clearly oircum-
aribed in time and space. Myths are all supposedly fixed' in 
advance and true forever, while new fictional constructions 
are always possible. Fiction is moreover governed by rules 
and conventions, and is /trivially/ fictional. The implica-
tions of the ludic use on the structure of fictional ontolo-
gies remains to be explored. 
To conclude, we have seen that speech-act orinted 
theories of fictional discourse are inadequate. Fictional 
discourse should be seen as part of a more general class, 
that of fictional constructions. In order to understand fic-
tion, one needs a strong ontological apparatus. Based on 
multi-level ontologies, fiction involves special ontologies 
and it differs from sacred ontologies in that its main use 
is ludic. Complex as they may seem, These ontologies could 
provide a non-reductionist and flexible basis for the seman-
tics of fictional constructions. 
Notes 
1 One presumably has recognized in this apologue an updated 
version of Rotrou's tragedy Saint-Genest, aomedien et 
martyvo. 
Incidentally, medieval philosophers were disturbed by the 
possible conflict between the social aspect of a rite and 
its secret effectiveness. According to Saint Bonaventure, 
a priest who celebrates the mass while in a state of sin 
does not have the power to perform the transsubstantiation. 
This entails the frightful consequence that a layman who 
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attends the mass officiated by the bad priest is in fact 
deprived of the benefit of it. If this answer appears to 
be a bit severe, let us think of a dying man who confesses 
his sins to and receives the last sacraments from an un-
ordained impostor. Will the dying man be saved or damned? 
If the answer is "saved," why is it then necessary to main-
tain the conditions on genuineness and appropriateness of 
rites? (But then, what would the rites be, if genuineness 
and appropriateness are taken away from them?) If the as-
swer is "damned," think that the impostor could later re-
pent, confess to a genuine priest and thus be saved, and 
what, then, becomes of. divine-justice? 
3 
In any case, not if by text we mean "a coherent sequence 
of sentences." As the term text sells quite well nowadays, 
it is not unlikely that someone has either already spoken 
or will speak of the 'text of pantomime', just as so many 
writers refer to the 'text of a dance', the 'text of a 
society' or even to the 'text of a city'. But these are, 
of course, metaphorical uses of the term. 
^ These rules are argued for in G. Gabriel, "Fiction-- a 
semantic approach." in Poetics 8 (.1979), p. 249. J. Searle, 
in' "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse," New Liter-
ary History 7 (.1975), pp. 319-32, uses only the sincerity 
rule. 
5 
By ultra-Meinongian ontology is understood an ontology con-
taining beings about which it is impossible to speak ade-
quately. 
6 R. Caillois, Lea jeux e't les hommes, Paris:. Gallimard, 1967, 
pp. 42-43. 
(Paper presented at the working group on Reference in Fic-
tional Texts 1979) 
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SOME THOUGHTS ON FICTITIOUS ENTITIES* 
Jerzy Pele 
Warsaw University 
1 FICTIONALIT Y AND LITERARINESS 
1.1 Ciraulus vitiosus in definiendo 
Literature is often characterized in terms of fic-
tionality: 
(i) those texts are defined as belonging to literature 
which refer to fictitious worlds. 
On the other hand, fictionality is often characterized 
by its occurrence in literature: 
(ii) those texts are defined as referring to a fictitious 
world which belong to literature. 
To claim both at the same time leads to a vicious 
circle. Instead, one should choose either the former or the 
former or the latter definition. 
1.2 Definitional equivalences 
The following definitions state both the necessary and 
the sufficient condition for literariness (Df.l) or fic-
tionality (Df. 2): 
Df.l. x belongs to literature = D fx refers to a ficti-
tious world; 
Df.2. x refers to a fictious world = D fx belongs to lit-
erature. 
1.3 Partial definitions 
Suppose, however, that somebody understands Ci) and 
(iil in a weaker way: 
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Df.3. If x refers to a fictitious world x belongs to lit-, 
erature; 
Df.4. If x belongs to literature, x refers to a ficti-
tious world. 
As fas as Df.l. and Df.2. are concerned, one should 
know what it is to say about x that x refers to a ficti-
tious world. And in the case of Df.2. and Df.4. - what it 
is to say about x that x belongs to literature. If he does 
not know the answers the definitions fall into the category 
of ignotum per ignotum for' him. 
J. 4 Kinds of reference in literary texts 
I am not going to accept any of the definitions given 
above, although I acknowledge that each of them contains a 
particulam veri. Certainly, expressions referring to fic-
titious entities do occur in literature and, certainly, the 
mode of their reference, in particular the fictitious one, 
does depend on their context of use. But it is far from 
clear what relation holds between literariness and fiction-. 
ality; and one reason for this is that both the concept pf 
literature and the concept of fictionality need to be made 
more precise. To analyse the former is the business of the 
theorist of literature. I shall limit myself to a few re-
marks on the latter. 
2 ON WHAT THERE ISN'T 
2,1 The term 'fictitious' with reference to extra-
linguistic entities and to expressions 
The main difference between the meanings of the term 
'fictitious'is connected with the fact that the adjective 
in question is sometimes applied to a linguistic entity 
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and on other occasions to non-linguistic ones. Thus we have 
fictional terms, sentences or texts, and, on the other hand, 
fictitious objects, events or phenomena. 
2.2 Non-existent entities 
2.2.1. Subsistence and intentionality 
When is a non-linguistic entity said to be fictitious? 
The answer found most often is: whenever the entity does 
not really exist, but, nevertheless, is being thought of, 
it constitutes an intentional object of somebody's desire, 
belief, dream, idea, etc. Some philosophers say that ficti-
tious objects do not exist but subsist only, and that ex-
istence and subsistence are two kinds of being. 
2.2.2. The kinds of non-existence 
On closer analysis, it appears that among those non-
existent entities some distinctions can be made. 
'2.2.2.1. Absolute and relative non-existence 
.An entity does not exist, in the absolute way, iff it 
has never existed and will never exist, e.g., Apollo. An 
entity does not exist at time i, in the relative way, iff 
it does not actually exist but, e.g.. Napoleon Bonaparte, 
it either existed, or, e.g., a next-week issue of a daily 
newspaper, will exist. 
2.2.2.2. Non-existent objects and non-existent events 
Individual non-existent objects and/or persons, e.g., 
a magic carpet, a carnivorous cow, can be distinguished 
from non-existent events and/or phenomena, e.g.,. and earth-
quake in Warsaw in May, 19 79, or the marriage of Hamlet and 
Lady Macbeth. 
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Notice, however, that when somebody contests the right 
of the latter to exist he does it sometimes for a different 
reason than in the case of objects. Namely he assumes that 
to exist means to be an individual object, cognizable 
through senses. If, in such a case, events, as different 
from concrete individual things, are said to be fictitious, 
fictitionsness is not opposed to being real or being factual 
but rather to being a physical object. 
2.2.3. On a classification of non-existent entities 
The two divisons presented in (.2,2,2.1) intersect to 
form the following classification of the entities which 
happen to be called, by different authors, fictitious in 
various senses of the term: 
\ENTITIES 












2 /see Table 2/ 4 /see Tables 
4 a-b/ 
Table 0: Non-existent entities 
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2.2.4. Non-existent objects 
2.2.4.1. Absolutely non-existent objects 












/1/ LOGICALLY An apple totally red and at the same 





72/ PHYSICALLY A carnivorous cow. Apollo. An apple 




/3/ PRACTICALLY The present king of France. A tar-
paulin for the Sun. 
Table 1; Absolutely non-existent individual 
objects and/or persons 
Logically possible, above, means consistent3 non-contradic~ 
tory; physically possible means in agreement with natural 
laws; practically possible means one that can he made. All 
those terms, however, should be taken cum grano salis, 
i.e.,., we should remember that they, all of them, refer to 
absolutely non-existent objects. It follows that the physic 
cal possibility of a given object does not involve the pos-r 
sibility of its coming to existence in the future. If we 
say that something, e.g. a certain object, is physically 
possible in this strange sense we mean that it is in agree-
ment with such natural laws as, for instance, the law of 
gravitation, in spite of the fact that the object under 
discussion does not exist. Only on this assumption can we 
say here that practical possibility implies physical pos-
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sibility, and the latter in turn, implies logical pos-
sibility. 
Let me make a comment on some of the examples. 
The space for practical possibility has been left 
blank and empty, because, if something is practically pos-
sible, in the sense adopted here, it may occur in the fu-
ture, and, therefore, belongs to relatively non-exsitent 
objects. 
Is the present king of France a physically possible 
non-existent object, or rather a logically impossible one? 
This depends upon the meaning we assign to the proper name 
France. If we understand by it the French territory and 
nation, then it is physically possible for France to be-
come a kingdom and for somebody to become its king; if, 
however, France is construed as the French republic, then 
the present king of France would be included in the cate-
gory of logically impossible non-existent entities. Analo-
gous arguments might be applied to the examples of physi-
cal impossibility. 
I fully realize that the examples shown in Table 1 
may appear controversial. More impoftant, however, than 
this or that way of assigning examples to the categories 
distinguished in the above table are the categories them-
selves that we have obtained as the result of our classi-
fication. Their occurrence points to the fact that many 
various kinds of thing are included in the class of abso-
lutely non-existent individual objects and, consequently, 
that different kinds of things and persons are sometimes 
called fictitious. 
2.2.4,2. Relatively non-existent objects 
Section 2 of Table 0 above consists of two categories: 
the category of past individuals and the category of future 
individuals, as represented in Table 2. 
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PAST Aristotle 
FUTURE The cathedral at Chartres in 1990 
Table 2: Relatively non-existent individual 
objects and/or persons 
2,2.5. Non-existent events 
2.2.5.1, Absolutely non-existent events 
Section 3 of Table 0, encompassing absolutely non-
existent events and/or phenomena will.be represented in 
Table 3 a-c 
ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 
LOGICALLY PHYSICALLY PRA CT. LOGICALLY PHYSICALLY PRACTICALLY 
The appoint-
ment of War-
saw in 1978 




























Table 3a: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena 
in which existent individual things and/or ~ 
persons occur 
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.WENT ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 
0 B V j e c t \ LOGIC. PHYTIC. PRAC. LOGICALLY PHYSICALLY | PRACTICALLY 
L To To To kill The meeting The meeting 
A o shave shave Sherlock of Hamlet of Sherlock 
B n the Sher- Holmes with Sher- Holmes with 
S p 
u 
I present lock - twice= lock Hol- Galdstone = 
0 c king of Hol- = /E/ mes = /F/ = /G/ 
L 0 France= me s= 
U • = /A/ = /B/ 

























- - - - - -
T 
E T To To peel That a To dissolve To feed one. 
N 
Li 
r\ shave an apple king of a a totally million per-
T X 
\J 
ri the totally republic red and to- sons with a u T king of red and - utters a tally green small total-
I M 
J. Q a repu- totally sentence apple in ly red and 
N 
D 
blic = green= in two water=/N/ totally green 




0 t. /K/ 
To To milk To milk a To keep a That Apollo 
D s P shave a carni- carnivorous carnivorous speaks Amer-
U . H Apollo= vorous - cow and to cow under ican English 






0 c at the 
B B . same time= 
J = / L / 
E n L p To wash To kill To dissolve That the pre-C 
T p R a tar- the pre- the present sent king of 
c A paulin sent king of France de-D 
C For the king of France in livers his 
T Sun=/J/ France water=/P/ speech from 
I twice=/M/ the throne 
c in American 
English=/T/ 
Table 3b: Absolutively non-existent events and/or phenomena in 




ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 







































a son of 
one's own 
daughter 
to be borr 

































































Table 3c: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena 
in which relatively non-existent objects and/or 
persons occur 
2.2.5.2. Relatively non-existent events 
Section 4 of Table 0 includes relatively non-existent 
events and/or phenomena. These can be divided according to 
what kinds of objects occur in them: existent /4a/ or rela-










The eruption of Vesuvius 
which destroyed Pompei 
To morrow's sunrise 
Table 4a: Relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena 




RELATIVELELY NON-EXISTENT ¿VENTS AND/OR PHENOM-
ENA 
PAST FUTURE 
" Ö * 
Ï » Ô 
A E I 
T X V 
I I I 
V S D 
E T U 
L E A 













The birth of 
Aristotle 
Table 4b: Relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena 
in which relatively non-existent objects and/or 
persons occur 
Please pay no attention to the examples in the tables 
above. I know that the examples are silly. And I do not 
insist on those particular that have been given. What is . 
important is the general idea reflected in the tables. The 
idea is certainly controversial, and I am fully aware of 
- 83 -
the fact. Can, for instance, an event be possible in spite 
of the fact that some impossible objects contribute to it's 
occurrence? But, on the other hand, is it really impossible, 
in a kind of a so-called literary world, to peel a self-
contradictory apple? 
2.3 Fictitious entities 
As we have seen, both absolutely and relatively non-
existent po88ibilia and impossibilia, and, among them, both 
objects and events, are on various occasions considered 
fictitious. 
2.3.1. The meanings of 'fictitious1 used with reference to 
entities 
Fictitiousness is predicated of the various entities for 
a number of different reasons, which is tantamount to say-
ing that there are many opposites to the adjective ficti-
tious when if qualifies some entity. The opposites are: 
existent, actually existent, factual, being an empirical• 
object cognizable through senses, possible. 
2.3.2. Kinds of texts referring to fictitious entities 
Certainly it is not literature alone that is concerned 
witfi'fictitious entities. Philosophers speak of circular 
squares, logicians - of the present king of France, physi-
cists of an ideal gas: all these entities are absolutely 
non-existent, and at least some of them are sometimes call-r 
ed fictitious. Everyday life, with its expectations, be-
liefs, suspicions, desires, dreams, suppositions, and as-, 
sumptions, provides numerous examples of referring to non-
existent objects and events. History speaks of past events, 
scientific prognoses - of future ones: all of them are rel-
atively non-existent. It seems that there is scarcely any 
kind of non-existent entity that could be pointed to as 
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occurring solely in literature, and also scarcely any kind 
of non-existent entity that would not once be called ficti-
tious . 
2.3.3. The concept of possible world 
This being the case some scholars look for help to 
modal logics and try to use the nowadays fashionable con-
cept of possible world as the last and only resort. In-
stead of saying that fictional texts refer to fictitious 
- in one of the meanings of the term - objects or events 
they maintain that the texts have whole worlds as their 
counterparts. Some authors try to prove that fictional 
texts speak of possible worlds (Eco, 1978: 29), while some 
thers claim that the texts cannot refer to possible worlds, 
because it is characteristic of literary fictionality that 
it is directed to impossible entities (Woods, 1974: 76). 
Oddly enough, the concept of possible world - at least 
so it seems to me - had been taken by the logicians from 
nowhere else but traditional considerations on literature 
where that loose, but suggestive and vivid, metaphor of a 
poetic or literary world used to appear in discussions con-
cerning literary characters. The logicians, most probably 
following Leibniz, have subjected the traditional concept 
of imaginary world to modifications which have resulted in 
the concept, or rather concepts, of possible worlds. The 
concepts, as different from that of the poetic or literary 
world, are better adapted to special logical needs, for 
instance, to the requirements of the analysis of reasoning. 
But it does not follow that they meet equally well the 
needs of literary sciences. To answer the special purposes 
of literary-analysis the boomeranging concept of possible 
world should be redefined with these new aims in mind. Be-
fore, however, it has been done, literary theorists should 
make up their mind whether they really need a concept of 
possible world to speak of both possible and impossible 
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entities referred to in literature, and whether, they pre-
fer to have one such concept for all the different kinds 
of prose and poetry of rather various concepts, each of 
them designed for a particular kind of literature, for 
instance, one for realistic novels, another for the phan-
tastic ones. 
2.3.4. Language and the fictitiousness of entities 
To account for the variety of kinds of non-existent 
entities, when at least some of them are being considered 
fictitious, one should realize to what extent it is lan-
guage itself that imposes the distinctions between them. 
This is why, I think, we should pay attention not so much 
to the fictitious entities themselves as rather to fic-
tional expressions, or, to be more precise, to such uses 
of expressions in which they become fictional. Fiction-




Professor J. Pelc read a rather extensive lecture in our 
working group in Vienna, however since that time his con-
ception and terminology of fictionality have so fundamen-
tally changed that we can publish here the introductory 
part of his study but we have to change his original ter-
minology according to his new thesis: instead of the pre-
dicate "fictional" we have two terms: "fictitious" and 
"fictional". This change in terminology has theoretical 
reasons: "I have accepted the following terminology: 
FICTITIOUS PERSONS, THINGS, ANIMALS, and FICTIONAL 
EXPRESSIONS, SENTENCES, TEXTS." (J Pelc: Letter to Z. 
Kanyo, 15th November 1982.) Professor Pelc is working on 
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DEICTIC REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS 
Gisa Rauh 
University of Gottingen 
O. As a guideline for the content of our contributions to 
this workshop we have been given three questions, which read 
as follows: 
1. Which theory of semantics should be considered as 
basic in the explanation of fictional texts? 
2. What is the importance of the reference to objects 
in the constitution of fictional texts? 
3. What kind of relation exists between fictional texts 
and reality? 
I first want to point out briefly how my contribution is re-
lated to these questions. As it stands, question (3) is ob-
viously addressed to the philosophers amongst us and an an-
swer cannot be or is not expected here. To the slightly mod-
ified version: What kind of relation exists between fict-ional 
texts and texts about reality?, however, a partial answer can 
be derived from what I have to say. Unfortunately, at the 
present stage of linguistic theory, there exists no semantic 
theory I know of which could be pointed at and thus be chosen 
as the one designed to successfully solve all the problems 
which emerge with the analysis of fictional texts. I shall 
therefore not attempt to do the impossible but restrict my-
self to displaying some of the essential problems a semantic 
theory has to meet if it strives for descriptive adequacy, 
not excluding the description of fictional texts. Thus ques-
tion (1) will be touched upon and answered tentatively, 
though no exhaustive nor definite answer is intended. I de-
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cided to concentrate on question /2/, since my topic, the 
use of deictic terms in texts, seems more than others suit-
able to demonstrate how expressions in a text are abstract-
ed from their reference to objects of the real world and 
how, nevertheless, the experience which the user of lin-
guistic expressions has developed from their reference to 
real objects is of essential relevance for the constitution 
and, conversely, for the analysis of fictional texts. I am 
going to show that deictic terms in fictional texts deter-
mine the role of their referents in the same way as in ut-
terances issued in actual communicative situations.1 An ade-. 
quate interpretation of deictic'terms in addition to the 
specification of the roles of their referents, however, re-
quires an identification of the deictic center of orienta-
tion with respect to which they obtain the specified role. 
In an actual communicative situation this center of orienta-
tion is given by the speaker, his coding time and his coding 
place. The referents of deictic terms in this context are 
objects of the real world, to be found in the extralinguistic, 
situational context of the uttrance or at least related to it 
and they constitute the concrete deictic field, which I call 
the frame of reference for deictic terms. In fictional texts, 
no such extralinguistic, situational context is given, but 
frames of reference, identical in structure to situational 
contexts, have to be identified here, too, if an adequate in-
, terpretation of deictic terms is to be achieved. I will show, 
therefore, that fictional texts are constituted by numerous 
frames of reference each of which can be identified as a 
concrete, though imaginary, deictic field, since it provides 
the referents of deictic terms as the concrete, real deictic 
field of a communicative situation provides the referents of 
deictic terms in utterances used in this context. Thus, an 
analysis of the constitution of a fictional text is depend-
ent on an analysis of the use and function of deictic terms, 
which, as a prerequisite reguires some information about the 
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special characteristics of this class of linguistic terms. 
1.1. Deictic terms constitute a special class of linguistic 
expressions in that they do not characterize the objects 
they refer to, as general nouns do, but they express the re-
lations that exist between their referents in a communica-
tive situation. The set of deictic terms in a language and 
the relations between them constitute a system of variables, 
which K. Buhler (.1934) called the deictic field ("Zeigfeld") 
of the language. Because of the special nature of the rela-
tions, Biihler compared a deictic field to a co-ordinate 
system, for every deictic expression is determined relative 
to a deictic center of orientation, the origo, which is lin-
guistically represented by the basic deictic terms I, here 
and now. This three-fold determination conveys the fact 
that deictic relations are distinguished on three levels: 
2 
person deixis, place deixis, and time deixis . The origo es-
tablishes points of orientation for all three levels: the 
person coding an utterance, his coding time and this coding 
place. Person deictic relations characterize the roles which 
persons may obtain in a communicative situation: "speaker", 
"addressee" or "the other person talked about". In English, 
th.e pronouns of the first, second and third person refer to 
these roles respectively. Place deictic relations organize 
positions relative to the coding place of an utterance and 
can-refer to positions either in the immediate vicinity, as 
expressed by here3 or farther away, referred to by means of 
there. Time deictic relations organize temporal relations 
relative to the coding time of an utterance and can express 
"co-extending with", "before" or "after". Thus, a deictic 
field forms a complex system subdivided into three subsys-
tems. Within each, of these subsystems the positions of the 
constituent elements are defined in a unique way with re-
spect to points of orientation. The definition of each posi-
tion is at the same time a.description of the deictic 
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term holding that position. That is, the existence of the 
abstract deictic field allows a context Independent descrip-
tion of each deictic tern, which is to be considered as a 
morphological realization of an abstractly defined position 
in the abstract deictic field3. This context independent de-
scription of a deictic term provides information about the 
role its referent obtains. Applying a feature analysis to 
deictic terms, this information could be expressed in the 
following manner; 
I you he3 ehe, it 
+ I - I - I 
— * II +11 - II 
-III -III +III 
Present Tense Past Tense ^ Future Tense 
now .yesterday tomorrow 
last year next year 
y+present/ /+past/ /-present -past/ 
here • -. there 
/-far/ /+far/ 
Each- set of features describing a deictic term can be con-
sidered as the description of its invariant meaning or its 
sense. 
1.2. Deictic terms can be used in different ways. The dif-
ference in their use does not affect their invariant meaning 
defined in terms of features above, but is concerned with 
their interpretation or the identification of their refer-
ents. BUhler distinguishes three modes of pointing as types 
Of use which he calls demonstratio ad oaulos et ad aures, 
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ánaphor and cataphor, and imaginary deixis. (."Deixis am 
Phantasma"). Further literature on deixis discusses a fourth 
mode, discourse deixis (Harweg 1968; Fillmore 1971; 197la).4 
The different uses of deictic expressions justify a classi-
fication of utterances' in two classes: situation-bound ut-
terances and situation-free utterances. I define a text, in-
dependent of its being fictional or non-fictional, as a se-
quence of situation-free utterances. Only in the case of 
situation-bound utterances is reference to objects of the 
real world performed by the use of deictic terms: The mode 
of pointing is the demonatratio ad oculos et ad auree. The 
identification of the .referents of deictic terms is achieved 
non-verbally. The interpretation of the deictic field which 
establishes the frame of reference for deictic terms is the 
extra-linguistic, situational context of an utterance, its 
center being idetified by the speaker, his coding time and 
his coding place. The first person pronoun refers to the ac-> 
tual speaker and the second person pronoun to the person ad-
dressed by the speaker. Tense and time deictic adverbs ex-
• press temporal relations with respect to the coding time and 
place deictic expressions localize object or events rela'tive 
to the coding place. Thus, in the case of demonatratio ad 
oculos et ad aures deictic terms refer to objects (in the 
broad sense of the word) of the real world. The deictic 
field is materialized by those objects which obtain a deictic 
function with respect to the speaker, his coding time and 
' his coding place. In this sense deictic fields establish 
frames of reference for deictic terms. 
If deictic terms are used anaphorically, cataphorically or 
discourse deictically the linguistic co-text establishes the 
frame of reference. Referents of deictic terms then are lin-
guistic units, either syntactically classified (anaphor and 
cataphor), or not classified (discourse deixis). In the case 
of imaginary deixis the deictic field as the frame of refer-
ence is comparable to that of the demonatratio ad oculos, 
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although its ontological status is imaginary rather than 
real. The utterer presents an imagined or fictitious situa-
tion and transposes the deictic center of orientation into 
this situation in such a way that consequently deictic terms 
are to be interpreted with respect to the transposed center 
rather than with respect to the real deictic center of which 
the actual speaker forms a constitutive part. Clear cases of 
imaginary deixis are examples of quoted speech. Quotation 
marks are conventions applied to indicate that deictic terms 
inside and outside are related to separate deictic fields. 
In an utterance as (1) 
(J) John said: "I am Leaving now. " 
the referent of the first person pronoun is not the actual 
speaker but a quoted one, and the time deictic adverbial now 
as well as the Present Tense do not refer to the actual cod-
ing time but to the coding time of the quoted utterance. The 
Past Tense, however, is to be interpreted relative to the 
actual coding time. The example shows that imaginary deixis 
is not restricted to fictional texts but may just as well he 
used to describe facts about the real world. 
2.0 Of the four modes of pointing briefly discussed here, 
imaginary deixis is the one relevant for an analysis of de-
ictic fields as frames of reference in fictional discourse. 
Although coded by a real person, the author, utterances which 
constitute a piece of fictional discourse, e. g. a novel 
short-story, or the like, do not count as"* utterances of the 
author since deictic terms used in this context do not refer 
to his person, time or place, i. e. the author's situation 
does not provide the deictic center of orientation. As a 
consequence, demonstvatio ad oculos cannot be the mode of 
pointing applied in fictional texts. Imaginary deixis, on 
the other hand, allows the author to establish deictic cen-
ters of orientation independent of his own situation. There 
are no restrictions as to the number of deictic centers he 
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may establish and, in addition, he may establish them on dif-
ferent levels. Proper analysis of the constitution of a fic-
tional text, which is the prerequisite for an adequate se-
mantic interpretation, therefore not only faces the problem 
of reconstructing deictic centers and related deictic fields 
but also the task of determining relations between them. 
In the following sections I shall provide empirical evidence 
for the necessity of reconstructing deictic centers in fic-
tional texts in order to provide an interpretation for de-
ictic terms occurring in this context. 
2.1. An author may design a piece of fictional discourse as 
if it were narrated by a specific person. This fictitious 
person is commonly referred to as the "narrator" and counts 
as the utterer of all those utterances of the narrative 
which are not marked as being issued or coded by other, e.g. 
by characters of the narrative, to whom we shall turn later 
on. Deictic terms used in utterances of the narrator are in-
terpreted within the deictic field of which his person, the 
coding time and the coding place of his utterances consti-
tute the deictic center. The deictic field of the narrator 
may include the reader as the addressee. In this case, the 
narrator is the referent of the first person pronoun and the 
reader the referent of the. second person pronoun, as in (.2).: 
(.21 It is enough to tell you, that as some of my worst com-
rades (,...1 knew me by the name Moll Flanders, so you 
may give me leave to go under that name till I dare own 
who I have been, as well as who I am. 
Defoe, Moll Flanders: 7) 
Within the deictic field of the narrator the role of the ad-
dressee may be assumed by characters of the novel, as in (.3): 
(.31 Yes, Mrs. Reed, to you I owe some fearful pangs of 
mental suffering. But I ought to forgive you, for you 
knew not what you did. 
CC, Bronte, Jane Eyre: 22) 
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The identification of the referents of deictic terms is 
achieved non-verbally. The interpretation of the deictic 
field which establishes the frame of reference for deictic 
terms is the extra-linguistic, situational context of an 
utterance, its center being idetlfied by the speaker, his 
coding time and his coding place. The first person pronoun 
refers to the actual speaker and the second person pronoun 
to the person addressed by the speaker: Tense and time de-
ictic adverbs express temporal relations with respect to 
the coding time and place deictic expressions localize ob-
ject or events relative to the coding place. Thus, in the 
case of demonstratio ad oculos et ad aures deictic terms 
refer to objects (in the broadest sense of the word) of the 
real world. The deictic field is materialized by those ob-
jects which obtain a deictic function with respect to the 
speaker, his coding time and his coding place. In this sense 
deictic fields establish frames of reference for deictic 
terms. 
If deictic terms are used anaphorically, cataphorically or 
discourse deictically the linguistic co-text establishes the 
frame of reference. Referents of deictic terms then are lin-
guistic units, either syntactically classified (anaphor and 
cataphor), or not classified (discourse deixis). In the case 
of imaginary deixis the deictic field as the frame of refer-
ence is comparable to that of the demonstratio ad oaulos, 
although its ontological status is imaginary rather than 
real. The utterer presents an imagined or fictitious situa-
tion and transposes the deictic center of orientation into 
this situation in such a way that consequently deictic terms 
are to be Interpreted with respect to the transposed center 
rather than with respect to the real deictic center of which 
the actual speaker forms a constitutive part. Clear cases of 
imaginary deixis are examples of quoted speech. Quotation 
marks are conventions applied to indicate that deictic terms 
inside and outside are related to separate deictic fields. 
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In an utterance as /1/ 
/1/ John said: "I am leaving now. " 
the referent of the first person pronoun is not the actual 
speaker but a quoted one, and the time deictic adverbial 
now as well as the Present Tense do not refer to the actual 
coding time but to the coding time of the quoted utterance. ' 
The Past Tense, however, is to be interpreted relative to 
the actual coding time. The example shows that imaginary 
deixis is not restricted to fictional texts but may just as 
well be used to describe facts about the real world. 
2.0. Of the four modes of pointing briefly discussed here, 
imaginary deixis is the one relevant for an analysis of de-
ictic fields as frames of reference in fictional discourse. 
Although coded by a real person, the author, utterances 
which constitute a piece of fictional discourse, e.g. a no-
vel, short-story, or the like, do not count as utterances of 
the author since deictic terms used in this context do not 
refer to his person, time or place, i.e. the author's situa-
tion does not provide the deictic center of orientation,_As 
a consequence, demonstratio ad ooulos cannot be the mode of 
pointing applied in fictional texts. Imaginary deixis, on 
the other hand, allows the author to establish deictic cen-
ters of orientation independent of his own situation. There 
are no restrictions as to the number of deictic centers he 
may establish and, in addition, he may establish them on 
different levels. Proper analysis of the constitution of a 
fictional text, which is the prerequisite for an adequate 
semantic interpretation, therefore not only faces the prob-
lem of reconstructing deictic centers and related deictic 
fields but also the task of determining relations between 
them. 
In the following sections I shall provide empirical evidence 
for the necessity of reconstructing deictic centers in fic-
tional texts in order to provide an interpretation for de-
ictic terms occurring in this context. 
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If the narrator refers to characters of the narrative by us-
ing third person pronouns, they fulfill the person deictic 
relation of "the other person talked about" with respect to 
the narrator as the utterer, i. e. within the deictic field 
of the narrator. An example is the following sentence, which 
introduces the narrative Across the River and into the 
Trees: 
(4) They started two hours before daylight, and at first, 
it was not necessary to break the ice across the canal 
as other boats had gone ahead 
(Hemingway, Across the River: 5) 
The introductory use of the sentence and thus the lack of an 
antecedent for the interpretation of they disallows an 
anaphoric interpretation and thus necessitates a deictic in-
terpretation. The point of orientation of time deictic rela-
tions in the deictic field of the narrator is provided by 
the time which counts as the coding time of the utterance 
under consideration. Thus, the Present Tense forms and the 
time deictic ^dvarbial now in (5) and (6) are to be inter-
preted as co-extending with the coding time: 
(5) I have been married ten years. I know what it is to live 
entirely for and with what I love best on earth. I hold 
myself supremely blest. 
(C. Bronte, Jane Eyre: 454) 
(.(?). We are now grown old; I am come back to England, being 
-almost seventy years of age, my husband sixty-eight, hav-
i 
ing performed much more than the limited terms of my 
transportation, and now, notwithstanding all the fatigues 
and all the miseries we are both in good heart and 
heaIth. 
{Defoe, Moll Flanders: 295) 
Past Tense forms and Future Tense forms refer to time inter-
vals preceding and following the coding time, respectively 
as can be derived from the following examples. In the con-
texts they come from, example (7) follows (6) and (8) fol-
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lows (5): 
(71 My husband remained there some times after me to settle 
our affairs, and at first I intended to go back to him, 
but at his desire I altered that resolution, and he is 
come to England also. 
(Defoe, Moll Flanders: 295) 
8 I know that a stranger's hand will write to me next, to 
say that the good and faithful servant has been called 
at length into the joy of his Lord. And why weep for 
this? no fear of death will darken St. John's last hour: 
his mind will be unclouded; his heart will be undoubted; 
his hope will be sure; his faith steadfast. 
(C. Bronte, Jane Eyre: 4 56) 
Thus., examples C51 — (.81 provide evidence that, in fact, in 
fictional discourse time deictic expressions in those utte-
rances which are presented as issued by the narrator have to 
be interpreted relative to the coding time of the utterance 
they are contained in. In addition, examples (6) and (7) 
show that place deictic terms also may have to be interpret-
ed in the deictic field of the narrator. The locative ad-
verbial in (.61, I am come back to England, represents thfe 
fact that the place of the narrator, who counts as the ut-
terer of (.5). and (.61, is situated in England at coding time. 
As the reader knows, the source of the movement expressed by 
come, which at the same time is the place of the state ex-
pressed by remain in (.7) , as America. The narrator deicti-
cally refers to this locality by using the place deictic ad-
verb there in my husband remained there some times, which is 
marked /+far/, indicating the relative distance with respect 
to the coding place. 
The data presented in this section where chosen to demontra-
te that deictic terms in fictional discourse - person deic-
tic, time deictic -and place deictic terms - may have to be 
interpreted within the deictic field of the narrator, i. e. 
with respect to the deictic center of orientation which is 
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established by the narrator, his coding time and his coding 
place. A deictic center of orientation can be defined as a 
function f of three variables s=utterer, ts=coding time and 
Zs=coding place, where the function obtains a different 
value whenever one of the variables receives a different 
value. That is, there are possibly many deictic centers of 
orientation of which the narrator forms a constitutive part, 
taking into account that the variables coding time or coding 
place need not be and usually are not constant throughout 
the full length of the text. Consequently, several deictic 
fields of the narrator may have to be distinguished each of 
them presenting a frame of reference, which have to be re-
constructed for a proper identification of the referents of 
deictic terms. 
2.2. In addition to the deictic field or, rather, the de-
ictic fields of the narrator an author of fictional dis-
course may establish further deictic fields centered around 
fictitious persons who function as characters in the narra-
tive. An example of such additionally introduced deictic 
centers and, related to them, deictic fields, has been men-
tioned already: quoted speech. Every utterance in fictional 
discourse which is presented as if coded by one of the fic-
titious characters introduces a new deictic field the center 
of which is formed by the character, the coding time and the 
coding place of his utterance. Example (9) represents a con-
versation between three characters as quoted by the ficti-
tious narrator of the narrative it comes from: 
(9) "It's a friend of mine - a Cheshire-Catsaid Alice: 
• 7 
allow me to introduce it". 
"I don't like the look of it at all", said the King: 
"however, it may kiss my hand, if it likes. " 
"I'd rather not", the Cat remarked. 
(Carroll, Alice: 81) 
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The deictic terras in each quoted sentence refer to a diffe-
rent deictic field and, in addition, those occurring in the 
utterances of the narrator refer to yet another one. Thus, 
for an adequate interpretation of (9), at least four deictic 
fields will have to be distinguished. 
Like quoted speech, "quoted thoughts" in fictional texts in-
troduce new deictic centers of orientation and related de-
ictic fields. In (10), 
(.70) They always take it personally, he thought. 
(Hemingway, Across the River: 20) 
they has to be interpreted with respect to the character 
whose thoughts are presented, whereas he has to be interpret-
ed with respect to the narrator who is presenting the 
thoughts. In both cases the pronouns determine the person 
deictic role "the other person/s/ talked about", however, 
with respect to different centers. Therefore, an analysis of 
(10) will have to distinguish two frames of reference for 
the deictic terms. 
Interior monologue can be viewed as a form of quoted thought 
lacking a quote indicating device. Since this is the only 
difference with respect to quoted thought, sentences repre-
senting this form are to be analyzed in the same way, i. e. 
for the present discussion, the deictic center of orienta-
tion for deictic terms used in interior monologue is the 
character whose thoughts are being verbalized. In (lib), 
which presents an example of interior monologue, place de-
ictic, time deictic and person deictic terms are determined 
with respect to the character, his coding time and his cod-
ing place. (11a), immediately preceding (lib), however, has 
to be considered as being coded by the narrator and, con-
sequently, deictic terms occurring in this context find 
their referents in the frame of reference determined by the 
deictic field' surrounding the narrator: 
- 100 -
(11) a. Grey horror Beared his flesh. Folding the page into 
his pocket he turned into Eccless Street, hurrying 
homeward. Cold oils slid along his veins chilling 
his blood: age crusting him with a salt cloak, 
b. Well, I am here now. Morning mouth bad images. Got 
up the wrong side of the bed. Must begin again 
those Sandow's exercises. 
(Joyce, Uliysses: 63) 
Thus, the analyst of fictional texts has to be prepared to 
distinguish different frames of reference for deictic terms 
in sequences of sentences, even though no change of orienta-
tion is indicated explicitly. 
Different deictic frames of reference not only have to be 
distinguished if new characters are introduced, but one and 
the same character may be in the center of different deictic 
fields. The following examples are all taken from Moby Dick. 
In each of the examples the place deictic adverb here is 
used, referring to a place in the vicinity of the utterer. 
In each of th©. examples the utterer is the same, but the 
places referred to by here are different: 
(12) Rather ominous in that particular, thought I. But it is 
a common name in Nantucket, they say, and I Suppose 
this Peter here is an emigrant from there, v 
(Melville, Mody Dick: 28) 
(23) But look, here come more crowds pacing straight for the 
• water., and seemingly bound for a dive (...). Inlanders 
all, they come from lanes and alleys, streets and ave-
nues - north, east, south, and west. Yet here they all 
unite. 
(Mellville, Moby Dick: 22) 
(.141 Look there, that chap running around the corner. He 
wears a beaver hat (...). Here comes another with a 
sou'-wester and a bombasine cloak. 
(Mellville, Moby Dick: 49) 
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For the interpretation of here in each of the examples, 
therefore, a different place deictic point of orientation 
has to be assumed. 
2.3. An interesting case of deictic reference is what goes 
under the name of "narrated monologue". While in the exam-
ples discussed so far frames of reference could be separated 
neatly because all deictic terms in one sentence were orient-
ed at one deictic center, the situation is different here. 
Deictic terms in sentences of the form narrated monologue 
are oriented at two deictic centers of orientation, thus al-
lowing collocations which otherwise are not permissible. (15) 
is an example of narrated monologues 
(.15) I joined tomorrow. 
(Conrad, Youth:. 116) 
In (15) the Past Tense indicates that the event described 
belongs to the past, whereas tomorrow locates it temporally 
in the future. The only sensible explanation for this super-
ficial contradiction is that the event time is viewed with 
respect to two time deictic points of orientation®. As a 
consequence, to describe sentences like (.15) two deictic 
centers of orientation will have to be established to pro- . 
vide the points of orientation for deictic terms'used in 
this manner. 
3.O." The examples presented may suffice to demonstrate that 
for an adequate interpretation of deictic terms in fictional • 
texts and, in this sense, for the determination of the 
frames of reference wich provide the referents for deictic 
terms, ah identification of the deictic center of orienta-
tion is necessary. Feature analysis which represents the 
roles referents of deictic terms obtain, though necessary, 
is not sufficient for an adequate interpretation of deictic 
terms. In this respect, however, situation-free utterances 
as constituents of fictional texts do not differ from situa-
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tion-bound utterances being used in an actual communicative 
situation. If, for example, John talks to Mary and Peter to 
Bill, then both, Mary and Bill, obtain the role of addressee, 
which can be interpreted on the basis of features describing 
the second person pronoun used to address them. But an ade-
quate interpretation in addition has to answer the question 
"addressee with respect to whom?", i. e. with respect to 
what deictic center. Therefore, proper analysis of deictic 
terms is dependent on the identification of the deictic cen-
ter and only if the deictic center is identified is an iden-
tification of the concrete deictic field as the frame of 
reference possible. 
In an actual communicative situation, i. e. in the case of 
situation-bound utterances, the identification of the deictic 
center is easy, since it is identical to the acoustic source 
of an utterance. A change of the deictic center is indicated 
by a change of the acoustic source, i. e. if of several per-
sons involved in a communicative situation another one takes 
up the role of the speaker, this implies that the deictic 
center of orientation has changed and that consequently the 
deictic terms used have to be interpreted with respect to 
the new center. In situation-free utterances the identifica-
tion of the deictic center cannot be achieved by means of 
non-verbal, sensual activities, but it has to be reconstruct-
ed. The process of reconstruction follows the rules derived 
from language use in actual communicative situations: Since 
the interpretation of deictic terms in dependent on the sit-
uational context of an utterance, is situation-free utter-
ances where no situational context is given the situation is 
imagined, its substance thus being different from, but its 
structure identical to real situations. To accomplish the 
necessary task of reconstructing deictic centers of orienta-
tion formally, i.e. within a linguistic theory, a contextual, 
pragmatic theory is needed which in some way provides a de-
scription of the abstract points of orientation with respect 
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to which deictic terms are to be interpreted. Such a con-
textual description will not have to be different for situa-
tion-bound and situation-free utterances. What differentiates 
situation-bound utterances and situation-free utterances, 
though, is that by definition diectic terms used in a situa-
tion-bound utterance are oriented at one deictic center of 
orientation and that, consequently, one contextual descrip-
tion for each utterance is sufficient. Situation-free utter-
ances, on the other hand, which consitute fictional and non-
fictional texts, may contain deictic terms oriented at more 
than one contextual description. In addition, a contextual 
theory for the analysis of text must provide means to de-
scribe deictic centers of orientation on different levels to 
account for the fact that different relations hold between 
deictic fields in texts, which can be identified as co-ordi-
nation, embedding and interference, as I shall demonstrate 
in the following section. 
3.1. Let us consider first a dialogue presented in a fic-
tional text: 
/16/ a. 'You're in good shape, Colonel,' the surgeon said. 
*I'm sorry I can't go on the shoot. I can't even 
shoot. ' 
b. 'Hell,' said the Colonel. 'That doesn't make any 
difference. Neither can anybody else in this army. 
I'd like to have you around. 1 
c. 'I'll give you something else to back up what 
you'-re using. ' 
d. 'Is there anything?' 
e. 'Not really. They're working on stuff, though.' 
f. 'Let them work, ' the Colonel said. 
/Hemingway, Across the River: 12/ 
(16a) , (16b) and (16f) are examples of quoted speech proper 
in that they contain quoted utterances and quote indicating 
utterances. The quote indicating utterances are to be consi-
- 104 -
dered as utterances of the narrator which provide informa-
tion about the identity of the interlocutors, who obtain the 
person deictic role of persons talked about in the deictic 
field of the narrator. The definite noun phrases the surgeon 
and the Colonel determine the reference of the first person 
pronoun in the quoted utterances (16a) and (16b), respec-
tivey. The deictic fields of the characters are in this 
sense dependent on the deictic field of the narrator. Since 
all deictic terms in the quoted utterances of (16a), (16b) 
and (16f) are oriented at the deictic center of a character 
and all utterances of the narrator at his deictic center, 
the dominance relation, can be specified as one embedding. 
Examples (16c) - (16e) present alternating utterances of 
the interlocutors without interfering introductory remarks 
of the narrator. As utterances which constitute a dialogue 
in a real communicative situation these utterances are pre-
sented and have to be analyzed on the same level. Though 
each utterance requires its own contextual description, none 
of them is dominant with respect to the others. The rela-
tion between them is thus one of co-ordination. 
In narrated monologue the pronoun used to refer to the cha-
racter whose monologue is being narrated is a third person 
pronoun, unless the narrative is a first person narrative 
and the narrator presents his own thoughts, sensations or 
statements of the past in narrated monologue form. The use 
of the third person pronoun indicates that the character as 
the referent obtains the person deictic role of the other 
person talked about with respect to the narrator, i.e. the 
pronoun is interpreted with respect to the narrator. If a 
narrative is presented in the Past Tense, thus indicating 
that the events narrated are to be viewed as having occurred 
prior to the coding time of the narrator, then a Past Tense 
in narrated monologue indicates the same time deictic rela-
tion. It is therefore to be interpreted with respect to the 
coding time of the narrator and its referent is provided by 
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the frame of reference determined by the deictic field of 
the narrator. In narrated monologue, on the other hand, 
place deictic and time deictic adverbs as well as pronouns 
not referring to the character whose thoughts, sensations 
or statements are narrated determine the roles their refe-
rents assume within the deictic field ofthe character. In 
(17) 
/17/ She was glad she had done so while she could, for now 
she could not. There her daughters had been safe from 
war and revolution and the trouble of the people. There 
they were.now, safe. Here she was alone 
/Buck, Liang: 8/ 
the pronoun she refers to the character and determines her 
role in the deictic field of the narrator as the Past Tense 
determines the events or states of affairs as past with re-
spect to the narrator's present. The pronoun they also de-
termines the person deictic role but with respect to the 
character's center, as now indicates co-extension of its ref-
erent with the coding time of the character, i. e. the time 
which counts as the time at which her thoughts and sensations 
were coded. Here and there, respectively, refer to places in 
the vicinity and not in the vicinity of the coding place of 
the character. Since the character in narrated monologue ob-
tains the same person deictic role as in quoted speech or 
thought within the deictic field of the narrator the same 
relation of dominance holds here. Since, however, in the sur-
face sentence deictic terms are oriented at two deictic cen-
ters, which results in an interference of deictic fields, 
this dominance relation may be specified as one of interfer-
ence . 
Thus, possible relations between deictic fields in fictional 
discourse are co-ordination (deictic fields of characters, 
e.g. in a dialogue), embedding (a deictic field of a char-
acter in relation to the deictic field of the narrator, e.g. 
in quoted speech or thought) and interference (a deictic 
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field of the narrator and a deictic field of a character, 
e.g. in narrated monologue). If a character quotes utter-
ances of another character, then again, this represents a 
case of embedding one deictic field into another and uoth 
are embedded into the deictic field of the narrator if he is 
the one who presents the speech of the first character. Po-
tentially there are no restrictions as to the number of em-
bedding and co-ordinating deictic fields in fictional texts. 
A contextual theory, therefore will have to provide not only 
the means to formally describe a deictic center of orientation 
but also ways to account for co-ordination, embedding and 
interference of contextual reference. As I mentioned ini'-
tially, I know of no linguistic theory, syntactically or se*-
mantically based, following generative grammarian or modal 
logic principles, which would be equipped to solve the prob-
lems here discussed. If, however, such a theory were develop-
ed, it would not only allow proper analysis of the reference 
of deictic terms in texts, but it would at the same time 
serve as a device to describe the pragmantic structure and 
thus an important aspect of the consititution of texts. 
3.2. In Rauh (.1978) I decided on using modified hypersen-
7 
tences as contextual descriptions. I by no means maintain 
that a hypersentence model can be considered a final solu-
tion since too many problems are related to the concept of 
hypersentences. But it may, nevertheless, serve as a start-
ing point to demonstrate what has to be done and what can be 
done. 
According to the modified hypersentence model I applied, 
situation-bound utterances are described in deep structure 
as being embedded into one hypersentence which syntactically, 
i.e. by means of syntactic categories and features, repre-
sents the speaker, the addressee, the person(s) or thing(s) 
talked about, and the place and time deictic points of orien-
tation, thus providing syntactically all points of oriental 
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tion necessary for the Interpretation of deictic terms. The 
verb in the hypersentence determines by means of features 
syntactic and semantic properties of the sentence which is 
finally generated as the surface sentence: A declarative sen-
tence is marked by the feature (+declarative), an interroga-
tive sentence by (+interrogative) and an imperative by ^im-
perative) . A second feature marking the verb in the hyper-
sentence indicates that the surface sentence serves the func-
tion of communication: (+communicatio). Constituent sentences 
of texts which contain deictic terms oriented at one deictic 
center of orientation are described in the same way as situa-
tion-bound utterances. 
Sequences of sentences containing deictic terms oriented at 
one deictic center are desribed as a conjunction of sentences 
embedded into one hypersentence, as figure (Fl) demonstrates: 
(Fl) 
If quoted speech is presented either in a fictionally or 
non-fictionally used sentence, both the quoting and the 
quoted.part are embedded in hypersentences in deep structure, 
the hierarchical structure describing the relation of domi-
nance holding between the two: 
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If a dialogue is quoted either in fictional or non-fictional 
texts in such a way that each quote is introduced by intro-
ductory sentences, then the introductory sentences appear as 
a conjunction of sentences embedded into the topmost hyper-
sentence, each containing a hypersentence as a direct object 
representing the contextual description for the quoted sen-
tences: 
If, however, a dialoque is presented without introductory 
remarks, then the underlying structure describes a conjunc-
tion of hypersentences and each of these hypersentences con-
tains as a direct object the sentence which later appears as 
the surface sentence. The description of each of the con-
joined sentences thus equals the description of sentences 
used as situation-bound utterances. But sentences constitut-
ing a dialoque are not isolated units. They present cohesion 
in that alternating interlocutors change the roles of speak-
er and addressee and the referent of you used by speaker^ is 
the "referent of I used by speaker2 and conversely. Thus, the 
relation of co-reference holds between constituents of con-
joined hypersentences, which can be captured by means of 
rules. The relation of co-reference also holds between con-
stituents of dominating and embedded hypersentences in ex-
amples of quoted speech. The referent of the noun phrase 
describing the person deictic relation of the other person 
talked about in the dominating hypersentence is identical 
to the referent of the noun phrase describing the role of 
the speaker in the embedded hypersentence. 
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Examples of situation-free utterances described so far, may 
occur either in fictional or non-fictional texts, their de-
scription being the same in both contexts. There is one 
difference, though, between sentences used fictionally or 
non-fictionally. Whereas in non-fictional contexts it is not 
possible for an utterer to present thoughts and sensations 
other than his own either in a directly verbally coded or 
narrated monologue way, this may be done by a fictitious, 
omniscient narrator who counts as the utterer of utterances 
issued in a narrative. To account for this fact descrip-
tively, I introduced the features (+experience ^cognition) 
as alternatives to the feature (+communication) marking the 
verb of a hypersentence to indicate the semantic function 
of the surface sentence. Hypersentences of this type domi-
nate sentences representing quoted thoughts, interior mono-
lugue and narrated monologue. In the case of the latter two, 
these hypersentences are themselves immediately embedded 
into hypersentences of the normal type vJhich serve as con-
textual descriptions of the narrator's situation. Thus, the 
similarity between interior and narrated monologue is ac-
counted for, the difference between the two being described 
by deictic reference, since deictic terms in interior mono-
logue are all determined with respect to the deictic center 
of the character, represented by the immediately dominating 
hypersentence, and deictic terms in narrated monologue are 
determined with respect to the deictic centers of both the 
character and the narrator, represented syntactically by the 
embedded and the dominating hypersentence, respectively. 
4. Concluding my presentation, I return to the questions 
introduced initially, which served as a guideline for this 
contribution, and suggest more or less tentative answers. 
First it was asked which theory of semantics should be con-
sidered as basic in the explanation of fictional texts. 
Whatever theoretical framework is chosen for a linguistic 
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semantic theory, it will have to provide context indepen-
dent descriptions of linguistic units which represent their 
sense. In the case of deictic terms considered here, such 
descriptions represent the roles referents of deictic terms 
obtain and are constant irrespective of the contexts in 
which deictic terms are used. Secondly, a linguistic seman-
tic (.or pragmatic) theory will have to provide means to ac-
count for the relevance of situational contexts for an ap-
propriate interpretation of deictic terms. Context independ-
ent descriptions are not sufficient, as can be seen expe-
cially in the case of narrated monologue. In addition, con-
textual theories will have to be prepared to distinguish 
contextual descriptions on different levels and establish 
rules to describe the relations between them. Question (2) 
was concerned with the importance of the reference to ob-
jects in the constitution of fictional texts. I have at-
tempted to show that a text is consituted by numerous frames 
of reference determined by the deictic fields which provide 
the referents for deictic terms in the text. Analyzing de-
ictic reference in fictional texts, therefore, at the same 
time provides insight into the (pragmatic), constitution of 
these texts. I have not talked about how I view the differ-
ence in substance of referents of deictic terms being either 
objects of the real or a fictitious world, though I indi-
rectly committed myself to an answer by applying a deictic 
theory which distinguishes such modes of pointing as imag-
inary deixis and demonstratio ad oaulos and relates imaginary 
objects to deictic terms used in fictional texts and real 
objects to those used in situation-bound utterances which 
apply the mode of pointing palled demonstratio ad oaulos, 
Whether a referent exists or existed in reality, is believed 
or pretended to exist, or simply imagined, has no impact on 
the linguistic act of reference, which can be defined as a 
realation between a linguistic and a non-linguistic unit, 
whatever the latter's ontological status may be. 
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Question (.3), finally, I modified slightly in order to be in 
a position to provide a non-speculative answer. The modi-
fied version asks for the relation that exists between fic-
tional texts and texts about reality. I suggest subdi/iding 
texts about reality into two classes, one representing situ-
ation-bound utterrances with a given situational context, 
the other representing situation-free utterances, such as 
letters, (auto)biographies, essays and the like, where situ-
ational contexts are not given but have to be reconstructed. 
Actually, it is only to the latter class that I relate the 
concept text. In this sense fictional texts and texts about 
reality linguistically differ only in one aspect in that in 
texts about reality it is not possible for a speaker to pre-
sent another person's thoughts or sensations in a quasi per-
formative way. If, therefore, a text contains thoughts or 
sensations verbalized and presented by a person who is not 
the experiencer, then this has to be taken as a fictional 
element in the constitution of the text. Otherwise, fictional 
texts and texts about reality cannot be distinguished on 
linguistic grounds. This implies, also, that imaginary deixis 
as a mode of pointing is not restricted to fictional texts 
but may just as well be applied in texts about reality, 
which, in fact, is the case. 
Notes 
1 The term "actual communicative situation" used here refers 
to what Lyons calls the "canonical situation of utterance": 
"this involves one-one, or one-many signalling in the pho-
nic medium along the vocal-auditory channel, with all the 
participants present in the same actual situation able to 
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see one another and to perceive the associated non-vocal 
paralinguistic features of their utterances, and each 
assuming the role of sender and receiver in turn" (Lyons, 
1977:637). Not included are, therefore, such communicative 
situations where technical instruments, e.g. telephone, 
walky-talky, loud speaker and the like, are used. 
2 
Bühler only distinguishes these three levels. As Fillmore 
(1971; 1971a) has pointed out, the level of social deixis 
also has to be considered. Schmid (1972), in addition, in-
cludes the level of mode as a deictic category. 
3 In Rauh (forthooming) I present a more detailed discussion 
of the relation between the abstract deictic field and its 
possible realizations. 
4 
For further information on modes of pointing see Rauh 
(forthcoming), and the references given there. 
5 The notion "count as" ("zählen als") was introduced and 
defined by A. Kratzer (1978) in the sense applied here. 
® More examples of narrated monologue which provide empiri-
cal evidence for the adequacy of the present analysis are 
provided in Rauh (1978) . The related problem of "narrative 
tense" is discussed indetail in Rauh (forthcoming). 
7 The hypersentence model I developed in Rauh (1978) is bas-
ed on Sadock (1969), which, though more primitive than 
Sadock (1974)., was preferred because of its being compat-
ible with early Chomskyan generative syntactic theory, 
which was the general theoretical framework of my approach. 
Early Chomskyan theory, on the other hand had to be pre-
ferred to his more recent works because hypersentences 
have to be deleted, a process which is highly restricted 
since the introduction of the "Structure-Preserving Con-
straint" (Emonds, 1976). Under this constraint hypersen-
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ON THE RELEVANCE OF POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR LITERARY 
THEORY 
Árpád Bernáth - Károly Csűri 
A. József University, Szeged 
1. Outline 
If we start from a conventional conception of litera-
ture in a broad sense, then we can regard as "poetry" or 
"literary works" all those oral or written utterances which 
are so declared by the authors or so admitted by the recip-
ients. A variaty of outward forms in characteristic of these 
historic occurences. Spells and magic tales, as well as the 
works of "concrete poetry" can be included here. 
The following considerations, however, will refer only 
to a more restricted part of the varied and multi-functional 
poetry thus conceived. More precisely, to the literary works 
in connection with which the following questions are put-: do 
they have any part in cognition, and if so, what may we come 
to know through them? It is enough to think of the culture 
of our continent, and we can see that the range of such 
works extends from Homer's epics to Beckett's dramas and 
further still. So it seems reasonable to ask that one of the 
central concerns of literary theory should be to answer 
these questions. In our opinion, every literary theory must 
be able to tell what the cognitive function is and what kind 
of knowledge may be attained through the analysis of liter-
ary works, or certain classes of these, forming the subject 
of literary research determined by the theory in question. 
This set of questions has been present in European 
thinking for a long time. It already appears in mythological 
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forms of this thought in debated as to whether Hermes or 
Apollon should be the patron of poetry, in the relation be-
tween philosophy and poetry, Plato and Aristotle are the 
first to raise the questions with which we are concerned. 
But our purpose here is not to present a historical survey. 
We refer rather only to the essential methodological lessons 
drawn from such a survey: scientifically established results 
can only be achieved, if questions which seem particularly 
poetic are analysed in an overall theoretical framework. It 
will hardly be sufficient to define the relation between 
"poetry and reality" ("Dichtung und Wahrheit") by means of 
poetics only or of the. conceptual system of aesthetics in 
some strict sense. Since the relationship in question can be 
seen as one special instance of the possible relationship 
between sign and significatum, it is expedient that we should 
take into consideration all those results attained in this 
field by linguistics, semiotics, logic and epistemology. 
Naturally, if the literary theoretician wants to exploit thé 
results of the above mentioned disciplines, he is forced, 
then, to express his demands - in our case for a semantic 
theory satisfactory to literary theory - clearly and defi-
nitely. The profit, however, is not necessarily unilateral 
and unidirectional, since demands concerning the producti-
vity of a semantic theory can at the same time mean a desir-
able challange for scholars of the sciences mentioned above. 
A consistent and complete semantic theory, able to describe 
and explain from its own point of view, the mechanism of 
natural and artificial languages in all possible context of 
use, would no doubt come in useful to every scholar. In our 
opinion, this task cannot be solved by a considerable exten-
sion of the subject matter of any of the foregoing disci-
plines. Rather there is a need for interdisciplinary co-op-
eration on the basis of common cognitive interest concerning 
semiotic systems. All the mentioned sciences examine the 
problem of how semiotic systems can deliver truths and how 
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they can orient the action of their users. 
2. The Frege paradigm 
From this last point of view, logic can be considered 
the fundamental discipline. Since logic, according to the 
founder of its modern, symbolical version, Gottlog Frege, 
is a science dealing with the most general laws of truth 
("Wahrsein"). But if we study Frege1s semantic theory from 
the viewpoint of literary theory, we must conclude that his. 
thesis is not satisfactory for establishing the semantics 
of literary texts. While sketching our objections, we wish 
to illustrate with a concrete example: what demands does a 
literary theory raise for semantic theories? In the spirit " 
of the foregoing, we shall show both the specific criteria 
on the basis of which literary theory may object to a se-
mantic theory, and the advantages following the co-operation 
between the various branches of science. Undoubtedly, liter-
ary theory may become richer through' the study and acquisi- , 
tion of versions of the logical semantics. In addition, a 
critical study with an eye to the demands of literary theory 
can lead to questions stimulating the improvement of the 
given theory of logical semantics. 
The insufficiency of Frege's semantics demonstrable 
from the viewpoint of literary theory - in contrast with 
many other logical semantics - does not derive from the fact 
that the scholar of logic ignored these aspects of the ques-
tion. Frege sees rather clearly that language has different 
usages. He differentiates the diverse usages by the lan-
guage's ability, in the case of a given usage, to convey 
truth. According to this, there exists serious and non-se-
rious speech, and the question of truth can only be raised 
in connection with the former. Only the statements of seri-
ous speech express thoughts, and thus only the thoughts can 
be true or false. In the case of non-serious speech we state 
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something only apparently, so such sentences express only 
apparent thoughts. But these are not included "in the con-
cern of logic, as the physicist willing to examine storm, 
ignores the storm on stage." (Frege 1973 (1897): 44) As our 
example shows, in Frege's system the serious speech includes 
the utterances of science, while the non-serious speech in-
cludes the utterances of science, while the non-serious 
speech includes those of poetry. 
As is well-known, in Frege's semantic theory both true 
and false are objects, and the objects as references ("Be-
deutungen") are denoted by proper names. Expressions not 
taking this role, are merely quasi-proper names ("Schein-
eigenname"). The quasi-proper names and the class of proper 
names still have a common feature: images are linked to the 
expressions belonging to them. Yet the images are always of 
a subjective nature because in every case they are some-
one's images, and because two people can never possess the 
same image. According to Frege, the duty of poetry is to 
produce precisely especially strong images. Beauty is the 
characteristic of images and the quasi-proper names pre-
cisely evoke particularly coloured images. Eventually, 
Frege's ideas on the difference of literature and science 
can be concluded as follows: science strives for the true, 
whereas poetry strives for th beautiful and only the beau-
tiful. The true is objective and, as a consequence of this, 
is the common property of many people. The beautiful is sub-
jective, thus it can be the content of only one mind. So it 
is impossible to imagine for Frege a discipline, the object 
of which is the literary work: "Every enjoyer of art has his 
own work of art, so between judgements referring to beauty 
there can be contradiction by no means" (Frege 1973 (1897): 
47). If we were still to insist on the scientific study of 
poetry, we could then do it only in the domain of psycholoqv. 
The possible confusion of serious and non-serious 
speech reveals that the expressions - at least in some cases 
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- do riot bear the sign of being proper names or just quasi-
proper names. That speech is serious or non-serious must be 
decided seperately. If we wish to work out a suitable pro-
cedure of decision within the scope of Frege's conceptual 
system, then we come up against the following insurmount-
able difficulty: Frege deduces the concepts of semantic 
theory from the definition of the object. The reference 
("Bedeutung") is the object, sense ("Sinn") is the way the 
object is given to us. An expression denoting object is 
considered a proper name. For Frege, however, - as is well-
known - not only those things are objects which can be rec-
ognized in the physical world with our organs of sense, but 
also the numbers - like number "7" -»geometrical forms -
like the "triangle" and, moreover, truth-values themselves. 
So the following question is inevitable: Why does "7" 
denote an object in mathematics, and why does "William Tell" 
not denote an object in Schiller's William Tell? Further-
more, why is the expression "3 + 4 = 7" true, and why is the 
expression "Tell shot an apple from his son's head" not 
true? Nor can the latter expression be false for Frege, 
since it is from a literary work. 
The logicians adhering to the conception of Frege will 
not find it strange, of course, that objects cannot be ren-
dered into statements of literary works. So they can answer 
our questions thus: That there existed a William Tell, and 
whether he shot an apple from his son's head or not, must be 
determined by the same methods as the questions: did Alex-
ander the Great ever exist and did he have a horse called 
Bucephalus? By no means do we proceed in the same way when 
deciding that the expression "3 + 4 = 7" is true. 
However, this answer cannot be satisfying for the school 
scholars of literary theory. Since, if we want to clarify 
the William Tell problem using the methods of the historian, 
then we are historians and not literary theorists. 
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Our reilectlon can also support an argument for lit-
erature being unable to constitute the subject of a special 
Literary science differing from history. And if our re-
searches result in the tact thai: William TeJ.! does not re-
ally exist, or, in reference to Frege, we postulate it in 
advance, then evidently we do not have the opportunity of 
admitting or negating some characteristics of William Tell. 
If the science of literature with its own congitive interest 
and method, cannot be studied, then we also must have a neg-
ative answer to the question as to whether literary texts as 
literature have any role in cognition. The inevitably neg-
ative answer, however, contradicts our intuition. There ex-
ists a literary science institutionally studied, and its 
history shows that its cognitive Interest and methodology at 
least partly differs from those of the history. Already 
Aristotle tried to work out such a literary theory in which 
"poetry tells the universal while history the individual 
cases" (Cf. Poetics, Ch. 9). 
3. The problem of the r&f.-. rtrna* of 11 l.-nwy characters^ 
We would like to demonstrate our observations concern-
ing the reference of literary characters with the help of 
an analogy. The subject matter of the analogy - adhering to 
a former example of ours - is constituted by natural num-
bers . 
In our opinion the natural numbers, concepts of second 
order also in Frege"s system, express something general. The 
general in this context means that connections or systems of 
connections expressed by natural numbers may be valid not 
only on one subject but on a whole range of subjects. On the 
other hand, the truth of statements coming from operations 
with natural numbers depends on whether we keep the rules on 
the basis of which the operations are performable, and which 
secure that the reference of expressions does not change 
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without marking that change. If a "sentence" resulting from 
an operation with natural numbers, e.g.: "3 + 4 = 7" is 
true - and it is true according to Frege because the ex-
pressions on both sides of an equation denote the same ob-
ject then the connection expressed by the "sentence" is 
generally true. That is, it can be valid in different sub-
ject matters. We want to stress two elements of the forego-
ing considerations. On the one hand, the "existence" of nat-
ural numbers depends on whether they are the members of a 
well-formed system. On the other hand, the generality of 
natural numbers and the expressions resulting from opera-
tions with them depends on whether or not their validity 
range is confined to one subject matter. We can also note 
that the number theories constitute those systems of rules 
which determine the inner structures of various numerical 
systems and the operations that can be performed with their 
members. The task of the single branches of applied mathe-
matics, then, is to elaborate the possible ways of refer-
ence of the different numerical systems to one another or 
to spheres beyond numerical systems. In other words, to 
determine the exploration of the less abstract images or 
models of the more abstract connections indicated above. So 
we must take into account that the systems of rules are of 
a formal nature and are always given by the theory, that is, 
they are human constructions. 
In one respect, there is a similar situation with lit-
erary characters. Their existence also depends on the ex-
istence of a system. This system which, for instance, ap-
pears as the structure of events in a work describing e-
vents, is given neither in advance nor explicitly but must 
be discovered by the scholar of "applied literary theory", 
the analyst of the work in question. He must reveal that 
the composition of events follows that of a more abstract 
sequence of events. This more abstract sequence of events 
is one realization of possible formations according to a 
- 122 -
system of rules, that is, a well-formed sequence of events. 
Let us call this abstract, well-formed sequence of events 
action from here on, or in other words action-structure. 
Consequently, we attribute existence conditionally to the 
characters of literary works describing a sequence of events 
only until we can explore or establish the systems of rules, 
according to which the action-model defining the composition 
of the sequence of events in the given literary work can be 
constructed. The more abstract equivalents of characters in 
the sequence of events in a work will be called figures in 
the action-structure. The attributes (=properties and rela-
tions) of figures are consequently prescribed by the system 
of rules. So the characters of the classes of literary works 
in question can be considered existent inasmuch as they cor-
respond to a figure, and they are general because it is not 
necessary that one figure should have only one corresponding 
character. All those structured sets of states of affairs 
can be mapped onto the action containing the figures, and 
which can be generated with the help of the system of rules 
underlying the model. At the same time, if we cannot 
strengthen our previous hypothesis that sequences of events 
of a particular text-world imitate a well-formed action-
model in their composition, while its characters imitate 
that of their attributes, then we are forced to regard the 
sequences of events as disordered and the characters as non-
existent . 
What emerges from these in relation to the cognitive 
role and subject of literary works? We think that if the 
science of literature wishes to attribute a role in cogni-
tion to the class of literary works taken here as an exam-
ple, then it must elaborate or find those systems of rules 
which determine the action-model of the single works or a 
whole series of them. If the analyst's work has succeeded, 
he can then try to expand the composition of the sequence 
of events, and the range of validity pertaining to the 
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features and systems of relations of the characters' at-
tributes: while he takes the role of the historian, the 
sociologist or the moral-philosopher, the analyst can judge 
where and when similar systems of rules operated in the 
world not necessarily available through texts, that is, in 
the real world. Besides, he can set requirements for the 
agents of the real world, for men of action, and he can set 
tasks and aims to be accomplished according to the explored 
system of rules. 
This latter observation, however, indicates the limits 
of the analogy that is set up. No doubt, there is a simila-
rity between the numbers and characters, the numerical sys-
tems and the action-structures from the analysed point of 
view, nevertheless we have to admit that the role of liter-
ary works played in cognition cannot be deduced solely with 
an analogy available in the subject of mathematics and lit-
erary science. The orderodness of text-worlds is not only 
of a syntactic-semantic nature, but of a pragmatic nature 
as well. In literary works the syntactic-semantic component 
always bears ethical values. Eventually that is the way lit-
erary works could and can become action-orienting systems. 
In this context can we speak of the cognitive role of lit-
erature, and can clarify more closely the question of what 
the knowledge, delivered by the given literary work, means. 
4. 'Major concepts of "possible world" in logic 
The next task is to find a semantic theory suitable 
for our purposes: a theory with the help of which the seman-
tic aspects of the foregoing considerations can be described 
systematically. In dealing with literary characters, we have 
already introduced some concepts the usefulness of which be-
comes apparent now. The expressions "real world", "possible 
range of reference", almost suggest that for the clarifica-
tion of the above problems, it is advisable to rely on the 
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possible-worlds semantics. This semantics has been elaborat-
ed by various modal and philosophical logics in the course 
of time, but above all in the last two decades. Using the 
possible-worlds semantics in literary theory is a tempting 
•experiment for the very reason because it would mean the 
revival of an old thought under new conditions, when the de-
vices of logic and the literary theory have been refined 
considerably since the first explicit experiment. The old 
thought referred to is the theory of Bodmer and Breitinger 
who tried to apply the Leibnizian concept of possible worlds 
directly to literature3. 
Studying the recent logical literature dealing with 
this question in mind, we find that the concept of possible 
world occurs in very different systems, and that these sys-
4 
terns define its content rather loosely and diversely . Es-
sentially, however, two basic types of opinions can be iso-
lated. 
(,l.a) According to one kind of thinking, possible worlds 
are that kind of abstract models of set theory which rep-
resent definite states. These theories are characterized 
mainly by the fact that, when giving the truth-conditions 
of propositions they fix formal and not material conditions^. 
(,l,.b) The constructivistic concept does not regard the pos-
sible worlds as given, but establishes them from the propo-
sitions in the light of certain conditions. That is, this 
kind of theory does not simply assume, but gradually builds 
up, that is, materially defines the possible worlds. 
If asking what standpoints the theories represent con-
cerning the relationship between the real world and possible 
worlds, then again the opinions form two major groups. 
(_2.aX Some logicians and philosophers think that possible 
worlds are autonomious evtities, and can be reduced to no-
thing else. According to them, these worlds must be under-
stood in the same way as our own world, that is)vthe differ-
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ence between the possible worlds and the real world cannot 
be ascribed to type-difference. The only point is that the 
events happening in the real world are different from those 
taking place in the various possible worlds. 
(,2.b) Several philosophers, however, state that possible 
worlds are theoretical constructs, intellectual projections 
the basis of which is the actual world. So possible worlds, 
through some vehicles, can be deduced from the real world. 
The construction of possibilities, in accordance with this, 
can happen by means of transformations of different com-
plexity. The transformations operate on the population of 
individuals, the descriptive make-ups and on the really 
7 operative laws of nature . 
5. The concept of possible world in literary theory 
In the first approach it seems that out of the dif-
ferent logical concepts (l.b) and (,2.b) promise the most 
for literary theory. That is to say, those logical ideas 
which expound the content of the concept of possible world. 
When, in principle, we also believe that possible worlds' 
are functions of the real world, we want to further stress, 
however, that this close dependence only occurs in the 
course of construction, or it is relevant only in that pro-
cess, since if the establishment of the possible world is 
finished, we can blow up the bridge over which we crossed 
from the real world to the given possible world. Let us 
imagine, for example, that we want to look for all those 
possible worlds which can be constructed with respect to a 
given possible wor]d. In this case we need not return to 
that real world from which the possible world in question 
was deduced. It is enough to regard the already-constructed 
possible world hypothetically as a real world from which g 
further possible worlds can be derived . The above proce-
dure guarantees that concepts of possible worlds shown in 
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(l.a) and (2.a) can also be used in cases of reconstruction 
of possible worlds. The great necessity of this opportunity 
for the interpretation of literary works will be easier to 
see, if we define the concept of possible world in literary 
theory more closely. 
First, however, we want to clear up the connections 
between the text-worlds, possible worlds and the real world. 
The practice of interpretations of literary works dis-
closes that the reconstruction of text-worlds of literary 
texts and the explanation of their structure is not possible 
on the basis of only one actual state of- the real world. 
Even if it were possible, that explanation would be irrele-
vant from the specific cognitive point of view of literary 
science. This, in the first place, is related partly to the. 
reference and truth problem already dealt with. Since no 
one can seriously doubt the fact that a lot of literary 
characters cannot by any means be referred directly to flesh-
and-blood persons of the real world, or at least not in a 
relevant way. It is conceivable in principle that none of 
the states of affairs in a literary text-world has an equiv-
alent in the real world, and therefore all the statements 
which express and denote the state of affairs of a text-
world are false. Moreover we can postualte, as many have, 
that every statement, which occurs in a literary work, inde-
pendent of the fact whether the state of affairs drawn by 
the"statement has an equivalent in the real world or not, is 
necessarily false. We can represent that opinion, too -
Frege's studies are good examples for this - that literary 
works do not contain statements in advance, so the question 
of truth-value cannot even be raised. No matter how we think 
of the sentences of the literary texts, we never regret ac-
knowledging that the characters and the states of affairs 
described by these sentences, play or can play a construc-
tive role in establishing a specifically autonomous world 
that will be defined more clearly in the following. 
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Discussing the analogy of numbers and literary charac-
ters, we have already referred to the fact that the charac-
ters of literary works, if they are to be considered exist-
ent, can be referred to the figures of a more abstract ac-
tion-model. We noted though, that, on the one hand, the 
number of characters and figures is not necessarily the 
same, while on the other hand, that the action-model itself 
is an abstraction, so its extension is smaller than that of 
the concrete text-worlds. But the analyst of the work must 
give the reference of all characters, that is, the slgnifi-
catum of every sign in principle. Furthermore, he must de-
cide on the truth-value of all states of affairs in the 
text-world. As a consequence of this, in spite of the oblig-
atory correspondence-relations, there is no such action-
model possible which forms the entire reference range of a 
given text-world. We also noted that all those structured 
sets of states of affairs can serve as a possible reference 
range for a text-world, the structure of which can be map-
ped to the action-model containing the figures and abstract 
events. The sets of states of affairs fulfilling the above 
conditions may be regarded as the possible worlds of liter-
rary works, and we suppose that characters in the text-
worlds refer to the individuals of possible worlds. The 
true and false truth-values can be rendered to the sentences 
expressing and denoting the states of affairs also according 
to the connection between the single states of affairs of 
the text-world and the possible world. Though it can hardly 
be doubted after the above, we still stress the following: 
the possible worlds as the referential ranges of the text-
worlds are not metaphysical entities. Possible worlds are 
essentially the referential ranges of the text-worlds struc-
tured, or to put it in another way, explicated with the help 
of the action-models. They are constructs in which the ar-
bitrariness of the states of affairs and their connections 
composing the text-world ceases. We can say figuratively 
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that possible worlds are the "images' of action-models con-
structed on the basis of the systems of rules, inasmuch as 
we approach the analysed class of literary texts from the 
recipient. The metaphoric expression relates to the fact 
that the abstract actions can be realized in very different 
'surface structures'. It is said in this connection that the 
extension of the possible world of a text can be conside-
rably greater than that of its text-world. This information-
enrichment, not irrelevant from the easthetic point of view, 
is related to the role of the action-model: the action-model 
as an abstract structure, and, consequently, a structure of 
more general force can 'open' several (similarly structured) 
referential ranges for the text—world in question, which the 
text-world as such can never achieve. It is time to draw 
the conclusion already evident by now: text-worlds, possi-
ble worlds and action-models are situated on different lev-
els of abstraction, therefore the methods for approaching 
and reconstructing them are also different. The text-worlds 
are mainly available through text-linguistical operations, 
.the action-models through logical-epistemological and the 
possible worlds through text-linguistical and logical- " 
epistomological. Thus is the cognitive function and value 
of literary texts related to the hypothesis of possible 
worlds, -on the one hand, while, on the other, it is related 
to the comparison of structures of the possible worlds and 
the.real world, A question to be dealt with later in more 
detail. 
As we have seen, the action-model plays a distinguished 
part in relation to the possible worlds. Among other things, 
it is so because the existence of literary works as possible 
worlds is attached to these models, and is determined by the 
models and by the rules generating those models, respective-
ly. This fact definitely excludes the possibility of meta-
physical interpretations of the possible-world concept used 
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here. When we stated that the literary characters refer 
partly to the figures of the action-models, partly to the 
individuals of a possible world, we then tried to give an 
explanation to the following facts. At least one part of the 
characters, determined by the model, possesses characteris-
tics of general force, that is, shares the 'number'-nature 
of figures. At the same time, all characters in the works, 
also those being directly attached to figures, preserve 
their individual nature, accidental-contingent characteris-
tic , and in this way they contribute to the creation of the 
'specialness' of the possible worlds. They cannot lose their 
contingent features for the action-models wish and are able 
to explain the text-world as a possible world only in a cer-
tain respect and do not explore all possible structures in 
it. 
The foregoing passages proved that the reference of 
figures, and generally the truth-value of the statements of 
a text is' closely related to our interpretational and prag-
matic standpoint. It is related to the way we read a text 
and to what kind of text we consider it to be from the be-
ginning. We tried to argue in the above that we handle lit-
erary texts as vehicles of possible worlds. In our consid-
eration, concepts like text-world, possible world, action-
model, real world, etc. are linked in one consistent con-
ceptual system. • 
• In a given possible world, which can be mapped to a 
literary text, truths and demandable norms derived from the 
base action-model and system of rules, also valid in the 
real world, 'reveal themselves' in a specific way by method-
ically reforming the real world. 
The literary characters as possible individuals, the 
extension of the reference-range of the text-world, and thus 
the growth, of information-richness of the possible world, 
the possible world as the 'showing up' of action-models in 
the sphere of the 'specific', that is, the realization of 
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abstract structures through specific surface structures, 
and other similar connections demonstrate convincingly that 
the introduced conceptual system can connect and explain the 
cognitive function of literary works, the knowledge deli-
vered by them and the aesthetic quality of that knowledge in 
a consistent and natural way. 
Before finishing this phase of our discussion, we re-
turn briefly to the question, how the concept of 'possible 
world' in literary theory, drawn before, relates to the 
'possible world' concepts in logic. 
We have already referred to the following: to (re)con-
struct the structure serving as the basis of a possible 
world, we must start from the supposition that the text-
world to be analyzed is a possible world. That is, in the 
first approach, like the formal conceptions of (l.a) and 
(.2.a), we postulate it as a possible world. To strengthen 
this hypothesis, we can try then to define those rules which 
materially determine and explain the possible world formally 
postulated in the sense of (l.b) and (2.b). The strong ne-
cessity of such a connection derives from the following con-
sideration: the reader of literary texts cannot suppose that 
there is a world available, independent from the world of 
the read text, with the help of which he could determine the 
truth-value of the statements in the text, and through which 
he could explain the composition of the text-world with the 
'mapping' operation. He can attempt, however, - and in so 
doing he does the job of a literary theorist - the systematic 
construction of a model which seems to be relevant from the 
point of view of the text-world's composition: its construct-
ing rules prevail in the text-world, they make it true and 
understandable from the viewpoint in question, that is, to 
change it to a possible world. 
The realization of our objective raises the following 
methodological problem: if we do not want to make in advance 
the laws and norms prevailing in the given state of real 
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world the system of rules in the model to be set up - for, 
in doing so, every possible world would be an image of a 
given state of real world - then we have to elaborate the 
procedure for disclosing the systems of rules underlying 
the various possible worlds. 
6. A theoretical example for the literary explanation of 
text-worlds operating with possible worlds 
First we would like to explain more precisely the prin-
ciple of possible world in the sense of (l.a). 
To understand a modal notion is to understand a certain 
relation. This is the <alternativeness relation", which is 
defined on a given set of possible worlds. According to Hin-
tikka, the alternatives to a world W may be thought of as 
those possible worlds which could be realised instead of H. 
In connection with this, a proposition p is possibly true 
in W, if and only if p is true in at least one alterna-
tive possible world of W. That p be necessarily true in 
W requires the condition that p should be true in every 
alternative possible world of W. 
Let us take now the finite set of the propositions p, 
q, r... z the extension of which is the sequence of events 
of text-world Wfc. In the following we consider this sequence 
of events as identical with In our assumption is 
the distinguished possible world W* of the real world Wr. 
"Distinguished" in this context means that W* is exactly 
that possible world from among the alternatives of W r in 
which p, q, r,..z are true. In Hintikka's semantic theory 
this ensures the possible truth of p, q, r,..z in Wr. We 
must mention two more preconditions of the text-world inter-
pretation: 
(i) P» q, r ... z neither belong only nor in the first 
place to the worlds of characters of W ; 
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tiil W r is not directly relevant from the viewpoint of 
text-world interpretation. 
The text-world W , which as opposed to the possible + 
world W , can be characterised as the choice and construc-
tion of the sequence of events p, q, r ... z, is not jus-
tified. At the same time W+, unlike Wt, is not given in a 
way available simply by linguistic devices, and we can re-
gard it as existent only if conditions ensuring the truth 
of p, q, r ... z are given. The elaboration of a system 
M for fulfilling the truth-conditions of p, q, r z, 
however, will not mean any more that we postulate the pro-
positions truej but that we have made them true by means of 
M. The system M in question, identical with the action-
model in this case, gives the material explanatory princi-
ple of W demanded by Rescher, and thus, in fact, the 
composition of W . 
But we have not yet reached the end of our investiga-
tions. We can take a step further with the method of modal 
semantics, Inasmuch as we now regard the possible world W + 
as a hypothetically real world. So in the next phase we 
search for alternative possible worlds for W +, and try to 
find at least one in which Mtp, q, r ... z) propositions 
of W + are true. That is, now we do not seek the truth of 
the single propositions, but rather a possible world in 
which the structure of propositions determined by M is 
true. Suppose that we should find such a world and 
W + + coincides with a clearly limited fraction of W . Since 
the mapping refers to the structure in question, W ful-
fills the truth-conditions also, if the propositions 
p, q, r ... z are replaced by other propositions or real 
sets of affairs. Our sole requirement is that the new pro-
positions, or real sets of affairs should have a structure 
M', either isomorphic or homomorphic with respect to M, 
The problem that the structure M itself can be multi-
dimensional in the case of literary narratives will not be 
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dealt with here. It is more important to observe that our 
method based on possible worlds comes full circle: in the 
example, starting from the real world W through the 
^ + 
text-worlds Wfc and the possible worlds W we reached 
•the real world W again. More precisely: the range of W ' +4-
coinciding with the possible worlds W structured by M'. 
We stress, however, that our process, in spite of all ap-
pearances, is not tautologic, for there is a hierarchical 
difference between the start and the end of the route vir-
tually made. From an epistemological point of view, the Wr, 
chosen for the start, is evidently not the W of the end. 
We wanted to make the .difference in the abstractional de-
gree of levels clear with the introduction of the marking W + T. Out of the grades connecting the starting point W ++ ^ 
and the end W , the text-world W. is realized on the t + 
level of comprehension, while the possible worlds W on 
that of explanation. From the viewpoint of cognition, W + 
can be attributed the following value: W + represents pos-
sible truths, inasmuch as in the real world W W pos-
* + + r sessed an alternative W in the treated sense. But if in 
W or in W' , that is, in the real world and other text-r t' ' 
worlds, respectively, there are more alternative worlds 
(.e.g.: W + + +, W + + + + etc.) of W+, then the general validity 
force of truths represented by W + actually increases 
parallel to their cognitive value. With regard to the fact -
that the scientific research making this circle is of an 
empirical nature, there is no way to establish logically 
necessary truths. 
In the end, we must make another mention in connection 
with the 'choice' of propositions structured by M. We can-
not declare that the real world W r always possesses such 
fractions that are characterized by M*-structures, that is, 
which qualify the possible world W + as a possibly true 
world on the basis of the correspondance principle. ,There 
are, or at least can be imagined, such literary world whose 
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possible worlds do not have alternatives in the real world. 
The alternatives of the possible worlds of a certain work 
of art must be sought in many cases in the various modali-
ties of W r. Literary works try to influence and orient 
their readers, and with the help of their possible world W + 
they 'show* what the real world W f should look like, must 
have looked like, could have looked like, etc.. It is evi-
dent that the possible truths become relativized in such 
cases. It is a more extreme example when the possible world 
of a literary work can be reconstructed, but no alternatives 
can be found for the model either in the real world or among 
its modalities. Until it can no longer be decided whether or 
not it is the invention of new truths not yet seen, it is 
more suitable to act in accordance with the coherence prin-
ciple of truth. If the statements in question can be deduced 
relying on the constructed model without contradiction, then 
we consider them valid statements. And valid statements in 
this system are true statements. Naturally as far as the ac-
tion-model has no alternatives on the basis of the corre-
spondence principle, we can speak of non-actualized possible 
truths". 
7. . Concluding remarks 
If we assert the epistemological question raised in the 
beginning of the study, then we also must declare that the 
cognitive function of poetry must be registered among the 
essential functions that can be performed by literary works. 
But the acceptance of such a standpoint has far-reaching 
consequences for literary theory: we must require, for ex-
ample, that such a semantic theory should form a part of 
literary theory with the help of which into the statements 
of literary, texts truth-values can be rendered. In this con-
nection, the first problem is that exactly that semantic 
"school which elaborated the semantics operating with truth-
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values, denies in advance the mapping of truth-values to 
the statements in-literary texts. To be more precise, it 
does not even allow that the thoughts expressed by assertive 
sentences can be regarded as statements. Thus, in fact, it 
denies that literary works can have any part in cognition, 
that is - apart from psychologocal knowledge - we can learn 
nothing through them. The above negative answer is derived 
from the conception that exclusively the real world can be 
regarded as the referential range of literary text-worlds, 
and so the basis of truth-value mapping as well. In this 
study we have argued that the truth-value of statements of 
literary texts can-be decided with the construction of dif-
ferent possible referential ranges. To form our conception 
into a theory, the possible-worlds semantics can offer a 
suitable basis and frame. We have reached this conviction 
but by starting to study the different modal logic systems 
or philosophical logic but on the basis of practical exper-
iments in text-world interpretation. Thus the presented lit-
erary theory conception is independent of the semantic model 
that serves as the interpretent of the metatheory of text-
world interpretation. Though we took the stand that the 
truth-value of statements in literary texts cannot be deter-
mined by direct reference to the real world, we by no means 
want to deny, that the possibility of this procedure exists, 
and acknowledge that the realization of this possibility is 
necessary in certain methods of literary text analyses. 
Therefore, literary theory cannot ignore this circular of 
question. We stress, however, that resulting from the nature 
of literary work, the indirect connection between text-world 
and real world, the systematic establishment of which is a 
scientific task, is more important. This is the reason for 
the more detailed treatment of the possibilities of the in-
direct, systematic connection in this study. To enlighten 
the problems, we introduced the concept of text-world, pos-
sible world, real world and action-model. As a suggestion 
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for solving.the question, we formed the following rela-
tionships between them: the text-world represented by lin-
guistic devices can be declared a possible world with the 
help of an explanatory action-model constructed on the basis 
of a system of rules. The possible worlds as structured and 
so explained text-worlds can be compared through the action-
model functioning as the basis to the range or ranges of the 
real world similarly structured, or to their different mo-
dalities as alternative possible worlds. For determining the 
alternatives the procedures used in modal logic can serve as 
models. 
In finalizing, we are of the conviction that all ques-
tions dealt with must play a central role in every such se-
mantic theory that lays claim to the description and ex-
planation of literary texts. At the same time, we see clearly 
that we had to ignore several factors in this study without 
which the problems raised cannot be solved satisfactorily. 
We hope that our work, in this restricted sense, contrib-
utes to a research not yet finished. 
Notes 
+ This study is the revised version of our earlier work 
entitled "Mögliche Welten" unter literaturtheoretischem 
Aspekt. The original one was lectured on the II. Inter-
national Congress of Semiotics (Vienna) in 1979. 
1 Frege described his semantic theory in several studies, 
in a form modified several times. 
2 
For the discussion of these question see Poetics 1979, 
Vol. 8, No. 1/2. 
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3 Cf. Breltinger 1966 (1740). 
4 
At our statements we relied mainly on the works of 
Link 19 76 and Rescher 1975. 
5 Cf. Rescher 1975: p. 4. 
^ This concept is mainly represented by Rescher 1975. 
7 Rescher 1975: p, 92 and 193. 
8 Rescher 1975: p. 92. 
9 Rescher 1975: p, 84,' 
1 0 Hintikka 1975: p. 160. 
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QUESTIONS OF REFERENCE IN WRITTEN NARRATIVES 
Hans-Heinrich Lieb 
Freie Universität Berlin 
1. Introduction 
/1/ Strether's first question, when he reached the hotel, 
was about his friend; yet on his learning that Waymarsh 
was apparently not to arrive till evening he was not 
wholly disconcerted. 
-This is the beginning of a novel. Suppose this is 
the only thing we know about the text. We also know English, 
have some general knowledge of the world, and have same idea 
as to what a novel is. How will the text be understood? Af-
ter very little deliberation we will cone up with a hypo-
thesis such ass';,''".;' 
/2/ Allowing for the fact that this is to be just a novel, 
the author wants us to believe that 
a. a man Cor a boy) who, according to the autHor, is 
called Strether [ probably by his second name], 
reached a hotel (the author believes that we are fa-
miliar with the man and the hotel); 
b. immediately after reaching the hotel the man asked 
a question of somebody [perhaps the receptionist]; 
c. the question was about a friend of the man (and the 
author believes that we know whom he as in mind); 
d. the man learned from somebody [ probably from the , 
person of whom he asked the question, and through an 
answer to his question]. that another man Cor boy), 
called Waymarsh, was apparently [ as seemed likely to 
Strether on the basis of what he learned] not to 
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arrive till evening [till the evening of the day of 
Strether's own arrival] (the author again believes 
that we are familiar with the person called Waymarsh 
[ who very likely is to be the same person as 
Strether's friend]); 
e. the man called Strether was not wholly disconcerted 
by the fact that the man called Waymarsh [ his friend] 
was apparently not to arrive till evening. 
Understanding the text along these lines will be almost 
instantaneous with an experienced reader even if he starts 
reading The Ambassadors by Henry James for the first time in 
his life. Ease of understanding is deceptive, though, when 
we try to establish how understanding is achieved. 
In the present paper I will be concerned with one parti-
cular aspect of this problem: the correct understanding of 
referential expressions in /1/, generally, of referential 
expressions in written narratives. The qualification 
"written" is used as a mark of caution; '"'I am analysing an 
example from a printed text and wish to leave it undecided 
to what extent my results carry over to arbitrary narratives. 
Questions of reference have been a standard topic in 
text linguistics ever since its inception, as any introduc-
tory text to the field will show. At the same time refer-
ence has proved one of the most recalcitrant problems in 
generative grammar both from a syntactic and a semantic 
point of view; recent developments such as "trace theory' 
seem to be partly motivated by the continuing struggle with 
'anaphora * and 'coreference'. 
In this paper I cannot even begin to review the exten-
sive literature on questions of reference in linguistics, 
the theory of literature, the philosophy of language, expe-
rimental psychology, and artificial intelligence research. 
Even so it should be safe to claim that the understanding 
of reference in real life situations, including the inter-
pretation of literary texts, remains ill-understood. Using 
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the beginning of The Ambassadors as a sample text, I will 
study some of the general considerations that a reader may 
have to apply for correctly understanding referential ex- • 
pressions in a written narrative. I will concentrate on two 
problems: reference and fictionality, and reference and the 
narrator. 
Naturally, some theoretical framework is needed. I 
shall here adopt the proposals made in Lieb (1979), (1980a) 
for the semantics of referential expressions and for sen-
tence meanings in general. 
2. Reference, fictionality, and the narrator 
2.1. General approach 
Consider, once again, hypothesis /2/. The initial 
proviso, "allowing for the fact that this is to be just a 
novel", is meant to take care of fictionality: James does 
not really want us to believe that ...; rather, he pre-
tends that he wants us to believe that ... I shall not here 
be concerned with the problem of precisely how "pretends" 
is to be understood (but see fn. 8, below). Nor will I elab-
orate on "wants us to believe". It should be kept in mind, 
though, that all of 72a/ to /2e/ is the content of a read-
er-oriented propositional attitude that the author pre-
tends to have. Only the type of attitude ("want - believe") 
has been indicated. The account of the attitude may cer-
tainly be improved. 
As it stands, hypothesis /2/ does not allow for a nar-
rator different from the author. A narrator (or a series of 
narrators) can be accomodated in such cases by the follow-
ing modification: 
/3/ The author pretends that there is a person who ... and 
who is the author of [ the given text] and who wants us 
to believe that ... 
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The dots after "who" indicate the properties with 
which the author explicitly or implicitly endows the nar-
rator. Note that the modification must follow the fiction-
ality requirement and precede the specification of the basic 
propositional attitude, which is pretended (by the author) 
to be an attitude of the narrator: the author pretends that 
there is a person who ... and who wants us to believe that 
... (where all references to the author in /2/ are replaced 
by references to the narrator). The modification can be 
extended, in an obvious way, to cover a whole series of 
narrators. 
For a more precise account we informally characterize 
a number of auxiliary notions. 
2.2. Auxiliary concepts 
First, consider the word sequence of text /2/ (of the 
text quoted in /1/), i.e. the sequence of English words 
used in the text such that sequential order mirrors left-
-to-right arrangement in /1/: 
/4/ The word sequence of /1/ = Strether's^ firstj question^ 
whenq he^ reached g the-j hotelg was g about^Q his^ 
friend' yet^ his^ learning^g that^ Waymarsh^Q 
was ̂  apparently 2q not^ t0 22 arr7-ue23 ¿"£^24 even^n9 2S 
he2g was21 >¡£¿28 whollydisconcerted^q-
• The word sequence is abstract, a sequence of English 
words.1 The text /1/ - the text quoted in /1/ - also con-
tains a concrete realization, say, the corresponding part 
of the original copy of The Ambassadors as produced by 
Henry James. 
We define a referential expression of a text as any 
part of the word sequence of the text such that reference 
conditions are associated with the part. For instance, 
Strether's^ may be taken as a referential expression of text 
/1/. As part of a reference condition associated with 
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Strether* a ̂  we may assume: 
/5/ There is exactly one x such that the speaker is refer-
ring by Strether*a^ to x. 
Strether'e^ is a referential expression independently 
of whether any associated reference condition is actually 
satisfied with respect to Henry James. Referential expres-
sions in the sense defined can be identified solely on the 
basis of the syntax and the semantics of the text as deter-
mined by 'English grammar'. 
As soon as the speaker is identified with Henry James, 
the ficitionality proviso must also cover the reference 
conditions associated with referential expressions. Thus, 
hypothesis /2/ should be modified to read: 
/6/ Henry James pretends that 
- there is exactly one x such that he is referring by 
Strether* 8 ̂  to x, and that he believes that we are 
familiar with any x to which he is referring by 
Strether's, and ...; 
and [ Henry James pretendsl that he wants us to believe 
that 
- for all x^ and x 2 such that he is referring by 
Strether'e, to x, and by the
7
 hotel8 to x_, x. reached 
The two parts of 76/, which are collapsed in the original 
formulation /2J, are to characterize the two parts of the 
meaning of the text. The first part of the meaning is its 
thematic part; it essentially consists of the reference 
conditions and other conditions associated with the refer-
ential expressions of the text. The'second part of the 
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meaning is its Thematic part; it essentially consists of 
conditions specifiying 'what is said' of anything that 
satisfies the thematic part Ca^ reached x 2' etc.), and 
'how it is to be taken' by the addressee ('wants us to 
believe'). Both parts are subject to the flctionalitv 
proviso.^ 
Inclusion of a narrator would be as in /3/. If a nar-
rator is included, "he" is /6/ must be understood to refer 
back to the narrator not the author throughout. 
What is formulated by /6/ is the content of a hypo-
thesis on the meaning of text /1/. If the hypothesis is 
correct, /6/ also is a formulation of the meaning. We shall 
not discuss the hypothesis any further but concentrate on a 
more restricted question: provided the hypothesis is cor-
rect, what are the meanings that the referential expressions 
of text /1/ have in the text? 
3. Textual meanings of referential expressions 
3.1. Author-independent meanings of referential expres-
sions 
The following expressions are assumed to be the referen-
tial expressions of the text quoted in /1/: 
/ 7 / a. Strether's^ 
b. Strether '-8^ first2 
•c. he ̂  
d. they hotelg 
e. * £ all 
f . his^ friend^ 
g- hisls 
h. his^ learning^^ . 
i . Vaymarsh^g 
j - evening.. 
4 k. ^ 2 4 
tillevening^^ 
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All referential expressions happen to be definite sin-
gular nouns or noun phrases or definite singular pronouns. 
In Lieb (19791 I have proposed a semantic analysis of such 
nouns and noun phrases which, suitably extended to cover 
proper names and pronouns, will here serve as my theoretical 
background. 
Take an expression of the form Definite Article + Sin-
gular Noun, such as the7 hotelg. Such expressions always are 
referential ones in the sense that reference conditions can 
be associated with them. Various meanings of the expressions 
can be distinguished. We may here restrict ourselves to a 
single type, referential-doxastia meanings. Very informally 
these may be characterized as follows. 
/8/ For any expression of the form Def Art + Sg N, a refe-
rential-doxastic meaning of the expression is any mean-
ing that imposes the following conditions on the normal 
use of the expression in utterances: 
a. There is exactly one object to which the speaker is 
referring by the expression in the utterance. 
b. Whatever the speaker is referring to by the expres-
sion in the utterance belongs to the 'reference • 
basis' for the head of the expression (the noun) re-
lative to the speaker, the utterance, and some lexi-
cal meaning of the head. 
c. The speaker assumes that any addressee has some know-
ledge of what the speaker is referring to. 
d. The speaker presupposes that whatever he is referring 
to has the properties specified by the lexical mean-
ing of the head. 
Suppose that the expression is the^ hotelg, and a cer-
tain concept, •hotel", is taken as the lexical meaning of 
J- 5 
hotel8, the head of the expression. /8/ then applies as 
follows (EngZ-iih =df the English used by Henry James in 
text (1)): 
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/9/ The referential-doxastic meaning of the_ hotelQ relative 7 o 
to "hotel^* and with respect to word sequence /4/, an 
appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and Engliih = the 
relation between utterances and speakers such that: 
a. There is exactly one x to which the speaker is refer-
ring by the^ Hotelg in the utterance. 
b. For all x, if the speaker is referring to x by the? 
hotelg in the utterance, then x is in the reference 
basis for hotelg relative to the speaker, the utter-
ance, and "hotel^". 
c. The speaker assumes that, for all x, if he is refer-
ring to x by thei hotel^ in the utterance, then any 
addressee of the utterance has some knowledge of x. 
d. The speaker presupposes that, for all x, if he is 
referring to x by they hotelg in the utterance, then 
x is in the extension of 'hotel^'.® 
Conditions /9a/ to /9c/ form a reference condition 
that can be associated with the^ hotelg. The meaning is 
called referential because the reference condition requires 
existence of exactly one referent (exactly one object the 
speaker is referring to); cf. (9a). The meaning is called 
doxastic because the referent must satisfy a speaker assump-
tion (.concerning the addressee's familiarity with the re-
ferent); cf. /9c/. Condition /9b/ requires that the referent 
be selected from the reference basis, that is from the 'set 
of relevant objects': at the time of uttering the-j hotelg, 
the speaker is willing to consider certain objects only as to 
whether they are or are not in the extension of "hotel^*. 
Condition /9d/ is a presupposition condition. There may 
be successful reference even if the speaker is mistaken in 
his belief that the referent is in the extension of "hotel^. 
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3.2. Author-restrioted meanings of referential expressions -
(..textual meanings) 
In /9/ we have identified a meaning of the7 hotelg that 
is independent of any specific speaker or utterance. We are, 
however, interested in the meaning that the7 hotelg has in 
the text quoted in /1/, a meaning that depends on Henry Ja-
mes. On our conception of a text (cf. Lieb (1980c), a text 
has an abstract part and a concrete part. In /9/ it is only 
the abstract part of text /1/ that has been taken into ac-
count. The concrete part comprises an appropriate portion of 
the original copy of The Ambassadors, for which we arbitrar-
ily introduce the following name: 
/10/ A* = df the smallest part of the original copy of The 
Ambassadors that contains a realization of word se-
quence /2/. 
We wish to speak of a meaning that the7 hotelg has in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Enqt-ilh, i.e. the 
the English used by Henry James in text /1/. Such a meaning 
will be taken as an entity of the same type as an author-
-independent meaning, i.e. as a relation u between utter«-
ances V and speakers V W e introduce the following concept: 
"u is a meaning of / in t with respect to V, V^, and S , 
where "f" stands for any part of a word sequence of a text, 
"t" for any text, and "S" for any 'language system' (in 
particular, a system of a language variety, such as a dia-
lect).. The following implication is assumed to hold by defi-
nition: 
y i l / For all u, f, t, V, Vir S, if u is a meaning of f in t 
with respect to V, and S, then u holds between V 
and 
As a first hypothesis we might simply identify the 




a. There Is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
the7 hotelg in text /1/ with respect to A*, Henry 
James and Engtiih. 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of then hotcla in text / o 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and English, 
then u = the referential-doxastic meaning of the7 
hotel8 relative to 'hotel^' and with respect to ... 
[ cf. /9/] . 
Because of /11/, the relation u that is the only textual 
meaning of the7 hotelg must actually hold between A* and 
Henry James, that is there must be exactly one x such that 
Henry James is referring by they hotelQ in A* to x etc., cf. 
/9a/ to /9d/. 
Hypothesis /12/ could be wrong in a number of ways. Firsts 
they hotelg could have several meanings in the text. Second, 
the textual meanings might be modifications of author-inde-
pendent meanings by which a narrator is taken into account. 
Third, the author-independent meanings might not be referen-
tial-doxastic ones but meanings of other types. Fourth, they 
might be meanings not relative to the concept "h >tel^' but 
relative to some other concept (we could have gotten the word 
meaning wrongI. 
More fundamentally, all meanings have to be modified by 
the fictionality proviso: A meaning of the-j hotelg relative 
to A* and Henry James is not a referential-doxastic meaning 
but is the pretending of a referential-doxastic meaning. In 
other words: 
/13/ a. Henry Hames pretends of A* and himself the relation 
/9/ - pretends that this relation holds between A* 
and himself. 
b. The pretending of relation /9/ = the relation between 
any (utterance) V and (speaker) such that pre-
tends relation /9/ of V and y,. 
- 151 -
The relation specified in /13b/ replaces relation /9/ as the 
meaning of the7 hotelg in text /1/: 
/14/ Revised, hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
the7 hotelg in text /1/ with respect to A*, Henry Ja-
mes, and Engllili. [ = /12a/] 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of iftê  hotelg in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Eng-f-cift, 
then h = the pretending of the referential-doxastic 
meaning of they hotelg relative to "hotel^" and with 
respect to ... [cf. /9/]. 
The essential features of /14/ are as follows. 
The (only) meaning of they hotelg in the text is obtain-
ed as a function of an author-independent meaning of they 
hoteIqj which itself is a relation between possible utter-
ances and speakers (authors). The function, pretending, ap-
plies to the meaning and replaces it by a new relation be-
tween possible utterances and speakers that -no longer in-
volves actual references. By /11/, this relation holds be-
tween A* and Henry James. 
In the case of a fictitious narrator a second function 
intervenes between pretending and the author-independent 
meaning of they hotelgf assumption /11/ again establishes 
the necessary link to A* and Henry James. The nature of the 
new function can only be determined after the account of the 
narrator that was suggested in /3/ has been made more precise. 
4. Reference involving a narrator 
4.1. The place of the narrator 
For the Ambassadors a first-person narrator must indeed 
be assumed. This 'I-narrator' must be a person satisfying 
the following requirements: Text /1/ - as part of The Am-
bassadors - i s a text by the person; A* is the form of a 
realization of text /1/ by the person.7 The author of any 
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text may preten<?»or claim that a narrator is or is not iden-
tical with the author and has a number of other properties; 
in the case of a first-person narrator, identity is claimed 
or pretended. For dealing with the narrator of the Ambassa-
dor e. we introduce a relation defined as follows: 
/15/ a = df the relation between any V^ and V 2 such that 
Vy = V2 and . . . ..,. 
where ...V^V^... is a formula whose free variables are at 
least "V2" and at most "l^" and "V2" and that formulates for 
V2 the assumptions made by Henry James concerning a narrator 
of the Ambassadors. We may then suggest that hypothesis /6/ 
on the meaning of text /1/ be replaced as follows: 
/16/ Henry James pretends of A* and himself the relation de-
fined for any V and as follows. 
There is a V2 such that: u holds between V^ and V2 
(i.e. V^ = V2 and ...V^y2...), and text /1/ is a text 
by V2, and V is the form of a realization of text /1/ 
by V a n d 
- there is exactly one x such that V2 is referring by 
Strether's. in V to x, and ...; 
The new hypothesis applies the general idea formulated 
in /3/ for taking a narrator into account: "The author pre-
tends that there is a person who ... and who is the author 
of the'given text and who wants us to believe that ...". 
Still, hypothesis /16/ has an important flaw: the reference 
conditions for Strether's^ and the other referential expres-
sions should be relativized not just'to some narrator V2 but 
to any narrator V2 independently of the number of persons 
that satisfy the conditions for V2. This is taken into ac-
count by the following modification of /16/: 
/17/ Henry James pretends of A* and himself the relation 
defined for any V and V, as follows: 
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a. There is a V~ such that: a holds between K and 
^ 1 2 
and text /1/ is a text by V2, and V is the form of 
a realization of text /1/ by V2. 
b. For any such V^, 
- there is exactly one x such that V 2 is referring 
by Strether's. in V to x, and ...; 
"There is a V2" in /17a/ may be strengthened to read 
"there is exactly one V2", which yields the case of a single 
narrator. The relation u as defined in /15/ involves identi-
ty; hypothesis /17/ therefore covers the case of a narrator 
fictitiously identical with the author, u may be replaced by 
a relation of non-identity to yield the case of a narrator 
fictitiously different from the author. 
Assuming that /17/ is correct as a hypothesis on the 
meaning of text /1/, what are the meanings of referential 
expressions like the^ hotelg in the text, and how are the 
meanings obtained? 
4.2. Textual meanings of referential expressions that in-
volve a narrator 
The single meaning of the^ hotelg in text J1/ is built 
up in two steps. As before, we start with the ferential-
-doxastic meaning of the-j hotelg relative to 'hotel^* and 
with respect to ... (cf. ./9/). A certain function that re-
mains to be determined applies to this meaning and yields 
the relation a defined as follows: 
/18/ u = df the relation between any V and Vsuch that: 
a. There is a V2 as required in /17a/, i.e. a as de-
fined in /15/ holds between and y2, and text /1/ 
is a text by V2, and V is the form of a realization 
of text /1/ by V2. 
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b. For any such V2< the referential-doxastic meaning 
of they hotelg relative to "hotel^" and with respect 
to ... holds between V and V2. 
To u we apply the function of pretending and obtain 
/19/ a = df the relation between any V and such that V^ 
pretends ii of C and V 
The function that directly applies to the referential-
doxastic meaning of they hotelg is defined as follows ("V", 
"V^", "V2" range over arbitrary events or objects in space-
time, such as speakers and speech objects or events; "u", 
"uĵ " range over relations between entities V and V^; "t" 
stands for any text): • 
/20/ The w-narrator-of-t version of u^ = df the relation 
between any V and such that: 
a. There is a V2 such that u holds between y and V^, 
and t is a text by V2, and V is the form of a reali-
zation of t by V2. 
b. For any such V2, u^ holds between V and V^. 
Having the two functions of narrator version and pre-
tending at our disposal, we identify the meaning of they 
hotelg in text /1/ by the following hypothesis that takes 
the place of the first revised hypothesis /14/: 
/21/ Second revised hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
they hotelg in text /1/ wiht respect to A*, Henry 
James, and Eng-iZih. [Same as /12a/ and /14a/.] 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of they hotelg in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Engt-Lih, 
then u = the pretending of the u-narrator-of-text-
/1/ version of the referential-doxastic meaning of 
they hotel^ relative to "hotel^" and with respect 
to ... [ cf. /9/] . 
By the original hypothesis /12/ the meaning of they 
hotel8 in the text was simply the referential-doxastic 
meaning. By the first revised hypothesis /14/ it was a func-
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tion (pretending) of the meaning. By /21/ it now is a func-
tion (pretending) of a function (narrator version) of the 
referential-doxastic meaning. This mirrors the growing dis-
tance form 'real-life reference' introduced first by fic-
tionality and then by narrator insertion. 
Our account avoids a major mistake in construing 'refe-
rence through a narrator': By setting up the function of 
narrator version as in /20/ and using it as in /21/, it con-
strues 'reference through a narrator' without falling into 
the trap of hypostatizing a fictitious narrator into a real 
person. The only spatio-temporal entities to whose exist-
ence we remain committed are A* and Henry James. 
There are many questions that our account of reference 
and fictionality and reference and the narrator does not yet 
answer, or even fails to raise. For instance, what is an Q 
adequate interpretation of "pretends"? For what texts is it 
g 
correct to assume fictionality in the sense of pretending? 
What is the role of pretending, or analogous propositional 
attitudes, for defining literary geners?10 I will pick out 
just one among the unsettled problems: giving a satisfactory 
analysis of proper names in fiction. In particular, how are 
we to deal with proper names that appear in a novel but seem 
to involve reference to real-world entities such as places 
or persons? After all, this is a case typical of so-called 
historical novels.11 In the remaining part of this paper I 
shall outline my answer to this question. 
5. Dealing with proper names 
5.1. General framework 
There is a vast literature on the semantics of proper 
names, especially in the philosophy of language. I shall 
presuppose familiarity with the main types of analyses pro-
posed in the literature and will not, in the present context, 
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relate my own account to existing proposals. Novel features 
of my approach will be easily recognized, just as partial 
agreement with previous accounts. 
Proper names, more specifically, singular forms of 
proper names, will be treated as a special subcase of defi-
nited singular nouns.-What, then, is an author-independent 
meaning of Strether 's^, in particular, what is a referen-
tial-doxastic meaning? 
For identifying a referential-doxastic meaning of the7 
hotelg we had to assume a certain concept, 'hotel^, as a 
lexical meaning of hotelg. It has been a much debated ques-
tion in the literature whether lexical meanings may or may 
not be assumed for proper names. I will posit such meanings, 
proceeding from the following idea: a lexical meaning of a 
proper name is a concept whose intension consists of the 
property of 'being called by that name'. 
As an example of such a concept consider 
/22/ 'Strether^' = the concept whose intension is the set 
(St), where St = df the property of being an x such 
p that x is called Strether in Engliih, 
EngtZih is a system of a certain variety of English 
p 
(possibly, only an idiolect of Henry James); Strether is a 
word paradigm of that system (having at least two different 
forms, represented by the nominative and the Saxon genitive; 12 
paradigm status is indicated by the P-superscript). The 
notion of concept again is understood as in Lieb (1979). The 
main difference between "Strether^" and a concept such as 
"hotel^' consists in the fact that the intension of the for-
mer is language dependent (involves a property that presup-
poses a system of a certain language variety or an idiolect), 
while the latter is not. The key term in the definiens of 
"St", ".. is called..in..", stands in need of explication 
but will here be left undiscussed. 
Given the concept 'Strether', a referential-doxastic 
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meaning of Strether's^ is obtained in strict analogy to the 
corresponding meaning of the^ hotelcf. /9/: 
/23/ The referential-doxastic meaning of Strether's^ rela-
< tive to 'Strether^ and with respect to word sequence 
/4/, an appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and 
English = the relation between utterances md speak-
ers 7 1 such that: 
a. There is exactly one x to which 7^ is referring by 
Strether's^ in 7. 
b. For all x, if is referring by Strether's^ in V 
to x, then x is in the reference basis for 
Strether'e^ relative to 7, 7 a n d "Strether^". 
c. 7^ assumes that, for all x, if is referring by 
Stretner'8^ in 7 to x, then any addressee of 7 has 
some knowledge of x. 
d. 7^ presupposes that, for all x, if 7^ is referring 
by Strether's^ in 7 to x, then x is in the extension 
of "Strether^. 
The meaning of Strether's^ in text /1/ is obtained ex-
actly as before by applying the relevant functions to the 
referential-doxastic meaning. The following hypothesis cor-
responds to the second revised hypothesis for the meaning 
ot.the-j hotels cf. /21/: 
/24/ Hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
Strether's^ in text /1/ with respect to A*, Henry 
James, and Enqtt&h. 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of Strether's ^ in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Engli&h, 
then u = the pretending of the u-narrator-of-text-/l/ 
version of the referential-doxastic meaning of 
Strether's^ relative to 'Strether^ and with respect 
to word sequence /4/, an appropriate syntactic ana-
lysis of /4/, and Engl-L&h. 
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Spelled out in detail the meaning u is 
/25/ the relation between any V and V^ such that V^ pretends 
that . 
a. there is a V2 such that 
(a) ^ = 
((3) ...1/^2 • • (informally: satisfies the condi-
tions specified explicitly or implicitly by Hen-
ry James for a narrator of the Ambassadors); 
Cy) text /1/ is a text by V2; 
(.6) V is the form of a realization of thext /1/ by 
b. for any V i f V2 s a ti sfi e s ( a a) t o (a<J) 1 then V and 
V2 satisfy /23a/ to /23d/, i.e. 
(a) there is exactly one x to which V2 is referring 
by Strether'g^ in V; 
[etc., cf. /23/]. 
By /11/ and /24/ relation /25/ holds between A* and Henry 
James. 
5.2. Discussion 
Hypothesis /24/ is sound only if the referential-
-doxastic meaning of Strether's^ relative to "Streher^" has 
been correctly specified, and this meaning depends on the 
way in which the concept "Strether^ was set up. With res-
pect to this concept we took the rather radical position 
that the only thing necessarily shared by all 'Strethers' is 
the fact that they are called this way. It may be argued, 
however, that we have failed to take account of certain se-
mantic aspects either by the lexical meaning or by the ref-
erential-doxastic meaning of Strether'sFor instance, ac-
cording to the initial hypothesis /2/, .'Strether' was to be 
a man or a boy. 
We may argue for this assumption as follows /¡e i s 
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obviously ' coreferential' with Strether 'e^,13 Assuming a 
normal use of the pronoun, actual reference by a form of p 
he must be to a male human past the earliest infant stage 
or to a male animal such as a dog or, possibly, to some kind 
of a robot, disregarding a few other, even itjore marginal 
possibilities. In a 'realistic* novel pretended reference 
also satisfies these conditions, which is not necessarily 
true of a fairy-tale. Since the pretended referent of 
Strether's^ is to be able to ask questions and robots have 
to be ruled out for a realistic novel in 1903, a man or a 
boy is most likely as the pretended referent of Strether's^. 
It is quite sufficient for this argumentation to assume 
the lexical meaning of Strether's1 to be as in /22/ and the 
referential-doxastic meaning as in /23/. On the other hand 
it certainly is compatible with the argumentation to intro*-
duce the property of being a male human directly into one 
of the meanings of Strether'This may be done in either 
of two ways. 
First, 'Strether^' as a lexical meaning of Strether'a^ 
could be replaced by the following concept: 
/26/ "Strethe^' = the concept whose intension is the set 
{Str}, where Str = df the property of being an x such 
P 
that t is a male human and is called Strether in 
Engl-Li h. 
Or else, we could add a presupposition condition to the 
referential-doxastic meaning of Strether'sthat is, a 
different referential-doxastic meaning would be assumed: 
/27/ presupposes that, for all x, if ^ is referring by 
Strether's1 in V to x, then x is a male human. 
For other proper names femaleness would have to be pre-
supposed, or being a location, or still other properties. 
It would be theoretically awkward to assume different types 
of referential-doxastic meanings for different types of pro-
per names. To avoid this, a function operating on the origi-
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nal referential-doxastic meanings could be assumed that 
assigns to meaning /25/ the relation between utterances V 
and speakers V^ that consists in V and V^ satisfying both 
the referential-doxastic meaning /25/ and the additional pre-
supposition condition /27/. Still, different functions would 
be needed for different types of proper names. 
Neither the first nor the second solution has to be 
chosen if we fall back on the reference basis for an occur-
rence of a proper name (cf. /23b/); conditions such as 
maleness' can possibly be treated as restrictions on the re-
ference basis when the referential-doxastic meaning is re-
stricted to an utterance and a speaker. 
The entire question may seem irrelevant for a name p 
such, as Strether , which is a family name rather than a 
P 
Christian name, but cannot be shunned for names like Ann 
P 
or John . I leave it undecided which solution should even~ 
tually be preferred. 
On our analysis, reference by means of Strether*s^ is 
entirely covered by the fictionality proviso, and rightly 
so. Such an analysis may seem inappropriate in the cases 
that will now be discussed. 
6.- Proper names and the actual world 
Adding the second sentence of The Ambassadors3 we con-
sid6r the following text: 
/28/ Strether s first question, when he reached the hotel, 
was about his friend; yet on his learning that Waymarsh 
was apparently not to arrive till evening he was not 
wholly disconcerted. A telegram from him bespeaking a 
room "only if not noisy, " with the answer paid, was 
produced for the inquirer at the office, so that the 
understanding that they should meet at Chester rather 
then at Liverpool remained to that extent sound, 
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Chester and Liverpool are cities in the actual world. 
On a correct understanding of The Ambassadors it is at 
Chester rather than at Liverpool, both in the actual world, 
'that Waymarsh and Strether had the understanding to meet'. 
It appears, then, that there must be reference to cities in 
the real world by means of the two place names. On the other 
hand, fictitious characters don't meet in such places. 
Put in a nutshell our solution to the problem is as 
follows: Henry James pretends that the narrator believes 
that he is referring to a place that is identical with the 
real Chester (with the real liverpool); we are confronted 
with the fiction of a narrator who identifies a place he is 
referring to with Chester in the actual world. How may this 
be construed formally? 
We begin by introducing the word sequence of /28/ (of 
the text quoted in /28*) as the sequence Strether's.. 
...Chester..Liverpool..sound^2> i n analogy to /4/. 
Discussion will be restricted to Chester 
As a lexical meaning of Chesterwe take a concept bJ 
'Chester^' defined in strict analogy to "Strether^" in /22/. 
The referential-doxastic meaning of Chester^ is determined 
in strict analogy to /23/, which specified the correspond-14 
ing meaning of Strether's 
/29/ The referential-doxastic meaning of Chester^^ relative 
to 'Chester^* and with respect to word sequence /28/, 
' and appropriate syntactic analysis of /28/, and the 
English used by Henry James in text /28/ (assumed to be 
identical with the English used in text /1/, hence, 
with Engli.Ah) = the relation between utterances V and 
speakers V^ such that: 
a. There is exactly one x to which V i s referring by 
Chesterg3 in V. 
b. For all x, if y^ is referring by Chester^ in V to 
x, then x is in the reference basis for Chesterg3 
relative to V, V., and "Chester". 
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c. V1 assumes that, for all x, if is referring by 
Chester ̂  in V to i, then any addressee of V has 
some knowledge of x. 
d. presupposes that, for all x, if t^ is referring 
by Chester,-, in V to x, then x is in the extension 
15 
of Chester^ 
No real-world Chester figures in the referential-doxas-
tic meaning of Chester Such a Chester is brought in by a 
modification of /29/: in addition to what is specified by 
/29/, the speaker V-̂  also believes that whatever he is re-
ferring to is identical with Chester in England. For a prop-
er formulation two additional constants are required in our 
semantic metalanguage: 
/30/ "Chester-in-England", a constant of the same type as 
the variable "x" and interpreted to denote a certain 
city in the actual world, located in England close to 
Liverpool, 
and a functor "application", defined as follows: 
/31/ The application to x of / given u = df the relation 
between any V and such that 
a. u holds between V and V^; 
b. V^ believes that, for all if V^ is referring by 
f in V to xthen x^ = x, 
where "/" stands for any part of a word sequence. In partic-
ular, 
/32/ the application to Chester-in-England of Chesterg3 given 
the referential-doxastic meaning of Chesterrelative 
to 'Chester^' and ... [ cf. /29/] = the relation between 
any V and V^ such that: 
a. V and V1 satisfy /29a/ to /29d/. 
b. V^ believes that, for all x, if V-̂  is referring by 
Chesterg3 in V to x, then x = Chester-in-England. 
The meaning of Chesterin text /28/ is now obtained 
by applying the functions of narrator version and pretending 
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(8* = the smallest part of the original copy of The Ambassa-
dors that contains a realization of the word sequence of the 
text quoted in /28/): 
/33/ Hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
Chesterg^ in text /1/ with respect to 8*, Henry 
James, and EngZ-i6h. 
b. For all u, if it is a meaning of Chester,, in text b J 
/28/ with respect to 8*, Henry James and Engtiih, 
then u = the pretending of the u-narrator-of-text-
-/28/ version of the application to Chester-ln-
-England of Chesterg^ given the referential-doxastic 
meaning of Chesterg^ relative to 'Chester^' and ... 
[cf. /29/1• 
On this hypothesis the textual meaning u of Chester^ 
is a function (pretending) of a function (narrator version) 
of a function (application) of the referential-doxastic 
meaning of Chester. ^. Spelt out in detail the meaning is D J 
/34/ the relation between any V and such that V^ pretends 
that 
a. there is a V2 such that 
(a) 1/L = V2; 
(B) (informally: V^ satisfies the condi-
tions specified explitly or implicitly by Henry 
James for a narrator of The Ambassadors); 
(y) text /28/ is a text by V2; 
(&) V is the form of a realization of text /28/ by 
V 2' 
b. for any V2, if V2 satisfies (aa) to (a6), then 
(a) V and V2 satisfy /29a/ to /29d/; 
(B) V2 believes that, for all x, if V2 is referring 
by Chesterg3 in V to x, then x = Chester-in-
-England. 
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By /11/ and /33/, relation /34/ holds between B* and 
Henry James. This does not imply that Henry James refer to 
Chester in England by Chester63 in 8*. At the same time a 
complex semantic relation to Chester in England is indeed 
established; this relation involves both the reference rela-
tion and the fictionality proviso. 
The meanings that expressions like Chester have in D J 
fictional texts with a fictitious narrator may well be among 
the most complex cases of 'referential meaning' anywhere."1"® 
We have isolated a semantic relation between such expres-
sions and objects in the actual world that involves, but is 
different from, a reference relation. There are other seman-
tic relations of this type, for example, the relation that 
holds in a roman a clef between a name of a character and 
its intended counterpart in the real world, but these can-
not here be discussed any further. 
The present paper has been exploratory. We stayed as 
close to an actual example as possible, gradually disengag-
ing the outlines of a more general picture. Formal rigour 
was used only when it was forced upon us (which was increas-
ingly the case). Hopefully, the results of this paper will 
seem encouraging enough to go on with a precisely formulated 
general theory. 
Notes 
* Sections 1 to 3 of this paper are largely identical with 
a paper read at The International Conference on the 
Structure of Narrative, University of Szeged (Hungary), 
Sept. 11-13, 1980, and at The International Semiotic Sym-
posium "Theoretical Semiotics: Verbal Signs - Visual 
Signs", University of Warsaw (Poland), Sept. 22-24, 1980 
- 165 -
The present complete version has profited a great deal 
from discussions during the two conferences. I am par-
ticularly indedted to Manfred Bierwisch for extensive 
comments. 
1 A sequence is taken,as a relation ta set of ordered pairs) 
that assigns exactly one object to each of the integers 
l,...,n, for some n. Thus,' the word sequence of /1/ is the 
set of pairs {(1, Strether's , .,., (.30, disconcerted)} , 
abbreviated as above. Note that the abbreviation also 
applies to parts of the sequence, for instance, the^ ho-
telQ = {(.7, the) , (8, hotel)}. 
2 
There are problems with 'the original copy' of The Ambas-
sadors (cf. Stallmann 1960: 381f), which will here be dis-
regarded. 
3 In Lieb (1980a)., "thematic part" and "rhematic part" are 
introduced with respect to sentence meanings. They are 
here applied to the meaning of a text that has a single 
complex sentence, in a very preliminary way. As a refor-
mulation of (.2) , (.6) does not yet provide a final version 
even for the parts of (.2) that are directly represented, 
4 The underlying syntactic-semantic theory of English allows 
only for nouns and noun phrases (including pronouns and 
proper names) as referring expressions. - The when-clause 
in (.1) has been interpreted in the sense of "When he reach-
ed the hotel, Strether's first question ...", i.e. not in 
the sense of "Strether's first question when ..." (cf. the 
comma in front of when) . 
5 Word meanings are taken as concepts in a psychological 
sense, as explained in Lieb (1979: Sec. 21 and defended in 
Lieb (,1980b) . 
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g 
Being a concept, "hotel^ has an intension (a set of pro-
perties , in this case) and an extension: the set of ob-
jects that have all the properties in the intension. 
7 By a realization of a text we understand an n-tuple con-
sisting of a speech, object or event, a 'meaning' of the 
object or event, and possibly certain other entities; the 
speech object or event is the form of the realization; 
cf. Lieb (1980c) 
g 
I would suggest an interpretation along the following 
lines. In pretending u of y and V^, V^ believes that u 
does not hold between V and Vand does not want that 
any addressee should believe it does; at the same time 
V^ wants that no addressee of V should act on the assump-
tion that u does not hold between V and (pretending 
implies a wish for the suspension of disbelief). 
9 
For example, a text in which a myth is told by somebody 
who believes in it is not a fictional text if pretending 
is explicated as above, fn. 8. I suggest that this case 
may be covered by assuming a propositional attitude of 
the author that is different from but analogous to pre- . 
tending. There may well be a number of different proposi-
tional attitudes each of which may take the place of pre-
tending. 
I suggest that propositional attitudes as criteria of 
classification cut right across literary genres: 'fiction', 
if meant to cover all ficitional texts, should not be set 
up as a genre. 
The question was brought up repeatedly in the discussions 
following the Szeged and Warsaw presentations of the 
shorter version of this paper. 
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12 In view of well-known examples such as the king of 
England'a eon it may be more adequate to analyse 
Strether's into Strether^ e 2 and exclude all Saxon geni~ 
tives as forma of nouns; this is immaterial though to 
our present discussion. 
13 
Coreference is one of the problems that are not discussed 
in this paper. 
14 
Note that discussion in Sec. 5.2 carries oyer in its 
entirety to the lexical and referential-doxastic meanings 
of Chesterg^. 
^ According to my atlas of the world, there are several x 
in the extension of "Chester^", one in England and four 
in the United States. 
Even in a novel proper names may occur outside the fic-
tionality proviso (the pretending operator) ; for in--
stance> documentary material may be included without 
really being 'worked into' the novel. As a rule, though, 
it should be the analysis in Sees 5 and 6 that applies. 
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TEMPORAL RELATIONS IN INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS 
Anita Steube 
Karl Marx University, Leipzig 
In speaking about temporal relations, we would like 
to distinguish at least three levels of description: 
st 
1 level: level of objects in the outer world 
2 n d level: level of mental representation of these objects 
and their relations and properties 
3 r d level: level of the structure of natural language with 
the level of the semantic structure of the ver-
bal expressions as one of its parts. 
Linguists are aware of the close relations between levels 
two and three as far as the meaning of the verbal expres-
sions is concerned. On level three, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish further between meaning structures as ideal ob-
jects and the form in which they are objectified, that is 
the linguistic description of meaning structures which of 
course is dependent from the concept of grammar and meaning 
the linguist makes use of. We will try to use intensional 
semantics and ignore the difference between the- objects and 
their descriptions on level three here. 
If time (level one) is conceived of as a property of 
matter, man is included in the course of time. So, if he 
wants to give order to the continuum of time in his mind he 
has to divide it at fixed points. One of the most suitable 
divisions is the so-called 'moment of actual experience' 
which of course constantly changes in time as man's experi-
ence changes. 
If man abstracts in his mind from those movements of 
matter which - from a ceitain point of view - are not rele*-
vant for him at a time, he creates the concept of 'space 
of time' (level two). One of the those spaces of time is 
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'Present'. It includes the moment of actual experience. 
Other relevant spaces of time are 'Past' and 'Future1. 
When Relchenbach introduced the reference point into 
logic1 he found not only a wonderful means for handling 
temporal structures, but - as I see it - also a candidate 
for psychological verification (on level two), that is, 
something man makes use of in giving order to the continuum 
of time. We are of the opinion that every space of time 
has a reference point. This is meant as the point from 
which that space of time is regarded by the speaker of the 
corresponding expression. Those spaces of time regarded 
from their beginning (such as expressed by 'since') have 
their reference point at their point of beginning, those 
regarded from their end have their reference point at their 
end point (such as those expressed by Past Perfect, 'up 
to'). The other spaces of time take a certain point in the 
space of time for their reference point (i.e. Future, Past). 
We have to add that a space of time (.on level three) is 
defined as an uninterrupted ordered set of points of time. 
Having come so far, we can define what Present, Past or 
Future are going to mean: Present is a space of time com-
prising the moment of actual experience (tQ) as its refer-
ence point (tR). Past is a space of time ending before the 
moment of actual experience. Future is a space of time be-
ginning after the moment of actual experience. We use an 
elaborated predicate calculation to formulate the semantic 
structures for the spaces of time. 
Present: T. l c To & fcRi = fco 
Past : T. l < fco & fcRi e Ti 
Future : T . 1 > fco & fcRi e T. 1 
As mentioned above, Past, and Future have their own refer-
ence points, they are defined in relation to the moment of 
actual experience which is really the main reference point 
So all the reference points form a system of relations. 
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I think that the spaces of time Past, Present, and 
Future have been exhaustively defined according to their 
place in the German tense system in this way because they 
cannot be objectified without knowledge of the context: 
If we use the expression 'heute' - in contrast to 'ges-
tern' - Present comprises one day only. But if we use the 
expression 'wohnen' Present may comprise - dependent on 
the context 'X wohnt in V - several years^. If we speak 
about the so-called complex tenses or 'resultative Tem-
pera' in German (they are Present perfect, Past perfect, 
Future perfect if we use the English names for the German 
forms) 'perfect' or 'resultative' doesn't mean the same 
as it means with aspects or, to be more precise, Aktionsar-
ten. For tense forms do not express the result of an ac-
tion. 'Resultative' means that these tenses mark the end 
(the maximum) of the relevant space of time. The maximum 
for Past perfect is at a point of time before a contex-
tually fixed point in the past. The maximum for Present 
perfect is either at or shortly before the point of actual 
experience. The maximum for Future perfect is at a point 
of time before a contextually fixed point in the future. 
These end points arc at the same time, the reference points 
of these spaces of time. 
Perfect : L . = 1 max T . 1 & t. 1 = tRi & fcRi ̂  = t, 
Past: Pon'.ect : t . = J. = max T. 1 & t. 1 = fcRi & t , < 1 fco 
Future Per feet: t. 1 ma x T . 1 s t. 1 = fcRi & t . > 1 V 
In German there is no one to one relation between tense 
forms and the corresponding temporal meaning. Abstracting 
from the genre-dependency of tense forms and from the in-
fluence of text formation on tense relations, we can make 
up Table one showing the most important German tenses^. 
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Table 1: 
temporal meaning tense form 
Present (aktuelle Gegenwart) 
Past (Vergangenheit) 
Future (Zukunft) 
Present perfect (resultative 
Präsens 
Präteritum, Perfekt 
Futur I, Präsens 
Perfekt 
Gegenwart) 
Past perfect (resultative Plusquamperfekt 
Vergangenheit) 
Future perfect (resultative Futur II, Perfekt 
Zukunft) 
Defining the main reference point as the point of actual 
experience means that it is of a deictic nature. The con-
sequence is that each tense form can be interpreted only 
when we know who uttered it and which time it refers to. 
That means, temporal semantics has to be based on utter-
ance meaning rather than on sentence meaning. In a com-
municational process. t Q is defined as the point of com-
mon actual experience of the partners. If one of the part-
ners quotes somebody else's speech (let as for simplicity 
think that the quoted person does not belong to that party) 
he must know that he cannot refer the temporally fixed 
proposition in someone else's utterance to this own refer 
ence point but only to that of the former speaker. But at 
the same time it is clear that man can give order to time 
only in accordance with one scheme. So the reporting part-
ner has to bring the former speaker's reference point into 
relation to his own. We know how this is done: The report-
ing partner announces the reported utterance by saying who 
made it and when (in relation to tQ). Let us take the 
announcement Peter said and the quoted utterance I will 
oome tomorrow. 
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Indirect speech : Peter said, he would come the fol-
lowing day 
spaces of time : T. T i 
reference points: t R < t Q t > t 
i j Ri 
(derived from the (derived from the 
definition of Past) definition of 
posteriority) 
relation between the spaces of time and T^: poste-
riority. Should the reference point in the former utter-
ance not differ from t the temporal relation between 
i 
the two spaces of time is simultaneity: with tD < t„ 
j Ri 
you have anteriority. Thus the reference point of the re-
ported utterance is indirectly related- via that of the 
announcement - to t^. 
As already mentioned, intensional semantics makes it pos-
sible and necessary to interpret the reference point by 
means of the context. Hence it should remain uspecified in 
the tense meaning itself. The semantic structures should 
be reformulated, comprising the main reference point as a 
variable (say t_ ). If we know from the context, that 
Rk 
t„ •= t_ we get Present, Past or Future (t_-based tenses K. u u J. 
are called absolute tenses), if it remains t , as in in-i\ • J 
direct speech, we get Simultaneity, Anteriority or Poste-
riority (tj, -based tenses are called relative tenses). If 
k . 
1 
we take the reference point in the tense meaning to be a 
variable, we easily understand how it is possible to use 
the same tense forms in absolute as well as in relative 
usage. The context-dependent interpretation of the tense 
form Present Tense as either Present or Simultaneity in 
German points to an ambiguity in tense meaning. Let us ex** 
plain this by comparing tenses with temporal adverbs. 
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There are adverbs which - like the tenses - have a vari-
able reference point: 
and there are others which are only related to tQ: heute, 
demnachat, vorhin. tp-related adverbs have to be replaced 
in reported speech: am gleichen Tag, bald, kurs vovhev. 
The tense forms and the adverbs with the variable reference 
point need not be replaced. 
There are slight differences between the occurring tense 
forms in direct and reported speechn, only when we use the 
subjunctive mood in German reported speech. There are two 
types of subjunctives, one formed from the stem of the pre-
sent tense form and the other formed from the stem of the 
past tense form. But the two types do not differ in tense 
meaning but only in what we would call the speaker's atti-
tude towards what is expressed by the reported utterance. 
When there are no longer temporal differences between Pre-
sent Tense and Past Tense in the subjunctive mood the rela-
tion between form and meaning changes in comparison with 
table one®: 
Table 2: 
bald, gleich soon 
bald danach, gleich danach - soon after 
temporal meaning tense form 
Simultaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) Konjunktiv Präsens, Kon-
junktiv Präteritum 
Anteriority (Vorzeitigkeit) Konjunktiv Perfekt, Kon-
junktiv 
Plusquamperfekt 
Posteriority (Nachzeitigkeit) Konjunktive Präsens, Kon-
junktiv 
Präteritum, Konjunktiv 
Futur I, würde + Infinitiv 
Posteriority Perfekt (re-
sultative Nachzeitigkeit) 
Konj. Perfekt. Konj. Plus-
quamperfekt, Konj. Futur 
II., würde + Part, Perf.+ 
Inf. 
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Simultaneity Subjunctive I; 
T. £ t. & t_ = t & CLAIM (reporting speaker, SAY (re-
J j i 
ported speaker, p^)) 
Simultaneity Sugjunctive II: 
a). T\ C & t R = t R & CLAIM (reporting speaker, SAY 
(reported speaker, p..)) & THINK (reporting speaker, 
MÖGLICH (-vpj) ) 
b> Tj £ T ± & fcR s CLAIM (reporting speaker, SAY 
(reported speaker, p..)) & THINK (reporting speaker, 
-vMOGLICH (Pj)) 
The differences a) and b) in the meaning of subjunc-
tive II are differences in the reporting speaker's in-
creasing degrees of doubt concerning the truth of proposi-
tion ̂  expressed by the reported utterance.7 
If sentences contain temporal expressions apart from 
tense forms, these are related to each other and to the 
temporal meaning by means of the reference point and by a 
specifi cation of the simultaneity relation. In a simple 
sentence, all the spaces of time have the same reference' 
point. And the space of time immediately to the right is a 
proper subset of the space of time immediately to the left 
in linear ordering from left to right. This concerns the 
temporal interrelation of the adverbials. Yesterday morning 
at 9 o'clock. 
The space of time expressed by the meaning of the verb 
(.often called action time) must be a proper or improper 
subset of the narrowest space of time expressed in the tem-
poral frame which the tenses and the adverbials form to-
gether (often called valuation time). Yesterday morning at 
9 o'clock Peter posted the letter. 
In temporally complex sentences the action time expres-
sed in the subclause becomes the temporal frame for the 
space of time expressed in the main clause. In durationally 
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complex sentences the action time in the subclause is 
equivalent in time to the space of time expressed in the 
main clause. This meets the above mentioned simultaneity 
relation. In sentences with the conjunctions naohdem or 
bevor there are two spaces of time ordered by the temporal 
relation 'before'. Both spaces of time however must be 
within the same temporal level (Zeitstufe). A temporal lev-
el is the intersection of sets of the comparative temporal 
meanings. Thus Present and Present Perfect belong to PRE-
SENT, Past and Past Perfect to PAST, Future and Future Per-
fect to FUTURE.8 
These findings allow us to explain text coherence. 
Propositions that are directly or indirectly related to 
the same reference point are interpreted by means of the 
same world-time points or - in other words - are in the same 
world. They can be temporally ordered by the relation 'be-
fore' when there are sufficient additional reference points 
which allow all the suborderings required.' Spaces of time 
that are not in relation to the main reference point can not 
be temporally interpreted or understood. This is already 
seen from the simple example of a complex sentence. 
xAfter I got the second edition of Longman'- s dictionary at 
a second-hand bookseller's my sister had asked for it seu-
eral times in vain before. 
The great majority of texts deal with objects and relations 
which are related to each other in one world. But when we 
come to literary fiction this does not suffice to fix the 
reference point. We must know in which world the moment of 
actual experience is. I.e. in science fiction, the temporal 
relations do not differ from those in the real world, they 
refer to t Q and are ordered by means of the relation 'be-
fore' . It is only our knowledge of the real world that tells 
us that a fictitious world is being spoken about, that the 
fictitious t Q has been used for a point of time which -
according to our knowledge of the laws of development in the 
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real world - could possibly be there after t but cer-
tainly not in t or even before. That means that the tem-
poral relations remain the same as in the real world only 
the axis, the main reference point has been replaced. 
If one text speaks about events that have to be inter-
preted in different worlds it is homogeneous if the world-
time points of both can be related to each other. Each set 
of world-time points has its own main reference point by 
means of which you can devide the text into subtexts. If 
there is no possible relation - such as for instance, when 
one has a dream - textual connection has to be achieved by 
other than temporal means. 
But there are other cases where only part of the ob-
jects and relations are placed in another world: Historical 
Present, for example, places part of the objects that in 
the actual world have the world-time points t < t in R. 0 
an individual view with the reference point t_ — t^. The 
i 0 
relevant objects are described as if they were experienced 
at the time of speaking about them. So the speaker for a 
time identifies two different points of reference, the ac-
tual t Q with the non-actual, but actualized one. But this 
identification is not supported by the adverbial temporal 
means. So that his partners' view of the actual world is 
maintained with the aid of linguistic means too and not on-
ly through their knowledge of the actual world: 
Da gehe ioh doch gestern niohtsahnend iiber die Strasse. 
These forms are often used in every-day German as well as 
in literature. If the adverbial frame changed too, the 
hearers would not notice the transpositional effect of the 
Historical Present so well, they could even take the 
speaker for a liar if they knew the facts. Using the His-
torical Present in fiction changes the main reference point 
once more from the real and non-actual but actualized world 
to a fictitious non-actual world. 
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Intensional semantics also helps to solve the long 
-lasting dispute about the temporal value of the German 
Preterite in Fiction. It was initiated by Käthe Hamburger9 
who deprived the epic preterite of any temporal meaning. 
The scholars taking part in the discussion afterwards ex-
pressed the most varied views. Leaving aside the interior 
monologue as an additional complication, intensional se-
mantics meets K. Hamburger half-way: It was expressly said 
above that only the interpretation of t_ < t„ is ac-
R^ O 
cepted as Past, and we have to add now that t Q must be 
the point of actual experience in the real and actual world. 
This automatically leads us to the decision that in fiction 
the semantic structure of the epic preterite is a function 
selecting a space of time Clevel one, in a fictitious outer 
world) before a fictitious moment of actual experience. It 
is not the temporal value (.expressed by the relation 'be-
fore' and the fact that the maximum of the space of time is 
not marked) of the tense that proves to be different in 
fiction, but that it is referring to a different world^"0. 
What is kept in fiction is the system of temporal relations 
in general and the classification of German tenses in tem-
poral relations in general and the classification of German 
tenses in temporal levels. 
In what has been said so far we have given no new da-
ta, The intention was to show that new theoretical in-
sights may help to explain old problems in an easy and nat-
ural way and may also help to avoid mistakes like those 
made in the past. At the same time we warn against the over-
estimating of intensional semantics. It cannot be used to 
explain the sequence of tenses in texts because these are 
so extensively influenced by non-linguistic factors such as,' 
among other things, the reader's and/or hearer's knowledge 
of the sequence of events in the outher world or the linear 
ordering of text-production and - perception. Here are two 
examples by way of illustration: 
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1. Sentences following each other in a coherent text writ-
ten in Präsens or Präteritum may be interpreted as expres-
sing successive events if this accords with the semantics 
of the non-temporal nucleus of the propositions. On a 
strictly linguistic basis we could only interpret them all 
as belonging to the given temporal frame. 
2. The textinitial and/or - concluding function of German 
Perfekt and Plusquamperfekt - often listed among the so-
called 'stylistic' functions of these tenses -
Mein Groesvater ist bis in sein hohes Alter viel gereist. 
Hinmal fuhr er durah Ungarn, eigentlich aus keinem endern 
Grunde, als um das Land kennenzulernen, in welchem sein 
verstrobener Bruder 1849 gefochten hatte. Auf einer kleinen 
Station stieg ein Mann von reichlicher Körperfülle zu ihm 
ins Coupe Unnötig zu sagen, dass der Wein pünkt-
lich eintraf. Mein Grossvater legte bei seinen Freunden 
Ehre mit ihm ein. Später hat er sich noch manche Sendung 
kommen lassen. Als er starb, schon in unserem Jahrhundert, 
fand sich noch ein beträchtlicher Rest vor. Ich habe mich 
12 ^ 
seiner mit Vergnügen aylgenommen. 
is of course, related to the temporal meaning of these 
tenses and t<5 the fact mentioned above that action time can 
function as a temporal frame relative to which other pro-
positions are temporally ordered (in temprally complex sen-
tences as well as in successive sentences in texts). But 
this is not enough for text formation. Different genres 
have different structuring principles. German Perfekt and 
Plusquamperfekt would certainly not be used in the same way 
in strictly descriptive texts and not every content can be 
fitted into such a frame. 
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MODEL-STRUCTURES AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 
/A LITERARY THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE BORCHERT-STORY: DIE 
KUCHENUHR/ 
Kâroly Csuri 
A. Jôzsef University, Szeged 
1. GENERAL LITERARY SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK 
1 ..1 Semiotia poetics versus linguistic poetics 
In a critical survey of linguistic poetics Roland Pos-
ner concludes that, as with linguistics, it cannot solve its 
task satisfactorily"*". Posner considers namely the systematic 
description and explication of the properties of verbal com-
munication the task of linguistics; while those of literary 
communication are the task of poetics. Literary communica-
tion is nothing but a verbal communication with an aesthetic 
function. 
According to him generative linguistics has studied, 
mainly the abstract regularities of the language system and 
the conditions of well-formedness of verbal utterances in 
written texts. And though there is no successful communica-
tion possible without this knowledge, neither is there any 
doubt that research of this kind if s necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for the explicit description of verbal 
communication. In this latter case one cannot neglect the 
conventions determining the use of rules, the requirements 
of speech acts and the elements of the concrete speech situ-
ation either. For the solution of the emerging linguistic 
and poetical difficulties Posner considers the most suitable 
those systems which have been worked out by research in com-
2 
munication theory and semiotics . 
It is well-known that in the communicative process 
through a certain channel the sender sends the recipient a 
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message which refers to definite designates, i.e. states of 
affairs and contexts on the basis of a code. The sign-mate-
rial is made up of elements passing physically through the 
channel, while the sign-vehicle is made up of the semio-
tically relevant parts of the sign-material. The receptive 
activity is influenced mainly by the structurization of the 
sign-material, the possession of the appropriate channel 
and code, and by the reception ability of the recipient. 
These factors determine the experiences and information the 
recipient must use to understand the message; or which he 
must deliberately ignore from his previous knowledge, or 
other sources at his disposal. 
Relying on the conceptions of the Russian formalists 
and the Prague structuralists, Posner distinguishes literary 
and non-literary communication by means of contrasting sin-
gle, individual and common, frequent actions. In this sense, 
communication itself is a complex action, too. The frequent 
communicative actions that occur in the same way automatize 
the connection between the partners and their relationship 
to the world. The use of constant codes fixes the structure 
of designates and that of the fraction of reality in ques-
tion and so the relation of the participants in the communi-
cation to the world narrows down and remains on one single 
level. As a contrast, the literary communication tries to 
change the fixed verbal and cultural codes. It deprives ac-
tions that have become ordinary in a given context of their 
automatic nature, and so, indirectly, it fosters the adapt-
ability of the society to possible events which happen in a 
form not coded in advance. 
How can literary communication fulfil this essential 
role? According to Posner, it can do so by putting the or-
dinary actions into new, unusual contexts. That is, it does 
not need a new language but a new use of language, The pre-
sentation of the world in a new context. In contrast with 
every other kind of communication, in literary communica-
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tion the entire sign-material acts as a potential sign-
vehicle. Besides, the different levels of the original 
sign-vehicles contain not only characteristics coded in ad-
vance but also such features that, otherwise, in the case 
of common use, do not carry information. So it seems expe-
dient to differentiate between the reception strategies of 
a semiotic process with and without an aesthetic function. 
Supposing we are the recipients of an aesthetic semiotic 
process, then we try to discover connections between the 
characteristics of the sign-material not coded in advance, 
and later to relate these to the characteristics coded in 
advance. We attribute informative value to these new connec-
tions which cannot be revealed directly by the codes known 
so far. The new context de-automatizes the codes of the ele-
ments coded in advance that otherwise work automatically. 
The elimination, the modification or the total reconstruc-
tion of the usual automatisms make the comprehension of the 
aesthetic message considerably more difficult, or course. 
Posner explains the specific nature of the literary 
communication by the following hypothesis: on reception of 
the artistic message a special, so-called aesthetic code 
operates in the recipient besides the verbal and other 
socio-cultural codes in general force. This enables the re-
cipient to interpret both the characteristics of the sign-
material not coded in advance and the level-specific infor-
mation as a sign-vehicle. That is, the aesthetic code oper-
ates partly on the elements of the sign-material, partly on 
those ingredients of the message which are determined by 
the verbal, rhetorical and other socio-cultural codes. 
Two conclusions at least, also very essential from the 
interpretation-theoretical point of view, must be drawn from 
the foregoing: 
Ш the aesthetic code as a whole is never given in advance, 
the recipient reconstructs it in every case; 
Cii) the aesthetic code, i.e. the aesthetic information of 
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the analysed sign-vehicle is not or only partly acces-
sible for a recipient who has no appropriate experi-
ences concerning the socio-cultural sign-systems and 
codes in question. 
J. 2 Abstract rule systems in linguistics and poetics 
Posner's study is a critical summary of the results of 
linguistic and semiotic poetics, and it argues convincingly 
for one of the possible directions for scientific advances 
the construction of a semiotic literary science. But the 
survey of his thoughts is not intended to support this con-
sideration only. However, it serves the purpose of proving 
that our interpretation-theoretical considerations on lit-
erary narratives are compatible with the general theses of 
literary semiotics as background-theory in every essential 
respect. In this sense, the reception of literary narratives 
is interpreted as a specific sub-class of the reception of 
semiotic processes carrying an aesthetic value. The narra-
tive sign-processes must have an independent theory, metho-
dology and terminology that are compatible with and con-
sistently adaptable to a more comprehensive and general lit-
erary semiotic theory, methodology and terminology. 
Posner's parallel between the limited potential of the 
generative linguistics and the structural or generative-
linguistic poetics is completely reasonable from a theoreti-
cal point of view. At the same time, we must see that the 
scientific level and results of the latest linguistic re-
search and those in poetics using linguistics as a starting-
point or model differ basically from one another. Despite 
the fact that the veriety of trends sometimes seems chaotic, 
linguistics has created the scientific basis providing a 
legitimate demand for advance: how can the abstract regu-
larities, the well-formed utterances be integrated into the 
structure of the verbal communication? How can grammatical 
theory in the wide sense and communication theory be related 
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to one another? 
This linguistically real demand seems illusory and un-
founded with respect to the current poetic theories: we do 
not know a poetics - also relevant from a literary point of 
view - that is able to set up rule systems which generate 
literary narrative text-structures and operate with lin-
guistic precision in the former sense. So besides admitting 
that the detailed description and explication of the pro-
perties of literary communication is a basic poetical task, 
it also has to be stressed that the scientific preconditions 
for such, kinds 'of analyses are to a large extent lacking or 
are imperfectly elaborated. Thus our study is intended to 
contribute not so much to the clarification of the general 
literary communication as to that of the basis of the com-
municative process. We try to describe a system of abstract 
regularities, a model-structure defining the composition of 
a Borchert-story in an explicit way. The model-structure on 
the one hand ensures the intersubjective control of the ex-
plication of the story, and on the other hand it can provide 
data for the elaboration of a further typology, comparative 
and literary communication theory. 
2 SOME INTERPRETATION-THEORETICAL QUESTIONS OF LITERARY 
NARRATIVES3 
2.1 Problem of reference 
In the first phase of the text-analysis the recipient 
renders one (or more) text-world(s) to the text. Yet this 
operation does not suspend for him the arbitrariness of the 
composition of the text-world. This arbitrariness, of course, 
characterizes the composition of both literary and non-lit-
erary text-worlds, and the recipient/reader must be able to 
suspend the arbitrariness of both types. The most natural 
and effective process for the suspension of the arbitrar-
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iness of non-literary text-worlds is to try to make the 
states of affairs of the text-world correspond with those 
of a fraction of reality actually existing. To put it in 
order words: we explain the composition of the text-world 
by that of the real world that is usually coded in a famil-
iar way. Many readers try to suspend the arbitrariness of 
the literary text-worlds with a similar reception strategy. 
It may be true - as we have already mentioned - that literary 
works for the most part do not dispenze with the use of lan-
guage and other socio-cultural codes, however, the mechanism 
that was valid for the suspension of arbitrariness in non-
literary texts is misleading here. We must make the recipi-
ents realise again and again that the ordinary codes operate 
in a new, unusual context, in different ways and with dif-
ferent purposes when they establish literary text-worlds. 
Among other things the semantic-pragmatic problem of the 
reference and the truth-value of literary.texts reminds us 
of this. 
The literary text-worlds usually operate with ficti-
tious persons, and so their primary range of reference is 
not the real world. But if the reference of the individuals 
in the propositions cannot be given in the real world, then 
the truth-value of the propositions cannot be decided on 
the basis of the real world either. Let us take the intro-
ductory sentence of the Borchert-story as an example: "Sie 
sahen ihn schon von weitem auf eiah zukommen, denn er fiel 
auf." (They saw him approaching them from afar because he 
was remarkable.) 
The reception strategy of non-literary text-reading 
stimulates us to try to identify the persons referred to by 
individuals represented verbally by the above pronominal 
forms. However, the lack of a pragmatical context destroys 
the possibility of identification in the real world. As a 
consequence of this, the supposed complex contact ('to see', 
'to approach'), between the individuals, unidentified ref-
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erentially, that is the truth-value of the whole proposition 
cannot be judged. We do.not know for sure whether the claim-
ed state of affairs exists/existed in the real world or not. 
In spite of the problems mentioned there is no doubt 
that the natural intuition of the reader, apart from the 
failure of the attempt at identification, will not deny the 
existence (in some sense) of the individuals denoted by "he" 
and "they", and that of the "contact declared concerning them. 
The recipient has namely no ground for the negation of the 
proposition, there is no real world here behind the text-
world from whose viewpoint he can seriously claim: 'They 
can't have seen him approaching them because he was not re-
markable at all*. The absurd consequences of utterances of 
this kind for literature are not difficult to see. The read-
er almost instinctively corrects his reception strategy £nd 
- in contrast with several logicians - supposes a reference-
relation here, irrespective of the real wprld. While doing 
so he also admits that the states of affairs in the text-
world exist irrespective of the real world, too, that is, 
the propositions about them that assert the states of af-
fairs in question and that are not directly linked to the 
4 characters possess true truth-value. 
In the following we try to define what in fact the 
range of reference of the fictitious persons is, and how 
this range, which ensures the existence of the fictitious 
persons (in some sense), can be explicated theoretically. 
2, 2 Model-structures as explications of literary 
text-worlds 
To answer the question of reference we choose an ap-
proach which attributes semiotic relevance to those elements 
and relations that are not coded in the usual verbal and 
other socio-cultural systems of signs in advance, and so 
cannot be directly interpreted within them. Hence we must 
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construct a code that is built partly upon the codes used 
and partly upon their systematic negation, and that can ex-
plicate the sign-material, with the created rules, which is 
not able to be interpreted in the usual way. This process 
can also be expressed in a system of interpretation operat-
ing with truth-values: apart from the states of affairs of 
the real world we accept here hypothetically that the pro-
positions of the analyzed text (not directly linked to char-
acters) are true; that is, the states of affairs of the 
text-world expressed by them obtain in the given form. In 
the course of the explication suspending arbitrariness we 
try to establish a model-structure (=code of the text-world) 
which makes the hypothetically true propositions - about, or 
more precisely, making up the text-world - true on the basis 
of the model-structure resulting only from its composition. 
How can the principles sketched here be applied in the 
explication of literary narratives? vie can start by saying 
that the states of affairs i= sequences of states, events 
and actions etc.) in the text-world of literary narratives 
are also ordered partly by properties coded in advance; that 
is, the time-, space-, logical and value-connections the 
recipient knows from the real world. We know, however, that 
any element of the sign-material or the connection of the 
elements that are not coded in advance or are coded in an 
unusual or superficial way can modify the automatic applica-
tion and enforcement of the codes mentioned in the text-
-world explication. To prove our theoretical presuppositions 
we take a short, preliminary and only partly analysed exam-
ple from the Borchert-story which will be discussed later in 
a more detailed and somewhat altered form. 
For the reader the decisive majority of the states of 
affairs are structured by seemingly usual, automatically 
operating codes. For the understanding of strange, unusual 
events, actions and states we also have our automatic codes: 
when the people sitting on the bench ask the young man who 
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is clutching the wall-clock about the loss of his parents 
and home, he answers in the affirmative and he "smiles" or 
"laughs" "heartily" in the meantime. The upset of the natu-
ral order of values to this extent can be judged by the 
reader, who relies on his experiences of the real world, as 
the young man became 'demented' in his pain; and this ex-
planation is also inspired by the behaviour of those sitting 
on the bench. No matter how much truth there is in this 
statement finally, the reader who suspends the arbitrariness 
of the composition of the text-world with this interpreta-
tion undoubtedly misunderstands the essence of the aesthetic 
code ordering the text^world, the whole strategy of literary 
text-reception. The tested evaluation mechanism that is able 
to characterize similar real situations satisfactorily can-
not be used automatically here. It is not possible because 
the very characteristics of this possible world is that pain 
appears here as happiness} dementia caused by pain as clear 
and unified value-coneciousness determined by happiness. Thé 
people on the bench express their pity and sympathy not in 
the conventional way of verbal and non-verbal acts but by 
turning away, making the establishment of contract impos-
siblej by their seemingly hostile attitude. Showing up the 
traditional, the mostly ineffective feelings and values in 
such a new context in an unexpected way queries and makes 
uncertain the automatism of the usual, habitual reactions. 
Wheri> however, we find the new ordering principles, the 
aesthetic code, in other words when we can construct a world 
where the ambivalence of feelings and values is not arbi-
trary any more, then pain and dementia affect the recipient 
with their 'original' force or in an intensified form since 
the explored explanatory system makes all the states of af-
fairs of the text-world function in favour of this. Let us 
see, however, what the exact situation is in the Borchert-
story. 
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The mother and the home, and the events of the past con-
nected with them become real values for the young man in the 
moment of their loss and only through their loss. This value 
is preserved and projected to the present by the wall-clock 
that remained outwardly intact. Strangely enough, the death 
of the mother, the destruction of the home means not value-
loss but value-recognition in the young man's life: his dai-
ly meetings with his mother, almost indifferent in the past, 
suddenly go through a meta-morphosis and become the symbols of 
the "paradisical" state of love and protection. The young 
man "laughs" and "smiles" "heartily" for he is happy: after 
his mother's death and the loss of his home he possesses in 
the wall-clock an object of incomparably greater value than 
he could feel in his mother's life and in the natural secu-
rity of home. So the world of the young man and the people 
on the bench is determined by an ambivalent order of values: 
what is 'past' for the people on the bench is 'present' for 
the young man, what is 'value-loss' for the people on the 
bench is 'value-preservation' for the young man, what is on-
ly an 'imaginary world' for the people on the bench is 're-
ality' for the young man, etc. Not only the codes of values 
but also those of causal relations operate differently from 
the usual principles: while the people on the bench attri-
bute the fact that the clock stopped at "half past two" to 
the effect of the bomb hitting the house, the young man sus-
pects a symbolic-mystical connection between the time shown 
on the clock and the time of meetings in the kitchen which 
nearly always took place "half past two" in the morning. 
At this point it is not necessary to continue the anal-
ysis. What we have said so far is enough to demonstrate the 
validity of the statement in the introduction: in the case 
of literary works the code of ordering can never be given 
totally in advance, and the automatic adoption and applica-
tion of codes from the real world or works of similar type 
- that can be profitably used there - may easily be mis-
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leading. On taking into consideration the entire sign-mate-
rial the recipient must find/establish those abstract regu-
larities which determine the model-structure of the text-
worlds. The model-structure, since it can be generated on 
the basis of a system of rules, is a well-formed, abstract 
sequence of events/actions with value-assignments.^ The se-
quences of events/actions of the actualized text-worlds 
follow this abstract and well-formed sequence of events/ac-
tions in their composition, and hence their composition is 
not arbitrary. The regularities set up re-organize, re-
structure the text-world on an epistemological level. 
The text-world explicated with the help of the model-
structure, which in this sense is the model or interpreta-
tion of the abstract model-structure, will henceforth be 
called the literary possible world. 
So the primary task of the explication of literary 
narratives is to elaborate a model-structure. The model-
structure in accordance with the coherence-principle ensures 
those truth-conditions under which the hypothetically true 
propositions asserting the states of affairs in the text-
world receive an actually true truth-value in relation to 
the states of affairs in the possible world. But we also 
stress that the task of literary explication (in the above 
narrow sense) is not confined to the construction of model-
structures only, since several literary possible worlds can 
belong, to one model-structure only as a consequence of its 
abstract and general nature.® That is why we must also give 
the distinctive features which, in contrast to the essen-
tial common characteristics represented by the model-struc-
ture, ensure the individuality, the peculiarity of the par-
ticular possible worlds. 
We must note a possible misunderstanding here. The 
model-structure cannot be identified with formal mathemati-
cal models in spite of certain similarities concerning the 
level of abstraction. There always exists at least one basic 
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difference: in contrast to mathematical models, literary 
model-structures are value-carrying/value-forming systems 
in every case. Atthe same time this fact explains also the 
possible action-influencing or action-orientating role of 7 
literary works. 
To go back to the literary-semiotic framework-theory, 
we can re-formulate Posner's general theses for ourselves 
as follows: the possible worlds in the above sense consti-
tute those new contexts where the usual, frequent actions 
of the real world are de-automatized, and become single and 
individual actions. After a certain time in the real world 
more and more fixed and automatic codes operate. In con-
trast, the code of a literary possible world - appart from 
the problem of epigon works etc. however much it may be 
built on codes valid in the real world, is not fixed or 
much less so, since it exists in itself only potentially. 
Actually it is produced in the process of.a reception of a 
creative nature on the basis of the possibilities ensured 
by the text-world as an individual version of general regu-
larities. An actually non-existent world becomes a possible 
world only and excusively by the help of the recignized and 
explored code, the explicative model-structure. 
'Presenting* the possible against the real, the actu-
alized, 'displaying* the usual in an unusual context; all 
this claims that our relation to the world should not be-
come fixed. 
It does not follow from this however, that in this way 
the literary text-worlds, in a word, literature should lose 
its contact with the real world. The reverse is true: on 
the one hand, one can only reasonably speak of possible 
worlds as dependent on the real world. On the other hand, 
and the plots as well-formed sequences of events serve this 
purpose, already in Aristotle's conception, the literary 
possible worlds display, change or re-create not the acci-
dental, contingent connections but the more profound, over-
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all value-structures of the real world. This is valid for 
every significant work, even if these general value-struc-
tures - for the very sake of ensuring the individual, par-
ticular nature that is specially important aesthetically -
can be obtained only through seemingly accidental, contin-
gent sequences of events. 
3. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE MODEL-STRUCTURE 
/Wolfgang Borahevt:. Die KUchenuhr/ 
3.J General remarks on the internal hierarchy of the 
model-structure 
Within the model-structure we distinguish between ac-
tion-logical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic components. 
Here we deal in detail only with the description of the 
first three ingredients. Pragmatic references will be in-
cluded only in the final chapter of the study: in the text-
world interpretation of the model-structure. 
It is also customary - as is proved by the enormous 
special literature - to examine the listed components of the 
model-structure one by one. This process is simpler inas-
much as in the formulation of the particular levels of struc-
ture one can disregard the compositions of others, the co-
herence and consistency between them. We, for our part, try 
to sum. up the components mentioned in one, hierarchically 
organized model-structure. The hierarchy is not from a 
specifically narrative point of view, instead, it is built 
up according to the different degrees of abstraction. The 
hierarchically organized model-structure cannot exaggerate 
the importance of the particular levels resulting from mu 
tual dependence, as is possible in the separate analysis of 
the levels. In this way we can perform a more complex analy-
sis and we can separate the transformational operations of 
the different structural levels better, and also those ele-
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xnents and relations on which the transformations in question 
operate. Prospectively the model-structure can serve as an 
efficient means in the typological systematization of the 
Borchert-stories. 
The roost abstract level of the model—structure repre-
sents a change of state in an action-logical sense. This is 
followed by the syntactic structure which assigns abstract, 
non-interpreted narrative categories and relations to the 
above change of state. The least abstract level is consti-
tuted by the semantic component that provides thematic 
value-markers for the syntactic categories and relations. 
The term 'thematic value-marker11 is not used by chance: it 
expresses the fact that in the interpretation of syntax 
thematic and value problems are often mixed, they sometimes 
fuse inseparably. The methodological difficulties resulting 
from this will not be discussed here since they do not af-
fect our purposes the possible generalization of the seman-
tic component with regard to the Bochert-stories and the 
unambiguous separation of semantics from the action-logical 
and systactic components. At the same time, we also stress 
that the positive and negative values - independently from 
the semantic level of structure - will also be marked on the 
action-logical and syntactic components of the model-struc-
ture. The unmarkedness or the 0+ n sign expresses the posi-
tive, while the "-'' sign or the unmarked symbol, or the 
verbal negation of the thematic value-marker expresses the 
negative value. 
A final methodological remark: the model-structure can 
be established only with full knowledge of the result of 
empirical text-analysis performed previously, succeeding it 
in time. However, the procedure whereby explicit structure 
logically precedes text-analysis has strict methodological 
consequences. The explicit formulation of the model-struc-
ture contains the possibility of supervision or denial from 
two points of view. On the one hand, if it seems reasonable, 
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we can theoretically doubt its overall nature, simplicity, 
function ability, consistency, coherence etc. On the other 
hand, we can empirically check if the model-structure is 
actually able to account for every relevant connection of 
the states of affairs in the text-world. If we find certain 
states of affairs or their connections which the model-
structure cannot explain satisfactorily within its own sys-
tem, within the theoretical requirements raised against 
itself we can query its validity. This, however, can be re-
liably solved methodologically only if we regard the text-
world of the story as a model, the interpretation of the 
model-structure; that is, we accept that the former logical-
ly precedes the latter. 
3.2 The action-logical component of the mo del-structure 
We describe the composition of the text-world of the 
story on this abstract level as a process-structure. The 
process means the transformation of an initial state into a 
final state.The transformation itself is the result of activ-
ity, in our case, it is closely related to the activity and 
intentions of the 'agents' who participate in the process. 
For the sake of simplification, in the formal explication 
we adopt not an action-logical but a so-called change-logi-
Q 
cal notation. So we interpret the change as action or sys-
tem of actions but we will note only the fact and direction 
of the activity. The relevant aspect of the action-logical 
structure can be determined without the explicit introduc-
tion of the 'agents'. 
From the general process-function (.-CpT)-)p the fol-
lowing four actual processes can be derived: pTp, -pT-p, 
-pTp and pT-p. Now we are going to construct from these four 
elementary processes the process-structure that is 'imitated' 
by the composition of the text-world of the Borchert-story 
on this level. 
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Let the initial state of the text-world (in the domain 
of empirical text^-analysi6) be of negative (-p) , and its 
final state of positive value (p), so the transformation 
C.JTJ produces a change-process (v) . This change-process 
takes place only if certain conditions tQ) prevail. It can-
not happen if those conditions are missing C-Q)s 
v ^ -pTp , if Q and 
v2s -pT-p , if -Q. 
So on an action-logical level, depending on the presence of 
the conditions, there is one change- (v^), or one preserv-
ing-process CVjl-
Two remarks must be added to the stated formulas 
U1 We made a restriction concerning the state-variables as 
opposed to the usual action-logical state-transforma-
tion. In the text-world of the Borchert-story it is not 
that an optional initial state p^ is followed by an 
optional final state p^, but that a state -p is re-
placed by a contrasted state p. Or, if the conditions 
are missing, _T_ preserves the same initial state -p. 
The transformation _T_ appears on this level of struc-
ture in the usual temporal-logical sense "and then", 
(.ill The given formulae are, of course, only possible struc-
tures; to get an actual structure we must know whether 
the conditions are met or not. On the basis of empirical 
text-analysis, the type of structure the Borchert-story 
realises can be characterized from an action-logical 
point of view mainly by the particularities of the final 
state. 
After these preliminary remarks we give the process-
structure which contains the most important regularities de-
termining the text-world of the story. 
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CaL Initial state v: -pT 
In our view the action-logical structure itself is also 
of a hierarchical composition. The components (states, pro-
cesses, acts, actions1 of the particular levels are defined 
g 
by the different connections of functors and arguments. 
That is, -p can be considered an abstract state such as is 
determined by the complex structure of the components of the 
levels. However, from the viewpoint of our objective such a 
detailed decomposition carries no importance. 
(b). The process of transformation v: _T 
The detailed exposition of the transformation _T_ is 
not necessary either. _T_ is namely a time-functor, the 
change marked by it does not influence the quality, thé 
value of the states. Formally, on this level, the states, 
more exactly the process v;_T_ can be characterized only 
as a sequence of time-states. But in the present context 
the Borchert-story interests us mainly as a sequence of 
events expressing value-state change. It is not unessential, 
though less important, whether the change takes place 'con-
tinously' or 'suddenly', 'quickly' or 'slowly', etc. 
tel Final state v: _T-p.p, for both -Q and Q are met; 
J " . " = "and"/ 
So the global action-logical component of the model-struc-
ture can be put down in the following simple pattern. 
vl,2 : -PT-P-P-
The final state contains an action-logical contradic-
tion. Since _T_ is only a time-functor, the transformational 
process does not explain the contradiction. The simultaneous 
realisation of -p and p is, however, the result of an 
operation not permitted in action-logics only. The existence 
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of the text-world of the Borchert-story does not depend on 
whether Its state-changes satisfy the requirement of logi-
cal consistency or not. From the viewpoint of the literary 
explication of the text-world there is no need to release 
the established contradiction. Moreover, as permitted by 
the former examples, we have reason to suppose that one de-
terminig feature of the possible worlds of Borchert lies 
just in this contradiction. It is quite another matter that 
the syntactic and semantic specification of the conditions 
Q can reduce the action-logical contradiction to opposi-
tions in the components mentioned. 
3.S The syntactic component of the model-structure 
Now we will examine what narrative categories and rela-
tions can be translated into the action-logical process-for-
mula. 
Let the initial and final states consist of complex 
states of affairs- that contain the abstract figures F and a 
F^. The two states are determined by the distinguished rela-
tion R between and F^. The opposition of p and -p 
is interpreted by the states of affairs +R(F ,F, ) and a D 
-R(Fa,F^). The realisation or non-realisation of the given 
conditions CQ). or (-Q) can be expressed by a relation S. 
S denotes the connection not between F and F, but be-a b 
tween F and F , and F, and F . F stands in the hi-a c b c c 
erarchy of figures under and F^ since the obtaining 
relation S is only a condition for the realisation of 
relation R. We mention - but will later expound - that es-
sentially F c serves to shorten the existing relation be-
tween F and F,. We introduce v to denote the syntac-
a a ^ s 
tic process, and the symbol _T _ to mark the transformations 
operating here. 
Now let us see how the possible structure of the nar-
rative syntax can be written down. 
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v s l: -R(Fa,Fb) T + +R(Fa,Fb), if 1. +S<Fb,Fc), 
2. +S(Fa,Fc); 
and 
vs2 : -R(Fa'Fb> T + - R ( Fa' Fb )' i f - S ( Fb' Fc>' 
2. -S (F ,F ) (=fac-a c 
ultative); 
We know from the analysis of the story that in the final 
state of the text-world the 'majority of the people on the 
bench' (Ffa) except 'one man' (Ffa) do not establish contact 
with the 'young man' (F ). In addition, in the initial state a 
of the text-world the 'young man' regards the clock in his 
hands as valueless and valuable at the same time: -S(F ,F ) 3 c 
and +S(F ,F ). So in the syntactic structure where we a C 
operate not only with abstract states but also figures, it 
is expedient to denote the marked duality of the 'people on 
the bench' and the 'young man' symbolically also: instead of 
F„ we use F . , F _, instead of F, we use F, , , F.~. a al a2 b bl b2 
Where the difference carries no importance, we will keep the 
original signs and F^. The figure F , which is inter-
preted in the text-world as the series of happenings occur-
ing between the 'wall-clock' or between the 'young man' 
(F=) and the young man's 'mother' (F,) in the presence of a u 
the 'wall-clock', necessarily possesses such properties that, 
according to the viewpoint of F and F, , permit a con-
+ a 
trasting interpretation C-S). F , however, cannot be substi-
tuted by figures F ^ and F c2 because F c is character-
ized by duality not in itself but only as an interpretation 
possible from the viewpoint of the other figures. So that 
whether F ,, F F,. or F,0 is linked to F deter-al a2 bl b2 c 
mines the nature of the relation S, too; that is the posi-
tive or negative evaluation of the attributes of F . 
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(.a) Initial state 
v : -R(F ,F, ) T + , because 1. -S (F. ,F ) 8 a O — D C 
2. +S<Fal,Fc) 
3. -S(Fa2,Fc) 
Before dealing with the transformational component _T+_ in 
more detail, we give the final state _T+_ turns the initial 
state into. 
(.cl Final state 





<Jbi}. The process of transformation 
V : T + s — — 
The final state clearly outlines the possibilities of _T*_, 
we know from what initial state what final state we must 
reach with the help of the transformations. We also know 
the conditions under which _T+_ transforms the initial 
state postulated in the model-structure into the final 
state. 
The introduction of F , and F _ • as well as F. , al a2 bl 
and FJ_)2 makes it possible to differentiate within the 
transformational component _T+_ between the classes of pre-
serving- C O and change-transformations (T ,) . But the ac-
tion-logical contradiction does not appear here because 
T + preserves the initial connection of F and F, with - p- ^ + a b 
reference to F and F. .. T changes the same initial cl Dl ~ U 
connection with reference to F and F, a b<J 
The preserving- and change-transformations of syntax 
differ from the preserving^ and change-processes of the ac-
tion-logical level, preserving the initial state does not 
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mean that the degree of opposition between the figures re-r 
mains the same in the final state. The change-transforma-
tions do not result in the total negation of the initial 
state, the establishment of its exact contrast either. 
In the following through some examples we show how the 
preserving-transformations can contribute to the explication 
of the basically semantic concepts: 'gradation' and 'gradu-
al! ty' . 
The operation of transformations is restricted by 
a necessary condition: -SCF.,F1. That is,- T + may not ID C *—• p ~ 
produce a state which, cannot be reconciled with the given 
condition. At the same time, the facultative condition ~ 
is(Fa,Fcl can be freely combined with the transitory states 
-RCF.^Fj^ ~ R ( Pa' Fb )n P r o d u c e d f r o m t h e initial state 
with transformations of a finite number T+, T + - pi- - pn-
The succession of transformations expressed the 'graduality 
The 'gradation' is the result of connecting several opera-
tions. On the one hand, we connect the transitory states 
created with the first members of the sequence of preserv-
ing-transformations to the simultaneous presence of the 
facultative conditions +S (F ,F ) and -S(F ,F ). On the 9 C 3 C 
other hand, in the case of further transitory states the 
condition -S(F .F ) is eliminated, and only the realiza-a c 
tion of +S(F = ,F ). is required. So the negative connection a C 
of the figures F^ and F c remains, but the initial 
bivalent connection of F and F releases in a positive cl c 
direction: that is why the opposition of F a and F^ 'in-
creases' through F . The climax of the contrast is reached 
when, wimultaneously with the last, negative transformation 
T + preserving the F.F, relation, the F - F -connection — pn— a D a c 
gradually acquiring a positive value perfects itself in the 
equivalence of the two figures (F = F ). (In the text-a c 
world: the young man identifies himself with the clock, then 
with the value-state of the past preserved in the clock.) 
Thus, when F, rejects F for ever it denies also F = ir-D c a 
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revocably through the equivalence relation. 
The structure of 'gradation1 can be further refined: 
Fa anc^ Fb n o t o n^y reject each other more and more 
sharply through F c but prior to this rejection each 
tried to win the other over to its own standpoint. F & and 
Ffa with the creation of every +S(Fa,Fc) and -S(Fb,Fc), 
respectively, give to F, and F the possibility of 
d a 
building a positive or negative connection with F . But 
in the case of F^ throughout, in the case of F in the 
second part of the sequence of transformations this pos-
sibility is blocked by the prescribed necessary and facul-
tative conditions. The 'gradation' appears here in the fact 
that, though the possibility for the elimination of the 
contrast comes about it is only so that we may realize 
directly: the opposition can still not be eliminated. The 
'gradual' nature is shown in that for example, the final 
state of the F -structure in the above sense is at the a 
same time the initial state of the successive F^-struc-b 
ture. Formally: 
. ..+S(F a JF o)-№i+ S (Pb,Fc)) .-S (Fb,F0))-( M(-S(Fa,Fc) ) .+S (Fa,Fc)-. 
where stands for implication and "M" is the sign of the 
modal operator 'possible'. The underlined formulae represent 
the simultaneous initial and final states. The principally 
infinite sequence is restricted by the finite number of the 
attributes of F , since the creation of connections +S c' 
or -S is based on the interpretation of these attributes. 
We will not go into details concerning the transforma-
tions that result in change. It is enough to mention that 
their operation is the function of the preserving-transfor-
mations; a change can take place only on completion of the 
opposition existing with the preserving-transformations. 
The composition of the syntactic level of structure is 
characterized by symmetrical order: the decomposition of 
F, into F, , and Fv-w their positive or negative relation b bi DA 
to F in the.final state exactly correspond to the initial 
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revocably through the equivalence relation. 
The structure of 'gradiation' can be further refined; 
F g and F^ do not only reject each other more and more 
sharply through F c but prior to this rejection each 
tried to win the other over to its own standpoint. F and cl 
with the creation of every + s(F a,F c) and -SCFb,Fc), 
respectively, give to F, and F the possibility of D 3 
building a positive or negative connection with F . But 
in the case of F K throughout, in the case of F in the id 3 
second part of the sequence of transformations this pos-
sibility is blocked by the prescribed necessary and facul-
tative conditions. The 'gradation' appears here in the fact 
that, though the possibility for the elimination of the 
contrast comes about. It is only so that we may realize it 
directly: the opposition can still not be eliminated. The 
'gradual' nature is shown in that for example, the final 
state of the F -structure in the above sense is at the a 
same time the initial state of the successive F, ̂-struc-b 
ture. Formally: 
..+S/Fa)Fc/-(M/+S/Fb,Fc//.-S/F.iJFc/)-.(M/-S/Fa,Fc//.+S/FaJi'c/)-.. 
where "-»" stands for implication and "M" is the sign of the 
modal operator 'possible'. The underlined formulae represent 
the simultaneous initial and final states. The principally 
infinite sequence is restricted by the finite number of the 
attributes of F , since the creation of connections +S or -S c' 
is based on the interpretation of these attributes. 
We will not go into details concerning the transforma~ 
tions that result in change. It is enough to mention that 
their operation is the function of the preserving-transfor-
mations: a change can take place only on completion of the 
opposition existing with the preserving-transformations. 
The composition of the' syntactic level of structure is 
characterized by symmetrical order: the decomposition of 
F b into and F b2' their positive or negative relation 
to F in the final state exactly correspond to the initial 
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Fal a n d Fa2 d u a l i t y o f F a a n d l t s bivalent relation to 
F . The final state, however, as we have mentioned, re-
peats the structure of the initial state to a greater de-
gree. This is supported also by the text-world interpreta-
tion of the figures: while the 'young man' interprets both 
F j and F a 2 ' 'the majority of people on the bench' corres-
pond to F b l and 'one man' to F b 2- T h a t ls> i n t h e initial 
state the 'duality' was restricted only to one person, in 
the final state already a group of people 'come into con-
flict' with themselves. 
3.4 The semantic component of the model-structure 
3.4.1 The interpretation of the syntactic rela-
tions -R and -S 
Let us interpret -R with the binary sign of C-con-
+ + 
tact-establishment) and -S with that of (-value-recogni-
tion). 
Since —S was the condition of -R in the syntax, 
it is obvious that among the figures of the model-structure 
only those relations are (-contact-establishment) which re-
fer to communication, comprehension, acceptance of values, 
that is the establishment of value-contacts, value-actions. 
This interpretation provides reason also for the 
specifically paradoxical nature of Borchert's space-struc-
tures, space-movements. We feel intuitivelly that in the 
text-world 'approach' (between the persons interpreting the 
figures F and F, ) always involves some 'moving off', a o 
while the 'increase of distance' involves some kind of 
'approach' as well. And though the view oriented on the real 
world instinctively interprets the 'approach' as (contact-
establishment) , the 'moving off' as (-contact-establishment), 
the formal 'approach' does not necessarily become (+contact-
establishroent), and the formal 'moving off' does not lead 
automatically to (-contact-establishment) because of the in-
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serted condition of (.-value recognition) . In the Borchert 
stories several combinations occur, the states of affairs 
of the particular text-worlds interpret most frequently the 
versions mentioned. A specifically Borchertian stylistical 
feature is the fact that the actions of seemingly least sig-
nificance, being very frequent and automatized in the real 
world, interpret the marked versions (contact-establishment) 
and (value-recognition): 'to speak to somebody", 'to ap-
proach somedoby', 'to look at somebody' etc. If these ac-
tions are bound by the (—value—recognition) condition, then 
the possible world in question is built up in a way where 
"to look at somebody', 'to approach somebody', 'to speak to 
somebody' entails the self-contrasting functions 'not to 
see', 'not to reach' and 'not to understand', respectively. 
This process means the de-automatization of the usual ac-
tions, too. As we have mentioned, the opposite is also true. 
The 'turning away', 'the cessation of talk', 'the different 
view' can only be interpreted as 'moving off' if they are 
accompanied by (.-value-recognition) , otherwise they are more 
intimate, personal forms of 'approach' like 'pity', 'sym-
pathy' etc. In the relation of F, and F, actual and ap-
d a 
parent 'moving o f f is mi_xed. 
3.4,2 The thematic interpretations of the figures 
Fal> Fa2> F W Fb2 and Fc 
So far we have interpreted in general the relations ¿R 
and ¿S as (_+contact-establishment) and (^-value-recogni-
tion), respectively, now we must find an answer to what con-
crete values one has to recognize or not to recogni e as the 
precondition of successful or unsuccessful Ccontact-estab-
lishment). 
In the light of the empirical text-analysis we must 
attribute decisive roles to the following thematic value-
pairs in the composition/explication of the text-world of 
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the "Kuchenuhr": /protection/vs/expulsion/, /love/vs/indif-
ference/, /life/vs/death/, /present/vs/past/, /material/vs 
/spiritual/-value approach, /eternal/vs/transitory/3 
/real/vs/imaginary/, /human/vs/object/. 
In organizing the thematic value-structure the figure 
F c is given a distinguished role. We already mentioned 
that F c possesses such attributes which permit a binary, 
contrasting interpretation in every case. The binary inter-
pretations always spring form the opposition of figures F a 
and F b, or F a l-F g 2 and F b l-F b 2 respectively. 
Let us take again the example of the analysed story. 
If in the initial state of the model-structure F c 
('kitchen wall-clock') possesses an optional complex at-
tribute A^ (= e.g.: 'the outwardly intact but inwardly 
ruined clock stopped at half past two'), then A.̂  can be 
reconciled both with the interpretation of F b of (mate-
rial-value-approach) , that renders (death), (past), (tran-
sience) , (object), (reality) values to F , and also with 
the value-combinative interpretation of (spiritual value-
approach) , (life), (present), (eternal), (human), (imaginary) 
of F ,. Simultaneously, F _ also interprets F : this es-ax az c 
sentially corresponds with the view of Fb< All this is re-
versed in the final state of the model-structure where the 
place and the view of F & 2 is taken by Fb2* relat:i-on 
of F b 2 to F • is, however, equivalent to the relation of 
F and F . a c 
We have already said that F , as distinct from the 
figures F and F. , corresponds directly not to a person cl O 
but to the object in the title; the 'kitchen wall-clock' in 
the text-world. Besides this, F c is interpreted by every 
state of affairs of this type, i.e. persons and objects with 
different properties and relations which are connected with 
the story of the 'kitchen wall-clock' in the text-world. When 
F a explores the attributes of the 'kitchen wall-clock', 
then he tells this story and tries to make its 'message' 
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comprehensible, sensible for Ffa. F c is nothing but the 
story of F g ('the young man') and F d ('his mother'). 
Since in the beginning the relation of F and F. is de-a a 
termined also by an unsuccessful, then a specifically suc-
cessful (value-recognition) and (contact-establishment), 
the Fa,Fd~story can be regarded essentially as a variant 
of the Fa,F&-story. Its syntactic structure can be charac-
terized as follows: 
v^: -R'(Fa,Fd) T + +R'(Fa,Fd), because +S'(Fa,F^), 
where " , " denotes the 'variant' and F̂ , is interpreted 
by the 'meetings between the young man and his mother that 
occured every day in the past at half past two in the morn-
ing' - state of affairs of the text-world. The specific 
nature of the relation is given by the fact that though the 
formal conditions of 'approach' and 'meeting' are ensured 
in the initial state, (real) (contact-establishment) i.e. 
based on (value-recognition) does not take place. In the 
final state, however, where the formal conditions are mis-
sing - F a: (.(present) (life)) ; F d: C(past) (death) ) - the 
contact-establishment takes place on an (imaginary) leve.l 
through the figures and F c. The contact-establishment 
of F g and F^ is structured similarly, with the differ-
ence that here the attempt, though it meets the formal con-
ditions, has only a partial result even in the second phase. 
If, later on, we handle F c as the Fa,Fd~story em-
bedded in the Fa,Fj3-story, and interpret it with thematic 
value-markers, then it is easy to show the way F = can a 
create positive contact with the same figure of F c the 
values of which does not recognize. 
We know that the (+contact-establishment) between F a 
and F^, and F a and F d presupposes (+value-recognition>. 
But this value-recognition is bound to thematic value-
markers contrasting and excluding each other in the two 
cases. For F a the (death), of F d makes the (+value*-rec*--
ognition) possible, for F., the (death) of F d excludes 
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(+value-recognltion) F , of which F d, and so the (death) 
thematic value-marker is just one ingredient, is a part not 
only of (past) but also of (present). Its ambivalent attri-
butes bear not only (mortality), decay, but also survival, 
i.e. (death) as well as (life). The (life)- and (death)-
interpretation of F c depends above all on the (material)-
or (spiritual value-approach). F^, since he himself is not 
a part of the Fc~story, interprets the 'outwardly intact 
but inwardly ruined clock' that contains the story in a 
condensed form from the viewpoint of the material value-loss 
exclusively. The approach of F is (spiritual), for him 
the 'outward intactness', as we have already mentioned, 
means (life), it preserves the (past) in the (present). The 
'ruined mechanism of the clock' is not of (death)-value 
either. On the contrary: it is the (eternalizing) of the 
values of the (past) recognized in the (present), raising 
them out of the (transitory). In the course of the (con-
tact-establishment) attempts which seem more and more un-
successful F g turns from F^ gradually towards F c > The 
identification of F with F to an increasing extent, a c 
the 'wall-clock' of the text-world, is not surprising any 
more since F_ unites in F_ actually with the F ,F,-a C . a u 
story, that is: the recognized positive value-state of his 
owns (past). So the "clock having originally an (object) 
marker becomes (human) for him, and he himself plays the 
role of (object) in the view of F b l : t h e 'people on the 
bench' turn away, the communication becomes formal. F , 
despite his initial intention, loses his connection with 
the (present) and through the Fc~equivalence he identi-
fies himself with his own (past). This identification also 
carries a double value. As we have seen, for F = the (past) a 
is positive, it means (life), an (eternal) state preventing 
mortality, it ensures (protection) opposed to the (expul-
sion) of those returning from the war; it provides the 
"paradisical" harmony of home, 'motherly' (love) opposed to 
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the (indifference)., the chaotic disharmony of the outside 
world. For F^ (past] has the value of (death]., (mortal-
ity)., while (present), represents survival, Clifel. 
In the model-structure F a is the active 'agent-fig^ 
ure', he attempts contact-establishment, demonstrating the 
recognized value through the narrated Fa,Fd~story. His 
dominant role is counterbalanced by the fact that while in 
his (spiritual), approach the positiye values are parts only 
of his (imaginary) world, the negative values of the (ma-
terial) approach of F^ are the elements of the actual, 
(real) world of the story. 
In presenting the thematic value-component we have de-
parted from the processes we used at the action-logical and 
syntactic levevels of the model-structure. We did not dis-
++ 
cuss in detail what kind of _T _ transformations take 
place between the same and different thematic value-markers 
in relation to the initial and final states of the struc-
ture. We have not made up a constructional system capable 
of giving the combinative possibilities and conditions of 
the introduced thematic value-markers clearly. For the sake 
of lucidity we have tried rather to demonstrate with some 
examples what states of affairs in the text^world interpret 
the thematic value-marker in the Borchert story. It has to 
be stressed, however, as the concept of model-structure is 
understood here, that the combinational possibilities of 
the thematic value-markers depend on the action-logical and 
syntactic level of structure that are higher in hierarchy 
and are qualified by positive or negative value-pairs from 
the beginning. That is, the thematic value-marker transfor-
mations _T + +_ are always determined by _T+_ or _T 
depending on whether they are in a position of _T+ and 
T, or T +_ and T_. We have shown in a concrete example: 
if we employ an optional transformation in the _T posi-
tion, i.e. in the initial state, then only a combination 
of the thematic value-markers that excludes the realiza-
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tion of +R(F ,F.) T + in relation to F and F. is a t ) — a b 
possible. That is, it does not make the realization of 
+S(Fb,Fc) possible but permits a facultative choice in the 
-S -relation of F and F . a c 
To the semantic explication of 'gradation* and 'gradu-
ality' we would add two short remarks only: (i) In this 
respect, the 'activity' of F o and the thematic value-a 
combinations linked to further and further degrees of 'ac-
tivity' play a basic role. The 'activity' aiming at contacb-
establishment demands that the value-approach of the fig-
ures, uncertain or not expounded at the start, achieve an 
increasingly clear formulation that results in the increase 
of opposition (Ffal) or identificational possibility (Fb2)• 
(ii) At the same time, the validity of the value-order al-
ready constructed can be queried or even decreased by the 
addition of an appropriate thematic value-marker (e.g.: 
(imaginary)), say, in the case of F . a 
In demonstrating the semantic component of the model-
structure, we laid stress on showing the structure-prop-
erties which were considered the most important also on 
this level. The attributes of F c permitting bivalent in-
terpretation express the same contradiction in the end-
state of the semantic structure that the process-formula 
_T-p.p of the action-logical level, or the simultaneously 
valid relation -S .of the narrative-syntactic level ex-
pressed, In this phase the thematic markers taken origi-
nally as opposition-pairs are subject to obligatory trans-
formations which abolish and preserve the opposition. The 
established values become relativized in the moment of their 
creation. The possible world to which the Borchert story 
according to its semantic-structureal component refers is a 
schizophrenia world because in it the evaluation of the same 
attributes at the same time opposes and excludes each other. 
As a further step, in order to show the connection between 
literature and reality, those areas of reality should be 
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'selected' by means of the constructed model-structure 
which are similarly composed to the semantic ingredient of 
the model-structure, i.e. which are in keeping with the 
given structurization. 
So far we have emphasized the dependency, the hier-
archical order of the components in the model-structure. 
The obligatory subordination referring to the initial and 
final states, however, does not determine the internal hier-
archical structure of the individual components. The syn-
tactic level fixes the steps of exposition, and in this 
sense every moment becomes relevant with reference to the 
Ccontact-establishment) and to its condition, the (valus-
+ + 
recognition); that is, relation -R and -S play a syn-
tactically distinguished role. On the semantic level, how-
ever, the values 'delivered' by the. syntactic relations 
become determinative. In the case of the Borchert story, 
the value-pair structurating the thematic level is linked 
to the embedded F ,F,~ (later on F -) -story that is of a d c 
syntactically subordinated importance. Its distinguished 
position is shown by one of the several facts, viz. that 
every further thematic value-pair is its partial and special 
interpretation with respect to or F^. The thematic 
value-pairs (protection)vs(expulsion) and (love)vs(indif-
ference) of the same level of relevance fix the further 
(life)vs (death) , (eternal)vs (transitory), (human)vs(object) 
value-judgements which, in this way, can be considered 
coordinates of each other. These latter are the interpreta-
tions of the (present)vs (past) theme with an (imaginary) or 
(real) basis obtained by a (material) or a (spiritual) 
value-approach. The drafted hierarchy can mean a certain 
orientational point of the more exact description of the 
thematic value-markers. A decisively thematic stress is 
given to the (present)vs (past) opposition-pair, the inter-
pretations of which are constituted by the partial value-
pairs of (li fe) vs (death) the (eternal) vs (.trans i lory) , the 
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(human)vs (object), relatively near to the concrete theme. 
The way in which the partial value-pairs come from the 
thematic opposition-pairs, in which the main value-pairs of 
the story like (protection)vs (expulsion) and (love)vs(in-
difference) come from the partial values can be best 
acterized by the contrast-pair of the (material)vs (spir-
itual) value-approach. The way and the basis of existence 
of the partial and main values are determined by the ontic 
contras't of the 'believed' or 'actual' (real)vs (imaginary). 
The theme , the way and the basis of existence, the partial 
values are states of affairs connected to (contact—estab-
lishment) from a syntactical point of view. But the range 














We note that certain pragmatic references which will be 
touches upon later can cause shifts in stress, modifica-
tions the abstract thematic value-component of the model-
structure . 
4 THE TEXT-WORLD-INT Eli PR ETATION OF THE MODEL-STRUCTURE 
4.1 On the relation between the levels of structure 
and the text-world 
According to the interpretation-theoretical principles 
already exposed the arbitrariness of the text-world is re-
leased by the model-structure as an explanatory system. The 
model-structure contains those regularities on the basis of 
which the text-world can be considered a possible world, 
and not an unordered, chaotic set of states of affairs. But, 
since we have differentiated several levels in the model-
structure, the question arises which level (s) of the model-
structure is (are) interpreted by the text-world. 
In principle any level can be projected onto the text-
world. In this case, according to the level of abstraction, 
we learn only some global features about the text-world 
interpreting the action-logical contradiction: the struc-
ture of the state-change refers to the fact that the world 
where the mentioned change actually happens 'splits* as 
regards its basic relation. 
If we examine merely the states of affairs interpret-
ing the syntactic structure, we trace the development in 
the relation of the two groups of characters, not defined 
more closely, the way of state-change, the formal combina-
tories of relations, the structure of the transformational 
steps from the beginning towards the final state. 
If the text-world interprets only the semantic struc-
ture, then we can get information concerning the thematic 
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particularities, the decisive values, the ambivalent nature 
of value and, through this latter, indirectly the 'split' 
of the world in question again. 
The isolated text-world-interpretations of the levels 
can play a very important role - as mentioned before - in 
the expounded typological and comparative analyses concern-
ing several works or authors. In this context, however, 
text-world-interpretation means the complex explication of 
the model-structure where the single levels are not sepa-
rated. So far we have demonstrated using several examples 
how the characters/persons and states of affairs of the 
text-world interpret the abstract categories and relations 
of the different levels of the model-structure. Therefore, 
mainly for reasons of space, we only show some syntactic 
and semantic-thematic mapping. The elements and formulae of 
the model-structure will be put in brackets. 
4. 2 "The Kitchen Wall-Clock". The Borchert-8tory as a 
literary possible world 
The start of the text-world is outlined only very gen-
erally in time and space. Somewhere people (F^) sit on a 
bench and they see a man (Fa) approaching them. The man 
holds a kitchen wall-clock (F ) in his hands. The charac-c 
teristics of the man and the clock show a similar duality. 
Both seem outwardly intact: the man's gait is youthful, the 
face, the hands, the painted numbers of the clock are un-
damaged (life). But both are "ruined" inwardly: the young 
man's face, the mirror of his inward state is "rather old"; 
the clock does not work, it has stopped for ever (death). 
The young man sits down beside the others (=formal contact-
establishment) and starts telling the characteristics of the 
clock and then the events connected with it. He cannot, how-
ever, convince the others of the value of the decayed clock 
(-S/Fb<Fc/), sometimes not even himself (-S/Fa2,Fc/). His 
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arguments meet with incomprehension, moreover symbolic re-
fusal (cf. the sequence of preserving-transformations 
_ T R J . The conversation gradually ceases and the clock takes 
over the role of the people on the bench. The 'moving off' 
from the people on the bench and the 'approach' to the clock 
makes it more possible for the similarity of the young man 
and the clock not to be a contingent feature. The latter 
gradually loses its objective-material characteristics and 
restrictions. Its "face" ('wie ein Teller") becomes a real 
"face" ("Gesicht"), and the young man talks to this "face" 
(for F a the clock is: Object (Fc/T++0bject/Fc) . Human 
(Fc)). Later the clock is reduced to a single point of time, 
to "half past two", to the meeting that means the most im-
portant event in the young man's past (F^). Through the 
stages of mere surface similarity ('intact exterior'), for-
mal identification ("face") and direct contact-estahlish-
ment (1 clock=communicational partner'.) the young man iden-
tifies himself first with the clock, then the time shown 
on it, and eventually with the value-state denoted by the 
point of time t(F =F ), (protection), (love)). He searched 3 c 
for contact with the present (F̂ ). but his attempts were un-
successful. So he finds an ever stronger and more natural 
contact with his own part, with his earlier life expressed 
in and by the clock, preserved and recognized in the stop-
ped time: "Then he said softly to the whitish-blue face of 
the clock: Now, now I know that it was Paradise. The real 
Paradise." 
His recognition expressed and told also in words re-
sults in another 'approach - moving off' - type movement, 
change in the text-world. The group of people on the bench, 
unified towards the young man until then, 'splits' with it-
self. The man beside him (Ffa2) who meditates over the mean-
ing of the word "Paradise" departs from the others (Fbl)• 
Though all this happens on a speculative level, his act 
(+S (F, ,,F ) links him symbolically already to the young 
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man C+R(Fa,Fb2).. This change is also the final state of 
affairs of the text-world: "And the man who sat beside him 
looked at his shoes. But he did not see them. He always 
thought of the world Paradise." Apart from this a motif-
connection also proyes the conversion of contacts.10 The 
man's seemingly insignificant action happens not for the 
first time. He also looked at his shoes when the young man 
spoke first of the salvaged clock and waited to see how the 
others, the people on the bench would react to the story. 
This time in the initial state of the text-world the reac-
tion of the people on the bench is still unified: "Those 
who sat on the bench in the sunshine did not look at him. 
One looked at his shoes, the woman looked into the pram." 
In the first case the man beside him, like the others, 
avoids contact-establishment. However, after learning the 
whole history of the clock, he loses the contact with his 
own earlier (xeali (object-world): "... But he did not see 
them (.the shoes).", and he feels a liking for the young 
man's (imaginary! reality, for the state of "real Paradise", 
yet uncertain in meaning but having positive value for him. 
His 'object-seeing' (material) value-approach is replaced 
by a (spiritual) viewpoint rising above the material. The 
motif-relation of 'looking at the shoes' between the ini-
tial and final states well displays the importance of the 
transformation connecting the two states, the change of 
value-sight and also the possibility of establishing the 
contact totally missing at the start. 
We know that the young man as well as the people on 
the bench belong to the 'survivors' of the war, to those 
who escaped. Nevertheless, while the latter judge every-
thing from the viewpoint of 'loss', decay, destruction of 
material goods, the young man lays stress on the "survival" 
of the clock; "You lost everything, didn't you?- "This has 
remained". In this world the survival of the clock seems 
able to counterbalance the loss of his mother and his home 
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in itself, since he "laughs" or "smiles" "heartily" when 
being asked about his bombed home. These facts indicate 
that the "kitchen wall-clock" of the title possesses a de-
cisive significance in the young man's value-world. As we 
have already dealt with the symbolic meaning of the clock 
on several occasions, now we only complete and systematize 
what was told before. 
The once so "natural", obvious daily meetings at night, 
the preparation of supper, the attentatlve love outgrow 
their routine and insignificance when they suddenly ceased, 
passed irrevocably. The reason and also the precondition of 
the young man's altered standpoint, of the revaluation of 
the earlier meetings is the destruction of war, his mother's 
death: "Now, now I know already that it was Paradise...". 
So destruction becomes bivalent for him: he loses his moth-
er and home but through the loss he recognizes the value 
and importance of them which he had never seen until then. 
This moment is a tragic discord as well: the young man rec-
ognizes the value when he loses it in the real world for 
ever. The fact that the precondition of value-recognition 
is the war, death has a very essential role. As a contrast 
to the background bringing destruction and wrenching man 
out of his place of protection the everyday motherly care, 
the security of home become a "real", earthly "Paradise". 
The kitchen wall-clock, the only 'witness' of the 
meetings between mother and son gains its real significance 
in this context. The ruined mechanism is of symbolic value: 
it shows not the passing of time but its preservation, the 
"half past two" point of time releases the Transience/, the 
time itself. Its outward intactness, the recognisability of 
'half past two" are a condition for the identiflability of 
the former state, for the preservation of /past/ in the 
/present/. To sum up the positive aspect of the clock we 
say: the stopped mechanism, the show time make the recogni-
tion of the values of the past possible; the outward in-
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tactness ensures the preservation of the recognized value 
from the past into the present, from decay into survival. 
By possessing it the young man, even in the actual /expul-
sion/ of his present can feel himself in the 'paradisical' 
state of /protection/ and /love/. The purpose of his at-
tempt at contact-establishment is to make this value-state 
giving /protection/ recognized, and to deliver it. 
The identification of the young man and the clock, 
however, has a distinctly negative value-aspect since the 
stopping of the clock actually means the cessation of his 
'metabolism', his death. The young man's 'survival' is just 
formal; he establishes a real contact with the past, with 
the world of the dead; the present, the majority of survi-
vors turn away from him. It is not inessential that when 
the only man on the bench finds contact with him, it is not 
the young man who joins the present, the real world of the 
'survivors' but rather the man who accepts the imaginary 
world and position turning to the past. So what was posi-
tive value-change on the abstract level of the model-struc-
ture (.+R ( F ^ F ^ l ) must be judged much more carefully from 
the pragmatic viewpoint of the movement-direction. This is 
also true for the increased preservation of the negative 
contact 1: there is no sharp contrast between 
the young man and the people on the bench. There opposition 
is only a difference in degree between the two groups of 
'survivors': standing closer to the present world of life 
or the past world of death. Returning to the pragmatic con-
text of the text-world we can say: the people on the bench 
exemplify a possible defensive attitude-model of the 'sur-
vivors mining at home ', the young man exemplifies that 
of the 'homecoming survivors' against the 'split', self-
destructive world. The former who experienced bombings, 
the destruction of their homes, the death of their rela-
tives directly accept the more (material) but also more real-
istic standpoint of value-loss as resumption of the present 
- 221 -
world. The 'home-coming' young man who did not experience 
the destruction of war, his mother's death directly and 
faces the terrors just now cannot comprehend and accept 
the facts as irreversible reality. He can exist .in the 
present, he can 'survive' his tragic losses only if he 
somehow succeeds in exploring and preserving the values of 
the lost past. So as a starting-point of his present world 
- opposed to those 'remaining at home' - he chooses the 
more (.spiritual! and, in this way, more cut off from real-
ity, standpoint of value-preservation. Only this behaviour 
makes it possible for him that his 'outward intactness' 
will sometimes be joined by 'inward mental survival'. Both 
those 'remaining at home' who vegetate and the 'home-coming' 
who actively turn to the past are 'dead-alive', their dif-
ference is-only a shifting of stress: in the case of the 
former already the 'living', in the case of the latter 
still the 'dead' characteristic dominates. This difference 
clarifies best the specific nature of the opposition of the 
people on the bench and the young man: those who approach 
the present, life necessarily refuse the way to the past, 
death. Their 'mute turning away' is .the expression of 'pity' 
as well since they know that the young man's 'discord' 
- which is the only tolerable way of 'mental survival' for 
him - leads just to this fateful direction they refuse. 
5. CLOSING JjEMA$KS~ 
Instead of a summary we shall mention some of those 
important problems which we were unable to deal with in de-
tail. 
(aI The model-structure is an idealized theoretical construc-
tion to which several text-worlds can be rendered in 
principle. As a consequence of this, the model-structure 
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<»ay be either less or more that its current text-world-
interpretant: not all of its components have an exact 
equivalent in a concrete text-world, and it is not nec-
essary either that every state of affairs in the text-
world should be linked clearly to a certain element or 
relation of the model-structure. 
CM Concerning its linear order and quantitative rates, the 
composition of the text-worlds does not depend or very 
indirectly depends on that of the model-structure. The 
question is directly related to the problem of 'grada-
tion' and 'graduality'. 
(.aI We did not explicate the concept of 'repetition' and 
did not define its place in the model-structure though 
its significance was clearly shown by the examples of 
the text-analysis. It is important to realize that the 
'repetitions' of seemingly equal value in the homoge-
nious medium of the text or the text-world /can/ belong 
to quite different, more, or less overall levels of the 
model-structure. 
(d\ There was only a brief reference to the question of the 
model-structure and .its verbal realization. One type of 
the Borchert-stories, including the one analysed in the 
study, is characterized by the fact that there is a 
sharp opposition between the very, simple, everyday lan-
guage and the system of values borne by it with the in-
terposition of the text-world/ possible world. The 
words/actions/events playing insignificant roles in the 
usual soc±o-cultural codes cause or influence basic 
value-changes in these worlds. 
Examples from the analysed story 
{a). The unambiguous text-world realization of the initial 
state -pT_ would mean that the 'people on the bench" 
and the 'young man' appear independently, separately in 
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the text-world. But the text-world Introduces the 
•young man' from the perspective of the 'people on the 
bench' C'They saw him approaching them.."). That is, 
the idealized (-contact)-state expressed in T_ is 
realized as the first 'unsuccessful attempt at contact 
-establishment". 
(.¿) The component -p in the final state _T-p.p, since 
it is the result of a preserving-transformation, can be 
separated from the initial state -pT_ only at the 
creation of the component p of the final state. The 
problem is that the state -p of equal value, that can 
and must be clearly differentiated in principle, fuses 
in the states of affairs of the text-world. 
The text-world size of the component p of the 
final state _T-p.p is only three states of affairs, 
that is insignificant in relation to the entire size of 
the text-world. At the same time, concerning its struc-
turalizing role it is equal with the component -p of 
the states -pT_ and VT-p.p in the model-structure, 
and so in the text-world Interpretation, 
(a) The repeated state of affairs of 'looking at shoes' 
has the most comprehensive role: it is decisive in 
structuring the action-logical level, in establishing 
the component p of the final state _T-p.p. The em-
bedded story F c as a 'repetition* or something to be 
repeated (depending on whether we take the time of its 
happening or its telling as starting point) ought to 
be denoted on the syntactic level. The 'young man's" 
ever returning thoughts, words have another theoretical 
status, with which he partly tries to prove and fortify 
his opinion even tc> himself, and partly, with the varied 
and completed forms of structure he ensures and incre 
creases the 'retardation' and 'graduality', i.e. the 
tension-creating force of the exposition. 
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(d) We gave some demonstrative examples under 3.4.1 in 
connection with this, further details cannot be dealt 
with here. 
Finally we should like to add the titles of some 
Borchert-stories which, in our view, may be explicated with 
certain modifications by the help of the model-structure 
elaborated in the present paper: Stimmen sind da - in der 
Luft - in der Nacht11, Blieb doch, Giraffe, Vier Soldaten, 
Der viele viele Schnee, Die Katzer war im Schnee erfroren, 
Das Brot etc. 
Notes 
1 Cf. Posner 1973 
2 
Posner's study appeared in 1973 and so his objections 
refer to the generative linguistic trends of the late 
•60s, up to the early '7os. The validity of his critique 
is shown by the very fact that mainly linguistics of 
pragmatic orientation, researches centering on speech-
act and communication, text-theory have developed enor-
mously since 1973. 
3 The interpretational theory represented here was first 
exposed by Bernath 1978a and 1978b. Its version connected 
to the 'possible worlds', see in Bernath/Csuri 1980 and 
in this volume. The present paper tries to embed the in-
terpretation-theoretical principles into a general lit-
erary semiotic framework. 
4 A more detailed discussion is provided in Bernath/Csuri 
1980 and the paper involved in this volume. 
There can be a counter-argument to our view: we can and 
often do possess pieces of information which make the ex-
\ 
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act explication of the reference of fictitious persons 
possible in the real world. It is evident e.g. in the 
case of characters who bear the names of actually ex-
isting historical persons. Since the question has an es-
sential philosophical-logical aspect and, consequently, 
a wide logical literature, we stress that our simplified 
answer will be literature-centered. We will show later 
in the paper that the characters of literary works are 
the individuals of that possible world that can be es-
tablished by the appropriate explication of the text-
world. The characters bearing the names of historical 
persons are the members of the same possible world, with 
the difference that their secondary reference relating 
to the real world can give a several implicit pieces of 
information that the text-world does not contain. How-
ever, the hierarchy is essential: the quantity and ap-
plication of the information of the real world is judged 
by the composition of the possible world in question, 
and not the other way round. We can explicate references 
of this kind as emblematic or text-external repetitions 
tcf. Bernat/Csuri 1978). 
5 The model-structure is represented here by 'sequence of 
events' since we examine literary narratives. Bernath 
1978a used the term plot-model in a very similar sense. 
In our view, however, the label model-structure is more 
adequate than the concept of plot-model from two points 
of view. On the one hand, it corresponds more exactly to 
the terminology of model-theoretical semantics; on the 
other hand, if used in the explication of literary nar-
rative texts, it is not restricted to marking the plot-
structure which is built up from events. More precisely: 
it expresses better the analysing practice which does not 
obtain information necessary to the entire explication of 
the work only from the events in the case of narratives, 
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but also from every connection and element of the text-
world that ensures the 'well-formedness* of the 'se-
quence of events'. 
6 Cf. Bernath/Csuri 1980 and its English version in this 
volume. We stress that the concept of literary possible 
world used here is not equal with the possible world con-
ception in modal and philosophical logics, even though it 
is derived from it and can be defined exactly. The trans-
mission of the term is not a more metaphor in this sense 
and its introduction to the conceptual apparatus of lit-
erary theory is reasonable because we can take the par-
ticularities of literature into account when applying it 
in the given modified form. On the question of the logical 
possible world cf, e.g. Hintikka 1975, Moravcsik 1975, 
Rescher 1975, Link 1976, Schnelle 1973 etc. 
^ Cf. Bernath/Csuri 1980 and the paper in this volume. 
Q 
In the action-logical notation we basically rely on the 
system of Sladek 1977, 
9 Cf, Sladek 1977: p. 8. 
I o 
We consider 'jootif-connections' those text-internal se-
mantic equivalence-relations which, have a relevant func^ 
tion in the model-structure explicating the text-world 
as a literary possible world, Cf, Bernath/Csuri 1978, 
I I Cf. my Borcherts-paper in BernSth/Csuri/Kanyo 1975, It is 
a first attempt in the same theoretical line without the 
explicit introduction of the model-structure used here. 
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NARRATOLOGY = THE THEORY OF THE EPIC? 
Árpád Bernáth 
A. .József: University, Szeged 
In literary theoretical studies on the whole the theory 
of the novel and the epic is gradually being replaced by 
narratology. It seems expedient to more and more researchers 
to start from the postulation that the sine qua non of the 
epic is the narrator: he is the mythical creator of epic 
works, and so the task of the theory of the epic is to ex-
plore the characteristic features of narration as a way of 
presentation. 
Certainly, the analysis of the features of the epic 
must inevitably include the discussion of the problems of 
narration as well: it is one possible ingredient of the text 
of an epic work. It is nevertheless evident that the inves-
tigations - even if we start from the narration - cannot be 
restricted only to the narration or only to the text. They 
must also include the answer to the question of what the 
text of an epic work represents, that is, they must deal 
with the characteristics of the text-world. For scholars of 
the epic, for researchers into narratology the basic "im-
manent" question is precisely what the relationship is be-
tween the two levels of literary works: the text and the 
text-world. 
From the viewpoint of the theory of genres the rela-
tionship between the two levels can be defined by telling 
which level of the epic work bears genre-constituent markers. 
According to the great majority of scholars dealing 
with the characteristics of epic works, as we have already 
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said, the class of works, analysed by them, have the narra-
tion as the determinative feature, narration being the most 
important component of the epic text; moreover, for some the 
whole epic text is a monologue, that is, purely narration 
where the linguistic manifestations of the figures are just 
quotations. 
We, however, share the opnion of those who find the abo-
lition of the genre-constitutive role of narration a more 
fertile solution. In this conception the works, the analysis 
and the theory with which narratology deals, are not neces-
sarily results of narration but simply of speech, writing, 
printing. The "novelty", the 'novel', as this genre is call-
ed, appears aa writing on the wall like 'mene, tekal, ufar-
sin' on the wall of the palace of the Babylonian Belshazzar; 
thus we could call it the writing of a spiritual hand, of 
the spirit of the novel. 
We seem to know the extent to which this standpoint can 
be attacked, which can be from at least two directions. 
Those who are willing to go along with our argument express-
ed in a rather mystical image can rightly ask: does not our 
opinion lead to the undesirable consequence that the possi-
bility of classifying literature according to genres caeses 
to exist. Whether every form of manifestation of lyric, 
dramatic and epic poetry does not turn into 'novelty', 'nov-
el'? Those who will not even take the first step with us ob-
viously say: why should those things always be doubted that 
have seemed to be the most certain among the various sug-
gestions? Since there is no other statement which arises 
more naturally than that the works constituting the class of 
epic literature be the expressions of some closed process by 
way of narration; that is, that narration is genre-constitu-
tive feature. 
Before 'showing what other possibilities the rejection 
of the genre-constituent function of narration opens for the 
classification of literary works from an essential aspect, 
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we must look to why the majority of scholars regard narra-
tion as an obvious genre-determinative feature. 
In our view this opinion results from the following 
train of thought. Employing language for the creation of 
literary works is inevitably secondary i.e. posterior, as 
the false use of a statement is posterior and, in this sense, 
secondary, opposed to its true use. Since we can only speak 
of a lie if we know under what circumstances the statement 
whould be true. Thus literary communication, that is, com-
munication by literary works is in a general sense, and 
each class of work in the communication can be derived from 
non-literary communication. Thus epic poetry can be derived 
from a certain communicative situation, the so-called nar-
rative situation, where the narration is the most important 
element. 
The constituents of the narrative situation - as it is 
found in many theoretical works - are the following: the 
narrating person, the process forming the object of the nar-
ration, already enclosed in the moment of narration, the 
process of narration and the public listening to the narra-
tion. This communicative process becomes secondary, i.e. 
literary, when at least one of the four elements is modified. 
According to scholars, who regard narration as a genre-con-
stituent element, it is the series of events forming the ob-
ject of narration or the narration itself. The process nar-
rated in an epic work differs from the object of ordinary 
narration in that a part of it (or the whole) may be vir-
tual, without the narration itself becoming a lie. As a con-
sequence of this (or distinct from this) the^general rules 
referring to narration may also change. (With respect to the 
fact that opinions about the nature of this change are very 
diverse even in the case of scholars starting from the nar-
rative situation, we must make do with this general remark 
in this connection.) 
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The deduction of the characteristic features of the 
epic from the ordinary narrative situation - in spite of 
appearences - is, in assence, the result of a historical 
approach: in spite of appearances the primacy of ordinary 
narrative situation is only temporal and not logical. Though 
we must know the historical connections these are, however, 
not enough to introduce the concept of narrative situation 
into theories the validity circle of which is not confined 
to the age of the emergence of the genre in question. In-
stead of a lengthy exposition on the theory of science, we 
would like to show the difference between the historical 
and the theoretical definition of a concept with the help 
of an analogous example; so much the more because the exam-
ple to be quoted helps us in the establishment of our own 
standpoint. 
In his Poetiaa Arsitotle compares mimesis as a charac-
teristic activity of poetry to ordinary mimesis, to imita-
tion (of a child). This does not mean, however, that the 
artistic activity could be deduced from ordinary mimesis in 
Aristotelian poetics. Mimesis as a literary theoretical con-
cept can no longer be identified with mimesis which is one 
of the natural reasons underlying the development of art. 
The difference between the two concepts of mimesis can be 
demonstrated, in the first approach, by saying that while 
mimesis in the earlier and ordinary usage supposes the 
existence of the imitated, in literary theory we also 
speak about Aristotelian imitation in the sense that the 
imitated only virtually exists. 
The example, as we can see and as we promised, is not 
distant since (there is a similar difference) between the 
mimesis of art and ordinary mimesis there is a similar dif-
ference as between the object of literary narration and that 
of primary narration. Not the similarity but the possible 
virtuality of the imitated and the narrated process is essen-
tial from the viewpoint of literary theory. While the liter-
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ary quality of the narrative situation comes from the fact 
that its narrator can also narrate virtual series of events, 
this circumstance in mimesis-theory is significant from an-
other point of view. According to Aristotle a work of ar-
tistic value is attained if the imitated satisfies certain 
conditions, and it is another matter that the required con-
ditions can be achieved more easily by imitating real or 
virtual events. 
With this comparison of mimesis and the narrative situ-
ation we hope that we have argued convincingly that the 
historical approach cannot always substitute for the theo-
retical, and that the narration is not necessarily and 
self-evidently a genre-constituent feature. But we have not 
yet pointed to the undesirable consequances that can follow 
from the likely theoretical definitions of the narrative 
situation and the narration. We would like to cover these 
questions also, though within the present scope we can 
touch upon the problem from one point of view only, and 
referentially. But before this we must also reply to the 
objections which maintain that precisely the rejection of 
the favoured role of narration is followed by undesirable 
consequences: among other things the classification of lit-
erary works from the essential point of view becomes im-
possible. 
Maybe many would not bother about this objection. 
There are theories which consider the classification of 
literary works a totally insignificant activity. For these, 
the value of a literary work lies only in its individuality. 
Such theories, however, over-emphasize the individuality of 
single works. It could be shown that a merely individual 
work of art would not be able to perform any function con-
nected with cognition. 
Anyway if we think about the rationality of the clas-
sification of literary works, we must take into account the 
fact that it can be carried out basically from the follow-
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ing points of view; rhetorical and hermeneutical. The im-
portance of setting norms of genres is different for the 
writer - that is, from the theorical point of view - and 
for the recipient - that is, from the hermeneutical point 
of view. The characteristics of genres determine strategies 
of creation and reception. Or conversely: the fact that the 
strategies of creation and reception serving the creation 
and the cognition of works, respectively have common char-
acteristics can prove that there are genres and groups of 
genres. 
In this conception the purpose of theories of genre, 
and so the criticism of their judgment is eventually to what 
extent they serye creation and reception. 
(.Intermediate summary: thus the two theories of genres 
- i.e. operation with rhetorical and hermeneutical view-
points - must be well separated. But this does not mean 
that they cannot have an identical component: the form-as-
pects of genres, that is, the features' of genres formally 
manageable are indifferent with, regard to the rhetorical 
and hermeneutical viewpoints.) 
When now presenting a classic example for the classi-
fication of the arts and, within it, that of literary 
works, we want to show, on the one hand, that relevant 
classification is also possible without the introduction 
ot the narrative situation, while, on the other hand, this 
kind of classification is sensitive to the differentiation 
between rhetorical and hermeneutical viewpoints. 
We turn again to Aristotle who, after separating 'the 
art of words* from other branches of art, classified liter-
ary works on the basis of the subject of imitation. He sys-
tematized those works explicitly' which depict acting per-
sons. Aristotle thought that the acting persons should be 
judged from an ethical point of view, namely, in their re-
lation to men outside the text-world. In this way he saw 
the possibility of three judgements: characters may be bet-
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ter, worse or similar to those existing independently of 
the text-world. And also on this basis works depicting act-
ing persons can be divided into three classes. 
If we take into account the social function of works 
depicting acting persons, - that they display the func-
tioning of value-systems determining the action in a pos-
sible world, and so can orientate the recipients' action 
- it is easy to see that this classification is relevant 
from the viewpoints of bqth creation and reception. It is 
evident at the same time that the basis of comparison per-
mitting the classification: i.e. persons that can be known 
independently of the text-world and the ethics of measure-
ments , may be different for the creator and the recipient; 
and if we could exclude this discrepancy only then should 
we say that Aristotelian genres are forms of works of art. 
Some may say we have been rash to use the expression 
"Aristotelian genres". Defenders of the narrative situation 
certainly will not hesitate to remark: it is true that 
Aristotle placed epic and tragedy in one class, for both 
imitate very worthy people. But did he not differentiate 
them as epos and tragedy on no other basis than that of • 
presentation? 
The question is more complicated than it appears. When 
Aristotle, independent of the classification mentioned be-
fore, classifies literary works according to the law of 
description, he relies on an already existing arrangement, 
that of Gorgius and Plato. Nevertheless, in this way three 
classes should be distinguished, too. 
Works where the poet speaks himself and makes others 
speak belong to the first class. Those where only the poet 
speaks and does not make others speak belong to the second 
class. Those where the poet does not speak and makes only 
others speak belong to the third one. 
So this classification also differs from the one which 
at present recognizes lyric, epic and drama. From our par-
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ticular point of view the following is essential: even if 
we conceived that in the former arrangement the third class 
is 'pure drama', while the first two are epic, and within 
this, the first class is nothing but 'pure epic', we must 
realize that Aristole does not prefer the first class which 
seems to realize the 'classic narrative situation', but he 
considers the mixture of 'pure epic' and 'pure drama' as 
the ideal epic, namely - if we can put it this way - few 
parts of 'pure epic' to many parts of 'pure drama*. Homer 
is a paragon for him because he seems to know that the poet 
is allowed to speak little for he is not an imitator in 
that sense! We admit that the characteristics of Greek cul-
ture, the almost total interpénétration of drama and stage, 
etc. may have contributed to the fact that Aristotelian 
poetics, to a certain extent, could become a source for the 
classification of literature as lyric epic and dramatic 
poetry where narration has become the major problem of epic. 
That this has not happened in the spirit of Aristotle may 
have appeared indirectly through the two - we stress, in-
dependently of each other - classifications already pre-
sented. 
To sum up the lessons of examples from the Poetical 
we must return to the Aristotelian programme which does not 
recognize the dominant role of narration. A theory of genres 
must be worked out which - at least from the hermeneutical 
point of view - attributed secondary importance to the dif-
ferentiation between drama and epic, possible on the basis 
of the method of representation. The theory of the epic 
thus conceived must be less concerned with the technical 
questions of narration and more with what Aristotle deals 
with in the core of this Poetics: myth /series of events 
and actions/ which appears in works imitating a /praxis ab-
stract, well-formed structure of the plot/ to be defined. 
Thus the theory of event or action becomes the central ques-
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tion of the theory of the epic, namely the theory of a good 
or bad-action leading is catharsis. For this reason the 
theory of the epic cannot be equated with narratology, in 
our opinion, which is just a non-central part of the for-
mer; the theory of the epic is, in the first place, a the-
ory of science dealing with the explanation of series of 
events represented by devices of linguistic systems. 
The realization of the Aristotelian programme, drafted 
before, has already begun. It is enough to refer to the ac-
tivity of V. J. Propp, M.M Bahtin, C. Bremond and T. Todo-
rov. 
We cannot conclude our discussion at this point. There 
is still a question to be raised: is it not possible to 
connect the programme here called 'Aristotelian' with the 
theory of narration starting from the narrative situation? 
We ourselves have stated that the studies concerning the 
characteristic features of epic, even if they start from 
narration, cannot be restricted only to the narration or 
only to the text: they must cover the text-world, too. More-
over, it is also evident that the Aristotelian distinction 
between the methods of presentation, that can be traced back 
to Gorgius, may be considered exploded now. The secondar-
iness of the literary narrative situation - according to 
relevant theoretical works - may start not only from the 
virtuality of the series of events to be narrated: other 
elements in the narrative situation may become virtual as 
well. So beside the actual narrator, the writer, a fictious 
narrator, and beside the actual recipient, the existing 
reader, the work-immanent "gentle reader', should be con-
sidered. Consequently the fictitious narrator, the ficti-
tious process and the fictitious "gentle reader' become the 
elements which determine the literary narrative situation. 
Now it is easy to see that narration as a form of communica-
tion is also fictitious, i.e. created. The fictitious nar-
ration is thus one possible, but not an exclusive, form of 
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information-relationship between the writer and the exist-
ing reader, and it would be impractical to restrict the 
epic to classes of those works where both the fictitious 
narrator and the 'gentle reader' appear. It may be true 
that scholars working with the narrative situation do not 
consider this restriction, but it is precisely this which 
leads them to find the narrator where no traces of him are 
found. 
In any case, the reduction of the theory of the epic 
to narratology has more far-reaching consequences than we 
would imagine. In the following - which is also at the 
same time a conclusion - we cover only one of the most im-
portant problems. 
If we turn from the analysis of narration to that of 
the narrated, i.e. the series of events in the text-world, 
there is the important question of what to analyse, what 
to explain. Which are the facts making up the text-world? 
And is the text-world homogenous, or does it have levels? 
If so, what is the relation between the levels? These ques-
tions can be answered if we give the truth-criteria refer-
ring to the statements of literary works that present se-
ries of events. 
The question of truth-criteria, since it was not raised 
in this context, was rejected earlier, while it has a-
chieved enormous popularity recently. To answer it, however, 
is impossible, or at least very difficult, if we start from 
the fiction of the literary narrative situation. This hy-
pothesis forces solutions which are not proved by the prac-
tice of literary science. We would like to affirm our asser-
tion with the help of an example' again, this time from a 
more recent work. We are thinking of L. Dolezel's Truth and 
Authenticity in Narrative. His study is significant also 
because Dolezel intended to summarise the research made in 
this field. He considers here a so-called binary model as 
the simplest model of the narrative /epic?/ text. The tex-
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ture performing the binary model results from the operation 
of two kinds of speeach act, the speech acts of the anony-
mous Er-form narrator and the personalized narrative agents 
/characters/. So the binary model is a refined version of a 
classic type of presentation - the poet speaks himself and 
makes others speak - and it is based on the concepts of the 
theory of the speach-act. The improvement, - in our opinion 
- however, has no advantages concerning the determination 
of truth-criterium. Since, when Dolezel wants to make use 
of the statement of the theory of speech-acts that certain 
linguistic actions, performative speech-acts, can only be 
performed by authentic persons, empowered to produce the 
given linguistic notion, then he is forced to accept the 
standpoint in the spirit of the theory of narrative situa-
tion that only those motifs /thematic units/ are authentic 
which are represented by way of speech-acts performed by 
the anonymous Er-form narrator, and thus the 'motifs' nar-
rated by the characters are not. Only the anonymous nar-
rator is empowered to tell the truth, the characters can 
only imitate truth-telling. 
If we confront this opinion with the analysing prac-
tice, its problematic nature is apparent at once. There ore 
only few works that can be assigned to the binary model, 
where the series of events in the text-world can only be re-
constructed on the basis of the manifestations of the anony-
mous Er-form narrator. 
Of course, Dolezel is also aware of some inconsisten-
cies in his starting-point. In spite of this he does not 
deny his starting hypothesis, only limits its validity and 
this leads to a very complicated, but what we consider in 
the end not satisfactory, system of suppositions. 
We think that the abandonment of the binary model de-
duced from the narrative situation is a simpler solution 
and it corresponds better to the analysing, text-world ex-
plaining practice, too. In our opinion the anonymous Er-form 
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narrator must be cancelled and replaced by the text not 
attached to a character. Besides the text not attached to 
a character, the utterances of persons represented in the 
text-world may be also a text-constitutive part. The texts 
not attached to a character are the utterances not of a 
fictitious, hidden subject favoured by anonymity but the 
linguistic images of sets of affairs belonging to a certain 
world. The statements of the characters speak either about 
these very sets of affairs or about other sets of affairs 
in that world. But they can speak - if the text-world has 
levels - about sets of affairs belonging to another world 
/another level of world/, and in this case, but only in this 
one, the relationship between the worlds actually the lev-
els of worlds is questionable. 
This is a significant modification in contrast to the 
theory based on the narrative situation, since in this way 
the statements of a character can also be authentic and, in 
this sense, true and the statements not defined by a charac-
ter can also be false, at least at one level of the text-
-world. The truth-criteria can be given not by the status of 
the statement deduced from the narrative situation but only 
by a theory establishing the coherence of the text-world 
elaborated by the recipient. 
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UNDERSTANDING AS CREATING NARRATIVE STRUCTURES 
(THE CONCEPT OF "WORLD" IN A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION) 
Antal Bókay 
Janus Pannonius University, Pécs 
Introduction 
It is natural that the researcher of the narrative 
tries to define first what it is he is interested in. But 
the concept of narrative in the semiotic and literary sci-
ences is hopelessly vague and confused. The theories spring-
ing from different aspects have arrived at different basic 
concepts on such a wide scale that integration between them 
is impossible. The traditional aspect of "Literaturwissen-
schaft" treats the concept as a particular aspect of the 
theory of genre, and leaves it on a rather abstract, non-
operative level. This means that instead of a theory, a 
critical survey of the epic, or more generally the novel is 
produced (Lubbock, 1921; Forster, 1927; Scholes-Kellog, 
1966). Leaving aside this trend in research, there are 
probably two aspects of investigation left. The first takes 
the narrative as a special communication about reality, as 
a fiction that represents possible actions in human life. 
The linguistical form for this approach bears no central 
importance. In this group there can be found as different 
works as the structuralist study of Propp (.1928) and the 
aesthetic approach of G. Lukács (.1947) . 
According to the other tendency the narrative is a 
linguistic form, a very complex organization of the action 
discourse and its basic definitions can be given by logic 
and linguistics (for fictional vs, linguistic definitions 
see; Gray, 19 75). 
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It seems to me that in consequence of the development 
of textlinguistics and other disciplines (semantics, logic, 
psycholinguistics etc.), in the study of semiotic objects it 
is possible to unite the two approaches of the fictional and 
linguistical definitions. It my paper - with a starting-point 
of the study of literature - I shall try to show some pos-
sible features of this model of narrative or, more generally 
speaking, of literary text theory. From the short history of 
the science of literature (if such exists at all), it is 
clear that metatheoretical orientations must be given more 
importance than anywhere else in the social sciences. These 
apriori assumptions are definitive and by leaving them un-
conscious the framework of investigation is limited (see: 
Scmidt, 1973; Dijk, 1979). This is the reason why I shall 
first try to give the metatheoretical assumptions of my 
study, and deduce the model of investigation only after 
that. 
Aspects- of investigation 
It was stated first in semiotics, in the most general 
science of signs and sign systems that its object of inquiry 
can be investigated from three different aspects (Morris, 
1938, 77-137.). The well-known aspects were summarised by 
Montague according to the following definition: "syntax is 
concerned solely with relations between linguistic expres-
sions; semantics with relations between expressions and the 
objects to which they refer; and pragmatics with relations-
among expressions, the object to which they refer and the 
users or contexts of use of the expressions (Montague, 1968, 
102. and Petofi, 1977, 122.1 Because of some categories 
gaining in importance later in this paper I would add one 
more original definition to the concept of pragmatics: "By 
pragmatics is designated the science of the relations of 
signs to their interpreters" (Morris, 1938, 108), The defi-
nition of Montague is a acceptable only as a starting point, 
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bearing in mind the problems Petofi has shown (1977, 119-
-149.),. Montague's definition and Petofi's treatment deals 
with the "syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects as al-
ways interwoven with each other" (Petofi, 1977. 127.). In 
the original definitions however it is also easy to find a 
hierarchy of the three. According to Carnap in the same 
volume "pragmatical observations are the basis of all lin-
guistic research" (Carnap, 1938, 147.). The hierarchy or-
dered according to a scheme where the first and basic ele-
ment is the pragmatic, semantics comes next, and the last 
one syntax. Together they comprise the totality of the study 
of semiosis. 
The sequence of the three aspects has shown the reverse 
order in the course of development in linguistics. The three 
categories - after the early abstract conception - represent 
the development of the science of linguistics, those para-
digms (Kuhn, 1962) that were used by researchers to treat 
a part of human reality. The aspects of investigation of 
semiotic objects represent important metatheoretical phases 
according to the process by which they have become the def-
initive aspects of an empirical science. The three phases 
seem to me to show a line of development in the social sci-
ences as well. W. Iser has provided a framework for this 
with the discussion of three categories of structure, func-
tion and communication (Iser, 1979). The investigator of the 
structure starts from a given whole, tries to analyse the 
elements of this totality and that system of rules that or-
ganizes them (the binary oppositions for example). In the 
case of a functionalist approach the structure loses its 
priority and is defined by its role in the context. The pri-
mary extratextual relation of the semiotic object is the 
meaning, the relation of the structure to the referred. The 
"function concept designates the relationship between text 
and extratextual realities and the meaning of the structures 
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within the text is revealed through their intended applica-
tion" (Iser, 1979, 12.). We can find some parallel in the 
development of paradigms in the linguistics and the trend 
shown by Iser. The definition of semantics by Morris is 
clearly parallel with the function concept in that both take 
as central the intensional reference of the structure to 
something other. Linguistical semantics - as opposed to the 
syntactical-structuralist period - put the formal theory of 
meaning in the centre. The limitation of the semantical as-
pect lies in the fact that it fixes, and objectivates the 
text function into the sign object. It explains only the 
production of the meaning which is understood as a static 
property of the sign object. The semantical aspects explains 
the moment of the genesis of meaning but cannot give an ex-
planation about the continuous validity of it (the two terms 
are from Iser, 1979.),. The category of validity is clearly 
a pragmatical concept, it shows the point of view of realiza-
tion, the use of the text. So as a summary, the syntactical 
aspect concentrates on the taxonomical, inner system, its 
paradigm was the first step of the systematic understanding 
of the semiotic process in linguistics. The semantical as-
pect deals with the expression-referent, the text/world rela-
tion. At last the pragmatic aspect integrates the other two 
into the text/reader relation. I would only note now the 
hierarchical system of the three paradigms is very close to 
the theory of Jiirgen Habermas. According to him the human 
understanding of the world is directed by three research mo-
tivating interests. These are basic epistemological orienta-
tions as well. The three interests are the technical, that 
tries to understand the inner mechanism of the object of 
knowledge, the hermeneutical investigates the meaning, the 
genesis and the emancipatovical that is the role of under-
standing in human progress, the validity of knowledge for 
us (Habermas, 1968. Radnitzky, 1968; Wellmer, 1976). 
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Metatheoretieal Problems of Pragmatical Theory of Narrative 
If our aim is to understand narrative texts it is 
clear that we should choose the pragmatic approach, because 
this is the only one that can integrate the other two. The con-
cept of pragmatics however, in its practical use, has not 
been converted into a unified aspect such as can be shown 
by the metatheoretieal conception. In most cases- for the 
sake of formal treatment - The pragmatic aspect is reduced, 
the instrument of the scientific explanation Cthe formal 
appartus) reduces the scope and content of the explanation 
(see Ferrara, 1977. on Montague and Barr-Hillel) . The most 
general and widely accepted definition of this kind is 
stated by Stalnaker: "pragmatics is the study of linguistic 
acts and the contexts in which they are performed" (19 72, 
383.1. But the theory of the context and of speech acts 
makes up only a part of pragmatics. It interprets the pro-
ductive forces of language use but it can give only ab-
stract maxims for the understanding process, it is limited 
to the definition of the text/world level. 
The autonomous text however in an ontological sense, 
has two extratextual constituents: its producer and its 
receiver. An essential characteristic feature of the two 
constituents is their definite inequality: the production 
is always momentary, objectivated, genetical, the subjective 
element is ..limited. These features enable the student to use 
formal means of description. The other constituent, the 
receiving and understanding, is always a process, organised 
around the validity and the subjective element plays an im-
portant role in this part of the ontological position. In 
this case where the repeated act of understanding is the 
central element there is only one possible basic category 
of pragmatics that is interpretation. 
The proposed metatheoretieal construction of the theory 
of narrative can be built up from the following ordered 
problems: 
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- -pragmatical level - its basic problem is the inter-
pretation of the narrative, the theory of validity 
based on the relation between text/reader 
- deduced from the previous level, the next thing is 
the semantical, describing the general problems of 
text/world relation, the fictionality and the ref-
erence 
- the next step in the deduction is the syntactical 
level, that produces the theory of the relations of 
the constitutive elements of the narrative. 
The hierarchical construction of the levels together with 
their interwovennes are the basic feature of the system. 
The relative ineffectuality in linguistic methods in the 
theory of literature - compared to their empirical, scien-
tific value - seems to me to result from the fact that a 
linguistic theory of pragmatics in this widest interpre-
tative sense is still missing. The semantic and syntactic 
methods is themselves seem to be "imported methodologies" 
(Petofi, 1980.1 for the related fields in the semiotic 
studies. 
It is clear that with the question of interpretation 
in the centre the minimal llnguistical utterance investi-
gated is the text. In the case of the syntactical or se-
mantical aspects it is possible to investigate separated 
sequences. The relation between the reader and text however 
can be realized only in the case of whole, complete utter-
ances. In defining the theory of interpretation we must 
start from this maximally complex semiotic object. 
A Model for Investigating Narrative - the Concept of World 
Based on the metatheoretical considerations we can 
state the model of investigation of the narrative. This 
seemingly very simple model fixes the mode of being, the 
basic ontological system of complex textis. All those texts 
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are produced and understood by somebody. They are inten-
tional, that is they refer to something that is called here, 
for the sake of simplicity, reality. 
AUTHOR TEXT READER 
REALITY 
The elements are in a reflexive relationship with each 
other, that is they mutually define each other. The inves-
tigation of the semiotic object often leaves aside one or 
other of the elements in this system. This can be accepted 
only as a provisonal abstraction of the scientific research. 
The three aspects reviewed in the previous parts appear in 
this model with some simplification in the following from: 
The syntactical aspect gives the analysis of the delimited 
TEXT; the semantical interpretes the AUTHOR TEXT REALITY 
system; and the pragmatical starts from the READER TEXT— 
—REALITY relations. The last one necessarily takes the 
other two as its elements. The whole system can be defined 
- with the help of philosophical terras - as the ontological 
starting point for the epistemology of semiotic objects. 
According to our pragmatical point of view we should 
build up our theory of narrative on the problem of interpre-
tation. It is a consequence of the model that we assume that 
the reader projects a special reality based on the text. The 
text is an intentional structure produced by the author. The 
question is whether there is any general structure of under-
standing that is common to the reader and the text and de-
ines their encounter. Several disciplines of the social sci-
ences have recently defined this phenomenon. Behind the 
terms like "frame", "science", "world", "schemata", there is 
a common principle that our mental apparatus uses a tech-
nique of perception that evaluates the data from the outside 
world not as simple facts but according to a prior, inter-
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pretative mental structure. It is also clear that the text 
or a special group of texts, where we can find the narra-
tives as well, take the same principle as the inner organi-
zation of their structure. 
The earliest conception of this thought was given by 
Gregory Bateson (1955). Bateson, realizing the independent 
feature of some forms of communication, tried to describe 
the logic of the metacommunicative process that was in 
charge with the independency from the actual world. He 
showed that the frame is a complex communicative technique 
that is a special mode of storing and activating informa-
tion about the world. Its function is that it separates from 
the very complex and hardly understandable processes of the 
world those phenomenon, those situations that are important 
to be understood or imitated. The social psychological elab-
oration of Bateson's theory was developed by E. Goffman 
(1974). According to him, the frame can be defined as the 
•principles of organization which govern events and our 
subjective involvement" (Goffman, 1974. 10.). Fillmore sum-
marizes the frame concept of Bateson and Goffman as they 
"refer to an analytical framework within which human ex-
perience can be made intelligible" (Fillmore, 19? , 130). 
World theories - Subjeotivity of the Self-suflicient Text 
It seems to me that the theories that can be used in 
the study of a literary work can be divided into three 
groups: the logical-semantical, the semiotical and the cog-
nitive science theories. Without any detailed presentation 
or discussion I.would like to emphasize only those points 
which may have decisive importance in a theory of narrative 
from a pragmatic aspect. 
A trend. around the term "possible world" investigated 
the phenomenon from a logical-semantical point of view. Its 
primary aim has been to give an adequate logical representa-
tion of tho proposi t.ional attitudes, the counterfactuals 
and the-- impiMSDn.il intensional contexts. Most of the for-
mulations <1m no I.. qj.ve more than a logical instrument: "the 
semantic I. Iieory treats the spaces of entities and possible 
worlds as bo!.-<•• undifferentiated sets having no structure 
whatever." (Thomason, 1974, 50.). The undoubtedly most im-
portant t heory world born of logical.-semanti.cal orientation 
is the work ot: Hintikka (1969; 1973; 1975). It is very im-
portant in I.ho sense that he tried to give a consistent 
philosophical, and ep.istemological definition of the possible 
world concept. Beside:; analyzing the mechanism of meaning 
production he sketches the general philosophical conse-
quences giving the bases of a now non-positivistic theory 
of representation. He also introduces those results that 
were provided by cognitive psychology in the study of per-
ception. The simplified essence of his system is that the 
"concepts, as meaning, are according to possible world se-
mantics functions from possible worlds to references (ex-
tensions)" (Hintikka, 1975, 207.). The possible world is 
a mental system that mediates the reality reference of the 
meaning and so puts and end to the immediate connection of 
the meaning and reference. The basic element, the "raw 
material" of human meaning production processes is the pos-
sible world. The intentionality and intentionality are also 
connected by the principle of possible world such as the 
ideai that intentionality is an intensional, inner conceptual 
construction of the mental arrangement of the extensional 
reality. Compared with phenomenology this new solution of 
the category of intention leads to the explanation of an 
important problem in epistemology. The principle of inten-
tionality as intensionality, that is a "concept is inten-
tional if and only if it involves the simultaneous consi-
deration of several possible states of affairs or courses of 
events" (Hintikka, 1975, 195.), gives a semantical-epis-
temological explanation for the fact of how the human being 
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is capable of departing from the immediate, actual reality 
and able to think about it by the help of the modalities 
of real-possible. Hintikka - according to his aims - in-
vestigates two basic problems in connection with the pos-
sible worlds: firstly the relation of individuals and the 
world, where he proves the world to be primary to indivi-
duals. Secondly, he investigates the problem of the relations 
between worlds, the problem of the identifiable individuals 
in different possible worlds. He has not dealt with the in-
ner construction of the worlds because according to his 
epistemological conception he tries to clarify the general 
principles of meaning production and reference. He has not 
dealt with the mechanism of interpretation, the analysis of 
the linguistically presented world. However from the point 
of view of narrative this can also be necessary so it would 
be useful to deduce the problem of world in such a reversed 
way even if it were strange from the point of view of logi-
cal semantics. So now I would like to move to a special 
narrativical, textlinguistical pragmatics based on the gen-
eral thesis of Hintikka... 
The reason why he has not dealt with the inner struc-
ture of the world can possibly be twofold. Firstly because 
he "brackets" it as a mental phenomenon that has been proved 
by psychology and tries to give the explanation of the logi-
cal relations of the individuals in a given arrangement. 
Secondly because the expressions analysed have an elementary 
nature and render it possible to restrict the analysis to 
the attitude and the possible world. It is probable, how-
ever, that the attitude has not only a mental representa-
tion, but that this subjective relation organises the system 
of relation of individuals delimited. This is a problem of 
the inner construction of the possible world. Even a simple 
belief utterance must be coherent in some way if it wants 
to be possible and so to be a world. If we start from the 
point of view of interpretation it is clear that the differ-
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ent text-types and the different speakers create the pos-
sible world in different ways. According to my hypothesis 
the difference lies in the textual or other objectifica-
ti.on of the intentionality, of the subjective organiz'ng 
factor. Hintikka has shown that, although the possible 
worlds are not "natural tilings", "they may be as solidly 
objective as houses or books, but they are as certainly as 
these created by man (however unwittingly) for the purpose 
of facilitating their transactions with the reality they 
have to face" (Hintikka, The characteristic features of 
objectivation in the case of different texts can be very 
different. Certain texts are connected strongly with the 
situation of the creation, because to source of intention-
ality is a subject in a special situation. It is possible 
that the situation and the subject are not objectivated 
linguistically and the utterance, or the written text, 
while departing from the situations, loses its possible-
world feature and the reader is not able to give it reality 
reference. On the other hand there are utterances that are 
able to fix linguistically these relations which objec-
tivate the possible world needed for the understanding of 
the different elements or individuals. The characteristic 
feature of these texts is that they are self-sufficient. So 
we can speak of the extrinsical and intrinsiaal organiza-
tion of the text-world. In the first case the world is or-
ganised upon a social or personal communicative situation. 
The adequate interpretation of the text is possible only in 
this situation and we need extratextual knowledge for the 
understanding. According to Paul Ricoeur these texts are 
organised in the. Umwe'lt and not in the Wei k and they have 
only ostensive reference (Ricceur, 1973) . By intrinsical 
textorganisation I mean that the world is inherent in the 
text, its reference understandable in itself. This is the 
principle of intentionality as intensionality projected to 
the whole text. The linguistic utterance in this case is 
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generally longer than the sentence and always functions as 
a text. The fact however that an utterance may consist of 
several sentences and so is a text would not mean that it 
has a world with an intrinsic organization (Eco, 1978. 29.). 
Cognitive Science and the Narrative World - a Metatheoretical 
Note 
Although the extension of the possible world concept to 
the text, the introduction of the interpretative aspect and 
the concept of an interpreter would not lead to the reduc-
tion of the world concept to more analogy, it is clear that 
in this direction the strict logical development of the con-
cept is not possible. There is no such logical theory at 
hand that would explain the macrostructures of complex texts 
and no such formalizable theory of language which can ac-
count for the ability of the speaker/hearer to produce and 
understand text. Another branch of the social sciences 
nevertheless puts this feature in the centre of interest. 
Cognitive psychology and research in artificial intel-
ligence are trying to investigate the process of understand-
ing from the point of view of cognitive factors, contextual 
parameters, and the formation of algorithmically explicit 
programmes respectively (Dijk, 1980, 3.). 
In the theory of narrative text both can be used only 
indirectly. Cognitive psychology has given new insights 
about the macro-systems of the mental processes of repre-
sentation and memory. At this point text theory can go on 
showing how these phenomena are represented in the text, in 
its inner structure, in the mechanism of reference and 
interpretation. In the opposite way the research into arti-
ficial intelligence has given new information about the 
analysis and processing of texts. Here the task of a text 
theory is to make general the consequences deriving from 
particular aspects. 
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To go back to my earlier methateoretical thoughts I 
there is a clear difference between the concept of structure 
and world. 
The "frame" or "world" is not the objective inner sys-
tem of relations of a phenomenon, it is not a static tax-
onomically once-and-for all describable structure but a re-
lational concept. Its existence is based on a relation, it 
is constituted in the relation of an interpreter subject and 
a verbal object. To refer back to Iser's proposal (Iser, 
1979.) in a somewhat modified manner, the special category 
of the third phase in the scientific development will be the 
world and the frame-. The structure concept explains a phe-
nomenon as an objective inner system of relations; the func-
tion concept defines the relations of this intrinsical ob-
ject to its context; the world explains the mutuality of the 
existence of the context and the intrinsie structure as a 
subject/object reflective relation. In the case of this cat-
egory the linguistic set of elements is structured, has a 
function, and is acquired by an interpreter. These rela-
tional features introduced by this category can clearly work 
only in thé actual text production and understanding proc-
esses. Scientific explanation disrupts this unity, because 
in the case of the interpretative process the objective 
linguistical facts and structures appear first. These can be 
the bases for deducing the meaning, and finally for building 
up the abstract general system, the world. 
From the point of view of interpretation the text world 
is antecedent and consequent at the same time. It means that 
in the spontaneous understanding of the text the encounter 
of the whole text and the readers' frames (expectations, con-
ventions etc.) defines the important structure and meaning 
elements. These in turn can help the thorough explanation of 
the abstract text world. Kuipers for example differentiates 
between the "global nature of description" and the "local 
nature of observation" (Kuipers, 19 75, 156.) in the case of 
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text-frames. The first is the explanation of the text ac-
cording to its world, the second is the description of the 
objective structure of elements. 
As a summary of this part we can state that the world. 
is a category of interpretation, an abstract system that 
comes from the rewriting of the concrete text in the prop-
er subject/object relation. 
Explanation 
Before analysing the inner structure of the text world, 
I would like to indicate some problems arising from our 
definition. 
The first is noted by Fillmore in the following way: 
"What is needed in discourse analysis is a way of discuss-
ing the development, on the part of the interpreter, of an 
image, or scene or picture of the world as that gets built 
up and filled out between the beginning and the end of the 
text-interpretation experience" (Fillmore, 197, 125). This 
is the question of explanation of the abstract system in 
the case of a concrete text, or to put it another way: the 
problem of the possible ways of explication of the implicit 
text worlds. It seems that there are two general possibil-
ités available. The first can be called inductive, the sec-
ond deductive. The world can be separated from the text in 
that I describe the linear connections of the elements in 
the text. I assign a basic element- say the sentence - and 
try to find longer segments consisting of these elementary 
units. At last I arrive at the whole text. This is a very 
frequent way among theories of interpretation, but it has 
several problems. First the assignment of the basic units 
is always arbitrary and exterior to the text world. The 
individuals in the analysis are defined according to ob-
jective rules of a science, generally of logic, action 
theory or linguistics. This is a step back to the struc-
turalist attitude because it tries to find the construc-
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tion of the world in the objective phenomenon, the world 
is purely a consequence of the process, and the individuals 
in the world are primary to the world structure. The frame 
is specified in this way by Schank-Abelson (1977) and 
Schank Lebowitz (1980). 
The other possible way of specification of the world 
is the construction of its parts from the whole. The start-
ing point is the spontaneous understanding of the whole 
text. The specification of the individuals, the relations 
in the world and the explicit world structure is based on 
this process. The concrete process of understanding is al-
ways centered on the possible outcome, because it always 
assumes a possible world from the data received up to that 
moment. This expectation is continuously corrected in the 
course of reading and understanding. The explicit world of 
the text is an outcome of a matching process between the 
knowledge frames, the expectations of the reader and the 
objective relation-possibilities in the text. In the cog-
nitive process research this phenomenon is called the 
"principle of continually available output" (Kuipers, 1975, 
179). 
Tranalation 
The other problem concerning the description of the 
abstract structure is the question of translation, or re-
writing. The world appears in the text in concrete. United 
images. In the process of interpretation we have to trans-
late these forms into another language according to the 
following minimal requirements: . 
- the translated and the translation should represent 
different levels of abstraction 
- the outcome of the translation should be more ab-
stract, or should have a conceptual nature (opposed 
to imagery) 
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- the outcome of the translation and the original is 
a one-many relationship 
- the outcome of the translation is more systematical, 
more mangeable and more operative 
- the outcome of the translation is functionally pre-
serving, that is it preserves every functionally 
important element from the original. 
Translation is probably the most important and most complex 
problem of the theory of interpretation. In reality every 
semiotic theory, and this includes linguistic theory, con-
tains an implicit theory of translation without the explicit 
analysis of its translation-nature. The syntactical use of 
the rewriting rule, or the system of semantic markers, is 
just as much translation as Fillmore's "case frame"-s 
(Fillmore, 1968; 197) or Dijk's macrostructures (Dijk, 
1972) . The translations can have a formal ot non-formal na-
ture. The first is developed by linguistics and logic in 
the syntactical and semantical treatment of semiotical ob-
jects. The second is the very old method of hermeneutics, 
the history of literature and philosophy, where the central 
interest is in the abstract structure of the content of the 
text, that objectivâtes human values, possible ways of life, 
etc. It can be hoped that pragmatics in the sense we have 
proposed would be wide enough to integrate the two ap-
proches in a complex scientific processing of the texts. 
Metaphorication 
I would like to make only a brief reference to a prob-
lem which is surely too important to be discussed in a 
short paper. This is a hypothesis that we can talk about 
text reference or a special type of it, that operates on a 
different route than the reference of the utterances de-
scribing simple states. In the case of the "story" or a fic-
tional text it is really very hard to apply the traditional 
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theory of reference. An intresting novelty in cognitive 
psychology nevertheless can be connected with our problem. 
According to this there are two types of memory: remember-
ing in imagery and remembering in propositions. The first 
means that "some central mechanisms are generating a (prob-
ably sequential) pattern of information which corresponds 
more or less to the structural information in the original 
perception" (Bower, 1972, 58.). This special connection 
based on structural isomorphism is the principle of imita-
tion. The text enables the interpretator to take its image 
content as structurally ismomorphic with his own world, 
specifying some "frames" of his life. In the process the 
text-world becomes significant for the interpreter. The 
text-objectivating frame or world is able to produce some 
imagery or appearence and can give information without 
transforming it into a propositional type. If somebody in-
terpreted the text, and shows the world inherent in the text 
for himself, than he would change the imagery information 
into a propositional kind. The two kinds of information can-
not be completely translated into the propositional.. The two 
kinds of information cannot be completely translated into 
each other - a well-known fact is that there is always some-
thing left after the translation (interpretation) of a lit-
erary text. A part of the above hypothesis is that the rela-
tion between the reader's frame and the concrete text, the 
one which produces the abstract world, is also considerably 
different from the usual text/reality relation in a hie et 
nunc situation. This connection can probably be investigated 
by elaborating th.e logic of analogy. The two types of re-
membering and the problem of analogy is explicitly connected 
by a pair of categories in Bobrow (1975, 31.). He uses the 
terms analogical versus propositional representation. Others 
have also shown these two knowledge types as contingency 
shaped and rule-governed (Baldwin-Baldwin, 1978.). 
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I have to mention another characteristic feature. The 
remembering in imagery is considerably indefinite , there are 
only some figures defined, all the others are indefinite 
background (Bower, 1972, 57.). The indefiniteness is a char-
acteristic feature of the world as well, because the closed 
intensional text gives just as much information in the ex-
planation as there is in the text. In the case of a normal 
reality reference there would be an immeasurable amount of 
information that can be gained to explain the given utter-
ance. This seemingly insufficient feature frees the text 
from being fixed to the immediate empirical reality and en-
ables many interpretators to connect many subjective frames 
to it. Here we find a strange situation: that it can be 
general without using abstract terms. This text seems to 
have a double meaning level. Firstly the utterances used 
refer to an immediate element of reality, secondly they take 
part in the construction of a general, abstract world that 
becomes explicit after interpretation. Certainly in the text 
not all the linguistic elements are capable of this. There 
are some central individuals that convey the world. These 
elements that were called "slots" by Minsky (1975) or IMPS 
by Winograd (1975) have a special position. From the point 
of view of literature we can say that they are special met-
aphors. The specialness comes from the fact that they show 
a metaphorizing process where in the tenor part of the met-
aphor is an abstract position, an element of the world, and 
the vehicle part is a concrete individual of an image. In 
the text they appear as descriptions of states and events, 
and their metaphorical character is not clear. Obviously 
they are not really metaphors, they are not a transference 
of names but the text has the extra task of representating 
a world. We are close here to the famous thesis of Roman 
Jakobson, that the poetic function is the shifting of the 
principle of selection to the axis of combination (Jakobson, 
1960, 358.). The text-world uses this technique similar to 
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metaphorisation to separate its individuals from those ele-
: nts of the text which are used only for giving background 
the imagery. Of course this distinction depends on the 
interpretator as well, according to our principle of a 
pragmatic subject - object relation. 
Text-typea — the Concept of the Story 
In particular these last thoughts refer only to a spe-
cial class of texts: those that are highly organised and 
completely self-sufficient. In this group we can find all 
literary texts, but there are many texts in everyday life 
that show this level of complexity. The group of complex 
texts can be called stories, taking the term in a rather 
wider sense, and including lyrical poetry as well. The 
"story" is a linguistic utterance on the text level that 
has a world defining its coherence. Fillmore has shown the 
connection of coherence and world: "a text is coherent to 
the extent that its successive parts contribute to the 
construction of a single (possibly quite complex) scene" 
(Fillmore, 197, 127.). In this sense in the case of a text 
we can speak of one world that can be divided into sub-
worlds with relative independence. The organization of a 
world like this shows an order of "nearly decmposable sys-
tems", where the subsystems in their immediate existence 
are relatively free, but they are built into the whole sys-
tem indirectly (Simon, 1969, 100.; Winograd, 1975, 191.). 
Another important feature of the story is mentioned by 
Dijk (1980, 13.)According to him the story is special in 
the sense that it has a "point" that is, after reading it 
we know why it has written. This psychological feature 
shows that the interpretator has recognized a text that is 
intrinsic, where there is no need of any situative, es-
tensive reference for its understanding. The "point" is the 
core of the principle of world production, a spontaneously 
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felt unity, that unites the different elements and is used 
as a subjective organizing principle. This means that the 
text has come to be significant in the reader-text rela-
tion. Rumelhart refers to the same abstract core in texts 
when defines the story as a summarizable text (Rumelhart, 
1975.) . 
The World philosophy 
Such features of the story throw light on the basic in-
terpretative constituents of the text world. If we define 
the world as an intensional system of relations that defines 
individuals as its elements, then the "point" mentioned a-
bove seems to be a central constituent. The system of rela-
tions is primary in existence to the individuals. This is 
the force that takes the individuals as a unity, carries the 
principle of identity (.that the individuals are the individ-
uals of the same world) and gives the proper functions in 
the identity. 
Philosophically it is a subjective phenomenon, a mental sys-
tem that selects all the elements and gives special inter-
pretation to them. In this sense Eco called the possible 
world "rational construct", and in a similar way Hintikka. 
stresses the principle of intentionality as intensionality, 
the Kantian features of his theory, and the ideological fea-
ture of the the possible world (Hintikka, 1969.). As a con-
stituent, I call this subjective core world-philosophy. It 
is a non-formal abstraction, the content producing the text 
coherence. This is the pure essence of the relations and the 
abstract common principle of these relations. The phenomena 
of the actual world can be ordered into levels of abstract-
ness, because in any two phenomena there is an abstract 
identity common to both. The world philosophy is always that 
level of abstractness that is characteristic of the given 
text-world, but the most general one. Its description can be 
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adequtely given with the help of the categories of philoso-
phy. It always depends on the interpretator, first of all 
on the matching process between the mental frame and the 
text, and on the features of the reader's frame. It exists 
between the textual and extratextual just because it is 
only indirectly in the text and can be made explicit only 
with the help of interpretation. And because the individu-
als are possible concretizations of this abstract world-
philosophy they take this abstractness in their concrete 
existence, the world-philosophy is the source of indefi-
niteness as well. 
The world-philosophy works like the attitude part of 
the propositional attitude sentences, it defines the system 
of relations of the individuals. This system - in the case 
of stories - is always a complex organization on two levels 
of organization, linear and non-linear. This distinction 
can be found in several world theories. Saarinen refines, 
for example, the theory of Hintikka, differentiating be-
tween the possible state of affairs and the possible course 
of events. The second "is a class of linearly ordered states 
of events" the first is a "temporal slice in several differ-
ent courses of events" and they have no future and no histo-
ry (Saarinen, 1979, 191.),. The role of this difference in 
Saarinen is that with its help is easier to show the two dif-
ferent ways of cross-identification based on continutity and 
similarity. Osten Dahl shows the same phenomenon from a mod-
el-theoretical aspect, differentiating between static and 
dinamic organization. "An ideal narrative discourse consists 
of two parts: a set of instructions for performing succes-
sive changes in that situation" (Dahl, 1977, 154.}. The 
first means a static and spatial, the second a dynamic and 
temporal organization. In our system we shall call the line-
ar organization world-process, the non-linear world-struc-
ture. The second is more basic, it shows the hierarchical 
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oreder of the individuals. Certain texts can exist without 
a world-process, without a temporal moment (such is lyrical 
poetry in literature). Of course the text is not able to 
state the world structure at once, so the text decomposes 
the simultaneous system into a linear string. The world-
structure is a level of organization which is not as ab-
stract as the world philosophy but it is not the linear or-
der of concrete constituents. It is the world-philosophy re-
alised in a concrete relation system. The world process has 
a linear organization, and refers to the functioning of the 
world. It shows those forms of movements which are the re-
sults of the dynamics of the individuals. The steps of the 
world process are always causal, they represent the abstract 
action structure of the narrative text. 
Individuals 
According to our earlier definitions the elements of the 
text-world are the individuals. The expression should not be 
understood in its logical sense. Here the term individual 
means that the world philosophy and the world-structure-
world-process are realized in concrete elements which are 
ealized in concrete elements which are acceptable even in 
actual, empirical reality. The individuals are those ele-
ments of the narrative, in which the world creating the text 
is manifested on the phenomenon level of the text. The first 
problem is that in a narrative text a lot of constituents 
can appear which - from a logical point of view - can be the 
individuals in a proposition. Nevertheless, from the point 
of view of the narrative world they are not individuals. The 
theory of narrative would be hopelessly complex if it at-
tempted to explain all the elements with linguistic objec-
tivation. It is also clear that in the different text types 
the proportion of individuals and non-individuals is dif-
ferent. Moreover it is also clear that the non-individual 
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elements are necessary constituents of the text as well, 
because without them the individuals would be abstract fig-
ures without a background. 
I take as individuals only those elements which fill 
in the empty spaces of the world structure. It is charac-
teristic of their quality that they are always metaphorical 
in the earlier sense, they,convey double information, an 
abstract content and an immediate appearence. The more gen-
eral constituents of the text-world - analysed earlier -
import the structure of reality into the text, and they give 
rewrite rules which change the empirical element to the po-
sition of an individual of the world. The indefiniteness 
.mentioned earlier is the consequence of this rewrite proc-
ess. In the process of abstraction such definitions, fea-
tures of the individual which can be important in the actual 
world situation are often deleted. 
If we consider the nature of the individuals in the 
narrative, an interesting analogy appears. According to this 
the individual is the morphological level of the narrative, 
the word of the sentence of the whole text. Eco for example 
analysed the individuals of the text as meaning units. It is 
definitive, however, what kind of semantic analysis we use 
for the description of the inner structure. In the case of 
an individual Eco collects those features which operate in 
it. The most important of these are the so-called diagnostic 
properties "allowing me to single out without ambiguity the 
class of individuals I am referring to within a contextual 
world" (Eco, 1978, 34.). Eco produces the feature elements 
inductively from the encyclopedic meaning and inserts these 
artificially produced elements into the system of the text. 
Our conception, however, says that the meaning assignment 
would not come from the construction of an artificially-
produced encyclopedic meaning but from the constituents of 
the world. This process would be deductive because a general 
definition would get concrete groups of features. Without 
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trying to describe such a process I would like to show an 
alternative method of semantic description. Fillmore gives 
the semantic notion of prototype based on the results of 
cognitive psychology. The prototype theory of meaning pre-
sumes that "the understanding of meaning requires, at least 
for the great many cases, an appeal to an exemplar or pro-
totype - this prototype being possibly something which, 
instead of being analysed, needs to be presented or demon-
strated or manipulated". The alternative, widely used, the-
ory of meaning is the "checklist theory" according to which 
'the meaning of a linguistic form is represented in terms 
of a checklist of conditions that have to be satisfied" 
(Fillmore, 197 , 123.). It seems to me that the basic dif-
ference between the two types of theory is that the check-
list theory renders the meaning independent from the user 
of the text and takes them as objective elements of the 
construction. The prototype theory defines the objective 
sign as the creative and created element of the subjec-
tively-produced frame of the user. 
If we try to use the prototype interpretation then in 
the case of the individuals in the text, the relations of 
the world structure, their abstract content would assign a 
prototype as the most general content of the individual. 
The text completes this general content with a minimal set 
of features for making the world appearing in its concrete 
form coherent on the level of imagery. It is probable that 
this complement is needed in the case of stories and liter-
ary works to give a sense of life to the text world. 
To summarize: every individual has two groups of com-
ponents: its relations and its features, where the first 
is definitive. The features are series of inherent, inner 
characteristics they are objectively given. At the genesis 
of the world these features present the individual as a pos-
sible alternative. At the same time they do not limit the 
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individual, because the features can be multiplied (infin-
itely) . The features can be defined in the case of an in-
dividual as those definitions according to which the indi-
vidual functions in the different worlds (actual and pos-
sible). The relation is external compared to the individual, 
and is not objectivated in it. It shows the prototype as the 
part of the system in a possible world. The features are 
potential, the relations are actual and realised. However 
the realations in the case of a given world actualize the 
features from the potential pool of features. 
The conception about the inner structure of the world 
is a pragmatic conception, that is part of an interpreta-
tive process. This means that the listing of the constitu-
ents would not mean a narrative syntax, but some syntacti-
cal consequences of the theory of understanding. 
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NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE STYLE 
Lubomir Dolezel 
University of Toronto 
The impressive progress of narrative theory in the past 
two decades has been, undoubtedly, connected with the elabo-
ration of models of narrative structures, i.e. of invariant 
narrative systems defined on various levels of abstractness. 
Inspired by Propp's descovery of a common scheme underlying 
a variety of particular stories, French Structuralists have 
devised various "narrative grammars' for the description of 
narrative invariants. Quite recently, Lévi-Strauss has given 
a cogent summary of this approach: "Probably there is nothing 
more than that in the structuralist approach; it is the quest 
for the invariant elements among superficial differences." 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1978, 8} cf. already Piaget, 1972, 6). "Nar-
rative grammars" have become a favourite and commonly used 
theoretical tool of folklorists, cultural anthropologists, 
text theoreticians and other specialists of narratology. 
However, a literary scholar working in the domain of 
modern narrative theory has been faced with a painful dilem-
ma: While recognizing that "narrative grammars" are a power-
ful explanation of the concept of "narrativity", he is forced 
to admit that these grammars generate structures which are 
aesthetically "barren", that is, lacking in aesthetic sig-
nificance or effect. A sequence or a matrix of functions, 
motifernes, mythemes ; etc. appears as an organizing principle 
of narratives, but it is aesthetically neutral, or, perhaps, 
irrelevant. It has not been observed too often that Propp 
was already aware of this limitation of "narrative grammars": 
If we are interested in those features which "provide the 
tale with its expressivity, its beauty and enchantment", we 
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have to go beyond the invariant structures and focus on the 
"variable properties of the tale" (Propp, 19692, 79). Obvi-
ously, aesthetic effects are somehow associated with vari-
ability, singularity of texts, with properties which are by 
definition outside the scope of models of invariant struc-
tures. 
If our localization of aesthetic qualities is correct, 
modern study of literature requires a narrative theory 
which will achieve almost the impossible: It should de-
scribe how both the invariant and the variable properties of 
narrative texts are organized and, moreover, it should es-
tablish explicit links between these two levels of organiza-
tion. In order to make some progress in this task, I propose 
to revitalize the very old concept of style in terms which, 
at first sight, might seem contradictory: Style is the 
2 
global regularity of %diosyncracy . In a comprehensive nar-
rative theory, stylistics, describing the variability of nar-
rative texts, could become a useful partner of narrative 
grammar, studying models of invariant narrative structures. 
Needless to say, such a narrative theory should also provide 
means for describing explicitly the links leading from struc-
tures to styles and vice versa. 
In what follows, I intend to demonstrate briefly and 
without any claims to exhaustiveness how such a comprehensive 
narrative theory could be pursued. In keeping with the pre-
dominant trend in contemporary narratology, I will remain 
within the framework of semantics. This focus is not fortui-
tous; in the domain of narrative texts, more than in any 
other domain of text theory, semantics necessarily represents 
the core of theoretical enquiry. 
1. Extensional and intensional semantics. In view of the 
fact that aesthetic effects seem to be carried by variable, 
often "minute" textual properties, our search for an ade-
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quate semantics of literature has to be guided by the prin-
ciple that any reductionism, i.e. any loss of meaning, is 
inadmissible. Specifically, any semantic theory or model 
which reduces complex meanings of literary texts to invar-
iant semantic representations is just a partial theory or 
model for literary semantics. 
Two semantic systems are worthy of note in our search 
for an adequate literary semantics: Frege's semantics - pro-
posed in the domain of the philosophy of language (see espe-
cially Frege, 1892), and Prague school semantics - developed 
for the specific purpose of poetics (see Mukarovsky, 1928). 
There are, in my opinion, many similarities between Frege's 
and the Prague school's ideas about language and literature, 
although there was probably no connection or influence be-
3 
tween the two sources of modern semantics. Their union post 
festum would be, in my opinion, beneficial to both: It would 
place the Prague school system into a broader theoretical 
development of 20th century semantics and, on the other hand, 
would prov.ide Fregean semantics with a necessary vital link 
to empirical semantic problems in language and literature. 
It is commonly known that Frege's semantics is based on 
the differentiation between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (ref-
erence) . In Mukarovsky's system, the corresponding components 
of meaning are called vyznamova struktura (semantic struc-
ture) and temati.aka struktura (thematic structure). In this 
paper, I will follow the already well-established practice 
of referring to Sinn as intension and to Bedeutung as ex-
tension. 
Efforts to apply Fregean semantics as an adequate se-
mantics as an adequate semantics of literature are hampered 
by the fact that the most developed accounts of intensions 
have followed reductionist models, in translating intensions 
into purely extensional languages. Such translating proce-
dures seem to be typical of contemporary logical semantics 
and of linguistic semantics based on logico-semantic cate-
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gories. At present, the most popular version of this proce-
dure derives its inspiration from possible-world semantics. 
Intensions are defined as functions from possible worlds to 
extensions. Such functions pick out from every possible 
world exactly those elements of the world which represent 
the extension of the given expression in that world. While 
such attempts to express intensions in an extensional lan-
guage are understandable and even necessary in logical se-
mantics, - with its goal of formulating truth-conditions in 
intensional contexts - they seem to be unproductive in lit-
erary semantics, precisely because intensions are reduced to 
extensions. We have to repeat again that an adequate inten-
sional semantics of literature has to give a non-reductionist, 
"autonomous" account of intensions. All experience, past and 
present, indicates that a non-reductionist theory of inten-
sions is the most difficult (some would say, impossible) task 
of semantical theory. 
All extensional accounts of intensions disregard the 
essential link between intensional meaning and its corre-
sponding verbal expression. With respect to the theory of 
intensions using the framework of possible-world semantics, 
this deficiency has been pointed out: "This analysis of in-
tension has made the concept essentially language-independ-
ent. An intension has extralinguistic entities both as its 
domain (possible worlds) and as its range (objects and truth 
values)." (Allwood-Andersson-Dahl, 1977, 129). This disregard 
of linguistic expression is, in my opinion, in clear contrast 
with Frege's original notion. For Frege, Sinn was "the mode 
of presentation" of the reference (op. cit., 119) and this 
mode is necessarily given by the form in which the language 
expresses the reference4. In accordance with Frege's original 
notion, intensions should be defined as those components of 
meaning which are necessarily and fully determined by the 
form of their expression. Obviously, intensions are generated 
only in languages which are not governed by a simple, one-to-
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-one correspondence between expressions and referents. 
While such an account of intension should satisfy a 
student of literature, it will make the task of intensional 
semantics even more difficult. If intensions are bound to 
the corresponding forms of expression, then they are altered 
or destroyed by any, even the slightest, change of expression. 
This means that there is no possibility of describing inten-
sions in any kind of paraphrase (rewording) of the original 
expression. The basic method of capturing meaning, the meth-
od of "interpretants", seems to be closed. It is impossible 
to represent the intension of an expression (sign) by another 
(synonymous) expression (sign). 
The insistence on a necessary and unalterable correla-
tion between intensions and forms of expression seems to be 
driving us into the same dead-end, where those afraid of the 
"heresy of paraphrase" have been resting^. However, reject-
ing paraphrase as a tool for describing intensions does not 
prevent us from seeking other, theoretically more satisfac-
tory, versions of intensional semantics. If intensions cannot 
be described directly, procedures of indirect description 
have to be formulated. 
In this respect, the necessary bond between intension 
and form of expression becomes a blessing. If intensions are 
determined and structured by the form of their expression, 
then they can be described indirectly through the structure 
or organization of verbal expression. Such a direction has 
been, in fact, pursued for some time in structural linguis-
tics and poetics, although the concept of intension has not 
been generally used. 
In spite of this opening, intensional semantics remains 
a formidable task. In the domain of narrative texts, it 
should be developed on two levels: 1. Intensional miaro-
semantias will investigate the intensions of linguistic units, 
such as words, phrases, sentences, in terms of the "inner 
form" of their expression. Intension of a higher unit will 
- 276 -
be interpreted as an integration of intensions of its cora-
ponential expressions.6 In this approach, verbal context 
appears as a form of expression and, as such, has been re-
ferred to in many accounts of Intensional meanings (see, for 
example, contextual theories of metaphor). 2. Intensional 
macrosemantics will investigate theories and methods for de-
scribing intensional meaning of whole texts, or, at least, 
of some aspects of this intensional totality. Again, it will 
approach this task through the study of the organization of 
the text's expression (its texture). The unity of the con-
cept of intension on the micro- and the macro-level of or-
ganization is ensured: the global regularities of texture 
correspond to the "inner form" of the micro-expressions, 
while the intensional structuring of the narrative world 
corresponds to the structuring of the micro-intension given 
by the integration of its componential parts. 
In this paper, intensional microsemantics will be left 
aside. I will concentrate on proposing and demonstrating one 
possibility of investigating intensional macro-organization 
in narrative texts. 
2. The concept of intensional function. The fundamental 
concept of narrative macrosemantics is the concept of narra-
tive world. Narrative world is a set of individuals, objects, 
properties, events and actions, which is constructed by the 
narrative text.' Narrative worlds are not formless entities. 
They are shaped in many different ways. The macro-restric-
tions operating on the set of elements forming the world are 
either extensional, or intensional. Extensional restrictions 
specify those conditions of admissibility in the world which 
are totally independent of the designations, names and de-
scriptions of the elements. A purely quantitative restriction, 
for example the number of narrative agents, is the simplest 
example of an extensional restriction, generating one-agent, 
two-agent and multi-agent worlds. A narrative world formed 
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by extensional restrictions has a shape, a structure, but 
- as has already been mentioned - this structure is totally 
independent of any possible expressions which will be used 
to verbalize the world. Of course, we have to talk about the 
extensional world, its elements and its structuring, for 
this purpose, we have to construct a purely extensional lan-
guage, i.e. an artificial system of signs governed by the 
principles of one-to-one correspondence between elements of 
the world and elements of the sign system. The construction 
of such a language has been an urgent task of semantics at 
least since Frege. At present, I believe, the most promising 
development in this direction is the elaboration of a system 
of semantic representations. However, for our present purpose, 
we do not have to go into details. 
Intensional macro-restrictions affecting the shape of 
the narrative world will be defined - in accordance with our 
overall conception of intensional meaning - as such regular-
ities which operate through the forms of expression of the 
world. Since the possibilities of expressing a world are ex-
tremely varied, we have, necessarily, a rich variety of in-
tensional world structures. Obviously, one and the same ex-
tensional world can be transformed by various forms of ex-g 
pression into many different intensional world structures . 
The study of the possible intensional world structures and 
of their relationship to the possible extensional world 
structures, is, in my opinion, the most important task of 9 
contemporary narrative semantics . 
In a relatively short contribution, it is impossible to 
discuss all the important problems connected with intensional 
world structuring. I will concentrate on the possibility of 
making the concept of intensional restrictions more specific 
and explicit. In order to give a sharp focus to the discus-
sion, I shall deal only with the so-called domain of the 
world, i.e. with the set of its individuals, "inhabitants". 
In the case of narrative worlds, the domain is given by the 
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set of agents acting in the world. Narrative agents (tradi-
tionally called characters or dramatis personae) are dis-
tinguished from other objects in the world precisely by 
their ability to perform actions. 
As extensional entities, the individuals-agents will 
be designated and referred to by a conventional set of sym-
bols, for example by the lower-case letters of the alpha-
bet:. a, b, c... In order to ensure the extensional character 
of this sign system, we will require that it follows the 
principle of one-to-one correspondence: each individual will 
be designated by one and only one letter. The domain of the 
narrative world will then be represented as set 
D — {a, b, c••,}. 
In particular narrative texts, agents will be "named" 
by the various expressions of natural language, serving in 
the function of singular terms. It is commonly known that 
two distinct categories of expressions are available for 
this purpose: proper names and definite descriptions. With-
out going into the controversy concerning the relationship 
of these categories of singular terms, I will state my a-
greement with those semanticians who claim that proper names 
and definite descriptions differ fundamentally in inten-
sional meanings. Such a view can be defended expecially with-
in the framework of the well-known theory of proper names as 
"rigid designators" . In the framework of our intensional 
semantics, "rigid" designation can be interpreted as inten-
sion because a proper name thus provides a special mode of 
presenting the individual. There is no doubt that every de-
finite description carries an intensional meaning given by 
its form of expression. In other words, we claim that the 
proper name Odysseus carries an intension different from the 
intension of the definite description the king of Ithaca 
and the latter, in turn, differs in intension from the hero 
of Homer's poem "The Odyssey", 
If we accept this idea, then we can say that natural 
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language provides at least two intensionally different al-
ternative forms of expressing singular reference; any given 
individual of the narrative world (that is any member of 
set D) can be assigned in every act of "naming" either a 
proper name or a definite description. In certain narrative 
texts, the selection of these alternatives can be governed 
by regular preferences, i.e. by stylistic regularities1} 
Formally speaking, in such texts the assignment of singular 
terms to narrative agents is governed by a two-value func-
tion which assigns either a proper name or a definite de-
scription to each individual in the domain D. Any function 
which provides a mapping of extensional symbols into inten-
sional expressions will be called intensional function. Our 
function which will replace extensional symbols a, b, c... 
by either proper names or definite descriptions shall be 
called intensional function of naming. The operation of 
this function can be observed in Defoe's Robinsion Crusoe. 
The regularity of naming in this novel is given by the fact 
that only three agents of its world, Robinson, Xury and 
Fridayj are assigned proper names, while all other agents 
are consistently expressed by definite descriptions; my ' 
fatherj the Portuguese captain, the English captain's widow, 
Friday's father, etc. 
The concept of intensional function, as defined, could 
become, in my opinion, a very important theoretical tool 
for describing the organization of intensional meaning in 
literary texts. Every intensional function generates a sty-
listic regularity of texture by controlling the selection 
of alternative expressions or categories of expressions. In 
fact, a stylistic regularity is empirical evidence of the 
operation of an intensional function in a text. On the other 
hand, intensional function is responsible for the inten-
sional structuring of the narrative world, by splitting the 
extensional world into a set of intensionally defined "sub-
worlds". In such a way, the concept of intensional function 
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provides the vital linkage between vegulariti.ee of texture 
(i.e. the form of the text's expression) and maorostructur-
% 
ing of intensional meaning. 
In the case of the intensional function of naming, which 
has been used as our concrete example, the domain of the nar-
rative world (D) is split into two subsets: the set of 
agents named by a proper name and the set of agents named by 
a definite description. The extensional macrostructure (do-
main) is transformed into an intensional macrostructure 
(picture of the domain). The resulting macrostructure is in-
tensional in character, precisely because its existence and 
shape are dependent on and fully determined by the regularity 
in the form of expression, in texture. If such a regularity 
did not exist, if, for example, all agents of D were ex-
pressed by proper names only, this particular intensional 
structuring would not come into existence. This statement 
should not be construed in such a way as to imply that with-
.out the intensional function of naming, no intensional 
structuring of the narrative world would be possible. Our 
theory assumes that there are many different intensional 
functions, and, consequently, many different ways of struc-
turing narrative worlds intensionally. Narrative macroseman-
tics should specify the particular intensional functions and 
describe their contribution to the overall intensional struc-
turing of narrative worlds. 
Two-value functions are the simplest form of intensional 
functions. Higher-yalue intensional functions are obviously 
possible, since natural language quite often offers more than 
two alternative forms of expression for one and the same 
extensional meaning. In fact, such is even the case with 
singular terras, if we inspect them more closely. While logi-
cal semantics has been satisfied with distinguishing proper 
names and definite descriptions, linguistic semantics has to 
take account of the fact that within both categories, there 
exist subcategories with substantial differences in inten-
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12 sional meaning . We can say, for example, that there exists 
a significant intensional difference between calling some-
body by his surname and calling him by his first name. 
Without going into a systematic theory of singular 
terms in natural language, I propose to use the following 
preliminary categories in our study of the intensional struc-
turing of the domain of narrative worlds: 
I. Proper name: 1) surname: a) without "inner form": 
Nixon ; 
b) with "inner form": 
Baker, 
Black ; 
2) given names: John, Petrovic; 
31 nicknames: Caddy, 
4) abbreviations: X.Ï. 
II. Definite descriptions: 1. fixed (i.e. stable through-
out the whole text): my 
father (in Robinson 
Crusoe); 
2. contextual/unstable (i.e. 
changing according to con-
text).: the last customer in 
the store. 
In different narrative texts, the intensional function 
of naming can operate over any set of these alternatives, 
that is the author may select the expressions for naming his 
agents from any one of these categories or any one of their 
combinations. In other words, intensional function of naming, 
if present in the text production, will operate as a two-, 
three-...n-yalue function, depending on the number of cate-
gories which enter the selection process. In order to demon-
strate the operation of intensional function of naming and 
its contribution to the intensional structuring of the nar-
rative world, I want to examine a text which certainly rep-
resents a challenge to semantic analysis, The Trial by 
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Franz Kafka. 
3. Intensional structuring in The Trial. A modern narrative 
text, examplified by Kafka's novels and short stories, has 
often been characterized as semantically multivalent, i.e. 
open to a multitude of semantic interpretations. This unde-
niable property of modern literature has often been taken as 
an excuse for interpretative anarchy: Since a modern text 
can mean anything, every reader or critic is allowed to con-
struct his own "meaning". Instead of undertaking the diffi-
cult and laborious analysis of the semantic structure of 
modern texts, literary criticism has taken the easy route: 
bypassing the text and formulating "meanings" which are 
nothing more than slightly adjusted versions of the critic's 
preconceived ideology. This characterization of contemporary 
"interpretative" criticism might seem too harsh and too gen-
eral. However, it certainly applies to the many critical 
"readings" of Kafka. They express the religious, political, 
social, psychological, etc. position of the critic, rather 
than Kafka's own semantics. 
Narrative semantics, which, at present, is the most ac-
tive part of structural poetics, operates in a direct con-
trast to this kind of "interpretative" criticism. In a me-
ticulous analysis, based on a comprehensive semantic theory, 
the text inherent regularities of the organization of mean-
ing are revealed. There is no denying the fact that the fi-
nal recovery of meaning from a literary text is accomplished 
in the act of reading, i.e. in the interplay of the text and 
(a)- reader. However, the acts of reading and interpretation 
are to be controlled by the semantic structuring of the text; 
if this control is disregarded, the "readings" and "inter-
pretations" offer subjective guesses, in the best case, and 
misrepresentations, in the worst case. 
In spite of an abundance of critical literature on 
Kafka13, little has been done to understand his work in the 
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light of narrative semantics. My modest excursion into Kaf-
ka criticism serves no other purpose than to demonstrate 
that: a) even the most "mysterious" texts generate meaning 
by regular processes and devices of meaning production; 
b) consequently, the structuring of meaning in these texts 
is no less susceptible to theoretical analysis than it is in 
the "simple" and "non-ambiguous" texts of classical litera-
ture. 
One of the interesting factors of semantic structuring 
in Kafka's The Trial14 is the operation of the intensional 
function of naming (as defined in part 2). This function as-
signs terms of singular reference to all the agents of the 
novel in a surprisingly regular and consistent way. Rare 
"exceptions" can be accounted for as manifestations of com-
peting regularities. The scope of the intensional function 
extends to both the narrator's texts and the characters' 
speeches; as a rule, agents are "called" by the same des-
ignation in both textual planes. For example, Frdlein Biirst-
ner is the regular designation of this agent used both by 
the narrator and by Fréilein Bùrstner's co-agents. Excep-
tions arise in such cases when an "intimate" way of desig-
nation, usually first name, is used in conversations be-
tween the agents: Josef K. is called Josef by his uncle and 
by Leni. 
The intensional function of naming in The Trial operates 
over the following set of categories: 
I. Proper name) 1. surnames Block, 
2. given (first) name: Leni; 
3. abbreviation: K. 
II. Definite description: 1. fixed: der Priigler (the 
whipper); 
2. contextual (unstable): ein 
junger Bursche (a young 
boy) - der Bursche (the 
boy) - der Sohn des Haus-
- 284 -
meistere (the son of the 
housekeeper). 
It seems to me that the distinction of surnames with or 
without "inner form" is irrelevant for this novel; nicknames 
do not occur. 
As a result of the application of the intensional func-
tion of naming, the set of agents of The Trial is split into 
the following, intensionally defined subsets: 
1. The protagonist forms a one-member subset, singled 
out from the set of agents by his exclusive proper name 
abbreviation. The standard form of the name is Josef K. with 
the variant K. and with contextual variants (used only in 
allocutions) Herr K. (in Mrs. Grubach's speech) and Josef 
(used by his "intimates", the uncle and Leni). It is note-
worthy that the priest (in chapter IX) addresses the pro-
tagonist Jooef K. (152), a quite unusual form of address in 
15 
German, even if full family name was used . While all the 
above given forms are variants of the abbreviation, there 
is an alternative mode of naming the protagonist, namely by 
fixed definite descriptions. This aspect of the protagonist's 
naming will be dealt with later. 
2. There is a group of agents whose standard name is a 
surname, in two different forms: a) The surname alone is as-
signed, as in the case of fluid, Tiltorelli, Block. Three 
minor characters are named in the same way: Rabendsteiner , 
Kullich, Kaminer; in this case, the mode of naming is excep-
tional, as will become clear later, b) The second variant 
of the surname, its polite form, is restricted to three 
agents: Fräulein Bürstner, Frau Gruber and Fräulein Montag. 
In the case of Frälein Bürstner, an occasional variant das 
Fräulein can be found in characters' speech, indicating her 
exceptional position in this set; the other two female char-
acters are episodic. An interesting detail should be men-
tioned here; In their most intimate moment (end of chapter 
I), Joseph K. wants to call Fräulein Bürstner by her first 
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name, but he realizes that he does not know it (27) . This 
lack of first name is no less significant for the expres-
sion of the intensional meaning than the polite surname 
under which this female agent is known. 
3. The agents assigned first names only are, at first 
sight, a rather mixed set: Elaa, Leni (K's mistresses), An-
na (the cook) and Franz and Willem (the wardens). What is 
significant in the case of this set is that it can be de-
fined by an extensional property: all characters in this 
group are of "low status" socially or professionally (Franz 
and Willem are described as "niedrige Angestellte" (10), 
low clerks).. We have here a case where intensional split-
ting of the domain coincides with its extensional subdivi-
sion, reinforcing its significance for the semantic struc-
ture of the novel. 
4. The possibility of naming agents by the assignment 
of contextual, unstable, changing definite description will 
concern us here from a purely formal aspect only. Unstable 
definite description is a transitory stage in the process 
of naming. It leads either to the assignment of a proper 
name, or to the selection of a permanent, fixed definite de-
scription. The introduction of one of the wardens in Chap-
ter I can be used as an example of both outcomes; the chain 
of naming proceeds as follows: ein Mann (a man) •*• der Mann 
(.the man) der fremde Mann (the strange man) •*• der Fremde 
(.the stranger). + Franz (in Willem's allocution) / der 
W&ahter (.the warden) (in narrator's text). The agent will be 
known thereafter under the proper name or the fixed definite 
description. This process does not apply to a group of minor 
or episodic characters who do not rise above the level of 
anonymity signified by the unstable definite description. 
Their role in the semantic structure of the novel will not 
be discussed, with, the exception of one specific case (see 
below). 
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5, A very prominent specific feature of the naming of 
agents in The Trial is the assignment of fixed definite de-
scriptions to a large set of individuals. Both the negative 
and the positive aspect of this mode of naming is signifi-
cant: On the negative side, these agents are - similarly as 
Josef K. - deprived of a standard proper name; their proper 
names are never given. On the positive side, the type of the 
fixed definite description is most important: the agent is 
designated by his function or position in the two social 
institutions represented in The Trial - the Bank and the 
Court. All the employees of the Bank, with the exception al-
ready mentioned, are named in this way: der Diener (the 
servant), der Direktor (.the director), der Direktor-Stell-
vertreter (the vice-director). The group of the representa-
tives of the Court, designated by fixed definite descrip-
tions, is rather large: der Aufseher (the supervisor), der 
Untersuohung&riahter (the examining magistrate), der Stu-
dent (the (law) student) , der Geriahtsdiener (the Court at-
tendant) , der Auskunftgeber (the informant) , der Prilgler 
(the whipper), der Kanzleidirektor (the director of the 
bureau), der Riohter (the judge), der Dritte Richter (the 
Third judge), der GefSngnisskaplan (the prison chaplain), 
etc. We should add that the designation der Angeklagte (the 
defendant) could be characterized as a fixed definite de-
scription expressing a "position" at the Court. It is as-
signed to minor (anonymous) characters, but in two cases, 
in the case of Josef K. and Block, it serves as a secondary 
designation of a major character1®. 
One exception to the exclusive use of the fixed defi-
nite description has already been mentioned: Josef K. 's 
wardens are given proper (first) names {Franz, Willem). .an-
other interesting case is the girl in chapter IV, whom Jo-
sef K, meets during his visit to the attic offices; she is 
not assigned a fixed definite description and, therefore, 
her function at the Court remains unclear. Much more impor-
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tant is the case of the two gentlemen in chapter X who arrive 
to execute Josef K. They are not given a fixed definite de-
scription. This exceptional case seems to me so significant 
that I will return to it in more detail in the conclusion of 
this paper. 
Having established the intensional structure of the do-
main of the narrative world, that is the subsets of agents 
defined by the intensional function of naming, we shall pro-
ceed to investigate how this structuring generates, or, bet-
ter to say, contributes to generating the. intensional mean-
ing of the novel. Let us recall our claim, according to which 
an investigation into the intensional structuring of the 
narrative world by means of intensional functions will give 
us indirect access to the intensional macro-meaning of the 
literary text. Specifically, in the case of the intensional 
function of naming, we hope to have gained an access which 
will lead us far beyond the traditional intensional seman-
tics of proper names derived from their "inner form" (cf. 
Eis, 1970).17. 
In spite of the fact that we have been investigating 
only one intensional function operating in The Trial, we-
should hope to uncover significant traces of the total in-
tensional macrostructuring of the text. In this first, and, 
necessarily, partial approach, I want to suggest that three 
aspects of the intensional macrostructure of The' Trial are 
generated, or, at least, indicated by the intensional func-
tion of naming; 
1. Hierarchy of agents and their relationships, Intensional 
structuring resulting from the application of the function 
of naming generates associations of agents in addition, and, 
sometimes, in contrast to those which are established by ex-
tensional criteria. The most obvious feature of this aspect 
of intensional macrostructure in The Trial is the isolation 
of the hero-protagonist in a one-member class, resulting 
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from the exclusive use of abbreviation as his name . 
As a result, Josef K. is differentiated from all other 
defendants, expecially from Block. The intension of excep-
tionality, uniqueness which becomes obvious in a systematic 
study of naming, outweighs the intension of anonymity or 
loss of identity which the abbreviation evokes in isola-
tion. Kafka's hero is certainly an ordinary man because his 
fate is the possible fate of anybody. He is, however, 
unique among the ordinary men because of his insistence on 
human dignity in the face of an inhuman, inaccessible force. 
The hero-protagonist forms the centre of the inten-
sional system and the other agents are grouped around this 
centre according to their particular relationships to the 
protagonist. The intensionally generated split in the set 
of female characters is especially striking. I have in mind 
the intensional contrast between E.lsa and Leni, on the one 
hand, and Fräulein Bürstner, on the other hand. K.'s mis-
tresses, being named by the first name only (their family 
name is never given), are linked to other low-status char-
acters. In this case, the intensional feature (name) brings 
the extensional property of the class (low status) into ä 19 
sharper focus. The low status of K.'s mistresses is espe-
cially significant in contrast to the inaccessible Fräulein 
Bürstner, named consistently by the polite form of surname. 
The special position of this female character vis-a-vis Jo-
sef K. is reinforced by the intensional contrast to the 
male group of characters around K. who act as his "helpers" 
or "informers"; these latter agents form a separate inten-
sional class because they are consistently named by surname 
only (Huld, Tittorelli, Block). 
In general, all agents of The Trial assigned a proper 
name (first name, surname, Frau/Fräulein + surname) can be 
said to form the "private" group of the hero. They enter 
into clearly specified relations and interactions with the 
hero, while their association with the institutions of the 
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world of The Trial is vague, indefinite, sometimes mysteri-
ous. The case of the minor representatives of the institu-
tions (the three bank employees and the wardens) is typical; 
they are attracted into the "private" group by their closer 
association with Josef K. 
2. The intension qf the institutions. Two social institu-
tions, the Court and the Bank, play a fundamental role in the 
semantic structure of The Trial. On the extensional level, 
these institutions are clearly in contrast: The Bank is a ra-
tional, highly-efficient and well-defined form of social or-
ganization with clearly determined procedures and goals of 
operation. The Court's mode of activity is desperately mud-
dled, irrational and chaotic, with no rules of procedure and 
with absolutely unpredictable results. This extensional con-
trast, however, is counteracted by a similarity on the inten-
sional level, indicating a deeper connection of these two 
institutionalized modes of social activity. The intensional 
similarity is given by the fact that the Bank's and the 
Court's representatives form one class on the criterion of 
naming: as we know already, they are named by fixed definite 
descriptions expressing their function or position in the 
strict hierarchy of both institutions: the director (in the 
Bank) - the Bureau director (in the Court). The semantic sig-
nificance of this mode of naming is reinforced by a lack of 
proper names with respect to this set of agents. They are 
"professionals", not "individuals". It seems to me, however, 
that at a deeper level, there is a special motivation for 
withholding the proper name in the case of the Court's offi-
cials. The reason is suggested by Titorelli, a very important 
"informer" about the workings of the Court. When Josef K. 
asks Titorelli about the name of the judge who is being por-
trayed by the painter, Titorelli replies: "Das darf ich nicht 
sagen." (108) ("I am not allowed to tell you"). This answer 
indicates that the proper names of the Court's officials are 
tabu. This tabu-like prohibition of proper names is consist-
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ent with the overall intensional character of the Court in 
The Trial: The Court is an alien, separate, unknown and in-
accessible invisible world^0. 
A minor point should bring us back to the protagonist. 
His central position in the "private" group has been em-
phasized. However, Josef K. is exclusive in yet another re-
spect: in the accumulation of names which are assigned to 
him. Josef K. is an individual who faces his tragic fate a-
lone. At the same time, however, he is a part of the social 
machinery represented by the institutions. Correspondingly, 
he is assigned "institutionalized" names in the form of 
fixed descriptions, being "Herr Prokurist" (Herr Assessor) 
in the system of the Bank and "der Angeklagte" (the defend-
ant) in the domain of the Court. In such a way, the one-mem-
ber set represented by Josef K. is the intersection of all 
three fundamental sets of agents who comprise the domain of 
The Trial: the "private" group, the Bank and the Court. The 
pivotal position of the tragic hero could not be highlighted 
in a more emphatic way. 
3. While the features of the intensional structure of The 
Trial, just discussed, seem to me quite clearly established, 
the third feature is controversial. I want to propose it as 
an hypothesis arising from a thorough examination of the 
texture of Kafka's novel. In order to become more convincing, 
the hypothesis requires further evidence. 
It is striking that the two men who appear in the last 
chapter of The Trial in order to kill Josef K. are not named 
in accordance with the intensional function controlling the 
assignment of names in this novel. If the intensional func-
tion were applied in this case, the men, as representatives 
of the Court, would be assigned (perhaps after a stage of 
instability) a fixed definite description corresponding to 
their professional function. If the Court has its judges, 
magistrates, whippers, etc., it could be expected to have its 
well-appointed and appropriately named executioners. However, 
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the naming of the two gentlemen remains in the vague mode of 
the unstable definite descriptions: in the narrator's text, 
they are called zwei Herren (two gentlemen), die Herren (the 
gentlemen) and seine Begleiter (his companions); in K.'s in-
ner monologue, they are "alte untergeordnete Sohauspieler" 
(old, minor actors) and vielleioht...TenOre (maybe...tenors). 
(K. even asks one of them in which theater they perform). 
This absence of the expected mode of naming would not be 
striking, if it was clearly established in the text that the 
gentlemen are representatives of the Court. However, unlike 
the wardens of chapter I, they do not claim to act according 
to a commission (Auftrag); they make a silent sign in answer 
to K.'s rather indefinite question (162). In other words, the 
association of these agents with the Court is expressed nei-
ther explicitly, nor by the intensional mark of the name. It 
is obvious that the identity of K.'s executioners is uncer-
tain. Should we assume then that they are not at all connected 
with the Court? Should we interpret K.'s execution as an event 
which was not "ordered" by the Court? A positive answer to 
these questions would bring a new dimension into the semantic 
interpretation of The Trial. If K.'s execution cannot be 
traced to the Court, then it is an absolutely random event 
coming from a different, unknown realm. Such a twist in the 
semantic structure of the story would indicate that Kafka 
wrote not only The Trial, but also, in the last chapter, a 
parody of his own novel, specifically, a parody of the rules 
governing its semantic structure. We know that the Court's 
proceedings and activities are purely random and arbitrary; 
consequently, any random and arbitrary event, if its origin 
is not specified, can be interpreted as originating from the 
authority of the Court. Because the Court initiates random 
and arbitrary events, any random and arbitrary event of un-
certain origin can be "blamed" on the Court, can be inte-
grated into the chain of the Court's proceedings. With re-
spect to the final act of The Trial, such an integration has 
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been, as a rule, performed by readers and critics. Our minute 
analysis of modes of naming in the novel suggests that this 
interpretation is far from self-evident. 
Contemporary literary criticism looks more and more like 
an isolated island of dilettantism in the ocean of theoreti-
cally and methodologically advanced anthropological and so-
cial sciences. The most obvious consequence of the human-
istic preference for speculation, which prevails in literary 
studies, is the contemptuous attitude towards the literary 
text. Unable to develop reliable methods for the study of 
text structuring, literary criticism has abandoned its prop-
er subject and has resorted to guesses about authorial inten-
21 
tions and readers' concretizations . Although these escape 
manoeuvres are often masked by complicated "theories", they 
are nothing else than symptoms of the persistent theoretical 
and methodological feebleness of literary criticism. 
Literary texts are complex semiotic objects and, as such, 
require the development of ingenious methods of investigation. 
Among the difficult tasks facing literary theory, the prob-
lem of intensional meaning is probably the most difficult. In 
view of our claim that intensions are crucial components of 
literary meanings, the progress of literary semantics de-
pends on the development of reliable methods for the study of 
intensions. Our suggestion to link intensional semantics with 
the traditional concerns of stylistics might be a step on the 
long road towards a theoretically sound and empirically 
fruitful intensional semantics of literature. 
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Notes 
1 The concept of style has not been accepted as a central 
concept of literary theory. Most students of literature 
have treated style as a peripheral, almost accidental 
property of literary works. In the realm of linguistics, 
stylistics has not fared much better than in the empire 
of literary criticism. While many fundamental aspects of 
language, such as suprasyntactic structures, "deviant" 
syntax and semantics, pragmatic aspects, etc., have been 
discussed under the label of (linguo-)stylistics, the 
discipline has not been recognized as a necessary compo-
nent of a linguistic theory. Rather, it has been the play-
ground of linguistists who, dissatisfied with the rigidity 
and inflexibility of popular linguistic models, have been 
trying to cope with the irregular, idiosyncratic, "messy" 
aspects of verbal communication. When, finally, the emerg-
ing text theory pushed some of the traditional concerns of 
stylistics into the center of theoretical attention, it 
failed to acknowledge the merits and results of its prede-
cessor. The study of style has not been recognized as one 
of the most fundamental tasks of text theory. 
o 
For Students of style, this definition will be neither too 
striking, nor yery original, Havranek has already defined 
style as "the singularized organization of a discourse in 
its totality" (Havranek, 1963, 64; the quoted paper was 
originally published in 1942). . 
These similarities will be explored in more detail in 
Dolezel, forthcoming. 
4 Only in view of this interpretation can we understand why 
the two sentences of geometry, quoted by Frege, have dif-
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ferent intensional meanings. In the rich literature of 
Frege's interpreters,Walker has come closest to formulat-
ing this character of intensional meaning: "Nothing pre-
vents one and the same object from being signified by sev-
eral different signs. Although the use of different signs 
is sometimes arbitrary and therefore superfluous, it is 
sometimes the case that the difference between the signs 
goes with a difference between the ways each sign presents 
the object in question, the Darstellungsweise" (Walker, 
1965, 75). 
5 
The classical formulation of the "heresy of paraphrase" is 
to be found in Brooks, 1947. 
c 
A study of intensions in terms of "inner form" of expres-
sions will connect intensional semantics with another major 
representative of the Prague school, V. Mathesius (see, 
Mathesius, 1947). 
7 The assumption that literary texts construct their own 
worlds of reference is one of the axioms of structural po-
etics; both theoretically, and methodologically it is much 
more stimulating than the traditional axiom of "mimesis". 
For a preliminary demonstration of certain procedures of 
world construction, see Dolez'el, 19 80. 
o 
In a less technical discourse, we could simply say that one 
and the same world can be rendered or verbalized in a varie-
ty of world "pictures". 
9 The most comprehensive account of the present state of nar-
rative semantics can be found in Woods-Pavel, eds., 1979; 
cf. also Csuri, ed., 1980. 
1 0 The theory was proposed and developed in Kripke, 1972 and 
1980. Kripke's thesis that proper names lack Fregean sense 
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(intension) is a necessary corollary of his assumption 
that intensions should be described in terms of possible-
-world semantics. I share Linsky's view that this thesis 
is "incorrect" (Linsky, 1977, 69 ff.). However, even the 
acceptance of Kripke's view on this matter would not in-
validate our main thesis: proper names having "zero" sense 
would still differ from definite descriptions which carry 
sense. 
The concept of style as a regulated selection of alterna-
tives has deep roots in stylistics. cf. Dolezel, 1969. 
12 
In the framework of logical semantics, the idea that "every 
singular term is either a personal proper name or a defi-
nite description" has been criticized by Linsky (op. cit., 
69). Linsky assumes that "there are many kinds of singular 
terms which fit neither of these two categories", without 
proposing any kind of categorization. I prefer deriving 
the "many kinds of singular terms" by subcategorizing the 
two basic kinds. 
For a thorough and relatively recent survey of Kafka crit-
icism, see Beicken, 1974, 
I am using the Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag edition of Der 
Prozega (Frankfurt/M., 1960). The English translation by 
Willa and Edwin Muir (Penguin Books, 1976) has been con-
sulted, but not necessarily followed. 
1 5 It is a minor point that the abbreviation is applied also 
to Josef K.'s uncle. The usage is clearly motivated by the 
need to protect the hero's mode of naming. 
1 6 It is important to note that the fixed definite descrip-
tion is used in all respects as a proper name. Most sig-
nificantly, the agent is identified by it in the ritual of 
introduction (.55, 78). 
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12 The abbreviation has been treated as a sort of "inner form" 
and, as such, has been discussed in Kafka criticism. The 
question whether it does or does not stand for the name of 
the author has received most of the attention (cf. Jaffe, 
1967, 13, 16 f.). 
18 
This isolating semantic effect would become even more ob-
vious if Kafka's intensional system was compared with other 
systems using abbreviations as names for agents. Zamjatin's 
novel My (We) represents a clear contrast to Kafka's sys-
tem: While in The Trial the abbreviation serves as an in-
tensional mark of the exceptionality of the hero, in Zam-
jatin's science-fiction novel, the names-abbreviations (giv-
en in the form of a combination of letters and numbers) 
mark the agents as belonging to a "faceless" mass; all the 
agents of the novel (with the exception of the Benefactor) 
bear this name, thus forming a large intensionally defined 
class. Depriyed of proper names, they are deprived of 
their individual identity. The Benefactor stands out in a 
one-member class, singled out by the fixed definite de-
scription. What we have here is a clear reversal of Kaf-
ka's intensional structuring with the preservation of its 
basic components. 
1 9 
The fact that Josef K. (as well as K. from The Castle) has 
sexual relations with women of low status has been common-
ly known in Kafka criticism (cf. Jaffe, op. cit., 94). 
20 
For a definition of the concept "invisible world" see Do-
lezel, 1979. 
21 
While these problems connot be resolved by abstract spec-
ulation, they are legitimate topics of empirical enquiry 
in the psychology and sociology of literary communication. 
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STUDIES ON FICTIONALITY 
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ACQUAINTANCE WITH NON-EXISTING ENTITIES: RUSSELL'S VIEWS 
ON FICTIONALITY1 
Zoltán Kanyó 
A. József University, Szeged 
1. Bertrand Russell was one of the most important founders 
of mathematical logic and he has contributed to the formula-
tion of a modern semiotics over and above his logical stud-
ies in a series of different, generally well-known philo-
sophical essays. Therefore if we want to summarize his spe-
cial conception we must mention repeatedly some ideas and 
concepts introduced by him which appear today to be basic in 
semiotic research. Notwithstanding the fact that some of 
Russell's writings have absolute authority we cannot here 
speak of any unanimous and adequate interpretation of his 
philosophical studies; in spite of the rational and lin-
guistic clarity in the formulation of his ideas the litera-
ture on Russell is full of misunderstandings and misinterpre-
tations (cf. Russell (1944)). A reason for these errors can 
be found in the changing of his philosophical ideas which 
could hardly be considered as true representatives of a 
nominalistic system: he started out as a monistic philoso-
pher, and even his first logistic work is characterized by 
a Platonic ontology, although he abandoned this position in 
his later studies he felt a sort of nostalgia for this 
view. We do not intend to give an account of Rus&éil's 
monist papers, even his later Platonic conception will only 
be mentioned and analysed briefly in order to make under-
standable the sense of the later changes. We shall have to 
summarize Russell's classical theory of denotation with all 
the new results it brought in ontological, epistemological 
and semantical contexts. Our main aim is, however, to give a 
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systematic analysis of Russell's views on fictionality. This 
investigation should be carried out not only because Russell 
was deeply interested in fictional texts and had an e-
normously wide literary and cultural education, he formulat-
ed from time to time some items of fiction, the number of 
which should not be limited to the published volumes Russell 
(1953), (19541 and (.1961), but should include many unpub-
lished stories, among others even a n o v e l o u r study is 
moved by the importance of Russell's remarks which seem to 
bear a paradigmatic character. We find Russell's semantic 
ideas concerning fictionality with all the dilemmas and open 
questions very characteristic of the nominalistic point of 
view even if in the case of a dogmatic standpoint they were 
not formulated at all or were worded in such a way that the 
difficulties disappeared. Russell's different attempt at the 
definition of fictionality give an insight into the problems 
of 'interpretation the nominalistically based theory is con-
fronted with, and point consequently to its advantages and 
to its risks. 
1.1. Before dealing with Russell's ideas concerning fic;-
tionality we must have a comprehensive view of his conception 
determining his semantic decisions. His first contribution 
to modern logic and semiotics was formulated in Russell 
(1903), in a characteristic work of the transition announc-
ing the new orientation in logic and mathematics and present-
ing a denotation theory based on Platonic ontology. We are 
mainly interested in his new ideas as far as they remained 
decisive in his later development. The Preface to the first 
edition of this volume speaks of two main objects: the re-
ducibility of all pure mathematics to a very small number of 
fundamental concepts and the philosophical explanation of 
these fundamental concepts which mathematics accepts as in-
definable (XV.). From our point of view the latter problem 
is obviously of main importance. 
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2.1.1. Russell's book opens with a definition of pure math-
ematics: "PURE Mathematics is the class of all propositions 
of the form 'p implies q', where p and q are propositions 
containing one or more variables, the same in the two pro-
positions, and neither p nor q contain any constants except 
logical constants." (3.) It follows an explication of the 
term "logical constant" by means of the enumeration of sev-
4 
eral examples, however, the central concept, the proposi-
tion, cannot in this way be elucidated, a full explanation 
is delivered during the theoretical explanation of logical 
concepts. Proposition is primarily introduced as a member 
of a logical metalanguage, and appears in opposition to log-
ical variable, logical constant, propositional function, 
etc. A logical variable is a very complicated concept, "... 
a variable is any term Qua term in a certain propositional 
function ... variables are distinguished by the proposi-
tional functions in which they occur, or, in the case of 
several variables, by the place they occupy in a given mul-
tiple variable propositional function." (107.) We can dis-
tinguish apparent and real variables, the former appear in 
propositions, "the variable is absorbed ... the proposition 
does not depend upon the variable; whereas in 'x is a man' 
there are different propositions for different values of the 
variable, and the variable is ... real". (13) The notion of 
a propositional function is explained, but not defined in 
the following way: "(fx is a propositional function if, for 
every value of i, is a proposition, determinate when x is 
given". (.19) A proposition can be conceived of syntactically 
in contradistinction to propositional function: "I shall 
speak of propositions exclusively where there is no real 
variable: where there are one or more real variables, and 
for all values of the variables the expression involved is a 
proposition, I shall call the expression a propositional func-
tion" . (13) The proposition has over and above this charac-
teristic and essential device: 
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"A proposition, we may say, is anything that is true or 
that is false." (12-13.) viz. it disposes of truth-value. 
Russell formulates a definition of proposition by means of a 
tautology 
/1/ p 3 p 
which holds only for propositions.5 The logical analysis of 
proposition by means of the explanation of its further con-
stituents such as material and formal implication, class, 
etc. is carried out in the way signalized by the quoted de-
finitions which demonstrate Russell's discoveries during his 
first generalization of modern logic and mathematics, and at 
the same time the superficiality of some of his theses. As 
the last ones have been corrected in Principia Mathematica 
and we do not want to evince the changes which Russell's 
system underwent during that time we want to disregard an 
extensive analysis of his logical metalanguage and we want 
to see briefly how the concept of proposition is embedded 
in grammatical and semantical contexts. 
1.1.2. Russell considers grammar already in this work "as 
a source of discovery" (.42) even if correctness in the use 
of language must be checked philosophically because the 
general requirements are not ideally fulfilled in natural 
language and in its practical use. Therefore he tries to 
explain the linguistic structure from a philosophic and may 
we say a general semiotic point of view. At the centre of 
his investigation again stands the proposition, however, 
the main difference between the linguistic unit "sentece" 
and "proposition" is not clearly explicated. In his discus-
sion with Bradley, Russell tries to point out the distinc-
tion between proposition and the linguistic unit sentence,6 
however, he cannot elucidate the mutual dependence of the 
two concepts on each other. In his later studies Russell 
(1919b) (1940) Russell points to propositions as invariant 
structure classes underlying declarative sentences formulât-
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ed in different languages which have the same meaning, al-
though in the linguistic formulation there exist some retho-
ric differences besides the choice of the language; in this 
way it represents one of the most abstract semiotlc struc-
tures of a linguistic utterance. As syntactic structures 
Russell mentions two different sequences: 
/2/ a. Subject - verb - predicate 
b. Subject - verb - object^ ... objectn 
/2/ a. can be considered as the classical Aristotelian 
way of analysis, Russell's contention that relational pre-
dicates, i. e. verbs, cannot be reduced to the ancient Sub-
ject - copula - predicate formula opens the way to the new 
mathematical logical analysis of language. However at this 
stage it is full of difficulties, one of the main problems 
consists in the fact that syntactical facts, e. g. the ex-
istence of various possibilities for the fulfillment of a 
syntactic function like subject, make a semantic interpreta-
tion of these constituents very complicated, even unaccep-
table. This problem will be solved in Principia Mathematica 
by means of the introduction of the Theory of Types. At this 
point the Platonic ontology of this theory clearly manifests 
itself: the semantic category corresponding to the syntactic 
category subject is "term": "Whatever may be an object of 
thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or 
can be counted as one, I call a term. ... I shall use as 
synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. 
The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, 
while the third is derived from the fact that every term has 
being, i. e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a 
class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be 
mentioned, is sure to be a term: and to deny that such and 
such a thing is a term must always be false.: (43) This is a 
characteristically Meinongian point of view which has a 
direct influence on a theory concerning fictionality: it is 
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quite clear that "the pseudo-exlstents of a novel" (45) 
partake in this generally assumed existence of the objects. 
Terms are distinguished as things - the counterparts of 
proper names - and concepts which are indicated by all other 
words. "Among concepts ... two kinds at least must be dis-
tinguished, namely those indicated by adjectives and those 
indicated by verbs." (44) The first class is defined as 
7 8 
predicate the second is that of relations. This grammati-
cal conception has without doubt contributed to a new inter-
pretation of the grammatical constituents, however, it does 
not offer a comprehensive overview of the linguistic system 
and the principles taken into account stand in contradiction 
to each other. 
1.1.3. This contradictory relationship applies first of all 
to the semantic part of the theory. On the one hand Russell 
wants to formulate a correspondence theory based on empiri-
cal confrontation of linguistic utterances and the real 
connexions denoted by them, on the other hand, however, he 
postulates the Platonic or realistic existence of the ob-
jects appearing in texts. "Denoting", "denotation" appear in 
this theory as a second semantic term beside "meaning". 
Meaning is defined as a symbolic relation standing between 
9 
single words and their non-verbal content. The proposition 
is considered as an objective non-linguistic structure, it 
consists of the entities indicated by the words,^ and cor-
responds with the Fregean "Gedanke" concept together with 
its t r u t h - v a l u e . I n this sense "meaning" is irrelevant for 
proposition and for the semantic analysis of this central 
unit. "But such concepts as a man have meaning in another 
sense: they are so to speak, symbolic in their own logical 
nature, because they have the property which I call denot-
ing. That is to say, wher a man occurs in a proposition 
/e. g. 'I met a man in the street'// the proposition is not 
about the concept a man, but about something quite different, 
some actual biped denoted by the concept. Thus concepts of 
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this kind have meaning in a non-psychological sense. And in 
this sense, when we say 'this is a man', we are making a 
proposition in which a concept is in some sense attached to 
what is not a concept." (47) Denotation is clearly introduc-
ed as the determining relation between some definite con-
stituent of the verbal equivalent of the proposition and its 
non-verbal or even verbal referent, a unit formulated in the 
sense of the correspondence theory. "A concept denotes when, 
if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not about 
the concept, but about a term connected in a certain pecul-
iar way with the concept. If I say 'I met a man', the pro-
position is not about a man: this is a concept which does 
not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the 
logic-books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an ac-
tual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house 
and a drunken wife." (53) Denoting can be expressed by pre-
dicates and more generally formulated by class-concepts which 
may appear alone in a simple subject-predicate proposition, 
but they may also have a great variety of closely allied 
concepts, i. e. an apparatus for describing the denotation 
in detail. The examination of denotation is carried out by 
means of the analysis of these operator concepts which com-
bine predicative concepts in a way to form new denotating 
concepts. The examples chosen are "all, every, any, a, some 
and the." (55) Russell's main contribution to denotion in 
this early work consists in the analysis of the first five 
mentioned operators by means of propositional logic and the 
calculus of classes, the definite description the had to be 
separated, because the author had here to be content with 
some general philosophical remarks concerning the main topic 
of his later theory of descriptions. 
At the beginning of this analysis Russell raises the 
question: "is there one way of denoting six different kinds 
of objects, or are the ways of denoting different? And in 
the latter case, is the object denoted the same in all six 
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cases, or does the object differ as well as the way of de-
noting it?" (53) The dilemma spelled out in the first ques-
tion is the classical problem of reference in medieval lo-
gic, i. e. which system should be chosen, the doctrine of 
distribution or the modes of reference. In the doctrine of 
distribution the difference of the reference is postulated, 
however, this solution leads to logical inconsistencies 
(cf. Geach (1962) 3-46), therefore we accept Geach's con-
clusion: 'if a theory of common nouns' being logical sub-
jects is to be taken seriously, it must make any (unambiguous) 
common noun refer in an impartial way to each of the objects 
that could be so named in a simple act of naming." (Geach 
(1962) 46). Russell's conception corresponds to the second 
theory, but it must be emphasized that this view is histori-
cally independent of the medieval approaches, but it agrees 
with them in pointing out "that denoting itself is the same 
in all cases" (Russell (1903) 62) and permits or does not 
exclude the conception of distinctness in the objects denot-
ed by all men, every men, etc. as various species of refer-
ence. (61). The definition of different denoting phrases is 
given by means of logical operations: "All a's ... denotes a 
numerical conjunction; it is definite as soon as a is given. 
The concept all a's is a perfectly definite single concept, 
which denotes the terms of a taken all together. ... Every a, 
on the contrary, though it still denotes all the a's, de-
notes them in a different way, i. e. severally instead of 
collectively, Any a denotes only one a- but it is wholly 
irrelevant which it denotes, and what is said will be qually 
true whichever it may be. Moreover, any a denotes a variable 
a, that is, whatever particular a we may fasten upon it, it 
is certain that any a does not denote that one; and yet of 
that one any proposition is true which is true of any a. 
An a denotes a variable disjunction: that is to say, a pro-
position which holds of an a may be false concerning each 
particular a, so that it is not reducible to a disjunction 
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of propositions ... some a, the constant disjunction ... 
denotes just one term of the class a, but the term it de-
notes may be any term of the class. ... In the case of a 
class a which has a finite number of terms - say a , a 2, 
a^, ... aR, we can illustrate these various notions as 
follows: 
/1/ All a's denotes a. and a- and ... and a . i. z n 
/2/ Every a denotes a^ and denotes a2 and ... and 
denotes a . n 
/3/ Any a denotes ^ or a 2 ... or an, where or has 
the meaning that it is irrelevant which we take. 
/4/ An a denotes a^ or a^ or ... or a, where or has 
the meaning that no one in particular must be 
taken. 
/5/ Some a denotes a^ or denotes a 2 o r ••• o r denotes 
a n, where it is not irrelevant which is taken, 
but on the contrary some one particular a must 
be taken." (58-59) 
Concerning the definite description the we must be con-
tent with some general remarks: "The word the3 in the singu-
lar, is correctly employed only in relation to a class-con-
cept of which there is only one instance. We speak of the 
King, the Prime Minister, and so on (understanding at the 
present time)} and in such cases there is a method of denot-
ing one single definite term by means of a concept, which is 
not given us by any of our five words. It is owing to his 
notion that mathematics can give definitions of terms which 
are not concepts ... An object may be present to the mind, 
without our knowing any concept of which the said object is 
the instance; and the discovery of such a concept is not a 
mere improvement in notation. The reason why this appears 
to be the case is that, as soon as the definition is found, 
it becomes v/holly unnecessary to the reasoning to remember 
the actual object defined, since only concepts irrelevant 
to our deductions." (62-63) Russell points out that "the 
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actual use of identity, though not its meaning, was also 
found to depend upon this way of denoting a single term." 
(65) 
1.2. We have dealt rather extensively with this Meinongian 
denotation theory because some of the most essential prob-
lems of Russell's later conception are notionally and ter-
minologically prepared in his early views, (cf. Hursthouse 
(1980)) even if some of his critics (e. g. Geach)are in-
clined to see in it an erroneous theory that should be dis-
tinguished from his later writings. We should like to lay 
stress equally upon similarity and dissimilarity, therefore 
we shall compare this starting point with the results of 
Russell's later development in view of ontologlcal and 
epistemological determination, and the syntactic-semantic 
structure of denotation. 
1.2.1. The ontologlcal standpoint in Russell's early work 
is Platonic or realistic, this can be established on the 
basis of his analysis of the semantic constituents of the 
proposition: we remember his postulate that the subject of 
the proposition was a term and this term was conceived as 
being in each case an existing entity. This is a Meinongian 
view and its theoretical background should not be explicat-
ed within the frame of the present study. However, this 
work does not appear an orthodox representative of the 
classical realistic view: with his critic oriented against 
the Aristotelian Subject-copula-predicate formula presented 
as the only logic-linguistic structure of our different 
utterances, Russell proves to be an adversary of the clas-
sical substance-attribute conception which is based on the 
12 
criticized subject-predicate theory. It is highly sig-
nificant thdt in the definition of matter Russell does not 
take the realistic foundation of his theory into account 
but he tries to give an empiricist characterization of this 
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entity. "Material unit is a class-concept, applicable to 
whatever has the following characteristics: /1/ A simple 
material unit occupies a spatial point at any moment; two 
units cannot occupy the same point at the same moment, and 
one cannot occupy two points at the same moment. /2/ Every 
material unit persists through time; its positions in 
space at any two moments may be the same or different; but 
if different, the positions at times intermediate between 
the two chosen must form a continuous series. /3/ Two mate-
rial units differ in the same immediate manner as two points 
or two colours; they agree in having the relation of inclu-
sion in a class to the general concept matter, or rather to 
the general concept material unit. Matter itself seems to 
be a collective name for all pieces of matter, as space for 
all points and time for all instants. It is thus the pe-
culiar relation to space and time which distinguishes matter 
from other qualities, and not any logical difference such as 
that of subject and predicate, or substance and attribute." 
(468). The spatial-temporal determined material units build 
chains of events underlying physical relations like causal-
ity, motion. The non-material particulars are - with the 
exception of some brief remarks on occupation of time with-
out existence (cf. 471) - not extensively dealt within the 
frame of this theory so that we do not have the slightest 
idea the place that chimerae and impossible objects should 
have in the realm of the being conceived by Russell (cf. 
Quine (1966) p. 658). Instead of a Meinongian development 
of this realistic system Russell's main decision in the 
ontological field consisted in giving up those terms which 
were not connected with space and time and of whose exist-
ence we have no empirical verification through perception, 
and in confining himself to the study of events and the 
problems of•knowledge, i. e. how do we obtain reliable in-
formation about the existing particulars. This turniny-point 
in Russell's ontological conception was a rather complicat-
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ed process and if one considers that some constituents of 
this system were worked out on such a scale as e. g. in the 
case of the redefinition of matter which was achieved in 
Russell (1927a) and the theory of knowledge by acquaintance 
and knowledge by description which goes back to 1902, one 
may ask whether we can speak about a coherent system or 
not.13 We can detect an inner logic between the different 
constituents the enumeration of which we begin with the 
earliest theory concerning the different kinds of knowledge 
of particulars. The sensible and understandable use of lan-
guage has, over and above grammatical and semiotical rules, 
some epistemological predispositions concerning our know-
ledge of constituents spelled out in the following general 
principle: "Every proposition which we understand must be 
composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquaint-
ed." (Russell (1910-1911) 209. and similarly Russell (1912) 
91.) This principle makes grammar dependent on our knowledge 
of the external world: we can only speak about objects that 
we know and the meaning of which is familiar to us by means 
of linguistic items. This means not only that proper names 
must denote different individuals, but "our bound variables 
range over known individuals only" and the "quantifiers 
range over objects of acquaintance only" (Hintikka (1981) 
175.) 
Russell admits two kinds of objects that correspond to 
the linguistic constituents: "There are ... at least two 
sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars 
and universals. Among particulars I include all existents, 
and all complexes of which one or more constituents are 
existents, such as this-before-that, this-above-that, the-
-yellowness-of-this. Among universals I include all objects 
of which no particular is a constituent. Thus the disjunc-
tion 'universal-particular' includes all objects." (Russell 
(1910-1911) 204.) The postulation of existing universals, 
which applies to the relation (it is supposed that we are 
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acquainted with the meaning of it and not merely with 
instances of it), is a characteristically non-nominalistical 
feature in Russell's system. 
Russell argues that there are two essential ways in 
which we can obtain knowledge of the non-verbal or verbal 
content of the constituents in our linguistic system: the 
first consists in acquaintance, i. e. a direct presentation 
of the particulars to us (cf. Russell (1910-1911) 201f.) 
the second in a verbal definite description "the so-and-so" 
having the distinctive features of this formula, namely the 
existence of a unique object possessing such and such pre-
dicates (Ibid, 205.) In this way Russell's theory of know-
ledge points to the epistemological frame in which the con-
ception of the perception of objects can be formulated and 
to a new denotation theory based on the principles of Rus-
sell (1905b) and of Principia Mathematica. 
1.2.2. Epistemological questions are introduced by the rela-
tion acquaintance: they can primarily be formulated accord-
ing to which objects may appear as referents of the dyadic 
relation "acquaintance", the relatum being always "we", i.e. 
représentants of a socio-culturally defined human community. 
These objects are, as we know, particulars and universals 
and according to Russell one becomes aware of both of them 
by means of sense-data (Russell (1910-1911) 201, 203.). 
After his early works Russell became a consistent follower 
of British empiricism, he considered that sense-data and 
perception are the only direct information we acquire from 
the world of the objects and therefore they are our means 
of control of our verbal expressions: We have no data at 
our disposal giving insight into the material structure of 
physical appearences except our sense-data, which can be 
considered a's mental events. Russell is of the opinion that 
we may have "some principle a priori without the need of 
empirical verification", however, the main line of défini-
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tion lies in another direction: "We may succeed in actually 
defining the objects of physics as functions of sense-data. 
Just in so far as physics leads to expectations, this must 
be possible, since we can only expcct what can be experi-
enced. And in so far as the physical state of affairs is 
inferred from sense-data it must be capable of expression 
as a function of sense-data." (Russell (1914b)). Russell 
explained this special compresence of physical-material 
structure with perceptive psycho-physiological connexions 
by the concept of his neutral monism redefining the rela-
tionship of mental and material constituents to each other 
in the structure of the world: "... the view which I am 
advocating is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what 
(following the suggestion of Dr. H. M. Sheffer) we cali 
'neutral monism*. It is monism in the sense that it regards 
the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely 
events; but it is pluralism in the sense that it admits the 
existence of a great multiplicity of events, each minimal 
event being a logically self-subsistent entity." (Russell 
(19 27b) 293.) "While, on the question of the stuff of the 
world, the theory ... has certain affinities with idealism 
- namely, that mental events are part of that stuff, and 
that the rest of the stuff resembles them more than it 
resembles traditional billiard-balls - the position advo-
cated as regards scientific laws has more affinity with ma-
terialism than with idealism." (Russell (1927a) 388.) Phys-
ics can never be analysed without taking into account the 
psychological component of the perception of the physical 
facts, therefore Russell deals intensively with the contem-
porary development of psycho-physiological sciences. He 
turned in first decade of this century to the behaviorism 
which he found a progressive experimental trend in psycho-
physiology, although he could never agree with its dogmatic 
antimentalism. He formulated his relationship to behaviorism 
in the following way: "This philosophy ... holds that every-
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tiling that can be known about man is discoverable by the 
method of external observation, i. e. that.none of our 
knowledge depends, essentially and necessarily, upon data in 
which the observer and the observed are the same person. I 
do not fundamentally agree with this view, but I think it 
contains much more truth than most people suppose, and I re-
gard it as desirable to develop the behaviorist method to 
the fullest possible extent. I believe that the knowledge to 
be obtained by this method, so long as we take physics for 
granted, is self-contained, and need not, at any point, ap-
peal to data derived from introspection ... Nevertheless, I 
hold that there are such observations and there is knowledge 
which depends upon introspection. What is more, I hold that 
data of this kind are required for a critical exposition of 
physics, which behaviorism takes for granted. I shall, 
therefore, after setting forth the behaviorist view of man, 
proceed to a scrutiny of our knowledge of physics, returning 
thence to man, but now as viewed from within". (Russell 
(1927b) 73-74.) Behaviorism can serve as an auxiliary sci-
ence and we may achieve by means of it a number of interest-
ing results, however, its conclusions must be queried be-
cause of the inadequate foundation of the theory. Russell's 
attack against behaviorism as a final philosophy formulates 
the inconsequences following from its theoretical and metho-
dological one-sidedeness (cf. Russell (1927b) 135, 139.) As 
to the material or physical side of the inquiry Russell gave 
up very slowly the Newtonian concept presented in Russell 
(1903): after the mainly linguistically-logically oriented 
logical atomism he turned again to the structures of the 
external world and after having given an outline in Russell 
(1924) he formulated an intensive analysis of matter in Rus-
sell (1927a) which applied already the results of Einstein's 
theory. This book is conceived on the basis of an elaborated 
variant of neutral monism, therefore the investigation ends 
with a part "in which we endeavour to discover a possible 
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structure of the physical world which shall at once justify 
physics and take account of the connection with perception 
demanded by the necessity for an empirical basis for phys-
ics. Here we are concerned first with the construction of 
points as systems of events which overlap, or are 'conpunc-
tual', in space-time, and then with purely ordinal pro-
perties of space-time. ... The conception of one unit of 
matter - say one electron - as a 'substance', 1. e. a single 
simple entity persisting through time, is not one which we 
are justified in adopting, since we have no evidence what-
ever as to whether it is false or true. We define a single 
material unit as a 'causal line', i. e. as a series of events 
connected with each other by an intrinsic differential causal 
law which determines first-order changes, leaving second-or-
der changes to be determined by extrinsic causal laws." 
(Russell (1927a) 401.) This special view remained Russell's 
conception concerning physical structure in his ensuing de-
cisive works (Russell (1940) and (1948)). Structure itself 
may be defined by several relations. There are abstract, log-
ical and mathematical relationships between the constituents 
of the structure that may be explained by means of a minimum 
vocabulary (cf. Russell (1948) 267-283.). 
1.2.3. These deep changes in the ontological and epistemol-
ogical structure of Russell's theory had direct consequences 
for the formulation of his denotation theory. In the early 
theory presented in Russell (1903) one may mention different 
"slips on Russell's part" (Geach (1962) 77.) such as the in-
correct translation of the formula "any term of an A", the 
unsatisfactory distinction between 'any' and 'every' at a 
certain place (cf. Geach (1962) 76-77.J etc. however the 
main problem with the whole theory consists in the faĉ t that 
it fails to.take into consideration the question of the 
scope and therefore it must be held to be radically incon-
sistent: "With a little ingenuity all the examples that gave 
plausibility to the distinctions between 'any' and 'every'. 
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between 'some and 'a', can be explained by differences of 
punctuation or scope." (Geach (1962) 105.) Russell's turning-
point with respect to denotation is his classical essay Rus-
sell (1905b): here he is compelled to revise the requirement 
to dispose semantic categories, meaning and denotation, each 
of them pertaining to different constituents of the proposi-
tion. The result of this revision is "that the whole dis-
tinction of meaning and denotation has been wrongly con-
cieved." (Russell (1905b) 50.) The central idea of the new 
theory is formulated so "that denoting phrases never have 
any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in 
whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning." (Russell 
(1905b) 43.) The terminology is new, Russell does not speak 
any more about denoting concepts, the denoting phrases cor-
respond to the combination of concepts by means of the six 
words all, every, any, etc. Besides the denoting phrases 
there is a simple constituent which has directly to do with 
denotation: "a name ... directly designating and individual 
which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own 
right, independently of the meanings of all other words" 
(Russell (1919a) 174.). Names, i. e. proper names have the 
function of designating particulars and in Russell's dif-
ferent periods the particulars were seen as "terms of rela-
tions in atomic facts" (Russell (1918-1919) 199.) or as 
"assigned to any continuous portion of space-time ... every 
proper name is the name of a structure, not of something 
destitute of parts". (Russell (1940) 31.) Independently of 
the different interpretation of this category there is a 
constant suspicion concerning proper names used in natural 
language: "The names that we commonly use, like 'Socrates', 
are really abbreviations for descriptions; not only that, 
but what they describe are not particulars but complicated 
systems of classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical 
sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be 
applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquaints 
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ed..." (Russell (1918-1919) 200, 201.) This view and in gen-
eral the application of Russell's theory of knowledge to the 
natural language raise different problems cf. Reeves (1933) 
and Black (1944). From the vocabulary only egocentric par-
ticulars such as "this" may fulfil the strict requirements 
in designating an object. In contrast to proper names, de-
noting phrases do not have a constant meaning, it is ques-
tionable whether they have significance at all in the con-
crete proposition. This can be decided by means of a strict-
ly codified translation of the proposition in a logical 
structure determining its constituents and their relation-
ship to each other. The idea of the reduction of denoting 
phrases to symbolic logic made most of the distinctions 
introduced in Russell (1903) outworn concepts: here the 
scope was fully recognized and differences between the lin-
guistic formulations that cannot be captured in a pure logi-
cal system (cf. Lang (1977), Kanyô (1977)) appeared to be of 
secondary importance. The logical analysis could give a 
clear logical-semantical interpretation for denoting phrases 
containing alt, every, no, any, some, the specific problems 
of denotation in this case are connected with the use and 
the semantic sense of variables bound by universal and ex-
istential operators. The remaining types of denoting phrases 
- the first introduced by the, the second by a(n) - repre-
sent highly interesting cases of denotation and are named 
descriptions, 1. e. the first definite, the second indefi-
nite description. It is the definite description that stands 
at the centre of the theory of description. This formula is 
formally defined: "a definite description is a phrase of the 
form ' the so-and-so' (in the singular)". (Russell (1919a) 
167.) This definition is unsatisfactory however, - as e. g. 
Linsky has pointed out in Linsky (1967) 63. the same expres-
sion does not refer to a particular in a general statement. 
In answer to similar criticisms in Moore (1944) 214f Russell 
deplored his "own carelessness in the use of ordinary lan-
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guage. As to this, however, I should say that the whole of 
my theory of descriptions is contained in the definitions at 
the beginning of *14 of Prinaipia Mathematioa, and that the 
reason for using an artificial symbolic language was the 
inevitable vagueness and ambiguity of any language used for 
every-day purposes". (Russell (1944) 690.) Therefore the 
resolving of the question "whether a phrase is or is not a 
definite description (in a given proposition) depends on 
the logical form of that proposition, on how the proposition 
is to be analysed". (Linsky (1967) 63.) Definite descrip-
tions are introduced as incomplete symbols. "By an 'incom-
plete' symbol we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have 
any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain 
contexts," (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 66.) This means that 
the apparent grammatical subject expressed by the denoting 
phrase disappears in the process of the logical analysis 
and what remains is a complex logical structure of different 
constituents which have not been transparent in the previous 
linguistic formulation. In this sense the definite descrip-
tion (e. g. "the author of Waverley") differs from a true 
proper name i. e. "Scott", being an incomplete symbol it'has 
a meaning in use, but not in isolation. "For 'the author of 
Wayerley- cannot mean the same as 'Scott', or 'Scott is the 
author of Waverley' would mean the same as 'Sott is Scott', 
which it plainly does not; nor can 'the author of Waverley' 
mean anything other than 'Scott', or 'Scott is the author 
of Waverley' would be false, Hence 'the author of Waverley' 
means nothing." (Whitehead-Russell (.1910) 67.) Therefore 
there can be no general definition of the meaning of a defi-
nite description, but only a definition of the uses of its 
symbol, i. e. "the propositions in whose symbolic expression 
it occurs." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 67.) The definite de-
scription itself is formulated as (i x) (<)> x) , its meaning 
can, however, be given in respect with a proposition, e. g. 
•The author of Waverley was a poet'. "This implies that (1) 
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Waverley was written, (2) that it was written by one 
man, and not in collaboration, (3) that the one man who 
wrote it was a poet. If any one of these fails, the proposi-
tion is false. Thus 'the author of ''Slawkenburgius on 
Noses'' was a poet' is false, because no such book was ever 
written: "the author of ''The Maid's Tragedy'' was a poet' 
is false, because this play was written by Beaumont and 
Fletcher jointly. These two possibilities of falsehood do 
not arise if we say 'Scott was a poet'. Thus our interpreta-
tion of the uses of (ix) (<)>x) must be such as to allow for 
them. Now taking to replace 'x wrote Waverley', it is 
plain that any statement appearently about (.ix) (ij>x) requires 
(.1). (3x).(<j>x) and (2) jx-fy? •x=y; here (1) states 
x r y 
that at least one object satisfies <px, while (2) states that 
at most one object satisfies $x. The two together are equi-
valent to (3c) : (fx- = • 4>x = c, which we defined as 
E! (ix) (4>x) ". (Whitehead-Russell (.1910) 68.) E! is the sec-
ondary predicate existence, the above formalized criterion 
means that there must exist the unique object referred to 
by the definite description. Russell's two most important 
definitions for definite descriptions are: . • 
14.01. [(3x)(4>x)] r(ix) (<f>x) = O c ) (x) Of 
[ (.(J>x) h (x = c) & 0|>c) ]. 
(Whitehead-Russell (1910) 175. We give the definition in a 
more easily understandable modern transcription.) This def-
inition expresses the above mentioned criteria: there is 
at least one object c, there is at most one object c that 
satisfies <j>x and this object disposes of the predicate i¡) as 
well. Or in Russell's formulation: "... 'the term satisfying 
j>x satisfies tyx' is defined as meaning: 'There is a term c 
such that (1) is always equivalent to ''.x is c'', (2) 
1¡10 is true"'. CRussell (1919a) 178.) The second definition 
states the existence-criterion: 
14.02. E! (ix) (fx) (3c) (x) (fx). 5 (x — c). 
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In Whitehead-Russell (1910) we find, besides this general 
introduction to definite description, a typology of its 
forms according to the syntactic category of the predicate 
determining the argument bound by the iota operator. In the 
quoted example "author" was reducible to the predicate 
"write", a transitive verb the grammatical object ("Waver-
ley") of which was given so that the prescriptions applied 
in general to the argument bound by the iota operator with-
out any distinction with respect to the syntactic role ful-
filled by this argument or by the predicate which determi-
nates it. If the predicate is a relation, several descrip-
tions may be distinguished. The general case of a descrip-
tive function is "R'y = (,x) CxRy) Df. That is, 'R'y' is to 
mean the term x which has the relation R to y". (Whitehead-
-Russell (1910) 232.) The relation itself may be defined as 
converse of a relation e. g. "less", versus "greater" (cf. 
238-241.) or the relative product of two relations e. g. 
"father" x "father" = "paternal grandfather" (cf. 256-264.). 
Relations with limited domains and converse domains, e. g. 
""brother" and "sister" express the same relation (that of 
a common parentage), with the domain limited in the first 
case to males, in the second to feiusles" (265. CT. 265—267«). 
For relations with limited fields cf. (277-278.). Plurality 
of descriptive functions can be taken into account with 
respect to the referents and relata of a given relation, 
thus "e. g. R is the relation of parent to son, S'y = the 
parents of y, S'x = the sons of a;", (cf. 242-246.) but even 
a special plural descriptive function "R''6" is introduced 
to mean 'the terms which have the relation R to members of 
e'" (279. cr. 279-295.). A number of non-propositional func-
tions existing between two classes, or two relations, or any 
class and a relation are called double descriptive functions, 
by means of which new relations and classes can be introduc-
ed and lay the foundations for the definition of operation 
(296-298.) The definition of unit class allows for a new 
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analysis of definite descriptions. As a new descriptive 
function we have "i'x, meaning 'the class of terms which 
are identical with x', which is the same thing as 'the class 
whose only member is a;'. We are thus to have i'x=y(y=x)". 
(340.) We can define the number 1 by means of the unit class, 
it is "defined as the class of unit classes, i. e. 
1 = a{(3x)•a = t'x} Df. This leads to 
f- :.a£l. = : (3x) : y 6 a . = . y = x. From this it ap-
pears further that 
I- : a £ 1. = . E! (ix) (xGa) , 
whence A 
b : z (<j>z) 1. = . El Ux) Gj>x) , A 
i.e. 'z Ux) is a unit class' is equivalent to 'the x 
satisfying <j>x exists'. 
If a 6 1, i'a is the only member of a, for the only 
member of a is the only term to which a has the relation 
Thus ' i ' a' takes the place of ' (ix) (jpx):', if a stands for 
zUz)." (.36.) 
As to the indefinite description we have no comparable 
formal analysis at our disposal. In Russell (1905b) we are 
told that it does not denote many terms, but it denotes am-
biguously, i. e. it denotes an ambiguous term. (cf. Russell 
(1905b) 41.) He analyses the proposition "I met a man" in 
the following way: '"I met x, and x is human" is not always 
false." Generally, defining the class of men as the class 
of objects having the predicate human, we say that: 'C 
(a man)' means '"c(.x) and x is human" is not always false. 
This leaves 'a man', by itself, wholly destitute of meaning, 
but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal 
expression 'a man' occurs." (Russel (1905b) 43.) Some 
further explications are to be found in Russell (1919a). 
Russell sets out from the same example and begins with the 
following proposal: "let us assume ... that my assertion is 
true, and that in fact I met Jones. It is clear that what 
I assert is not 'I met Jones". I may say 'I met a man, but 
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it was not Jones'; in that case, though I lie, I do not 
contradict myself, as I should do if when I say I met a man 
I really mean that I met Jones. It is clear also that the 
person to whom I am speaking can understand what I say, 
even if he is foreigner and has never heard of Jones. 
But we may go further: not only Jones, but no actual 
man, enters into my statement. This becomes obvious when the 
statement is false, since then there is no more reason why 
Jones should be supposed to enter into the proposition than 
why anyone else should. Indeed the statement would remain 
significant, though it could not possibly be true, even if 
there were no man at all. 'I met a unicorn' or 'I met a 
sea-serpent' is a perfectly significant assertion, if we 
know what it would be to be a unicorn or a sea-serpent, i. 
e. what is the definition of these fabulous monsters. Thus 
it is only what we may call the concept that enters into the 
proposition." (Russell (1919a) 167-168.) In a word, the indef-
inite description is explained by means of an existential 
operator, the uniqueness is not explicitly claimed but it 
could be assured with the same syntactic means as in the 
case of the definite description; as for the semantic in-
terpretation the only criterion consists in the significance 
of the proposition, the involved relationship is denota-
tional in so far as the semantic role of the existential 
operator and the uniqueness point to effective connexions, 
however, the content of the relationship itself remains in 
the generality of concepts (cf. Quine (1939).) . We bring our 
short overview on Russell's early and later conceptions con-
cerning semantics and denotation to an end here. We aimed at 
a comprehensive summary of his most important notions and 
ideas without their deeper critical evaluation, it serves as 
a necessary background to our inquiry into Russel's views on 
fictionality. 
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2. Our overview on descriptions ended with the question 
concerning reality or non-reality of the objects denoted by 
indefinite descriptions, the discussion of semantical and 
denotational problems led to fictionality and this is no 
mere chance: the formulation of the later, classical variant 
,, of the theory of denotation was at the same time a continu-
ous reflection on different aspects of fictionality. The 
formation of this theory can be understood as a revision of 
Russell's own realistic conception and one of the aims of 
this revision was to get rid of fictitious entities by means 
of an adequate methodology. Some months before the compre-
hensive study "On Denoting" there appeared another article 
by Russell in Mind (Russell (1905a)) expressing already the 
new theoretic position in the form of a criticism of MacColl. 
MacColl formulated in MacColl (1905) a logical theory which 
according to its ontological position can be considered as 
a Meinongian variant. MacColl wants namely to incorporate 
among the individuals of logic not only those which denote 
real existences, but also those which refer to non-exist-
ences, "that is to say, (to) unrealities, such as centaurs, 
nectar, ambrosia, fairies, with self-contradiction, such as 
round-squares, square circles, flat spheres, etc." (MacColl 
(1905) 308.) and considers classes consisting of real ex-
istences, of unrealities and mixed classes; in this way the 
single null class of algebra is substituted by an infinitude 
of pure and mixed classes consisting of fictitious elements 
which require a special treatment and interpretation. This 
view challanges Russell's new conception concerning seman-
tics and denotation; on the basis of his logical and theo-
retical insights he has no longer any understanding for 
Meinongian solutions, and from this point on the special 
Russellian theory of denotation conflicts with ideas. This 
theory of denotation is one of the main sources of Russell's 
views on fictionality, so we are going to inquire into some 
of the theses concerning some aspects of fictionality set up 
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on the basis of this theory of denotation in his works. 
2.1. An essential problem of fictionality is the question 
of existence. The critical article (Russell (1905a)), be-
gins also with an investigation of th& meaning of "exist-
ence". Russell states: "There are two meanings of this word, 
as distinct as stocks in a flower-garden and stocks on the 
Stock Exchange, which yet are continually being confused or 
at least supposed somehow connected. ... 
(a) The meaning of existence which occurs in philosphy and 
daily life is the meaning which can be predicated of an in-
dividual: the meaning in which we inquire whether God exists, 
in which we affirm that Socrates existed, and deny that Ham-
let existed. The entities dealt with in mathematics do not 
exist in this sense: the number 2, or the principle of the 
syllogism, or multiplication are objects which mathematics 
considers, but which certainly form no part of the world of 
existent things. This sense of existence lies wholly out-
side Symbolic Logic, which does not care a pin whether its 
entities exist in this sense or not. 
(b) The sense in which existence is used in symbolic logic 
is a definable and purely technical sense, namely this: To 
say that A exists means that A is a class which has at least 
one member. Thus whatever is not a class (e. g. Socrates) 
does not exist in this sense; and among classes there is just 
one which does not exist, namely, the class having no mem-
bers, which is called the null-class." (Russell (1905a) 
98-99.) This conception of confronting syntactically and 
semantically two meanings of "existence" was, however, only 
a transitory opinion, it was implied by the realist convic-
tion that numbers are objects differing from realia and 
their way of existence must be distinguished from the exist-
ence of things. This distinction was introduced in order to 
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prohibit drawing consequences from the realia to the class 
of numbers but it was not intended to dissolve the unity 
of objects; quite on the contrary, by means of the principle 
of extensionality a unique way of explication is give 1 for 
objects belonging to both ontological classes. "Suppose we 
say: 'No chimeras exist'. We may mean that the class of 
chimeras has no members, i. e. does not exist in sense (b), 
or that nothing that exists in sense (a) is a chimera. 
These two are equivalent in the present instance, because if 
there were chimeras, they would be entities of the kind that 
exist in sense (a). But if we say 'no numbers exist', our 
statement is true in sense (a) and false in sense (b). It is 
true that nothing that exists in sense (a) is a number; it 
is false that the class of numbers has no members. Thus the 
confusion arises from undue preoccupation with the things 
that exist in sense (a), which is a bad habit engendered by 
practical interests." (Russell (1905a) 99.) In this way it 
is understandable that the logical analysis is Principia 
Mathematica puts an end to the ambiguous explicability of 
this term and the view summarized in (a) is considered as a 
current but erroneous conception; the unique explication is 
based on a developed form of the thesis of extensionality 
which gets a nominalistically based semantic interpretation 
in the later philosophical writings. But let us see first 
the syntactical definition: "When, in ordinary language or 
in philosophy, something is said to 'exist', it is always 
something described, i.e. it is not something immediately 
presented, like a taste or a patch of colour, but someting 
like 'matter' or 'mind' or 'Homer' (meaning 'the author of 
the Homeric poems'), which is known by description as 'the 
so-and-so', and is thus of the form (i x) (<¡> x) . Thus in all 
such cases, the existence of the (grammatical) subject 
(» x) (<p x) can be analytically inferred from any true pro-
position having this grammatical subject. It would seem 
that the word 'existence' cannot be significantly applied to 
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subjects immediately given; i. e. not only does our defini-
tion give no meaning to 'E!x', but there is no reason, in 
philosophy, to suppose that a meaning of existence could be 
found which would be applicable to immediately given sub-
jects." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 174-175. A similar ex-
plication is to be found in Russell (1919a) 178-179.) The 
sense of this standpoint is that "exist" may appear as 
grammatical predicate in connection with an apparent proper 
name, but this constituent cannot be considered as a logi-
cal proper name, but only as a description, and existence is 
not to be evaluated as a logical first class predicate, but 
as a second class predicate having a description for its 
argument. The first part of this thesis is based on Rus-
sell's theory of knowledge; he is of the opinion in this 
case that a direct acquaintance is not expressible. The 
categorical postulation that the proposition 'This exists' 
has no significance seems rather doubtful, expecially if we 
take into account the considerations in Moore (1936) 186-
-188.: it seems to be an artificial decision, the principle 
of acquaintance cannot convince us of the illegitimity*of 
the use of "this" or of "exists" in the proposition "This 
exists" which appears to have significance and consequently 
a propositional meaning. On the other hand this analysis 
points to a very important syntactical-semantical distinc-
tion: "existence" is to be separated from the attributive 
first class predicates expressing certain properties, this 
insight has important philosophical consequences (cf. 
Kneale (1936)) and this has been observed in modern inten-
sional logic as well (cf. Montage (1974), von Kutschera 
(1976)). 
Existence in Russell's sense was defined by means of 
the equation 14.02 that has been quoted in part 2.23 above, 
Russell gives the following verbal explication of this de-
finition: "'the x satisfying 4>x exists' is to mean 'there 
is an object a such that is true when x is a but not 
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otherwise." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 31.) This definition 
permits the use of an existence-predicate with a description 
as an argument in cases in which the description can be ana-
lysed as an expression which is bound by a non-negative ex-
istential operator, and defines the uniqueness of the bound 
variable i. the secondary predicate "exist" can only in 
that case significantly be applied to a description if there 
is an object which this description denotes in reality. This 
means that the condition of the use of the existence predi-
cate is the applicability of the existential operator to the 
arguments in an extensional sense, i. e. the predicate "ex-
ist" can be used in connection with a description if the 
latter can be interpreted as a class having only one unique 
real member. This implies a principle of translation which 
has to be applied to each grammatical apparent proper name 
and as a result of the transcription it clearly formulates 
the extensional relations between a class and its unique 
member in the positive case. In the case that this logical 
scheme is not assured, i. e. if there are no objects, we 
are confronted with descriptions which have significance 
but are to be considered as false because the bound vari-
ables do not denote anything. This class of false descrip-
tions or of descriptions with non-existing denotation in-
volves fictitious objects too. Besides fictionality we ought 
to mention in this context some other types of utterances as 
well, such as lies, errors, and different strategies or con-
ventions which may obtain in certain connexions a negative 
evaluation etc., however this would take us from our seman-
tical point of view. Therefore we do not try to define these 
pragmatic distinctions and in connection.with fictionality 
we shall refer, without further distinction, to this class 
defined by a non-existing denotation and we do not want to 
presuppose any general pragmatical rules e. g. whether the 
speaker considers the objects as fictitious or not or how 
the interpreter chooses between different possibilities, 
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etc. We shall consider for the time being the logical lan-
guage of the analysis as a sort of ideal language is Rus-
sell's sensci, a metalanguage revealing the inner structure 
of natural language. (As to "lie" consider Russell (1940) 
194.) We have in this sense a clear program concerning fic-
tionality, we have to rewrite the apparent proper names of 
natural language as descriptions and if the objcct denoted 
by the description cannot be explained as a class that has 
one member the proper name is to be taken as fictitious. In 
answer to MacColl's proposal about classes of unrealities, 
centaurs, round squares, etc. Russell explains his stand-
point: "Concerning all these we shall say simply that they 
arc clnsscs which have no members, so that each of them is 
identical with the null class. There are no Centaurs; 'x is 
a Centaur' is false whatever value we give to x, even when 
we include values which do not exist in sense (a), such as 
numbers, propositions, etc. Similarly, there are no round 
squares. The case of noctar and ambrosia is more difficult, 
since these seem to be individuals, not classes. But here we 
must presuppose definitions of nectar and ambrosias they are 
substances having such and such properties, which, as a mat-
ter of fact, no substances do have. Wo have thus merely a 
defining concept for each, without any entity to which the 
concept applies. In this case, the concept is an entity, but 
it docs denote anything. To take a simpler case: 'The pre-
sent King of England' is a complex concept denoting an indi-
vidual; 'the present King of France' is a simiiar complex 
denoting nothing. The phrase intends to point out an indi-
vidual, but fails to do so: it does not point out an unreal 
individual, but no individual at all. The same explanation 
applies to mythical personages, Apollo. Priam, etc. These 
words have a meaning, which can be found by looking thorn up 
in a classical dictionary;- but the have not a denotation: 
there is no entity, real or Imaginary, which they point out" 
(Russell (1905a) 100.) The last remark may be completed by 
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the following analysis: "A proposition such as 'Apollo 
exists' is really of the same logical form, although it 
does not explicitly contain the word the. For 'Apollo' means 
really 'the object having such-and-such properties,' say 
'the object having the properties enumerated in the Classi-
cal Dictionary." (The same principle applies to many uses of 
the proper names of existent object, e. g. to all uses of 
proper names for objects known to the speaker only by re-
port, and not by personal acquaintance.) If these properties 
make up the propositional function fx, then 'Apollo' means 
(i x) (<p x) , and 'Apollo exists' means 'El (i x) (<t> x) :" 
(Whitehead-Russell (1910) 31.) 
Although logical analysis is not strictly regulated as, 
for example, categorial grammar is, the main problems are 
not raised by it. Our principal concern is to find an ade-
quate test by means of which it can be unambigously decided 
to which category an item belongs. We rewrite the proper 
names of grammar and now we must choose all those which can-
not be considered as fictional units. A class of the bound 
variables which prove to be unique and have certain proper-
ties can be put together on the basis that I have direct 
acquaintance with them. These are particulars perceived in 
space-time such as "my father", 'ray son", and if self-aware-
ness is allowed even "myself". As each item depends on my 
personal perception and my own perspective each is idio-
syncratically and specially mine: if I speak of "myself" and 
your refer to me there is an essential difference in the way 
I am and you are aware of me as mind and body and as source 
of perception. But the same difference can be maintained 
with each object of a direct acquaintance, they are intro-
duced as items of a highly individual perceptional process, 
(cf. in this connection Russell (1910-1911) 206-208.) "A 
table viewed from one place presents a different appearence 
from that which it presents from another place. This is the 
language of common sense ..." (Russell (1914) 84.) The lan-
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guage of common sense is however presupposed to be the 
basis for natural language: its inner content appears to be 
determined by the structure of our perception. This is the 
rase not only for objects which X am aware of in a di ect 
process of acquaintance, whenever I know some object, even 
if my knowledge is mediated by a description given by some-
body else, my individual perception takes part in this 
process and determines its subjective character. But if lan-
guage is to this extent subjective and exclusively deter-
mined by individual perception one may raise the question 
of why and how a communication or an exchange of these 
highly individual contents should take place, how we can 
escape a form of sollipsism? As to the last problem Rus-
sell's characteristic argumentation is the following: 
"... we can never prove the existence of things other than 
ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity results 
from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and 
my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that every-
thing else is mere fancy." (Russell (1912) 33.) However, 
"every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natu-
ral view, that there really are objects other than our- . 
selves and our sense-data which have an existence not de-
pendent upon our perceiving them." (Russell (1912) 37.) 
Besides the principle of simplicity there is an instinctive 
belief and the testimony of physics that speak for a reality 
of the external world even if there is no complete corre-
spondendance between our sense-data and the objects of the 
external world. This opinion shows clearly the insensitive-
ness that Russel had with respect to the soclo-cultural 
determination in the use of signs. This must be emphasised 
in spite of Russell's numerous, in some respects very in-
structive socio-logical, historical, pedagogical and poli-
tical studies some results of which were taken into account 
in his last comprehensive work Russell (1948), e. g. in the 
genealogy of sign use by means of animal inference, analogy, 
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scientific methods, etc. (Russell ( 1948) 198-210.) But 
even here his fundamental ideas remained the same: sign 
and language are primarily defined by perception. If the 
pragmatical dimension of communication is simply overxooked, 
if the use of signs is considered in the sense of the empir-
icist and idealistic tradition of the XVIIIth century with 
respect to an abstract man appearing only through his 
psycho-physiologi cal faculties and not as being a represn— 
tative of a historical, sociological and cultural community, 
then the use of sign loses its proper sense. Communication 
can only be understood as an interaction between member of 
a community, a sort of game in which they take part accord-
in- to the conventional rules of the community. This insight 
must be used for the definition of the objects we are speak-
ing of, i. e. the definition of fictional objects and their 
relation to existence, in this case the conventional element 
is a corrective factor unifying the ways of perception in a 
certain community in a certain space-time. We think that if 
we know an object it is not only important whether we know 
it by direct acquaintance or by a description, but also 
which model we follow in the perception or generally in the 
process of awareness. If I am a soldier in a war I do not 
perceive "a man" in general, but as enemy or friend or neu-
tral person and I act according to norms which appear in 
peace time inhuman and abnormal. The object is differently 
perceived in socially or culturally different situations 
and this means that we never have the true image of facts, 
as Russell assumes, in language or in perception, percep-
tion and image are always conventionally influenced and 
manipulated. 
The role of social and cultural factors ia even more 
important in cases of acquaintance by description. The per-
ceived communication puts a description at my disposal 
which I can rewrite in the given logical form. In this case 
I am not acquainted with the bound variable and it depends 
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on me whether I ascribe to it an existence on the basis of 
the speaker's personal acquaintance or on the basis of a 
direct acquaintance by somebody else to which an unbroken 
causal chain leads from the speaker. If I accept that in 
both cases the original proposition becomes involved in my 
beliefs, i. e. the propositional attitude of the proposi-
tion changes, it becomes a belief-proposition, an inten-
sional structure that, according Russell's correct analysis, 
cannot be characterized by means of the extensional method. 
(Russell (1918-1919) 216-228.) However, with the intension-
ality there appear some other difficulties which have been 
pointed out by several critics of Russell's denotation 
theory, (cf. Linsky (1967) 67-84. Hintikka (1981)). From our 
point of view it is very important to see that the belief-
system is organized by conventional norms. There is a well 
distinguishable difference in readiness to believe the 
statements of foreigners: there are early centuries full of 
wonders and miracles, later on as scientific control spreads 
and achieves universal authority they are limited to social 
strate which hold out for the old beliefs. Fictionality, 
fictional objects, fictional existence are conjoined to a 
socio-cultural game in which there is a convention that the 
speaker need not refer to real persons and other objects in 
telling a narrative. The appearance of this fictional narra-
tive is certainly secondary to story-telling in which this 
possibility was not given, where everything had to be con-
sidered as true, e. g. in sagas and in myths. 
But how can these ideas be approached from the Rus-
sellian theory of fictionality and how can they be explained 
in a formally correct semantics? Russell uses in fact some 
generic terms such as narrative, novel, drama, etc, but we 
cannot state any essential regularity concerning theoretical 
formulation of genres or other textual units having conven-
tionality as their basis, (cf. below the discussion in 3.2.) 
However there are some other more or less nominalistically 
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based - in our terminology "Russellian" - studies on fic-
tionality of which we mention two here: Reichenbach (194 7) 
and Lieb (1981) that may point out a way towards conven-
tionally defined fictionality. Reichenbach appreciated Rus-
sell's logical work very highly (cf. Reichenbach (1944) and 
they influenced each other very directly. In Reichenbach 
(1947) we have the first comprehensive attempt to explain 
natural language by means of symbolic logic, in this way 
fictionality is also dealt with. The main novelty in com-
parison with Russell consists in qualifying the existence 
of fictionality, i. e. binding it to a certain type or genre 
of utterances. There are some remarkable disagreements be-
tween this approach and Rusell's conception, so the rela-
tion between the physical level of language and the level 
determined by direct perceptions has a different order in 
Reichenbach than in Russell: Reichenbach thinks that physi-
cal existence is introduced by the existential operator, 
i. e. "the sort of existence applying to concrete objects 
of our daily environment as well as to the objects discov-
ered by the methods of science" (Reichenbach (1948) 274.) 
constitutes the primary non-fictitious level in language.. 
The objects of perception counting as primitive elements of 
language in Russell are considered as the first examples of 
fictitious existence in Reichenbach. "We speak of seeing an 
object not only if the object is physically present; we say 
that we see certain objects also when dreaming, or when 
looking at physical objects of a different sort ... Such 
objects are fictitious; but it is convenient to deal with 
them as though they were real objects. We shall call them 
subjective things. The name immediate things will be used 
... to include both objective things which are perceived 
and subjective things; thus if a thing is immediate it is 
left open whether it is at the same time objective." 
(Reichenbach (1947) 274.) Russell's primitive objects are 
immediate things, according to the analysis in 3.2. Let us 
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enumerate first the different sorts of existence without 
any deeper analysis of the structures introduced by Reichen-
bach. After a general characterisation we shall deal more 
thoroughly with one type of fictitious existence. "A second 
sort of fictitious existence ... extends the domain of 
existence much farther than does immediate existence. Fol-
lowing the second conception, we speak of existence whenever 
the assumption of physical existence is not contradictory. 
We thus introduce a category of logical existence ..." 
(Reichenbach (1947) 276.) "A third sore of existence appears 
in statements which refer to ... propositional attitudes" 
jReichenbach (1947) 277.) The next "form of fictitious ex-
istence refers to what may be called intentional objects 
... When we conceive terms like "desire1, 'plan', 'attempt', 
as functions, we ... are compelled to interpret" the prin-
ciple of existential generalization, "as referring to a fic-
titious existence." (Reichenbach (1947) 280.) The last form 
of fictitious existence mentioned by Reichenbach is literary 
existence which is defined with respect to "fictitious ob-
jects whose existence is assumed when sentences concerning 
such objects are stated in a book. The fictitious existence 
of these objects ... is therefore translatable into the 
physical existence of sentences in a book." (Reichenbach 
(1947) 282.) 
This typology of different sorts of existence is based 
on an essentially extensional logic of the Russellian type, 
however the intention to map all the relevant connections 
of conversational language on to a logical analysis led to 
the first formulation of some concepts of intensional log-
ics. The formulation itself remained true to the exten-
sional and the Russellian empiricist and behavioristic 
ideas. As an example we may consider the existence conjoin-
ed with intentional objects in the following sentence: 
(3) Peter desires to live in New York 
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As a first step it is formalised in the following way: 
(3) • (3v)ln[f(Xl,yi) JMv) .ds(x rv) 
"Here ,f(x1,y1)' means 'Peter lives in New York', and 'ds ' 
means 'desires'. The particle 'to', in this interpretation, 
is regarded as introducing event-splitting." (Reichenbach 
(1947) 281.) In a second step the intentional objects are 
defined in terms of the psychological notion of fulfillment 
and (3)' is translated into physical existence: 
(3) ' ' (3 z) bst (x^ , z) . [f (x »y^iff (Z) ] 
"Here 'bst' means 'bodily state' ... 'ff* means 'fulfill-i 
ment* (Reichenbach (1947) 281.) and 3 means a conncective 
implication. However nowadays the translation is not direct-
ed to "bodily state" as in the days of behaviorism but to 
"logically possible worlds".' This new concept has not been 
without objection. The question is raised whether this 
notion is well founded ontologically. Before this problem 
became so hotly debated Russell had touched on this topic 
several times and developed a rather ambiguous standpoint in 
this respect. Mainly in connection with physics he liked to 
formulate his ideas with respect to different possible 
worlds (cr. Russell (1927a) 89. (1914) 190, in connection 
with ethic Russell (1910)), but his ideas concerning the 
perceptual foundation of language led him to a consequent 
negation of the hypothesis of possible worlds: "Logic, I 
should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology 
can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as 
truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general 
features. To say that unicorns have an existence in her-
aldy, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most pitiful 
and paltry evasion. What exists in heraldy is not an animal, 
made of flesh and blood, moving and breathing of its own 
initiative. What exists is. a picture, or a description in 
words. Similarly, to maintain that Hamlet, for example, 
exists in his own world, namely in the world of Shakespeare's 
imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the 
ordinary world, is to say something delibaretaly confusing. 
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or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. 
There is only one world, the 'real' world: Shakespeare's 
imagination is part of it, and the thoughts that he had in 
writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have 
in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fic-
tion that only the thoughts, feelings, etc. in Shakespeare 
and in his readers are real, and that there is not, in ad-
dition to them, an objective Hamlet. When you have taken 
account of all the feelings roused by Napoleon in writers 
and readers of history, you have not touched the actual 
man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of 
him. If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing 
left of him; if no one had thought about Napoleon, he would 
soon have seen to it that some one did. The sense of reality 
is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending 
that Hamlet has another kind of reality is doing a disser-
vice to thought." (Russell (1919a) 169-170.) We think that 
this last opinion corresponds to the nominalistic stand-
point. In this context we do not wish to deal with inten-
sional logic, therefore the inner problems of the different 
kinds of existence as far as they can be considered topics 
of different philosophical logics will not be discussed 
here. 
Reichenbach followed Russell in formulating "that fic-
titious objects cannot be given proper names. They can only 
be described and therefore are expressed by means or vari-
ables bound by qualified existential operators. The word 
'Hamlet', therefore, is not a proper name, but an abbrevia-
tion standing for the description of a fictitious personal-
ity." (Reichenbach (1947) 283.) The last remark - a des-
cription of a fictitious personality - proves the novelty 
of Reichenbach"s approach and reveals the essence of the 
extension of applicability of truth and falsehood. Russell 
was of the opinion: "We experience 'Hamlet', not Hamlet; 
but our emotions in reading the play have to do with Hamlet, 
- 338 -
not with 'Hamlet'. 'Hamlet' is a word of six letters; 
whether it should be or not be is a question of little in-
terest, and it certainly could not make its quietus with 
a bare bodkin. Thus the play 'Hamlet' consists entirely of 
false propositions, which transcend experience, but which 
are certainly significant, since they can arouse emotions. 
When I say that our emotions are about Hamlet, not "Ham-
let", I must qualify this statement: they are really not 
about anything, but we think they are about the man named 
'Hamlet'. The propositions in the play are false because 
there was no such man; they are significant because we know 
from experience the noise 'Hamlet', the meaning of 'name', 
and the meaning of'man'. The fundamental falsehood in the 
play is the proposition; the noise 'Hamlet' is a name'. 
(Russell (1940) 277.) Russell's analysis acknowledges only 
one sort of existence which could be qualified in Reichen-
bach" s terminology as immediate existence and tries to 
explain the significance of a fictitious and consequently 
false sentence by means of emotions. But this is a rather 
dangerous and uncontrollable solution; it is undefined in 
which cases emotions can win against pure rationality and 
in this way it may institutionalize irrationality in cer-
tain fields of life. Instead of that rather difficult 
approach Reichenbach's consequent extension of truth and 
falsehood to these special sorts of existence is very con-
vincing. Certainly we must not confound the languages of the 
different existences: what may appear as existent on the one 
level is considered empty on the other. This level-relativ-
ity emphasizes the one-sidedness and negativity of the Rus-
seilian standpoint: fictional sentences considered from the 
point of view of physical or immediate existence must be 
held as false, however they are not conceived of as elements 
of this language, they belong to the level of fictionality 
which disposes of special criteria of truth and falsehood. 
Reichenbach's proposal for the definition of literary 
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existence was to use the physical existence of senteces 
in a book. This is a very essential step; in a fictional 
text there exists only what is introduced as existent or 
whose existence can be inferred on the basis of the text. 
In some respects the definition proves to be too loose: 
being stated in a book does not quarantee that the text is 
of a literary character. Therefore Reichenbach admits a def-
inition which translates "literary existence into the ex-
istence of images and emotions in the reader. The interpre-
tation will lead to a fictitious existence similar to im-
mediate existence." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.) This is Rus-
sell's idea and we shall have to say something about it in 
3.2. but we must express already here our conviction that 
it is an essentially weaker solution than the first one as 
it does not allow any combination of the structure with 
socio-cultural convention. The combination did not succeed 
in this case, Reichenbach had to include, besides the def-
inition, general laws accounting for the psychological 
authenticity of the work: "The behavior of the fictitious 
persons in their fictitious environment should be so pre-
sented that it satisfies the laws of psychology holding for 
actual persons; in other words, the laws assumed for the 
behavior of the fictitious persons should be objeatively 
true. ... A further requirement is that the laws expressed 
by the behavior of the fictitious persons play an important 
role in our own lives and therefore hels us to understand 
human behavior in general." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.) These 
requirements are too general and too absolute, it is fal-
lacious if one wants to have a general law for life and all 
kinds of literature, we must rather admit a great number of 
different codes for literary genres which need not in each 
respect correspond to the rules of our life. The aspect of 
relativity has been increasingly taken into account in those 
works on fictionality which are based on a Meinongian pos-
sible world semantics (cf. Kanyó (1980a)), the importance of 
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the nominal istic contribution is not less, however we cannot 
give a systematic picture of the development of this re-
search here. There no special fictional objects are looked 
for, it is rather tne way of the linguistic formulation that 
is in the centre of scientific reflection; fictionality has 
to be understood as a consequence of the conventional use of 
language. As a very impressive example we shall briefly men-
tion Lieb (1981). In this reasonably formulated study Lieb 
lays the foundations for a formal theory of fictionality. He 
assumes in accordance with Searle (1975) that the fictional 
text is embedded in pretence which plays the role of a pro-
positional attitude (cf. Lieb (1981) 552.). He wants to in-
clude several propositional attitudes, which would serve as 
criteria of classification and "cut right across literary 
genres" (552.). There are different formal definitions, the 
first determines how the referential constituents have to 
be understood on the basis of the grammar of the language. 
As a second step the referential constituents appear as the 
referential-expressions of concrete texts, they have textual 
meaning, a referential-doxastic meaning which is defined by 
means of new definitions. If a narrator is involved in the 
fictional text then the realization of the fictional text is 
attributed by the author to him, an appropriate place is 
assigned to the narrator in the formal system and referen-
tial expressions that involve a narrator are also correctly 
interpreteted. The most difficult case is the explication 
of the case in which there are normal proper names embedded 
in fictional texts, but Lieb's system can stand up to this 
challenge as he characterizes this case as a complex seman-
tic relation which "involves both the reference relation 
and the fictionality proviso." (558.) Thus Lieb's well-
founded formal system has enough adaptability to deal with 
problems like dependence on genre, conventionality and it 
comes very near to the ideas we have formulated in general 
terms above. 
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The Russellian definition of fictional existence leads 
to these reflections. We can establish that it has a double 
character: as a formal system it may be considered an in-
fluential starting point for semantical considerations of 
fictionality, but as to the philosophical and epistemolog-
ical interpretation of this system which appeared in reduc-
ing language to immediate objects and in declaring fictional 
existence for falsehood there is a negativity and an abso-
lutized one-sidedeness which do not admit the formulation of 
a coherent theory. As a matter of fact, there are different 
possible solutions in Russell's writings, the first is an 
agnostic one and follows from his theory of knowledge: if 
there is a fictional entity introduced into the elements 
which according to our knowledge and our beliefs build up 
the world we have no method at our disposal to indicate that 
it has practically no reference. Russell is without doubt 
right in putting for the idea that in the knowledge of 
different communities there are undetected fictional enti-
ties and if we want to rely on the most secure grounds we 
must take the language of science - first of all physics ' 
and psycho-physiology- into account. This analysis again-
leaves out of consideration the pragmatic dimension of 
knowledge and beliefs, the socio-cultural rules which deter-
mine the emergence and the development of conventions, their 
manipulation and all the forms of influencing the community. 
But Russell can provide us with a positive solution as well , 
that is worth while to be examining intensively. 
2.2. In adapting the perceptual phenomena as a basis for 
the interpretation of language Russell must have assumed not 
only the existence of perceptions such as can be verified by 
means of physics, but also the existence of impressions 
which occur ,in dreams, in hallucinations, in the imagination, 
etc. - as Reichenbach has clearly formulated, immediate » 
existence involves subjective existence. This sphere of sub-
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jective existence is named by Russell, according to the 
philosophical tradition, recapitulatively as imagination. 
In this section we want to summarize Russell's views on 
imagination with the intention of showing whether they can 
be connected with the theory of fictionality. 
The existence of imagination is not unproblematic in 
modern psycho-physiology: behaviorism, the trend which Rus-
sell highly appreciated because of its experimental methods, 
was extremely antimentalistic and did not accept introspec-
tion as a valid psychological method, therefore it led to 
the negation of imagination. Russell argues in Russell 
(1919b) for the existence of images and he does not admit 
the reducing of these phenomenona to the pronunciation of 
words sotto voce as Watson wished to solve this question. 
An image occurring in visualizing cannot be explained by 
behaviorist methods, it can at most be rejected, because one 
can be acquainted with it only through introspection and 
this method cannot be held for a source of knowledge accord-
ing to the behaviorists. But Russell sees no principal prob-
lem in introspection. Two reasons can be mentioned against 
this method, one is privacy, the other is the independence 
of the laws of physics. As for privacy Russell mentions 
that "we shall have to include among such date" which can be 
obtained only through introspection "all bodily sensations" 
(Russell (1919b). 294.), i. e. since there is a class of data 
that admit by their nature only an introspective observa-
tion, introspection cannot be excluded. Much more interest- . 
ing is the other argument, namely that the data of intro-
spection "do not obey the laws of physics ... I think it 
will be found that the essential characteristic of intro-
spective data is concerned with localization-, either they 
are not localized at all, or they are localized in a place 
already physically occupied by something which would be in-
consistent with them if they were regarded as part of the 
physical world. In either case, introspective data have to 
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be regarded as not obeying the laws of physics ..." (294-
-295}. Russell is aware of the challenge and as a reaction 
he builds up the phantastlc idea of a subjective existence 
which marks a new period in his theoretical interpretation 
of denotational relations mainly in the years 1914-1927 
which can be characterized by Wittgenstein's influence on 
logical atomism and by the intensive study of behaviorism 
and psycho-physiological connexions. Russell's main thesis 
consists of postulating existence for everything insofar as 
it is built on sensations even if the content of the sensa-
tions contradicts the laws of physics. "Phantoms and images 
do undoubtedly exist in that sense ... if you shut your eyes 
jtnd imagine some visual scene, the images that are before 
your mind while you are imagining are undoubtedly there. 
They are images, something is happening, and what is happen-
ing is that images are before your mind, and these images 
are just as much part of the world as tables and chairs and 
anything else. They are perfectly decent objects, and you 
only call them unreal (if you call them so), or treat them 
as non-existent, because they do not have the usual sort of 
relations to other objects ... If you imagine a heavy oak 
table, you can remove it without any muscular effort, which 
is not the case with oak tables that you actually see. The 
general correlations of your images are quite different 
from the correlations of what one chooses to call 'real' 
objects. But that is not to say images are unreal. It is 
only to say they are not part of physics. Of course, I know 
that this belief in the physical world has established a 
sort of reign of terror ... That sort of attitude is un-
worthy of a philosopher. We should treat with exactly equal 
respect the things that do not fit in with the physical 
world, and images are among them." (Russell (1918-1919) 
257.) 
The sphere' of imagination originally appeared in Russell 
(1914a) where the external world was interpreted by senses 
-data and all objects of sense were declared real (cf, 93f,). 
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In Russell (1914b)) we find the direct connection with the 
denotation theory: images are here explained as descrip-
tions. Russell expounds in this context that 'illusion* and 
'unreality' have to be derived from the fundamental pair 
'true' and 'false' which can be applied to propositions and 
descriptions, "but not to proper names: in other words, 
they have no application whatever to data, but only to en-
tities or non-entities described in terms of data. 
Let us illustrate this by the terms 'existence' and 
•non-existence'. Given any datum x, it is meaningless 
either to assert or to deny that x 'exists'. We might be 
tempted to say: "Of course x exists, for otherwise it could 
not be a datum'. But such a statement is really meaningless, 
although it is significant and true to say, 'My present 
sense-datum exists', and it may also be true that 'x is my 
present sense-datum'. The inference from these two proposi-
tions to 'x exists' is one which seems irresistible to peo-
ple unaccustomed to logic; yet the apparent proposition in-
ferred is not merely false, but strictly meaningless. To say 
'My present sense-datum exists' is to say (roughly): 'There 
is an object of which ''my present sense-datum'' is a de-
scription'. But we cannot say: 'There is an object of which 
••x'1 is a description', because 'x' is (in the case we are 
supposing) a name, not a description." (Russell (1914b) 
167-168.) This early contribution to the problem of imagina-
tion promises a sort of differentiation of existences in the 
method of Reichenbach: "Concerning the immediate objects in 
illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, it is meaningless to 
ask whether they 'exist' or are 'real'. There they are, and 
that ends the matter." (168.) This view allows for a posi-
tive account of fictionality as it is not to be considered 
as non-existence but as a particular variant of existence 
that should be characterized. However Russell who remained 
true to the notion of imagination did not undertake the sys-
tematic discussion of conventional language on a logical 
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basis and his philosophical interpretation of this problem 
presents different solutions. 
Terminologically we must distinguish between imagina-
tion which is applied to the whole mental process and image 
which represents a constituent of this process. Images are 
divided according to the fields of sensation into visual, 
auditory and tactile and we may ignore other kinds of images 
(.Russell (1927b) 184.) Images", imagination should be di-
stinguished from sensations, the differences has been sought 
generally 
"/1/ By the less degree of vivedness in images; 
/2/ By our absence of belief in their 'physical 
reality"; 
/3/ By the fact that their causes and~~eifects are 
different from those of sensations." (Russell 
(1921) 145.) 
But these arguments are not convincing, Russell means "that 
the test of liveliness, however applicable in ordinary 
instances, cannot be used to define the differences between 
sensations and images." (148.) Secondly he points out: 
"Images cannot be defined by the feeling of unreality, be-
cause when we falsely believe an image to be a sensation, as 
in the case of dreams, it feels just as real as if it were a 
sensation." (.149.). Therefore the grounds for the distinc-
tion are sought in causes and effects, but there are dif-
ferent definitions which try to formulate the essential dif-
ference, namely that sensations come through the sense-
-organs and are connected with the world of physics, while 
images represent mental processes that are independent from 
the laws of physics. The multiplicity of definitions shows 
Russell's inner uncertainty, his first contribution to this 
topic after its general exposition in two philosophical 
studies in 1914, Russell (1915), gives two different defini-
tions, and the reader may choose on the basis of his own 
reflections. The first definition has as its background the 
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recognition that "Sensation and imagination together ... may 
be defined as 'acquaintance with particulars not given as 
earlier than the subject." (Russell (1915) 33.) This last 
definition may be identified with "'particulars given as 
simultaneous with the subject.' But such identification pre-
supposes, what must not be assumed without discussion, that 
an experienced particular must be given as in some temporal 
relation with the subject. If- this can be denied, we may 
find here an intrinsic difference between sense and imagina-
tion. It may be that in the sense the object is given as 
'now', 1. e. as simultaneous with the subject, whereas in 
imagination the object is given without any temporal rela-
tion to the subject, i. e. to the present time." (Russell 
(1915) 33.) In this way the following two definitions may be 
given for imagination and sensation: "'Imagination' is 
acquaintance with particulars which are not given as having 
any temporal relation to the subject. 'Sensation' is ac-
quaintance with particulars given as simultaneous with the 
subject." (Russell (1915) 35.) But Russell is of the opinion 
that this interpretation may be rejected, the explanation to 
be substituted here must "allow that imagination and sensa-
tion are different relations to objects. ... if images have 
any given time-relation to the subject, it must be that of 
simultaneity; hence in this respect they will be indistin-
guishable from sense-data. We cannot hope ... in this case 
to explain the 'unreality' of images by the nature of the 
relation of imagining ... The 'unreality' of images may, on 
our present hypothesis, be defined as consisting merely in 
their failure to fulfil the correlations which are fulfilled 
by sense-data. ... images change in ways which are wholly 
contrary to the laws of physics; the laws of their changes 
seem, in fact, to be psychological rather than physical, 
involving reference to such matters as the subject's 
thoughts and desires." (42-43.) 
After Russell's intensive psycho-physiological studies 
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this provisory contribution to the theoretical foundations 
of irrationality was succeeded by a more scientific argumen-
tation: the physiological difference between sensation and 
image with respect to stimulus that was rejected in Russell 
(1915) 36. is considered as a possible basis for a defini-
tion: "... images have been defined as 'centrally excited 
sensations', i. e. sensations which have their physiological 
cause in the brain only ..." (Russell (1921) 150.). They 
stand clearly in opposition to sensations which are based on 
the sense-organs and the nerves connecting the sense-organs 
with the brain. But this explanation does not fit in with 
Russell's conception, it is replaced by another hypothesis 
tha.t_txies_to._gxplaln._the peculiarity of imagination by 
means of a special sort of ¿ausation which is named mnemic • 
and is based on mental connections: "... and image is occa-
sioned, through association, by a sensation or another image, 
in other words that it has a mnemic cause - which does not 
prevent it from also having a physical cause. ... Sensations, 
on the other hand, will only have physical causes." (120-
-121.). Russell hints at several possible solutions, but his 
ideas are not satisfactorily expounded in Russell (.1921) ; 
the most convincing explanation of this topic is to be found 
in Russell (1927b) which summerizes the different ideas con-
cerning images and generalizes some early conceptions. A 
central motive of the theory of imagination is that the 
image depends on earlier sensations, "an image is more or 
less vague, and has a number of similar sensations as its 
prototypes." (188.) The similitude and the criteria of re-
semblance are inquired into and Russell believes that there 
are" "innumerable methods ... by which you can test the 
likeness of an image to its prototype." (.190.) Russell's 
analysis concludes "that an image is an occurrence having 
the quality associated with stimulation by some sense-organ, 
but not due to such stimulation. In human beings, images 
seem to depend upon past experience, but perhaps in more 
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instinctive animals they are partly due to innate mechanism. 
... an 'image' is an occurrence recognisably visual (or au-
ditory or etc. as the case may be), but not caused by a 
stimulus which is of the nature of light (or sound or etc., 
as the case may be), or at any rate only indirectly so caus-
ed as a result of association." (192-193.) This conception 
is practically a generalisation of the theory concerning 
memory-images discussed in Russell (1921) , as images are not 
only constituents of imagination, but play an important role 
in memory and in word meaning. As to memory-images they "do 
not differ in their intrinsic qualities" from imagination-
-images. "They differ by the fact that the images that con-
stitute memories, unlike those that constitute imagination, 
are accompanied by a feeling of belief which may be express-
ed in the words 'this happened'. The mere occurrence of im-
ages, without this feeling of belief, constitutes imagina-
tion; it is the element of belief that is the distinctive 
thing in memory." (Russell (1921) 176.) Russell assumes that 
'the prototype of our memory-image did fit into a physical 
context, while our memory-image does not. This causes us to 
feel that the prototype was 'real', while the image is 
'imaginary'. (185). In immediate memory Russell deems to 
have found something that "bridges the gulf between sensa-
tions and the images which are their copies." (175.) It ap-
plies to the fading of a sensations: "At the beginning of a 
stimulus we have a sensation; then a gradual transition; and 
at the end an image." (175.) 
In the complex of meaning and thinking, images again 
play an important role according to Russell's considerations. 
One of the main questions is how words or images may occur 
in the absence of their objects. There is a behavioristic 
theory with respect to this connection but it is found to be 
restricted and inadequate, and is replaced by a theoretical 
approach which is, in spite of its declared anti-conventio-
nalism a pragmatic theory insofar as it arises out of the 
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use of language and gives definitions with respect to use. 
After distinguishing the active and passive understanding 
of a word or image he gives different ways of understanding 
words: 
"/1/ On suitable occasions you use the word 
properly. 
/2/ When you hear it, you act appropriately. 
/3/ You associate the word with another word (say 
in a different language) which has the appropri-
ate effect on behavior. 
/4/ When the word is being first learnt, you associ-
ate it with an object, which is what is "means'; 
thus the word acquires some of the same causal 
efficacy-as the-object. (Russell_(19_19b) 301.1 
The cases apply to a use of language which Russell names 
'demonstrative as they point out a feature in the present 
environment' (301.). However this is not the only use of 
language, the two sorts of images already mentioned memory-
-images and imagination-images, lay the ground for other 
uses of language: 
"•/5/ Words may be used to describe or recall a memory-
-image: to describe it when it already exists, or 
to recall it where the words exist as a habit and 
are known to be descriptive of some past experi-
ence. 
/6/ Words may be used to describe or create an imagi-
nation-image: to describe it, for example, in the 
case of a poet or novelist, or to create it in 
the ordinary case of giving information - though 
in the latter case, it is intended that the imagi 
nation-image, when created, shall be accompanied 
by belief that something of the sort has occurred 
(302.) 
These two u£es are named narrative use and imaginative use, 
and both of them indicate the use of words in thinking. 
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"... it is ... the possibility of a memory-image in the" 
speaker "and an imagination-image in the hearer that makes 
the essence of the narrative '•meaning'' of the words." 
(Russell (1921) 201.) "Images, as contrasted with sensa-
tions, are the response expected during a narrative; it is 
understood that present action is not called for. ... words 
used demonstratively describe and are intended to lead to 
sensations, while the same words used in narrative describe 
and are only intended to lead to images." (202.) 
"The 'meaning' of images is the simplest kind of 
meaning, because images resemble what they mean, whereas 
words, as a rule, do not." (Russell (1919b) 303.) In this 
sense images represent a case par exellence for corres-
pondence theory. "That of which an image is a copy is called 
its 'prototype'; and this, or its parts, ... is always an 
indispensable part of the cause either of the image, or of 
its constituents (in the case of complex imagination-im-
age)." (304.) In developing this semantic standpoint Russell 
speaks of image-proposition and word-proposition and of the 
possibility of translation from the one formulation into the 
other, and expounds the thesis that images may apply to par-
ticulars and universals as well (cr. 308f. and Russell 
(1921) 208ff.). In connection with imagination it is the as-
sociation which plays the determining role. "The essence of 
imagination ... is the absence of belief together with a 
novel combination of known elements." (Russell (1927b) 199.) 
"What causes us, in imagination, to put elements together in 
a new way? Let us think first of concrete instances. You 
read that a ship has gone down on a route by which you have 
lately travelled; very little imagination is needed to gen-
erate the thought 'I might have gone down'. What happens 
here is obvious: the route is associated both with yourself 
and with shipwreck, and you merely eliminate the middle 
term. Literary ability is largely an extension of the prac-
tice of which the above is a very humble example." (200.) 
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Another example Is a not very Impressive Shakespeare-anal-
ysis which tries to explain philologically and psychologi-
cally the associations involved in the text. "Thus excep-
tional imaginative gifts appear to depend mainly upon 
associations that are unusual and have an emotional value 
owing to the fact that there is a certain uniform emotional 
tone about them." (201.) 
We wished to give a concise summary of Russell's dif-
ferent views on image and imagination without being compell-
ed to deal extensively with his conceptions concerning mem-
ory, meaning, belief, truth and falsehood and all the other 
fields where image and imagination can appear. At the end of 
this summary we must confess that this picture is rather 
confused and this is not solely our fault: Russell's theory 
on image and imagination, this attempt to formulate a posi-
tive approach to unreal existences, consists of different 
proposals which stand ontologically and semantically in con-
tradiction to each other and which, taken individually, 
prove to be too general and cannot reveal the characteris-
tics of this phenomenon. The problem was originally conceiv-
ed of on the basis of Principia Mathematlca and we find this 
starting-point very promising in several respect: images are 
introduced here as descriptions, i. e. expressions denoting 
one object which must consequently exist. This explanation 
of images has the sense that images can be presented only as 
descriptions, everybody taking part in the communication 
cannot be acquainted with the object of the images, as it is 
habitually inaccessible for everybody outside of the speaker. 
Nevertheless the speaker has the possibility of verifying 
the existence of this object: "... if ... what is given is 
never the thing, but merely one of the 'sensibilia' which 
compose the thing, then what we apprehend in a dream is just 
as much given as what we apprehend in waking life." (Russell 
(1914) 166-167.) We do not dispose of a register of the real 
objects, objects are identified by means of sense-data. If 
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we have sense-data, we must admit that their object exists 
in the case of dreams, hallucinations, etc. these objects 
"have their position in the private space of the perspective 
of the dreamer; where they fail is in their correlation with 
other private spaces and therefore with perspective space. 
But in the only sense in which 'there' can be a datum, they 
are 'there' just as truly as any of the sense-data of waking 
life." (167.) This analysis is very instructive because it 
tries to explain a number of idiosyncratic phenomena on the 
basis of the accepted general solution. This leads, however, 
to contradictions: it is impossible to allow for the exist-
ence of all the objects which can be inferred from our dif-
ferent sense-data, if we want to keep up a coherent view of 
the world we must reject 'things' which "cannot be combined 
according to the laws of physics with the 'things' inferred 
from waking sense-data". (170.) It means that the obejcts 
are there and are not there at the same time, the coherence 
of the system is not satisfactory. There is a positive solu-
tion, as we have pointed out in the previous part, where 
Russell's negative remarks were taken into consideration: on 
the basis of socio-cultural conventions there may be differ-
entiated several uses of language which, according to the 
conventions, may have different definitions as to existence, 
in the number of thpse different existences there should be 
included fictionality as well which has primarily a conven-
tional character. However Russell cannot accept this sort 
of solution as he does not believe in the central importance 
of conventionality, he believes in a natural process of the 
development of language and inquires into rather idio-
synchratic connections of language which are not primarily 
communicative and which by their very nature can be system-
atically accounted for only with difficulty: he deals with 
private language, the language of dreams, but always in such 
a way that normality is victorious over excessive deviation 
and madness. The topics are very difficult and in spite of 
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Russell's deep insights his treatment remains fragmentary 
and unsatisfactory. Russell's fundamental methodological 
problem consists in demonstrating how one and the same thing 
can be two, i. e. how an image is just the same as a sensa-
tion and how they differ from one another. The general an-
swer used to be that image is mental and sensation is mate-
rial, however this distinction is not important in Russell's 
philosophy: mind and matter may have the same structure in 
the sense of neutral monism, therefore some other distinc-
tion is needed. An extreme solution is presented in Russell 
(1915): "If ... imagination involves no time-relation of 
subject and object, then it is a simpler relation than sensa-
tion, being ... merely acquaintance with particulars. The 
object imagined may, on this view, have any position in time 
or none, so far as the mere fact of its being imagined is 
concerned. Sensation, on the other hand, is a relation to a 
particular which involves simultaneity between subject and 
object. Sensation implies ficquaintance with the object, but 
is not identical with acquaintence." (43.) The opposition 
of imagination and sensation goes back to an early reflec-
tion: "non-existential occupation of time, if possible at 
all, is radically different from the existential kind of 
occupation." (Russell (1903) 472.) The introduction of non-
-existential occupation of time has the consequence that we 
must know the objects directly, not by means of sensations, 
and this conviction should lead us to give up Russell's 
whole conception with a sensational, interpretational lan-
guage and to introduce objects on the basis of a realistic 
ontology and to explore several insights by means of which 
the objects can be investigated. Therefore we must agree 
with Russell in rejecting this possibility. But with this 
proposal he gives up.the possibility of introducing arbi-
trary units as individuals in the language: image or imagi-
nation should not be considered as the simplest relation of 
acquaintance but as a consequence of a sensation-relation. 
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Therefore image is conceived of as secondary element, name-
ly as a copy of a sensational prototype. This means again a 
new turning point in the development of the theory: the def-
inition of image in the manner of the word 'meaning' means 
a break not only with the realistic conception, but with the 
early ideas expounded on the basis of Principia Mathematica; 
images no longer appear as descriptions considered in the 
process of presenting and acquiring knowledge, but as voca-
bulars of a subjective way of expression. Russell presents 
a theory of meaning new in several respects: he enumerates 
the different constituents that may have meaning and he con-
siders complex forms such as propositions, beliefs with 
their objectives, the interrelations of these forms with 
images, etc. The new element of this theory is that meaning 
is defined in spite of his anti-conventionalist "conviction 
by features of use, Russell applies here first of all the 
methods of behaviorism. This meaning conception is not ex-
pounded in a formal way comparable to the denotation theory" 
in Principia Mathematica, but its main lines are pointed 
out. The theory is based on the Frege-principle: "The ob-
jective reference of a proposition is a function (in the 
mathematical sense) of the meanings of its component words." 
(Russell (.1921). 371.) Propositions have, however a. different^ 
dimension which is the characteristic duality of truth and 
falsehood. This essential semantic duality is inquired into 
on different levels. Propositions such as linguistic formu-
lations are contrasted with facts. Facts maybe positive and 
negative (as to negative facts cf. Russell (1918-1919) 
211ff; and Oaklander and Miracchi (.1980)). Facts can be most 
simply translated by means of image-propositions "which may 
be believed or disbelieved, but do not allow any duality of 
content corresponding to positive and negative facts" (Rus-
sell (.1921). 276.). The word-propositions represent another 
level, they "are always positive facts, but are of two kinds: 
one veriried by a positive objective, the other by a nega-
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tive objective." (Russell (1921) 277.) Russell introduced 
facts under Wittgenstein's influence: as Quine points out, 
facts are "non-linguistic things that are akin to sentences 
and asserted by them ... His facts are what many of us would 
have been content to call true propositions" (Quine (1966) 
664.) Russell himself called them so in his early writings. 
This solution did not find Quine's approval: "Russell's pre-
dilection for a fact ontology depended, I suggested, on con-
fusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise I think Russell 
would have made short shrift of facts. He would have been 
put off by what strikes a reader of "The Philosphy of Logi-
cal Atomism": how the analysis of facts rests on analysis of 
language. Anyway Russell does not admit facts as fundamental: 
atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound 
objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not a-
tomic facts but sense data." (665-666.) We can have no bet-
ter opinion about the theory of image-propositions: there 
is no regular structure for this proposition and its con-
stituents given, the terminology worked out for lingual con-
nections which appear according to this theory on another 
level seem to be metaphorically applied to the visual sphere, 
and in this way the correlations which surely exist between 
image and word are put into an unadmittedly close contact. 
The whole process of translation hinted at several times 
cannot be discussed with such predispositions. In this way 
we have different ways of expression which are so complicat-
ed that there are no direct connections between them, this 
applies to the behavioristic relations which try to explain 
an unconventional subjective form of thinking such as imagi-
nation, hallucination, dream, etc. It must be emphasised that 
these forms are not parts of a socio-cultural communication, 
nor are they to be considered as a genre of communications, 
but they are embedded in psycho-physiological processes 
which have without doubt an important signifiance in human 
life, although its characteristics are quite different from 
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the socio-cultural connection. The relative importance of 
these elements is different from the point of view of the 
language system and its use and although it is desirable 
that all the elements should be taken into account yet they 
should be given the weight which is their due according to 
the grammar and the use of language. In this sense the sub-
jective forms chosen by Russell are not to be considered as 
fundamental linguistic relations; they are, on the contrary, 
secondary forms belonging to different minimal classes. 
Therefore we must hold this theory, in spite of the'interest-
ing and sometimes even revealing analysis, to be erroneous. 
If we take one of its most attractive features, the defini-
tion of contents of images on the basis of associations, we 
are aware of the difficulties of the theory. "... a word or 
image means an object ... when it has the same associations 
as the object. But this definition must not be interpreted 
too absolutely: a word or image will not have all the same 
association as the objects which it means." (Russell (1921) 
291.) This rather vaguely defined relation is applied on the 
one hand to explicate consciousness and, generally, the 
mind: in this connection it is postulated that several im-
ages belong to a certain prototype which may be related to 
each other without the help of the prototype. On the other 
hand the introduction of the prototype raises the question 
of whether the mental events are causally dependent upon 
physical events in a sense in which the converse dependence 
does not hold. This dependence is the materialistic view of 
the question, and Russell, who would like to maintain his 
neutral position, is compelled to declare: "... I think the 
bulk of the evidence points to the materialistic answer as 
the more probable." (303.) In this case all that he said 
about the mnemic causation as a special cause of images, 
their mental nature, etc. loses its importance; we believe 
that the dilemmas can be solved if they are put in the form 
of an empirically formulated question and we are interested 
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not in the philosophical but the empirical solution. Asso-
ciations play an important role in the modern theory of lan-
guage for instance, Saussure attemps to capture the associa-
tions but he takes a conventional system into consideration 
and he and his followers have incomparably more to say than 
the philosopher considering expressions. A detailed inves-
tigation of. Russell's proposals seems to be as devoid of 
interest in this respect as the analysis of his remarks con-
cerning literary analysis: the research in these fields 
achieved more valuable results. 
And what is the importance of this theory of imagina-
tion for fictionality? We must see that imagination can only 
account for the psychological ability of the narratives, but 
not for their conventional rules. Therefore a particular un-
certainty in evaluating fictional narrative exists': although 
a special use of the words evoking images in the narrative 
has been introduced Russell speaks of "a consistent whole 
composed partly or wholly of false propositions, as in a 
novel." (Russell (1921) 268.) In this sense the theory of 
imagination is an unsuccessful attempt to complete the 
classical denotation theory with a positive approach to un-
real existences. The cause of the failure consists in 
choosing the subjective psycho-physiological elements to 
interpret language and to postulate a unique homonymous sys-
tem for language itself. Nevertheless, with the requirement 
of conventional use of the words there appears the possi-
bility of the delimitation of a genre as a special way of 
communication. We appreciate this attempt to define these 
uses of meaning, however we would not like to put these 
special images - these rather questionable units - at the 
centre of the definitions, we are convinced that the genre 
is not determined by the direction towards one or other 
image, but by socio-cultural conventions that can be mapped 
into the language by means of different language systems in 
competition with each other. 
- 358 -
3. At the end of our discussion we have to raise the ques-
tion of how far this conception, which has proved to be in 
some formal respect very important, in other connections of 
the interpretation however, erroneous can be considered as 
characteristic of the nominalistic systems of fictionality, 
i. e. of the Russellian systems. During the analysis we 
have had the chance to be convinced that Russell's system 
cannot be held to be nominalistic in every respect: he pos-
tulates universals, and the ontological basis of some of his 
terms such as negative fact and even fact etc. may be que-
ried. His way of interpreting language with respect to 
sense-data which are considered as the building stones of 
material and mental structures of the universe in the sense 
of neutral monism is not commonly widespread among the nom-
inalists of logico-linguistic semantics. At the same time 
we must be conscious of the fact that through his theory of 
description Russell exerted an influence in the interest of 
nominalism and against Meinongian conceptions and his con-
ception of the imaginary belongs to the same approach. How-
ever we do not want to give an appreciation of his role in 
the history of philosophy, and our points of view have been 
methodological ones: we pointed out the double approach to 
fictionality which has the specific appearance of denotion 
theory and the theory of imagination and which expresses the 
dilemma to give either a totally negative or a positive so-
lution to fictionality. We have evaluated Russell's denota-
tion theory which corresponds to the negative answer, how-
ever we have tried to show that Russell's formulation should 
be completed in such a way that fictionality could be dealt 
with, and only Russell's positive solution was rejected, not 
the positive solution as such. These contradictory impulses 
stem from the acknowledgement of two principles at the same 
time, the first is that objects should not be multiplied, 
consequently we need not assign existence to objects which 
have been invented; the second is that if something is there 
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it must be acknowledged, this principle can be fully sat-
isfied in a stratified language system. The problem is that 
the severe nominalistic methodology prohibits the accepting 
of some appearances as existents which we believe to Know 
on the basis of our native language and our conventions. 
What is the way out: criticizing natural language in the 
name of science and an ideal language or in proving it to 
be considerate to the naivities of language and conven-
tions? There is no general answer. What we have tried to 
make understandable in connection with fictionality is that 
existence should not be sought only in the physical or 
psycho-physiological sphere but in socio-cultural contexts, 
in conventions and in different pragmatic factors. These 
social elements should not appear foreign to nominalism, a 
nominalist treatment of their complex structures would con-
tribute to their better and simpler understanding. The same 
applies to fictionality: we are acquainted with these (phy-
sically) non-existent figures, and we should give an account 
of the nature of our acquaintance. 
Notes 
1 This study was formulated for the "Semantics of Fiction" 
- number of Poetics, 11 (1982). editor: Prof. Dr. Hannes 
Rieser, however, it could not be published because of its 
length. It represents at the same time a part of my invfes-
tigations concerning fictionality, as to the central ideas 
of my conception cf. my study: The Main Views on Fiction-
ality in the Logico-Semantic Tradition, Stud.ia poetica 3, 
pp. 115-124. and another long study about the Meinongian 
semantics in correspondance with fictionality: Semantik ftir 
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heimatlose Gegenstände. Die Bedeutung von Meinongs Gegen-
standstheorie für die Theorie der Fiktionalität, Studia 
poética 3, pp. 3-114. The present study should not be con-
sidered as a finished work about nominalistic semantics, 
not even the whole part of the Russellian semantics could 
be dealt with, the most important failures are Russell's 
critic on Leibniz and the late development of the inter-
pretation of his logical analysis. These parts will be 
finished later on, for the time being it appears in this 
form. 
"My intellectual journeys have been, in some respects, 
disappointing. When I was young I hoped to find religious 
satisfaction in philosophy; even after I had abandoned He-
gel, the eternal Platonic world gave me something nonhuman 
to admire. I thought of mathematics with reverence, and 
suffered when Wittgenstein led me to regard it as nothing 
but tautologies. I have always ardently desired to find 
some justification outside human life and to deserve feel-
ings of awe. X am thinking in part of very obvious things, 
such as the starry heavens and a stormy sea on a rocky 
coast; in part of the vastness of the^ scientific universe, 
both in space and time, as compared to the life of man-
kind; in part of the edifice of impersonal truth, espe-
cially truth which, like that of mathematics, does not 
merely describe the world that happens to exist. Those who 
attempt to make a religion of humanism, which recognizes 
nothing greater than man, do not satisfy my emotions. And 
yet X am unable to believe that, in the world as known, 
there is anything that I can value outside human beings, 
and, to a much lesser extent, animals. Not the starry 
heavens, but their effects on human percipients, have ex-
cellence; to admire the universe for its size is slavish 
and absurd; impersonal non-human truth appears to be a 
delusion. And so my intellect goes with the humanists, 
though my emotions violently rebel." Russell (1944a) 19-20. 
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14 
in the beginning of the century, X had composed 
various stories and, later, I made up stories to while 
away the tedious climb from the beach to our house in 
Cornwall. Some of the latter have since been Written down, 
though never published. In about 1912, I had written a 
novel, in the manner of Mallock's New Republic, called 
The Perplexities of John Forstioe. Though the first half 
of it I still think is not bad, the latter half seems very 
dull to me, and I have never made any attempt to publish 
it. I also invented a story that I never published." 
Russell (1969) 34. 
4 
"... logical constants are all notions definable in terms 
of the following: Implication, the relation of a term to 
a class of which it is a member, the notion of such that, 
the notion of relation, and such further notions ..." 
(Russell (.1903/3..) 
"It may be observed that, although implication is indefi-
nable, proposition can be defined. Every proposition 
implies itself, and whatever is not a proposition implies 
nothing. Hence to say 'p is a proposition' is equivalent 
to saying 'p implies p'; and this equivalence may be used 
to define propositions." (15.) 
6 "But a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, 
does not .itself contain words: it contains the entities 
indicated by words." (47) 
7 "Predicates ... are concepts, other than verbs, which oc-
cur in propositions having only one term or subject." 
(.45.). 
8 "Every verb, in the logical sense of the word, may be 
regarded as a relation; when it occurs as verb, it actual-
ly relates, but when it occurs as verbal noun it is the 
bare relation considered independently of the terms which 
it relates." (52.) 
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"Worlds all have meaning, in the simple sense that they 
stand for something other than themselves." (47.) 
1 0 "But a proposition unless it happens to be linguistic, 
does not itself contain words: it contains the entities e» 
indicated by words." (47.) 
"Here the Gedanke is what I have called an unasserted 
proposition - or rather, what I called by this name co-
vers both the Gedanke alone and the Gedanke together 
with its truth-value. It will be will to have names for 
these two distinct notions; I shall call the the Gedanke 
alone a propositional concept; the truth-value of a Ge-
danke I shall call an assumption." (503.) The last re-
mark is completed by the following erroneous note: 
"Fege, like, Meinong, calls this an Annahme: FuB. p. 21." 
As to Annahme cf. Kanyo (1980)a. 'Assumption' was not 
used later in this sense in the Russellian system. 
12 
cf. "Matter, we are told, is a substance, a thing, a sub-
ject, of which secondary qualities are the predicates. 
But this traditional answer cannot content us. The whole 
doctrine of subject and predicate ... is radically false, 
and must be abandoned." (Russell (1903) 466.) 
13 
"Coffa (1980) demonstrates an essential differences bet-
ween the theory of knowledge by acquaintance and Rus-
sell's ideas explained in "On Denoting". 
1 4 A typical evaluation of it by Quine goes as follows; 
"Now here, in contrast to the class matter, I think Rus-
sell even concedes the Platonists too much; retention of 
the two-place predicate 'is similar to' is no evidence 
of assuming a corresponding abstract entity, the simi-
larity relation, as long as that relation is not invoked 
as a value of a bound variable. .A moral of all this is 
that in attention to referential semantics works two ways, 
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obscuring some ontological assumptions and creating an 
illusion of others." (Quine (1966) 662.) 
^ cf. "God and immortality, the central dogmas of the 
Christian religion, find no support is science. It can-
not be said that either doctrine is essential to reli-
gion, since neither is found in Buddhism... But we in 
the West have come to think of them as the irreducible 
minimum of theology. No doubt people will continue to 
entertain these beliefs, because they are pleasant, just 
as it is pleasant to think ourselves virtuous and our 
enemies wicked. But for my part I cannot see any ground 
for either. I do not pretend to be able to proye that 
there is no God. I equally cannot prove that Satan is 
a fiction. The Christian God may exist; so may the Gods 
of Olympus, or of ancient Egypt, or of Babylon. But no 
one of these hypotheses is more probable than any other; 
they lie outside the region, of even probable knowledge, 
and therefore there is no reason to consider any of them." 
(Russell (1925). 13-14.). 
1 6 cf. "... the basis of a language is not conventional, 
either from the point of view of the individual or from 
that of the comunity. A child learning to speak is learn-
ing habits and associations which are just as much deter-
mined hy the environment as the habit of expecting dogs 
to bark and cocks to crow. ... a conventional origin is 
clearly just as mythical as the social contract by which 
Hobbes and Rousseau supposed civil government to have 
been established. We can hardly suppose a parliament of 
hitherto speechless elders meeting together and agreeing 
to call a cow a cow and a wolf a wolf. The association 
of words with their meanings must have grown, up by 
some natural process, though at present the nature of the 
process in unknown." (Russell (1921) 189-190.). 
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Russell's arguments against conventionalism have been 
definitely refuted in Lewis (1969) . 
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"PRETENDS", LINGUISTICS, AND GAME-THEORY 
/A PARADIGM CASE OF GENERATING FICTION/ 
László Tarnay 
A. József University, Szeged 
0. Introductory Remarks 
It seems to be a common assumption among scholars that 
the verb "to pretend" plays a significant role in generating 
fiction. It has been equally taken up by such different ap-
proaches as the strict logical-linguistic analysis, the 
speech act theory, the possible world semantics and ontolog-
ical philosophy of literature."'' It has gradually become a 
common practice unduly to impose burdens on a single predi-
cate, while the fictional interpretation of the word went 
uncontested. So, the question whether there is any ambiguity 
hidden in its semantical representation has not been raised. 
On the forthcoming pages our concern will be to give an ana-
lysis of what such a representation may look like. This we 
do in two major stages: first, by drawing a detailed picture 
of the different uses of our word we touch on some problems 
of multiple interpretation and assert how fiction can be 
generated, and secondly we hint at a game-theoretical frame-
work in which oür previous assessments could be reformulated. 
But in order to clear the ground for our task we should make 
some preliminary statements. 
The basic difference between our approach and the 
attitude generally accepted is, as we see it, that the latter 
is towards giving some consistent system in which the claims 
of a descriptive study of fictional phenomena are met in 
order that the question how fictional interpretations are 
possible, rather than whence such a possibility may come. 
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may be properly answered. To accomplish this aim "pretends" 
is introduced into the analysis as a primitive term which 
is supposed eo ipso to account for the usual real/fictional 
ambiguity. Whereas our approach is focused on what "pre-
tends" means and on how it is used in different contexts; 
It turns out that it has a multiplicity of independent 
readings and an intricate web of presuppositions, so much 
so, that no onesided application of it in the field of lit-
erary semantics seems to be forthcoming. It follows then 
that "pretends" is by no means primitive but should be 
traced back to the concept of identity. A corollary of our 
approach to the semantics of "pretends" will be an argument 
on the need to distinguish two kinds of identity: metaphys-
2 
ical and epistemological. Evidence for this distinction 
will be extensively given on examining linguistic data for 
our term; yet, some independent clarification may be in 
order. We call methaphysical any identity (or concept what-
soever) that can be established on the basis of our lin-
guistic and logical capacity alone, whereas we call it 
epistemological if it is established on our assessment of 
what the world looks like and of what may contribute to con-
firming our knowledge of it. To see this distinction work we 
may give some examples where the two interpretations are 
conflicting: e.g. consider of there being some competing 
candidates who, say, have written a test; then uttering the 
sentence "I could be the winner" will be metaphysically or 
epistemologically biased depending on whether I am excluded 
from the class of the participants or form part of it. Or 
the sentence "I could be your father" is viewed differently 
if it is the product of pure fantasy or a topic introduced 
in court. To put it in a general way, the multiplicity of 
possible routes that events may have taken is a merit of our 
conceptual system in the first case, while, in the second it 
is the result of our trying to cope with how things really 
are, and hence it reflects our lack of knowledge. Although 
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this distinction is not one of possible worlds (for both 
seem to allow them), a difference in the assessment of i-
dentities is generated: a metaphysical identity is a kind of 
trans-world identity based on some logical-linguistic cri-
teria and hence calling for an answer to the problem of es-
sential and contingent attribution of predicates, whereas 
an epistemological identity is a kind of trans-world identity 
- if any - for which the much-debated essential/ contingent 
ambiguity may not arise, as we have seen in our second ex-
ample: having a certain father is usually esteemed to be an 
essential property, it can rationally be questioned in some 
circumstances without its having the least bearing on the 
identity of him for whom this property is predicated. An 
epistemological identity is then not only any continuity in 
time-and-space but as the second part of our definition 
above puts it, it is any assessment on sameness that may 
prove useful in understanding how things are. What are now 
the criteria of this latter identity? It is this question 
which a proper analysis of "pretends" must raise and try 
to answer. What may seriously hinder such an attempt is the 
fact that the meaning of "pretends" is contaminated by the 
interference of the two identities, so much so that a multi-
plicity of readings is generated. In order to entangle them 
we should embark on a systematic study of its possible 
occurances. 
1. An Attempt to Locate the Meaning of "Pretends" 
This part is devoted to giving a diagnostic treatment 
of the meaning of "pretends": it should reveal the basic 
problems in understanding the word and give some tenets for 
asserting the ambiguities in its interpretation. To prove 
our hypothesis we first have to clarify, what constraints 
seem to be imposed on the use of "pretends" in linguistics; 
whether they are valid should bear heavily on what inter-
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pretations are assigned to the given grammatical structure 
it happens to be embedded in. Two such constraints seem to 
be in the offing: one comes from Searle who says that "one 
cannot truly be said to have pretended to do something un-
less one intended to do it".3 "Pretends" then should "con-
tain the conception of intention built into it."4 The other 
goes back to G. Lakoff: it says that the use of this word 
always presupposes the truth of the negation of its sen-
tence-complement. Let us examine them briefly. 
The first constraint by Searle is stated in the prag-
matics of speech acts: it is part of the essential condi-
tion of "pretends". Yet, it seems to be dubious whether it 
can qualify as such in the form cited above. Consider the 
following short dialogue uttered in court: 
A: The accused pretends to be innocent. But he is guilty. 
B: He does not pretend to be innocent, for innocent he is. 
Both interlocutors can be rational in arguing for the 
particular positions they hold. If so, then the use of "pre-
tends" is supposed to be neutral as regards whether the 
accused has had any intention whatsoever. This boils down 
to the fact that a statement of the form: 
/1/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he has no inten-
tion of doing so. 
need not be paradoxical. One may be unaware of playing off 
a belief of being so-and-so. A proper example for /1/ can 
be somebody who is considered mad, although less sophisti-
cated cases would do as well. On the other hand, the use 
of "pretends" seems to affect what people believe about the 
person of whom it is predicated. Bearing this in mind we 
may try to replace /1/ by the stronger form: 
/2/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he cannot be said 
to be playing off a belief of being so-and-so 
which is indeed paradoxical. Now, we can formulate a more 
palatable condition on the illocutionary force of "pretends": 
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/C/ One cannot be truly said to have pretended to do some-
thing unless he can be said to be playing off a similar 
belief 
Instead of "playing off a belief" we might have said "making 
others believe accordingly" as well. The reason why there 
seems to be a difference between what the audience conceives 
to be like an illocutionary act and the per-
formance of such an act simpliciter, in our opinion, resides 
in the fact that "pretends" is not a performative verb. One 
cannot say: I hereby pretend... We can only describe an act 
of pretending, i.e. we can assign a similar force to utter-
ances which we esteem to convey such a force in advance. But 
then it loses its Sxplanatory power and is reduced to being 
a proxy for a previously accepted distinction. It is this 
fallacy that is often committed when "pretends" is claimed 
to account for fictional phenomena: it seems to state that 
fiction is what is intended as such whereas it should state 
rather that fiction is what is supposed to be intended as 
such. It will turn out later that to amend this character-
ization we should conceive fiction as a particular game in 
which players aim at an agreement other than in normal com-
munication. But for the time being we remain with the idea 
that there is a methodological difference between illocu-
tionary forces assigned on the basis of the performative 
character or on the lack of it. 
By blurring this distinction Searle is led to the con-
frontation of two different senses of "pretends": one being 
an intention to deceive, i.e. "to pretend to be or to do 
something that one is not doing", the other referring to a 
performance "which is ae if one were doing or being the 
thing" but this time without any intention to deceive.7 He 
claims that fiction can be predicated in the latter sense. 
Although his further analysis of the role of pretending in 
fiction involves the same fallacy we hinted at above: in 
order to assign the illocutionary force of pretending to 
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utterances one should not only presuppose the real/fictional 
ambiguity but be aware of how it is already distributed over 
the utterances, this postulation of different senses stands 
in need of an adequate justification. For, what could be the 
difference between the concept of deception and that of "as 
if"? For one thing, it cannot lie in the lack of intention 
because it would violate the essential condition of "pre-
tends" and we cannot speak of two different senses of the 
same word any more. If so, then the lack of intention to de-
ceive with "as if " cannot mean a lack of intention simpli-
citer. And indeed, Searle is ready with the answer: if we 
take "pretends" in this second sense, the speaker's inten-
tion is aimed at suspending the requirements that are to 
obtain when the speech act of assertion is performed. If I 
pretend to be Nixon in this sense, then I could only pretend 
to refer to Nixon as myself, i.e. reference is suspended. 
Searle's example here is misleading; for he mentions only 
fictional individuals as cases of suspended reference, while 
with existing individuals like London, Napoleon, Nixon,, etc. 
reference is claimed to be successful. This is again due to 
the hidden assessment about what can count as real/fictio-
nal before we embark on our analysis. But as we can see in 
the case of my pretending to be Nixon, reference to an 
existing individual can equally be suspended if the problem 
is formulated in this way. So, suspension is rather a gen-
eral criterion. In order for an utterance to be fictional a 
proper act of pretending of reference should be enhanced. 
But what happens if I state that I am Nixon so as be let 
into the White House? Does referring apply then? We might 
feel prone to answer in the affirmative provided that the 
deception was successful. But soon it is realized that such 
a use of "pretends" equally violates the essential and also 
the sincerity condition ui assertion in that the speaker does 
not believe in what has been uttered and that it does not rep-
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resent an actual state of affairs. Yet, it could be argued 
that the suspension of these conditions is not intended 
- although it is dubious whether someone could lie without 
the slightest intention of suspending being sincere! - but 
what is really intended is a succesfull reference. But what 
does it mean to refer successfully in this case? Does it 
mean that I refer to Nixon? Clearly not. For on the basis 
of a casual reference to the president I would never be ad-
mitted into the White House. Such an approach will then 
misplace any idea of rigid reference. Does it then mean 
that I refer to myself? Clearly not. For referring success-
fully to myself would again be inadequate for entering the 
building. It will misplace any idea of a speaker-oriented 
reference as well. So, if there is any reference intended 
in this case, it must be of a queer sort. Rather, it is 
the supposed identity of Nixon with myself that is intend-
ed in order to be let in. 
If we want to keep up the difference between the two 
senses of "pretends", we have to allow that there is an in-
tention to play off an identity belief in the first case • 
while it is lacking or suspended in the second. But is this 
so? If I state that I am Nixon on the stage, is there no, 
however vague, idea of a similar belief being played off? A 
negative answer would undoubtedly render stage-roles maining 
less. Of course, there is a sense in which no complete iden-
tification is possible, but no more can we speak of complete 
identification in the case of deception there is a clear 
sense in which I could not be one with Nixon however I striv 
ed. 
To sum up, the difference between the two uses of "pre-
tends" cannot be located in having some intention of playing 
off a belief, for in both senses there is a similar inten-
tion; it cannot be put into the kinds of belief that are be-
ing played off, for they equally involve identity. It must 
lie then in the belief-contents to be appropriated. If so, 
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then we must speak of different meanings of "pretends" but 
not of different senses. To account for the complexities of 
these belief-contents will be the task of the semantics of 
our term: ambiguities are generated as a result of different 
identity beliefs which are to be played off. 
The constraint that G. Lakoff seems to impose on."pre-
tends" apperantly belongs to its semantics. It is tantamount 
to saying that a sentence like 
/3/ John pretends to be a caesar 
seems to depend on another: 
/4/ John is not a caesar 
If we look upon the relation between /1/ and /2/ and 
state it to be presuppositional, we are drawn to the pecul-
iar character of this verb in that it cannot be tucked into 
any of Karttunen's three categories: I plugs, II epistemic 
verbs, III holes, for either it is a plug since it blocks 
the truth of its sentence complement or it is a hole since 
Q 
it filters the negation of the very same clause. To put it 
in another way, the role of "pretends" is then to express 
or rather to conjoin the contradiction of "x is an F" and 
"x is not an F" in a non-contradictory way. This idea is 
emphasized by the somewhat taunting 
*/5/ John pretends himself to be a caesar 
which can have the following logical form underlying: 
/6/ x pretends x is an F 
If we take further the unnegated complement of "pretend^' 
as the proper belief-content that is played off when an utter-
ance like /3/ is put forward, we immediately see why Sear-
le' s examples were misleading: he considered sentences 
which had the structure of /7/ rather than /6/: 
/7/ x pretends y is an F 
The asymmetry of /6/ and /7/ seems to have justified 
the difference between the two senses of "pretends". We have 
witnessed that a form like /6/ can equally well be used to 
generate fictional interpretation. There seems to be nothing 
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in /6/ and /7/ that would call for one or another meaning 
(or sense). But then corresponding surface forms should 
inevitably be ambiguous, for apparently /6/ and /7/ are not 
the same. To bring their difference home we have to r ¡fine 
them to a considerable degree along the lines we have been 
arguing for the belief of identity. Then the relevant read-
ings of contexts with "pretends" will soon yield to analysis. 
2. The Ambiguities of "Pvetenda": Fundamental Caaeo 
An independant motivation for our claim can be given by in-
vestigating pronominalization in constructions like /3/ with 
respect to /5/ and /8/ on the basis of /6/ and /7/. A 
similar argument has already been given by Barbara H. Par-
9 
tee : the core of her argument is aimed at showing that 
surface forms like /3/ and /5/ go back to a stucture of /6/ 
while surface forms like /8/ go back to /7/: 
/8/ John pretends John to be a caesar 
/5/ resulted from the variable reading of pronouns whereas 
/8/ by a corresponding pronominalization of laziness should 
yield /9/: 
*/9/ John pretends him to be a caesar 
The acceptance of /9/ may be doubted, although similar con-
structions with "believes", "imagines", etc. are readily 
available. The reason why /9/ seems to be felt incorrect 
lies in the fact that there is a residual claim of identity 
in it, which is absent from contexts with e.g. "believes": 
/10/ John believes him to be a caesar 
where there is no relation whatsoever between John and the 
referent of "him". According to Partee there are some other 
examples which suffer from the same fault as /9/, i.e. 
which do not allow a corresponding laziness-reading; they 
are so-called psychological verbs like "feels good", in 
which a prohibition to substitute the same referring expres-
sion into independent variables can be motivated by the fact 
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that one is unable to have the same sensory feeling as 
another, and hence, to use an idea of Castañeda1^ one cannot 
feel self-identified except with himself. To account for a 
residual identity claim with respect to /9/ we now have to 
bring up evidence for /8/ and show therewith that this 
residual identity is different from self-identity that has a 
structure like /6/ and hence gives way to reflexivation. In 
this way we can reinstate the distinction between /6/ and 
/7/ by saying that they convey different identity claims. 
Let us consider constructions with "only" by means of which 
ambiguities like that of /6/ and /7/ are usually tested: 
/11/ Only John pretends himself to be a caesar 
/12/ Only John pretends John to be a caesar 
The meaning of /11/ is clear, but we may feel embarass-
ed by /12/. Yet, we would like to argue that we can think of 
a situation when /12/ is true while /11/ false. Consider a 
masquarade to which people are admitted only if they are 
disguised as one of the others /also present/ in order for 
him to be caricatured. If now, by some acid self-irony, 
John thinks of spoiling the party by making a mockery of 
himself, and if being a caesar is not a unique way of cari-
caturing, then /11/ says something about each individual's 
self-identity while /12/ is concerned with their supposed 
identity with John. The rule of equi-deletion would then 
delete "himself" in /11/ and pronominalization-of-laziness 
lead to /9/ in /12/. Such an idea can be made more blatant 
by paraphrazing our construction slightly: 
/13/ Is is a pretense for John for him to be a caesar but 
it is a reality for Jack 
/14/ It is a pretense for John to be a caesar but it is a 
reality for Jack 
/13/, which comes from constructions like /12/ and /9/, be-
comes a natural way to express the difference between Jack's 
and John's judgments about John's being a caesar; while in 
/14/ it is a difference between Jack's and John's claim for 
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the throne which is judged. In /14/, which involves each 
individual' s self—identity equi—deletion was obligatory. 
The correct semantical representations of /13/ and /14/ are 
respectively: 
/15/ It is a pretense for x for y to VP but it is a reality 
for z for y to VP 
/16/ It is a pretense for x for x to VP but it is a reality 
for z for z to VP 
/15/ and /16/ may be looked upon as the first result to 
amend the original /6/ and /7/. The use of identical vari-
ables in both conjuncts stand for our residual identity 
claim, while self-identity is safeguarded by the use of dis-
tinct variables in each. However, on closer inspection, they 
will turn out to be still inadequate to apply to cases put 
forward along the Searlian argument of "pretends". Take his 
first sense: /15/ may partly explicate what is happening 
when "I am Nixon" is uttered with the force of pretending; 
substituting "to be Nixon" for "to VP" we will have: 
/17/ It is pretense for x for y to be Nixon but it is reality 
for z for y to be Nixon 
If the variable "y" is used to bring home a residual 
claim of identity and if our argument about there being such 
an identity in any fictional representation in order for the 
idea of role to be realized is sound, then /17/ will equally 
represent the second sense of "pretends", and hence the 
difference has again been lost. The reason for this is that 
we have only tried to represent the two identity claims in 
two separate sentences and disregarded the possibility of con-
joining them into one. Yet, fiction seems to be the result 
of such a conjunction of identity beliefs: for, what is lack-
ing to disambiguate /17/ is the idea that in the case of 
deception the individual to be substituted into "z" takes his 
belief-content "for y to be Nixon" to convey a self-identity 
for him with respect to "y", while in the case of fictional 
representation he takes it to convey the residual identity 
claim but not the former, which can be duly said to be sus-
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pended. To account for this and similar amendments we have 
to formulate the corresponding semantic representations so 
that they make clear not only which of the two identities 
should figure in the relevant belief-contents that are being 
played off but - as we shall see - also to which the indi-
vidual who is playing them off is committed. 
But before laying down these representations we would 
like to produce some indépendant motivations for making our 
distinctions. 
3. A Pragmatical Paradox in a Semantical Vein 
Consider a case described in Johnson-Laird /1982/ after 
Bas C. van Fraassen:11 the king's son is thrown into prison 
and is forced to wear an iron mask. Although the king be-
lieves that the is dead, he should appear before him but he 
is looked upon as a common criminal. However, had the king's 
son endeavoured in -vain to be recognized by his father, the 
following problem may be easily raised: How can we sincerely 
report the effort of the son? We cannot say that he claimed 
simply to be the son of the king for his father believes 
him to be dead and naturally would not trust a common crim-
inal. Neither can he have claimed not to be a common crim-
inal because people in iron masks are generally considered 
to be criminals. And neither can he have claimed not to be 
a man in iron mask for no-one realizes that he is wearing a 
mask, and hence, it would amount to saying that he is not 
identical with himself, which is absurd. We think this the 
proper place to use "pretends"; what he can do is try to 
play off the least obtrusive belief about himself. As he 
cannot take off his mask or assert absurdities, we may re~ 
port his intention as 
/18/ The son of the king pretends that the man in the iron 
mask is not a common criminal 
The pecularity of /18/ is that identities are express-
ed via definite descriptions, yet the meaning of "pretends" 
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does not seem to have changed: the same multiplicity of 
interpretations can be correlated with the different con-
texts /18/ may occur in (e.g. release from prison, being 
locked up again, or mutual recognition) depending on how 
identities are taken to figure in the corresponding belief-
-content that is part of the meaning of an act of pretend-
ing. But we do not enlist these possibilities here since 
they flow easily from the various semantical representations 
{ we are going to define next. 
4. A Semantical Paradox in a Pragmatical Vein 
An independant motivation of distinguishing between 
different concepts of identity results from an investigation 
into the semantic principles of introducing definition or 
meaning postulates into one's language. Suppose we define 
"mad" as "having a wrong idea of oneself" which should be 
tantamount to an incorrect predicate-attribution. But what 
happens if we apply "mad" to its own definiens; for clearly, 
mad is a property and hence can be assigned to any individu-
al. Yet, if one incorrectly attributes "mad" to himself,- he 
is supposed to be mad by definition; then however, he can-
not have attributed it incorrectly to himself since he is 
already in possession of it. And if, in turn, he is right 
in attributing it to himself, he cannot be supposed to be 
mad again by definition. But then he should be attributing 
it incorrectly and a vicious circle is established.1^ 
To realize that semantic paradoxes inherent in any 
vocubulary run on parallel lines with our previous example 
where we can speak of a so-called deictic paradox, and that 
they are solved if the two concepts of identity are taken 
into consideration, we may re-formulate the present case by 
using "pretends"; we do not think that there is anything 
wrong with this, for, how else could we sincerely report 
one's serious misconception about himself than making use 
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of "pretends"? Not for example by "imagines" since to 
imagine oneself to be so-and-so has clearly nothing to do 
with what others should believe of him but in order for one 
to be considered as mad this latter condition is necessary. 
/19/ can then be a neat approximation: 
/19/ John pretends to be mad 
If the semantical representation of /19/ is taken to be 
similar to /6/, the vicious circle argument is introduced. 
Yet, if we apply, our ideas on identity, the paradox is 
dissolved: John not only believes himself to be mad but 
rather he self-identifies himself with someone who is mad. 
Then his madness results from a misconception of self-iden-
tity rather than an incorrect attribution of a predicate, 
although the latter is part and parcel of the former /see 
below/.13 
5. An Attempt to Formulate Ambiguities in the Traditional 
Framework 
On the basis of the aforegoing discussion we may try 
to re-assess the semantical importance of the different con-
texts "pretends" is allowed to occur in; the only problem 
arising from this claim is the lack of a proper transcript 
for the two kinds of identity. As a loose approximation we 
may try to express self-identity by a formula common in the 
epistemic logic of Hintikka to represent identification of 
referents: (x = a); while we may indicate by another formula 
(x = y) identity simpliciter. The meaning of "pretends" then 
results as ambiguous in six ways: 
/20/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and F/a// 
/21/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ 
and F/b// 
/22/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and F/y// 
/23/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b// 
- 387 -
/24/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and F/a// 
/25/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and /a = b/ and F/b// 
Possible paraphrases of /20/-/25/ can be given as follows: 
/26/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies 
himself as a caesar 
/27/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies 
himself with no-one else but Napoleon who is a 
caesar 
/28/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that 
he is a caesar 
/29/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that 
he is no-one else but.Napoleon who is a caesar 
/30/ John is being hypnotized: he behaves as if he were a 
caesar 
/31/ John is being nypnotized: he behaves as if he were no-
-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar 
Applayin "only" as a test, we see that the contexts 
which contain a self-identity claim do not give way to pro-
nominal ization-of- laziness : 
/32/ Only John is hypnotized in order for him to behave as 
if he were no-one else but Napoleon 
/33/ Only John is hypnotized in order for John to behave 
as if he were no-one else but Napoleon 
While /32/ is understandable as what makes a restric-
tion on who is to be hypnotized to behave as if he were Na-
poleon, /33/ amounts to the same, or else it is an obvious 
nonsense: for, there can by no means be anybody the hyp-
notizing of whom would result in somebody else's, say John's, 
behaviour as Napoleon. If there is self-identity involved, 
14 
then only a variable-reading of pronouns is possible. 
The tackle Fraassen's example, however, we have further 
to refine our formulation. For, there are cases (our case of 
being let into the White House included) in which to under-
stand the meaning of "pretends" we have to define not only 
what the corresponding belief-contents are but also what 
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the epistemic attitude of the audience is like. What we are 
implying here are examples like: 
/34/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he 
is a caesar 
/3 5/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he 
is no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar 
which can have the structures: 
/36/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a// and /Ez/ Bz//x=y/ 
and /x = a/ and F/a// ^ / x pretends F/a/// 
/37/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a// and /Ez/ B2//x=y/ 
and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b// 3 /x pretends//y=b/ 
and F/b/// 
Of course, our intuition about the acceptance of these 
formulas should be checked: it might be thought illicit to 
predicate "pretends" of somebody who would not be prone to 
admit that he has done so. Yet, we claim that we do use this 
word not only to highlight the difference between what one 
intends to make us believe he is doing and what he is really 
doing but to attribute a similar difference between what one 
is said to be trying to make us belive and what he is said 
to do. We can think of the whole history of madness and how 
"mad" is attributed: as we may put it, what we have pre-
viously explained as cases of being mad are the clinical 
cases whereas these new forms can be looked upon as the non-
clinical. Apart from any consideration of whether they are 
acceptable, an important conclusion should follow independ-
ently: the use of "pretends" is motivated by any difference 
in the epistemic attitude of the speaker (or the subject of 
the sentence) and the audience (jither with respect to how 
things are or how they (the speaker or the audience) are 
supposed to conceive of them. From this it results that the 
truth of the negation of the complement is only optional 
and hence the presupposition could easily be suspended pro-
vided a difference in the relevant epistemic attitudes makes 
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up for it. I may be truly said to pretend to be the president 
even if unbeknown to me I have already been elected for some 
time and try to be let in the White House if no-one around 
should happen to have learnt about my being president /La-
koff's presupposition cancelled/. But I may be equally said 
to pretend to be the president if by some foul deed unbe-
known to me I have already been deposed for some time and 
try to be let in if every-one around should happen to have 
learnt of my misfortune (Searle's condition cancelled). It 
can be seen then that no easy transcription of a proper 
semantical representation of some occurances of "pretends" 
is easily forthcoming. There are some serious demands on the 
contexts of its use which lead to a multiplicity of readings 
as to how the relationship between beliefs, iterated beliefs 
and reality should be construed. For instance, a possible 
reading of our original White House case is the following: 
/38/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a/ and x pre-
tends/A = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b/ 3 /Ez/ Bz//x = y/ 
and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b/// 
To arrive at Searle's second sense of "as if", we 
should omit the second occurance of the formula /x = a/ 
from /38/, thus giving our last amendation to /23/. We 
shall not reproduce here all the amended versions as they 
can be calculated on the basis of /38/. We give, however, 
a formula for the paradoxical case of B. van Fraassen to 
show the neat resemblances between the semantical reasons 
of "pretends" and its pragmatical motivations, both of which 
should be as proper contextual extension of its occurrence. 
For the sake of simplicity, assume that the son of the king 
is John while the man in the iron mask is called Jack. Then 
the interpretations of /x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ are 
forthcoming if John = a and Jack = b. Indicate the corre-
sponding predicates by capital M/ask/, S/on/ and C/riminal/. 
Disregarding here the inner structure of definite descrip-
tion as irrelevant to the point we are making, we arrive at 
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the following formula; 
/39/ /Ex////M/x/ and /x = a/ and S/a// and /Ey// —/x=y/ and 
/C/y/// ^ /x pretends///y = b/ and M/b/ 3 C/b// => 
/Ez/ Bz///x = b/ and M/b// 3 — C/b///// 
The complexity of /39/ is due to the surplus difference 
of belief contexts and reality. It is entirely different 
from either of the previous forms, and this is as it should 
be; for, John cannot be taken as a fool or an actor since 
the audience have no idea of his being a son of the king or 
or his being disguised. Yet, John's supposed act is an act of 
pretending because he intends the audience to take a rea-
soned step from what he knows to be an acting in disguise to 
a purported fact about his self-identity with the person be-
hind the mask. It is as if from one's playing a part on the 
stage, there were something to be inferred about his identity 
outside the stage. No wonder then that the effort of the 
king's son fails. This is a step which requires thinking in 
the metalanguage. A premature conclusion might be that from 
something fictional no judgement on how things are in real-
ity can follow. 
A final comment on the formulae conceived in the tradi-
tional framework should still be made. It might be suggested 
that they are based on scope distinctions, so much so, that 
"pretends" appears to be functioning as an operator. If so, 
we must have committed the very fallacy we wanted to avoid: 
the assumption that it is primitive. This idea, however, 
would be based on the fact that our formulae are sound; yet 
they suffer from a serious drawback: the different identity 
claims they seem to raise can in no sense be said to be pre-
tended by the speaker (or the subject of the sentence). What 
then can be the reason for their being embedded in its 
scope? In accordance with what we have said about the general 
character of its illocutionary force, a reason may be put 
forward in the form of an assumption like the abstract per-
formative hypothesis. It would entail there still being a 
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unique sense in which the semantics of "pretends" can con-
tribute to the analysis of the sentences. Ambiguities could 
not arise; for, in how many senses can I perform an act of 
asking or threatening or boasting, etc? Apparently in one, 
otherwise the concept of illocutionary force itself would be 
ambiguous, and we would have to introduce some other hypoth-
esis or an element playing the part of disambiguation. Yet, 
we have seen that already Searle accepted at least two dif-
ferent senses of "pretends" and we argued that the difference 
between them can only be accommodated as a difference in 
meaning. If identities are a semantical fact, then where does 
our knowledge of fiction come from when we are present at a per-
formance on the stage? A pragmatically-biased answer would 
run as saying that it is not the meaning but the use of sen-
tences: how language is used - that yields this information. 
So far so good. But this pragmatical fact cuts deeper into 
the meaning of terms: not in that it assigns referents to 
them but in that it gives criteria for establishing new 
identities between individuals, and this is already a se-
mantical result. To describe what is at work here theoreti-
cians introduced possible world models which generated the 
same problem as is at stake here: how can identities across 
worlds be constructed? And so, the problem was given purely 
semantical twist. Our approach ventures to pass in between: 
identities are a result of strategical moves of the partici-
pants in a language game; in that they are yielded by moves, 
they are semantical facts, but in that the corresponding 
moves are made in a language game the playing of which is 
motivated by some pragmatical fact outside the game, they 
are pragmatically related. On starting to play a game play-
ers have to decide how to interpret individual terms; but 
why they interpret them as they do cannot be justified with-
in the game. A major merit of such an approach is that it 
enables players to pass from one game to another almost in-
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perceptibly by reinterpreting their terms. Such a possibil-
ity may be indicated by a game rule correlated to the use 
of "pretends". Another advantage of the strategical charac-
terization of identities is that it explains away the dif-
ference between what we called epistemological and meta-
physical modalities. The use of identical terms or terms 
which stand for identical variables in two different lan-
guage games can only be metaphysically grounded: residual 
claims of identity always refer to such possibilities: they 
relate two different variables from different worlds under 
some description like "x playing the part of y" that might 
or might not equal alternativeness in a possible world 
theory (see below). Self-identities, on the other hand, are 
a restriction on using the same variable all through a given 
a language game. As such they express epistemological atti-
tudes with respect to a world. The two Searlian senses of 
"pretends" can be thought of as initiating different language 
games. When formulating the meaning of "pretends" it is not 
enough to say that an act was performed but we have to lay 
down what game the players seem to be starting on; the 
proper criteria, however, cannot be given within the terms 
of the game, as an actor cannot say to the audience that he 
is acting. They abide by the rules, the acceptence of which 
is a contingent fact on the part of the players. 
A strange but well-founded conclusion to the discussion 
above c^n be added to the effect that, since "pretends" is 
considered a game-initiator rule and it is up to the players 
to start playing or not, there are no truth-conditions to be 
correlated with the use of "pretends". For I may at any time 
turn my back on the stage or take an utterance as part of a 
similar move at face value, i.e. as a move in the original 
game. It follows rightly from-the fact that no act of pre-
tending can be explicitly performed, rather such acts are so 
described. Hence, this is our solution to the problem of 
assigning a force of pretending to an utterance in a non-
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explanatory manner. 
6 . A Further Evidence of the New Identity Claim 
Indépendant evidence for the need to explain identities 
can be recovered from the classical problem of systematic 
ambiguity of predication. To put it clearly, we may recur to 
an example by Reichenbach: scarfs can be used either as 
turbans or as slings. However, objects individuated as tur-
bans cannot be identical with objects individuated as slings, 
unless the property "scarf" is predicated of both of them. 
But then, we create systematic ambiguity by assigning to a 
predicate "turban" an argument, the value of' which could be 
either objects originally made as turbans or objects origi-
nally made to be scarfs but eventually used as turbans. In 
the latter case, to avoid ambiguity, the function "being 
scarf" can be introduced as an argument of a higher type. 
To apply our device to the case, consider the following 
example: 
/40/ Mary was wearing a turban but she unfurled it for Pe-
ter to wear it round his neck 
/40/ enables us to re-formulate our ideas in terms of pro-
nouns; how should "it" be interpreted? To take it to be 
bound by some antecedent like "a turban" and "a sling" will 
lead to the absurdity that the two occurances of "it" do 
not refer to the same individual. /40/ then expresses a 
nonsense situation by conjoining two entirely different 
clauses. But we can equally take "it" to stand for that 
common aspect (being a scarf) under which turbans and slings 
are associated: it then expresses some residual claim of 
identity between some object which is a turban or a sling 
and one which is a scarf. Putting it in the traditional way 
we can represent the core of /40/ as: 
/41/ /z//Ex//Ew////x = z/ and G/x/ and W/w,x/ and 
UF/w,x// ^ /Ey//Ev///y = z/ and — T/y/ and S/y/ and 
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W/v,y/// 
where the capitals T/urban/, U/n/F/urls/, S/ling/, and 
W/ears/ stand for the corresponding predicates and the vari-
ables z, x, and y range over objects of which "scarf", "tur-
ban" and "sling" can be predicated respectively. 
Examples like /40/ testify that identities of variables 
may in the last resort be epistemologically based and hence 
be part of the same language game. So, we should revise our 
ideas on this. To accomplish this aim we should consider a 
related example. 
7. Fiction VB "Pretende" 
On the basis of our argument about /40/ we may feel 
entitled to substitute "pretends" for "was" in it; 
/42/ Mary pretended to be wearing a turban but she unfurled 
it for Peter to wear it round his neck 
Yet, /42/ is different from /40/ as can be seen from a 
closer scrutiny of the structure of the first clause. It 
duly gives way to the presupposition that results from ne-
gating the complement of "pretends"; but because of the • 
scope ambiguity of negation there are three distinct out-
comes: 
/43/ — /Ex///x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x// 
/44/ /Ex///x is a turban/ and — /Mary is wearing x// 
/45/ /Ex// — /x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x// 
/43/ is clearly unacceptable for it makes pronominalization 
impossible in the next clause; /44/ is unacceptable for the 
same reason; so, there remains /45/. It says that there is 
nothing as a turban: there is no object is which is a turban; 
while /40/ asserted that there was something as a turban only 
it was unfurled. Formulating the core of /42/ alongside with 
/41/ we have: 
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/4 6/ /Ex//Ey//Ew//Ev/// w pretends //x = y/ and T/x/ 
and W/w,x// and UF/w,y// 3 /S/y/ and W/v,y/// 
By /46/ we have returned to our original /x = y/ for-
mula, which indicates that there is an optional move to ini-
tiate a new game. Since it is optional, it may or may not be 
respected in the next moves. If it is, then what follows the 
complement of "pretends" will pertain to fiction and /46/ 
has to be re-written accordingly. If it is not, then /46/ 
applies, i.e. "pretends" is only used as a garden variety of 
one of its presuppositions, this time /45/ to secure pro-
nominalization. This kind of use of "pretends" is quite 
common in forms like "He pretended to be happy" for "He was 
not happy" or rather for "He tried to be happy", "They pre-
tended to have built a nice house" for "They built an ugly 
house", etc. This use of "pretends" is parasitic on negation: 
in our example, it turns on whether or not what Mary was 
wearing can be considered to be a turban; it is a purely 
epistemologically-biased question. Hence, the only thing 
that counts is that the presupposition-filtering be such 
that it allow further play, this time pronominalization. To 
secure it, the use of /42/ should intend some function like 
"x consists of y", "x is a long strip of cloth" or simply 
"x is a scarf". These functions are means of ensuring play 
in the original game: they are based on the epistemology of 
the situation in which the sentence is uttered. They are 
what associate /42/ with /40/; yet, it is important to keep 
in mind that sentences like /42/ are parasitic on negation, 
for, it is this fact which the other use of "pretends" takes 
advantage of. It initiates a new game which in some sense 
conjoins /40/ and /42/: as /42/ is parasitic on negation 
this new use is grounded in the fact that something is not 
is it is perceived or known of. But is does not aim at en-
hancing this default in our epistemology as we indicated 
above, for then it would mean continuing the original game; 
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but it tries, so-to-say, to perpetuate this default by 
simply taking it for granted and hence assembling /42/ to-
gether with /40/ but from the standpoint of a new game; 
note that if it were the original game to be played, it 
would amount to cancelling the awareness of an error and to 
perpetuating a misplaced awareness of its opposite. Players 
who miss this game-initiating use of "pretends" simply fall 
into the state of illusion or deceit. But by enhancing the 
principles of a new game the meaning of /42/ is raised in 
the form of /40/ onto a higher metaphysical level. Normal 
language games are epistemological games: they are played so 
as to further the knowledge of the participants. Games ini-
tiated by "pretends" are metaphysical games: they are played 
so as to give the participants some hindsight about how 
things could have been. This is the reason why "pretends" is 
not performative, why /40/ can equally be taken as a move in 
a game initiated by "pretends": what is sure is that some or 
all proper parts (let alone "presuppositions") are parasitic 
on negation. "Pretends", then, cannot be made part of some 
particular sentence structure for it could be part of any. 
But it cannot have an illocutionary force simpliciter for it 
entails semantical principles of playing a new game, which 
we examined at some length in the previous parts of this 
paper. 
With this we round off our analysis of the use of "pre-
tends". In the remaining pages we put forward a constructive 
proposal for the treatment of this peculiar verb within some 
game-theoretical framework. For lack of space we can only 
hint at the basic outlines of a similar theory that could 
accomodate most of the problems we have come across during 
our analysis. The two major pillars on which the present 
approach to "pretends" rests and which, though they have 
been treated separately, should be integrated in a natural 
way, are what we called the Searlian condition on "pretends" 
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and its presupposition matrix proposed by G. Lakoff. Armed 
with these tools we are ready to set out on a more elabo-
rate proposal. 
8. "Pretends" in Game-Theory 
We have already adumbrated in a concise form the prob-
lem which a game-theoretical analysis of "pretends" should 
resolve. As it has to be a kind of linguistic theory based 
on game-theoretical principles, we have to cast a glance at 
what results have already been achieved in the field. A by 
now rather extensive body of works deals with the possibil-
ity of introducing game-theory into questions of semantics: 
there are game-theoretical semantics elaborated by J. Hin-
tikka and some of his followers. The basic aim of such a 
theoretical approach is to give an algorithm for the evalua-
tion of infinitely long sentences by reducing them to their 
atomic constituents; this it does by correlating semantical 
games with each such sentence with the definition of proper 
rules to govern the moves of the two players, Nature and 
Myself. These verificational games however, may have no rele-
vance to the analysis of "pretends" if the latter has no 
truth-conditions, and hence cannot be given a truth-value. 
Having a truth-value is not a linguistic fact, however, so 
it may not be a major default if the semantics of some sen-
tences need to be played off by some other criterion coming 
from outside its linguistic context. And, correspondingly, 
there is another recent approach to linguistics on the basis 
of game-theory, which provides a similar possibility. It is 
elaborated in the book of L. Carlson on dialogue games. He 
departs from the idea of semantical games in that the aim of ' 
playing dialogues cannot be the evaluation of sentences but 
rather the realization of some specific agreement with 
respect to them. Of course, ordinary dialogues should be 
levelled at putting forth true sentences, for players do 
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want to have a common idea about how things are in reality. 
Biased by the idea of truth Carlson can without much diffi-
culty accommodate the semantical game rules in his dialogue 
game theory. To secure adherence to truth each player's con-
tribution to a game is viewed as an effort to approach 
Nature's position, whose moves can without further ado be 
introduced into the playing of any game. Dialogue games are 
then played in order to know, and hence they are epistemolo-
gical.15 
If we want to define what new game "pretends" may ini-
tiate, the first principle to be substituted is that of 
truth. What can be the aim of the players if agreement with 
truth is taken away? It might be answered: entertainment. 
But it is not a constitutive principle; it is not an aim 
within the game, rather an outside motivation, and as such, 
it could refer to any kind of play in general. Neither would 
passing the time or similar solutions be a better candidate. 
Anyway, on closer inspection it turns out that there is 
nothing that could coherently replace truth as a principle. 
Hence, what we would like to propose is that the aim of play-
ing a game of fiction is agreement of the players simpliciter 
on some particular metaphysical possibility of how things 
could be arranged. It is important to see that this attempt-
ed arrangement can equally violate physical or even logical 
laws that govern ordinary dialogue games. Yet this arrange-
ment is not something to be guessed; it should be based on 
the actual moves the players make in the game. If there is 
an author or performer, his moves are to be accommodated 
within the game just as those of Nature have been in ordi-
nary dialogue games. It is his position, then to which the 
agreement of the participants is duly recalled. Any dialogue 
that takes up a passage from a text by such an author should 
be viewed correspondingly. Take the following example: 
/47/ Who killed Roberta? 
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On the basis of Carlson's argument on representing 
dialogues by means of game-trees, a natural interpretation 
of /47/ can be given below. The neccessary assumptions for 
doing this flow directly from the dialogue game rules Carl-
son formulated. To wit, to put forward /47/ one should pre-
sume an, even implicit, previous move that somebody killed 
Roberta. This (these) previous move(s) should play down the 
fact that a new game different from that of seeking the 
truth is at stake here; for, how else would players know 
what game a move by /47/ is part of? This pre-condition of 
game-playing can be made common by the use of "pretends", 
yet, there are other forms to recall attantion to it, e.g. 
"I have read it somewhere...", "He told us the story of his 
latest novel", etc. But as it is simply a means of giving 
intention that one is playing a game, to say it out loud is 
not a neccessary condition of playing: I may turn to some-
body with the boldest intention of asking /47/ and he may or 
may not understand my aim when aswering; moreover, he may 
even misunderstand my aim, and rack his memory about some 
actual Roberta who has been killed. And he need not be un-
successfull in his effort. Can we say then that we are play-
ing a game? We think not. Yet, our utterances affect moves, 
only moves within two entirely different games. Then common 
understanding can be reached only by explaining explicitly 
what separate game each of us is playing. Asking /4 7/ then 
- just like the utterance of any sentence in general - ne-
cessitates that one's aim in putting forth that particular 
move the given utterance instantiates be divulgated. This 
requirement is no more for instance than the knowledge that 
we are playing bridge and not poker. An utterance can easily 
count as a move in two different games. If so, then players 
should be reminded of what game they are playing or else 
their moves cannot be accommodated within the same game. 
Albeit as we think it justified that the new game that 
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"pretends" might initiate should be defined as a separate 
game on the idea that the players are furthering a differ-
ent aim, we can turn to the game-tree of /47/. We cannot 
give, however, a complete representation of it as it "ould 
involve all possible answers - which may easily be infinite, 





A asks B: 
Who killed 
Roberta? 
Who killed Roberta? 
Clyde killed Roberta? 
A asks B: Who killed Roberta? 
B answers A: Clyde killed Roberta? 
In drawing the figure of /48/ we did not deviate from 
Carlson's method of analysing dialogues, only the middle 
branch is to be interpreted as the silent moves of the 
author, this time T. Dreiser, whose position is the ideal 
which the other players, A and B. would like to share. This 
amendment, however, carries some other explanatory power: 
contrary to Nature, the Author may be directly addressed, 
and hence his moves may not neccessarily remain silent. 
This further means that he may participate not only in a 
1 6 
tultively correct answer to the question. 
/48/ Who killed Roberta? Who killed Roberta? 
j Clyde killed Rober-
ta 
Who killed Roberta? Who killed Roberta? 
A asks B: Who killed Ro- Clyde killed Rober-
berta? ta? 
A asks B: Who kill-
ed Roberta? 
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dialogue gaige about some book of his but he may even be 
questioned about some hitherto unwritten story of his. That 
is, he may put forward any fictional story he likes. On the 
other hand, if a story, whose author is already dead or is 
simply unknown is at stake, his moves are doomed to be si-
lent. This means nothing more than tha t, the Author is at 
once the authority of the corresponding game. 
Another justification of such an interpretation of the 
Author is given alongside our proof about fiction as meta-
physical possibility. For, what else can one's inquiry into 
the way things may have turned out mean than authorizing one-
self to accupy the position of Nature in a corresponding 
game? This is the way fictional interpretations of sentences 
can most differ from the original. If we are contemplating 
by all means in our power some epistemic possibility - which 
we would tend to call probability - we are trying to remain 
within the boundaries of the same game, i.e. we are doing 
our best to confine ourselves to what the moves of Nature 
are. To use our initial example: if one has undergone an 
exam, one ponders whether he is accepted or not, then eo 
ipso one guesses what the position of Nature could be by-
making some proper moves such as "I solved almost all the 
exercises" by (p. argue). "Then I have many points" by (D. 
infer), and "He who has many points is accepted" by (D. ex-
plain).. Whereas, if one starts telling a story about being 
a candidate and doing some test to pass an exam, and he 
states than he is accepted, his audience will not take his 
moves - if taking them correctly - to be guesses about the 
position of Nature, but rather about the position of an 
Author who may or may not be instantiated by the speaker. 
This latter fact explains away the case that virtually any-
body may re-tell the story of some author: it is not a se-
rious restriction, however, for it asserts only that there 
should be some Author or other whose moves, either silent 
- 402 -
or not, are incorporated in the relevant game tree of the 
game. 
At this point we can relegate our discussion to the 
problem of identities; in an epistemological situation self-
identities are to be safeguarded by any player of the cor-
related game. The use of identical terms is warranted by the 
logical game rules. Yet, at any stage of the game the option 
of starting a new g- o may arise; e.g. when contemplating on 
the result of the test, one might wish that he had never vol-
unteered to do it. Epistemology may give way to metaphysical 
thinking at any moment. Then, we may have said he pretended 
that he did not take the exam, in which case the use of 
identical terms or variables were motivated by our residual 
claim of identity. The difference of identities is safe-
guarded by the difference of games; within one single game 
no such claim can be justified. Metaphysical games are para-
sitic on epistemic games in the same way as the use of "pre-
tends" is on negation. Hence playing the former requires the 
awareness of some of the latter kind. Yet, this information 
may not be available to every player, and so misunderstand-
ing is forthcoming; it then entails an identification of. the 
residual identity with self-identity on the basis of the use 
of self-identity being warranted all through a given game. 
Misunderstanding may come from either direction: if one 
takes a residual claim of identity for self-identity, he is 
said to be cheated into this idea, and the first Searlian 
sense of "pretends" is born. If one takes somebody's self-
identity claim to be based on a residual'identity, he is 
said to consider that person as mad, i.e. as one who mis-
conceives his own identity. Neither interpretation is how-
ever, connected with the notion of truch; for, they are 
based on how a player conceives the game he thinks he is . 
playing and the game he supposes his partners are playing. 
Yet, from the latter fact may come other misunderstandings: 
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for not only may one have lost the information of soma pre-
viously played game, but one may attribute a similar loss 
to any of his partners while he is still conscious of the 
difference. So, if one takes somebody to be such that he 
considers a residual claim of identity as based on his 
self-identity, then one is said to take that person as a 
simple disbeliever (as with the mirror case of madness, it 
would need further elaboration as the whether it should be 
assembled with it or not); if one takes somebody's self-
identity claim to be grounded in a residual identity, then ] 
one is said to take the person for said to take the person, 
for mad. It seems to be similar to the second case of mis-
understanding above, but it may turn out to be different 
if we emphasize that this time another viewpoint is being 
made: it is not belief simpliciter, rather attribution of a 
similar belief that counts. Hence, one may equally consider 
somebody to believe or not to believe the claim of miscon-
ceived identity? we have spoken about the first alternative, 
if it is the second, then one may consider the person to 
have been hypnotized in order to play off the given 
identity. 
These are all proper cases which may motiyate the use 
of "pretends". Correct or not, they can equally be represent-
' ed by corresponding game-trees which contain the relevant 
epistemic stated of the players even with respect to each 
other's thoughts. What should be emphasized, however, is 
that the fictional use of "pretends" is distinct from the 
previous in that it requires from every player that he be 
aware of having started a new game. No similar misunder^ 
standing we have delineated is welcome. This does not, in 
our opinion, disqualify the use of "pretends" in the other 
cases; it is based on the idea that the players construe 
about how the relationship of two different games should 
be viewed. And it is the possibility of such a construal, 
rather than the notion of truth, that is required. 
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9. Logical Game Rules and "Pretends" 
Elaborating further the concept of the new game we 
seem to meet with some difficulties regarding the proper 
specification of rules. The underlying idea, which motivated 
the application of logical rules in enveloping the structure 
of the dialogue, has been an adherence to truth, a conserva-
tion principle of consistency. If nature as an ideal player 
is replaced by some less omnipotent source, the whole system 
of logical game rules will be threatened. Consistency cannot 
be warranted by some application of a rule simply because 
any Author may authorize any move. He can even harbour in-
consistency. Hence, if the aim of the players is a common 
sharing of his position in the game, the inconsistency, when 
divulged, cannot be eliminated but should be admitted into . 
their epistemic alternatives. Intuitively, this means that 
everything should be allowed to be metaphisically possible. 
By what rules can such a claim be safeguarded? The proper 
answer is a serious challange to the concept of game; by 
some roundabout reasoning on how people understand fictional 
utterances we may feel entitled to propose that understand-
ing it is not a neccessary conclusion of playing, . which in 
game-theoretical terms would mean that players may happen to . 
miss the rules that the corresponding game neccessitates; 
and playing without an adequate knowledge of the rules is a 
contradiction in terms. Yet, we think that this latter is a 
non-sequitur. Examples of misrepresenting some of the rules 
of the game are abundant: the most fitting ones can be the 
apparent violations of any of the rules by some of the play-
ers, like e.g. offside in soccer, which of course result in 
punishment of the perpetrator. But it would be misplaced to 
say that he was not playing in any sense of the word. If it 
were so, then he would be simply disregarded as such and 
could not interfere with playing. The condition for his re-
maining in the game may be the fact that he can still be said 
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to have been following the rules of the game in every re-
spect except the particular one he violated. In order to be 
disqualified his violations would have had to exceed a cer-
tain limit, the definition of which is almost always very 
arbitrary. One minor point to be noted here is that as for 
the violation of a rule, there is no difference methodolo-
gically whether the person has only misrepresented the rule, 
simply disobeyed it, or been unconscious of it. What counts 
is whether the move has been made or not. In order to be 
said to be empirically playing a game, one need-only be con-
sidered to have been observing a limited number of game 
rules. 
This general observation can be extended to language 
games as well. One may err in playing and yet not be disqual 
ified. Naturally this point is further enhanced when one's 
playing a game of fiction; for while Nature's moves always 
recall the same set of rules, which by some routine of play 
may have been adequately internalized, in a game of fiction 
the position of the Author can be instantiated by almost any 
player, and hence the corresponding moves may recall a dif-
ferent set of rules, so much so that one may be able only to 
guess at them at the outset. What makes the principle of 
playing survive, however, is that, since the means of carry-
ing off moves, i.e. uttering a set of sentences, is essen-
tially the same as in games with Nature; there is always a 
rather well-defined set of rules in the former that can have 
been internalized by playing the latter. 
The internalization of the rules of a game of fiction 
is achieved by trying to cooperate with the supposed Author 
of the game. As he can be addressed, the use of rules can be 
tested by putting to him such questions the answers to which 
will recall one of those rules. This way to obtain some idea 
of the game is, then, inherent in the aim of the players: by 
selecting proper strategies to arrive at a common agreement 
they go through a process of understanding. While sharing 
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the position of Nature meant knowledge of how things truly 
are, sharing the position of the Author here means under-
standing what he meant by putting forward his sentences. 
Games of fiction are not played in order to know the truth 
but rather to comprehend how a player conceives things to 
be. A major difficulty in completing a process like this 
resides in the fact that the moves put forward by the Author 
may often leave doubt about some implicit moves needed for 
the internalization of rules. To formulate correct topical 
questions with respect to them may turn out to be decisive 
for understanding. It would be well worth giving some ex-
amples. Works of the fantastic, paradoxical or absurd genres 
can serve us here. "Dans le labirynthe" by A". Robbe-Grillet 
provides us with a good many cases; consider one of the 
basic problems of the novel, which is also referred to by 
the title: What was the relationship between the boy and 
the soldier? Who led whom? Interpreting the Author's moves 
by putting questions, we arrive at the thought that the 
logical rule (C. cons) is no longer available; on the other 
hand, we have to make a case for the opposite rule (C. in-
cons).: contradictory moves may be admitted if both have 
been adequately explained in the game. To understand what 
is at stake here, consider the corresponding game-tree; we 
have indicated the rules we applied so that each node fol-
lowed from the one above in the tree: 
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/49/ /D. Question/ Who followed whom? 
/D.explain/ Did the soldi . the boy follow 
the boy? the soldier? 
/D.answer/ Yes. No. Yes. No. 
/D.infer/ 
/D.infer/ The boy preceded the soldier. 
The two last moves by /D.infer/ put forward by the 
Author clearly violate /C. cons/. Hence it warrants our con-
clusion. 
While /49/ Keeps the other logical game rules intact, 
we may consider another case, which makes the use of /D. 
argue/ obtrusive; we are referring to the problem whether 
the soldier finds himself in the same room at the end of 
the novel as at the beginning of it. The relevant core of 
the game-tree is the following: 
/50/ /D.question/ Where is the soldier? 
/D.explain/ Is he in the same room as before? 
/D. answer/ /D.reply/ 
/D.argue/ He finds many things 
the sa ' 
He finds some things 
different in it. 
/D.infer/ He does not* recognize it. 
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What is remarkable about /50/ is that the last move by 
/D.infer/ connects two branches, which have contradictory 
nodes higher in the tree (Yes vs No by (D.answer/). This is 
clearly different from /49/ in that it not only violates 
/C.cons/ but also conjoins contradictory moves in an infer-
ence which directly challanges the meaning of the tree. Hence 
either it is the conclusion of the inference which is un-
warranted, or it is the premises which are incorrectly put 
forward. As with /49/ we have seen that there is nothing 
wrong with /D.infer/, it must be the rule that connects the 
premises with the rest of the upper trunk of the tree, which 
has been misplaced here. Hence, we eliminate /D.argue/ by 
simply cutting the tree of /50/ at the relevant nodes into 
two. 
A last example for the internalization of rules comes 
from the play ^'Waiting for Godot" by S. Becket. We reproduce 
this time the relative passage in its entirety. 
/51/ Estragon: In my opinion we were here. 
Vladimir: (looking round) You recognizee the place? 
Estragon: I didn't say that. 
Immediately we give a game-tree for it: 
/52/ /D.ask/ Were we here or not? 
/D.answer/ 
/D.argue/ In my opinion we were here. 
/D.explain/ I recognize the place. 
/D.ask/ You recognize the place? 
/D.infer/ 




When interpreting /52/ we have two solutions: either 
we state that the Author violates /C.cons/ by putting for-
ward Estragon's two sentences, or we note the particular 
role /D.explain/ plays in the tree. But as we lack the moves 
for relegating the right branch to the highest topical ques-
tion, a respective Violation of /C.cons/ seems to be unwar-
ranted. Note here the apparent difference between /52/ and 
/49/: the condition for violating /C.cons/ can be defined 
as a condition that two contradictory answers of a polarity 
question should be put forward as a move by the'Author. As 
"No" to the highest topical question remains only a possi-
bility (in 'the lack of closure of proper branches), we can-
not assert the violation of /C.cons/. On the' other hand, we 
note that the move by /D.explain/ is almost ineffective as 
such, for, it explains nothing: from it either a positive 
or a negative answer to a polarity question can be inferred. 
The first is an implicit move, while the second is explicit. 
Hence our conclusion about the futility of /D.explain/. This 
means in other words that either nothing can be adequately 
explained because the contradictory possibility still sur-
vives, or anything can ben explained because at least one of 
the answers of a polarity question can be provided with an 
explanation. This way we have intuitively formulated a con-
dition on the futility of a rule: a rule /D.explain/ is in-
effective if it leaves open both possibilities of a polarity 
question that follows.from what should have been explained. 
By now, we can re-assume our results about games of fic-
tion in the following three conditions defined by means of 
game-trees; these three conditions are basic in the process 
of making a guess at the valid rules of the game, hence they 
are basic in understanding fiction. They attest simply how 
the use of some rules may be found invalid or not. Hence, 
they contribute to the way players must reason in order to 
make moves governed by rules which are accepted within the 
game. We state them briefly as 
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/C.E/ Whether an epistemic alternative of the Author ia 
consistent or inconsistent depends on whether two 
contradictory answers of a polarity question are put 
forward independently by him 
/C.EL/ A rule should be eliminated from the gaifle if there 
is some move governed by some other rule which can 
be inferred from two premises put forward by the 
given rule as moves that are connected to the two 
contradictory answers of a polarity question higher 
j 
up in the tree 
/C.IN/ A rule is ineffective if there is such a polarity 
question that in the event of one of its contradictory 
answers being connected with some move put:forward by 
the use of the given rule, still permits its other 
answer to be put forward 
Possibly, there are other such testing procedures. Yet we 
think it has sufficed to show that the idea of a game of 
fiction can be rationally based, and that the conclusion 
that game playing with imperfect information about some of 
the corresponding rules is out of place is really a non^ 
sequitur. An inductive test at rules not only can be level-
led at game-positions but should be referred to by the 
players of the game in order to understand the relevant 
structure of the game, viz. to guess at the previous moves, 
and hence to understand fiction as the result of the game. 
A final note on this part should be made before going 
on. By defining the aim and the rules of a game of fiction 
we have almost rounded off our argument about the game-theo-
retical treatment of fiction. No explicit foundation of 
so-called supernatural sentences should be needed; if con^ 
fronted for instance with a fable by La Fontaine, we do not 
meet any serious difficulty in correlating a game with it 
just because it may contain some sentence about animals that 
speak. Accepting a sentence as 
/53/ The ant asked the cricket why he danced so much. 
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will not amount to a violation of some rule simpliciter; 
it will only incorporate a move by the Author about ants and 
crickets to the effect that they can speak, which is game-
-theoretically trivial. It can again be shown by drawing the 
corresponding game-tree for /53/: it is important to see 
that it depends on the correct formulation of the highest 
topical question: 





From /54/ it results that the highest topical question 
of a game of fiction bears special importance: it represents 
the point of playing at which the new game we have now rep-
resented was initiated. If so, then there may have been some 
preceding move by which it was overtly expressed. This is in 
accordance with the possible use of "pretends" we proposed 
before. By some due re-consideration of the condition for 
putting forward the topical question of /54/, we can assume 
the point at which the game of /54/ was initiated to be ins-
tantiated by the following sentence: 
/55/ x pretends that someone can speak 
where x stands for the actual Author of the game. Then, on 
the basis of what we said about the use of "pretends" 'being ' 
parasitic on negation we are confronted by the next two 
possibilities: 
/56/ / E x / — /x can speak/ 
The ant asked the cricket why he danced 
so much. 
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/57/ — /Ex/ ,/x can apeak/ 
The discussion of the two forms /56/ and /57/ will be 
the topic of the chapter below; with this we close our ana-^ 
lysis of "pretends" and the game-theoretical framework pro-
posed as a possible approach. This closing topic is the 
problem of reference, to which we will be giying a dialogue 
game solution. 
10. Reference, Games, and "Pretends" 
A major merit of a game-theoretical approach to fic-
tion, we consider, is that the problem of non.-existent£, and 
hence of reference, will not arise as such. Consider for 
instance the question of there being speaking ants in the 
fable by La Fontaine; it is simply a contradiction in terms, 
for, there is no game whatsoever in which such a question 
could be put forward as a valid move. No concept of play can 
tolerate a sentence such as: 
/58/ There are speaking ants 
/58/ is either misconceived or ambiguous; if it is the lat-
ter, then it is tantamount again either to /59/ or to /60/: 
/59/ Speaking ants exist 
/60/ "There are speaking ants" can be correlated with an 
accepted move in some game of fiction 
/59/ is clearly false; for, there is no move by Nature where-
by the putting forward of /59/ could be taken to be a means 
of furthering common agreement with respect to truth, i.e. 
the position of Nature. /60/, on the other hand, is true as 
/54/ testifies it. Yet why can forms like /58/ arise? If we 
retrace our steps to the two kinds of identity, an answer 
may be forthcoming: /58/ belies the same misconception of 
identity claims as was seen to motivate the use of "pret-
ends". Though we cannot go into the different interpreta-
tions of /58/ according to which a misconception is created 
-- we have already given a similar enumeration, but we at 
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least hint at the source the dilemma of /58/ may come from; 
in order to see it, consider a transcription of /54/ with 
variables to indicate semantical structure. We also add the 
neccessary dialogue premise of /5.4/, i.e. the complement-
-sentence of /55/ as the game-initiator move. A partial dia-
logue semantical tree of /54/ is the following: 
/61/ x can speak 
Now, it should be clear that the underlying dilemma 
of /58/ is the misconception of an identity claim /x = y/ 
in the form of self-identity /x = a/. Whereas the only war-
ranted conclusion might have been something like /y = a/, 
which is, in turn, the proper interpretation of /60/. /61/, 
and hence /54/, is ambiguous: they can induce either an 
ordinary or a new dialogue game interpretation. It is /55/, 
which should be taken to be a neccessary dialogue premise of 
/54/ and /61/ in order to safeguard fictional reading; to 
avoid misconceived forms, such as /58/ a game-initiator move 
such as /55/ should be henceforth remembered. 
By now we are ready to answer the problem of choosing 
between /56/ and /57/; if our previous argument is sound, 
then to understand /54/ we have to assume /55/ as a dialogue 
premise, which is neutral to the difference of /56/ and 
/57/. It is simply irrelevant on what kind of negation the 
use of "pretends" is parasitic in particular; it will only 
become relevant if "pretends" is used merely as a proxy for 
negation (see our distinction above), i.e. if epistemology 
replaces metaphysical thinking. If dialogue games have any 
explanatory power, then it need not come as a surprise that 
Who can speak? 
If y are ants, 
y can speak 
If z are crickets, 
z can speak 
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the meaning of a sentence is not a matter per se, but. rather 
a matter of embedding it into some dialogue context or 
other. If sentences are semantically ambiguous, they must 
induce various contextual analyses. Since reference is part 
and parcel of semantics, it is, in our opinion natural that 
an ambiguity like the real/fictional, boils down to the con-
struction of different dialogue game contexts between which 
no direct inferential relation need be adequately based. The 
use of fiction is justified as long as the information of 
playing a separate game is kept alive. 
11. To Sum up 
In this paper we have attempted to give a detailed 
treatment of the word "pretends" and its semantical charac-
ter. We stated that its ordinary uses give rise to a neat 
distinction of identity claims, and sought -for a possible 
coherent formulation of the ambiguities attested. We hinted 
at the inadequacy of the classical framework and proposed a 
game-theoretical solution. In outlining the corresponding 
theory, we touched upon some related phenomena as logical 
structure, reference and real/fictional ambiguity and ar-
gued that they can be accomodated in dialogue game con«* 
struction in a very natural way. We think finally that a 
game-theoretical analysis of fiction can be considered as 
further evidence of the utility of introducing the concept 
of game into the field of the humanities, besides the al^ 
ready available approaches, Hintikka's semantical and Carl-
son's dialogue game theories. 
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Notes 
1 Cf. for instance Searle (1974), Pavel (1981), Lieb (1981). 
2 
Saarinen (1982a) makes a similar claim with respect to 
reference simpliciter; his approach encouraged our dis-
tinction, though we will argue that it is a distinction . 
in the way how identities are viewed. 
3 Searle (.1974); also in Searle (1979) p. 65. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Lakoff (.1970) ch. V. 
6 Cf. Searle (.1979) p. 7. 
7 
See note 3. 
8 Cf. Karttunen (1974). 
9 Cf. Partee (.1975). 
1 0 It is Partee herself who brings up an argument by Casta-
ñeda; for the latter, see for instance Castañeda (1968). 
1 1 In: Saarinen (.1982c) pp. 1-69. See p. 47. 
1 2 
This example is taken from a short satirical piece by a 
fairly well-known Hungarian author, F. Karinthy: Science, 
What is at stake here, in other words, is that John may 
think that he is identical with, say, de Sade, who, in 
turn, is mad, without forcing us into a circle of reasons 
ing on John's madness. 
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14 The following remark may be in order here: as our ana-
lysis is biased by the concept of identity, this argument 
cannot be connected directly with an approach based on 
coreference like e.g. that in' Hintikka-Carlson (1977). 
Coreference can be realized by either kind of identity: 
in game-theoretical semantics it is expressed by the fact 
that the same set of rules is used in each case. What is 
at stake here is a distinction in the rules that support 
the différent identity claims (see especially when our 
game-theoretical framework is put forward). Our restric-
tions then may be looked upon as a restriction on the 
uses of variables rather then on the individuals they 
refer or corefer to. Laziness is a matter of indépendant 
substitution of the same term into different variables 
- hence giving way to some, say, residual claim of iden-
tity /x = y/ because there may be terms for which a si-
milar process is not valid, whereas in Hintikka-Carlson 
(1977) the question of a pronoun's being lazy or not dep-
ends on its corefering with one term or other, hence in 
each case a claim of self-identity with respect to the 
coreferred individual applies. 
15 
In what follows we constructively apply Carlson's dialogue 
game treatment to the problems of "pretends" and of fic-
tion. For lack of space we cannot reproduce his arguments 
in detail, neither can we repeat his definitions of game 
rules. Yet, we do not think that a complete acquaintance 
with his work should be neccessary in order to understand 
the basic claims of our paper. 
1 6 Cf. Carlson (.1983) p. 11. 
1 7 We use the Faber paperback edition of Becket's play; Sa-
muel Becket: Waiting for Godot, Faber and Faber, 1956, 
London, p. 15. 
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